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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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CONTENTS

ARTICLES

	PAGE
ADDAMS, JANE. Class Conflict in America - - - - -	766
ASAKAWA, K. The Significance of the Orient - - - - -	749
BASSETT, JOHN SPENCER. Race Friction - - - - -	825
BELIN, H. E. A Southern View of Slavery - - - - -	513
BLACKMAR, F. W. Sectionalism - - - - -	811
CARVER, T. N. Competition - - - - -	656
The Basis of Social Conflict - - - - -	628, 646 ✓
The Relation of the Social Sciences - - - - -	393
CARY, C. P. Contradictions of Ideas and Beliefs - - - - -	805
CLARK, JOHN B. The Relations of the Social Sciences - - - - -	394
COE, GEORGE A. Contradictions of Ideas and Beliefs - - - - -	800
COOLEY, C. H. Competition - - - - -	655
DAVENPORT, GERTRUDE C. Hereditary Crime - - - - -	402
DEVINE, EDWARD T. The Basis of Social Conflict - - - - -	645 ✓
DUBOIS, W. E. B. Race Friction - - - - -	834
EARP, EDWIN L. Race Friction - - - - -	833
ELKIN, W. B. The Problem of Civilization in the Twentieth Century - - - - -	541
ELLWOOD, CHARLES A. Sociology, Its Problems and Its Relations - - - - -	300
FLISCH, JULIA A. Sectionalism in America - - - - -	819
GARNER, J. W. Race Friction - - - - -	828
GIDDINGS, FRANKLIN H. Are Contradictions of Ideas and Beliefs Likely to Play an Important Group-Making Rôle in the Future - - - - -	784, 808
The Basis of Social Conflict - - - - -	644 ✓
GILMAN, MRS. C. P. Class Conflict in America - - - - -	781 ✓
Contradictions of Ideas and Beliefs - - - - -	804
The Basis of Social Conflict - - - - -	644 ✓
GILMORE, F. A. Contradictions of Ideas and Beliefs - - - - -	805
HALSEY, JOHN J. Race Friction - - - - -	833
HAYES, EDWARD C. The Basis of Social Conflict - - - - -	643 ✓
HENDERSON, CHARLES RICHMOND. Industrial Insurance. IV - - - - -	34
V - - - - -	183
VI - - - - -	349
VII - - - - -	489
VIII - - - - -	584
IX - - - - -	841
HOXIE, ROBERT F. Class Conflict in America - - - - -	776 ✓
JENKS, ALBERT ERNEST. The Significance of the Orient - - - - -	752
JONES, JENKIN LLOYD. Contradictions of Ideas and Beliefs - - - - -	799
JOHNSON, ALVIN S. Class Conflict in America - - - - -	773 ✓

KEASBEY, LINDLEY M., Competition	- - - - -	649
KINLEY, DAVID. The Relations of the Social Sciences	- - - - -	395
LLOYD, ALFRED H. The Institution and Some of Its Original Sins	- - - - -	523
LOOS, ISAAC A. Sectionalism in America	- - - - -	815
MOORE, FREDERICK W. Sectionalism in America	- - - - -	812
MORROW, PRINCE A. Prophylaxis of Social Diseases	- - - - -	20
MUSSEY, HENRY RAYMOND. Class Conflict in America	- - - - -	774 ✓
RANKIN, HENRY WILLIAM. Political Values of the American Missionary	- - - - -	145
REINSCH, PAUL S. The Significance of the Orient	- - - - -	742
RHOADES, MABEL CARTER. A Case Study of Delinquent Boys in the Juvenile Court of Chicago	- - - - -	56
ROSS, E. A. Competition	- - - - -	657
Rational Imitation	- - - - -	721
The Nature and Scope of Social Psychology	- - - - -	597
The Basis of Social Conflict	- - - - -	641 ✓
The Relations of the Social Sciences	- - - - -	396
ROSS, JOSEPH B. The Temper of the American	- - - - -	380
ROWE, L. S. Municipal Progress in Brazil	- - - - -	508
SCHELTEMA, J. F. The Opium Trade in the East Indies. I	- - - - -	79
II	- - - - -	224
SMALL, ALBION W. Are the Social Sciences Answerable to Common Principles of Method? I	- - - - -	1
II	- - - - -	209
III	- - - - -	392, 399
Ratzenhofer's Sociology	- - - - -	433
SMITH, J. ALLEN. Sectionalism in America	- - - - -	817
SMITH, J. BURRITT. Competition	- - - - -	659
SPENCER, MRS. ANNA GARLIN. Contradictions of Ideas and Beliefs	- - - - -	807
STONE, ALFRED HOLT. Is Race Friction between Blacks and Whites in the United States Growing Inevitable?	- - - - -	676, 838
TANNER, AMY E. Glimpses at the Mind of a Waitress	- - - - -	48
TAYLOR, GRAHAM. Class Conflict in America	- - - - -	769 ✓
Competition	- - - - -	658
TURNER, FREDERICK J. Is Sectionalism in America Dying Away?	- - - - -	661
THOMAS, W. I. The Significance of the Orient for the Occident	- - - - -	729, 754
TODD, EDWIN S. Race Friction	- - - - -	832
TURNER, FREDERICK J. Is Sectionalism in America Dying Away?	- - - - -	661
UNGER, MRS. J. O. Gumplowicz' Theory of Race Struggle	- - - - -	746
VICKERS, E. H. The Basis of Social Conflict	- - - - -	645
WARD, LESTER F. Contradictions of Ideas and Beliefs	- - - - -	806
Social and Biological Struggles	- - - - -	289
Social Classes in the Light of Modern Sociological Theory	- - - - -	617
The Basis of Social Conflict	- - - - -	646
The Relations of the Social Sciences	- - - - -	397
The Sociology of Political Parties	- - - - -	439
WEBSTER, HUTTON. The Relations of the Social Sciences	- - - - -	398
WEATHERLY, U. G. Competition	- - - - -	657

WEATHERLY, U. G. Race Friction - - - - -	823
WILCOX, W. F. Race Friction - - - - -	820
WOLFE, A. B. The Basis of Social Conflict - - - - -	638
WOODRUFF, CLINTON ROGERS. Some Permanent Results of the Philadelphia Upheaval of 1905-6 - - - - -	252
A Review of Municipal Events - - - - -	455

REVIEWS

ADDAMS, JANE. The Newer Ideals of Peace.— <i>George Herbert Mead</i> - -	121
BALDWIN, JAMES MARK. Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental De- velopment. Fourth Edition.— <i>Charles A. Ellwood</i> - - - -	281
BENTLEY, ARTHUR F. The Process of Government; A Study of Social Pressures.— <i>A. W. Small</i> - - - - -	698
BOSC, HENRI. Les droits législatifs du président des États-Unis d'Amérique.— <i>Charles Edward Merriam</i> - - - - -	120
BRUCE, PHILIP ALEXANDER. The Rise of the New South.— <i>David Y. Thomas</i>	410
CADBURY, EDWARD. Women's Work and Wages.— <i>S. P. Breckinridge</i> - -	411
COMMONS, JOHN R. Races and Immigrants in America.— <i>C. A. Ellwood</i>	561
DORSEY, J. FOREST. The Development of Western Civilization.— <i>V. E. Helleberg</i> - - - - -	570
DOWD, JEROME. The Negro Races: A Sociological Study.— <i>Charles A. Ellwood</i>	855
EARP, EDWIN L. Social Aspects of Religious Institutions.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i>	858
HERR, PAUL. Das moderne amerikanische Besserungssystem.— <i>C. R. Hender- son</i> - - - - -	276
HOBHOUSE, L. T. Morals in Evolution.— <i>C. C. North</i> - - - - -	564
HONEY, WILLIAM H. The Mountain People of Kentucky.— <i>Samuel Mac Clintock</i> - - - - -	275
HOWARD, GEORGE E. General Sociology. An Analytical Reference Syllabus; Comparative Federal Institutions; An Analytical Reference Syllabus.— <i>V. E. Helleberg</i> - - - - -	569
KERN, W. J. Among Country Schools.— <i>T. J. Riley</i> - - - - -	285
KNOFF, S. A.—Tuberculosis as a Disease of the Masses.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i>	276
LAFARGUE, PAUL. The Right to Be Lazy, and Other Studies.— <i>A. W. Small</i>	272
LA MONTE, ROBERT RIVES. Socialism, Positive and Negative.— <i>A. W. Small</i>	272
LAMPRECHT, KARL. What Is History?— <i>Caroline M. Hill</i> - - - -	278
MONEY, L. G. C. Riches and Poverty.— <i>T. J. Riley</i> - - - - -	284
MORE, LOUISE BOLAND. Wage-Earners' Budgets.— <i>H. P. J. Selinger</i> - -	706
MÜNSTERBERG, E. Amerikanisches Armenwesen.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> - -	128
PRATT, JAMES BISSETT. The Psychology of Religious Belief.— <i>C. A. Ellwood</i>	562
REINSCH, PAUL E. S. American Legislatures and Legislative Methods.— <i>Charles Edward Merriam</i> - - - - -	118
RENTOUL, ROBERT REID. Race Culture; or Race Suicide?— <i>C. R. Henderson</i>	120
ROSS, EDWARD A. Sin and Society.— <i>A. W. Small</i> - - - - -	566
SNEDDEN, DAVID S. Administration and Educational Work of American Juvenile Reform Schools.— <i>T. J. Riley</i> - - - - -	568
SPARGO, JOHN. Capitalist and Laborer and Modern Socialism.— <i>A. W. Small</i>	272

SUMNER, WILLIAM G. Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Mores, and Morals.— <i>G. E. Vincent</i> - - - -	414
SWEVEN, GODFREY. Limanova; The Islands of Progress; Riallaro; The Archipelago of Exiles.— <i>Charles A. Ellwood</i> - - - - -	282
TENNEY, ALVAN A. Social Democracy and Population.— <i>E. A. Ross</i> - -	571
THOMAS, W. I. Sex and Society.— <i>Alfred C. Haddon</i> - - - - -	113
Welfare of Children. Brooklyn Public Library Reading List.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> - - - - -	708
WOLFE, A. B. The Lodging House Problem in Boston.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i>	275
WOODS, ROBERT A. Americans in Process.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> - - -	276

 RECENT LITERATURE

July, 1907 - - - - -	130
September, 1907 - - - - -	286
November, 1907 - - - - -	420
March, 1908 - - - - -	709
May, 1908 - - - - -	859

 NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

July, 1907 - - - - -	134
September, 1907 - - - - -	288
November, 1907 - - - - -	427
January, 1908 - - - - -	573
March, 1908 - - - - -	718
May, 1908 - - - - -	863

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NUMBER I

ARE THE SOCIAL SCIENCES ANSWERABLE TO COMMON PRINCIPLES OF METHOD?¹

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Dr. Hoxie's "Rejoinder" raises, directly or indirectly, questions which cover the whole field of sociological methodology. They are not to be disposed of in a single reply. Some of them indeed are incapable of decisive answer in the form of premise and conclusion. They depend upon mental attitudes analogous with the states of mind which on the one hand affirm and on the other deny that an impressionist picture truly reflects reality. I neither claim nor admit that there is any further parallel between the impressionist picture and the things in question between Dr. Hoxie and myself. The single point of the analogy is that, for better or for worse, the change which would have to occur in either of us, if one of us should adopt the view of the other, would be less like the change that an advocate produces when he succeeds in making the court reverse a previous ruling, than like the change which occurs in the mind of the artist through shifting of attention from one aspect to another of the objective world. One may decide that the aspect which a landscape presents when it is looked at through the interests of an engineer

¹A paper read at a joint meeting of the Economic and Sociology Clubs of the University of Chicago. It is a reply to Dr. Hoxie's "Rejoinder," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, pp. 739 ff. For the paper which called out the "Rejoinder" *vide ibid.*, pp. 11 ff.

is more real than the aspect mirrored in the interests of a poet. To be convinced on either side, however, one must be controlled by a rather peremptory habit of looking at things in a certain way. In order for the poet to accept the engineer's picture, or the engineer the poet's, it will not be enough merely to assemble more of the things that either values. In addition to that, or apart from that, there must be more valuation of each other's things. I am likening neither Dr. Hoxie nor myself to engineer nor poet, except in the one particular that the questions between us concern primarily a process of selective attention and constructive valuation which formal reasoning cannot directly control. Each of us brings to scrutiny of the world a subjective habit which heightens certain values and depresses others. It is only as each of us may succeed in bringing the other's view into focus, and in holding it for a considerable period in unprejudiced comparison with his own, that we may set up the conditions in which it is possible for direct inspection to change our valuations. It may be too much to suppose that two such convinced advocates of contrasted views as Dr. Hoxie and myself are capable of sufficiently dispassionate consideration of a divergent view to modify our previous opinions. Be that as it may, though we fail to convince each other, the presentation of the alternatives may possibly afford to persons whose prepossessions are less invincible means of forming juster valuations than either of us has reached.

As a preliminary to restatement of the view which I represent, attention should be called to certain discriminations which are matters of course among sociologists, but which may easily escape the notice of others. These distinctions were assumed in the paper to which Dr. Hoxie replies,² and they were more explicitly formulated in a later paper, but they seem to have made little impression, and I hope presentation of them still more directly will promote mutual understanding.

In the first place, it must be admitted that the word "sociology" is used in several senses. Both scholars and laymen are responsible for this confusion. The scholars recognize it and are

² *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, pp. 11 ff.

trying to correct it. So far as it is necessary to analyze the ambiguity for our present purpose, the alternative uses of the term may be reduced to two general types. On the one hand "sociology" is the name for a division of scientific problems unquestionably in the same order with the problems which present academic custom assigns without dispute to history and political economy and political science, etc. To cite a single class of illustrations, the problems to which we give the name "group psychology," including such widely contrasted species of problems as those of racial groups on the one hand, and those of fortuitous crowds on the other, obviously constitute a division of science which the older social sciences neglected. There can be no boundary-line disputes between sociology and the other social sciences, so far as such problems as these are concerned. Considering these alone, sociology could never have raised claims that would have provoked Dr. Hoxie's challenge. Professor Ross has put this side of the case in his usual picturesque fashion in this paragraph:

The empire of the czar is bounded on its western frontier by the clearly defined and well-explored territories of highly organized governments like Austria and Germany. On its eastern side, until recently at least, it melted vaguely into the little-known lands disputed among the Khanates of Central Asia. Economics likewise is bounded for the most part by regions that have been well defined and thoroughly explored by highly organized sciences. But on one side it is embarrassed by an uncertain and disputed frontier with a little known territory, subject to the conflicting and unreasonable claims of rival chieftains. Sociology is its Central Asia.³

Whether Professor Ross's figure is the most fortunate or not, it puts the one side of the case with sufficient vividness. There are practically no questions of principle between sociology so understood and the other social sciences. It is in this sense that sociology takes its place in academic organizations as one of the co-ordinate departments of the social sciences. As was expressly stated in the paper which Dr. Hoxie has criticized, the independence and autonomy of academic departments are in no sense under discussion. The boundaries of these departments are drawn by

³ *The Foundations of Sociology*, p. 40.

considerations of practical convenience, and no good purpose would be served by calling them in question.

The second generic sense in which the term sociology is used gives it a content of a quite different order. Dr. Hoxie is entirely right when he declares, in a passage to which I shall return, that the sociology for which I am contending must be in a wholly different plane from the autonomous social sciences in whose name he protests. It is this second sense which gives this paper its title. It is a pure accident that sociology in this second sense is at present chiefly pursued by persons whose academic post falls within the academic department entitled "sociology." The essential interest of one academic department in a valid methodology is no more intimate than that of another. Every species of social scientist or of social philosopher has indeed taken a turn in times past at some phase of the same general methodological problem which at present apparently appeals more strongly to sociologists than to other types of social scientists. In the nature of the case, however, the present balance of interest is temporary. Whoever bears the brunt of the task of changing a more into a less crude methodology, the results must eventually be the common property of all the social sciences. Indeed, unless I am much mistaken, the main lines of methodology for which the sociologists are contending are really drawn with approximately equal precision by others who somewhat strenuously object either to the term sociology, or to many of the proposed sociological categories, or to emphases or methods, or to all combined. Not merely men of a younger generation like Sombart, but men of an older generation like Schmoller and Wagner, are jibing over into essentially the methodological course toward which the whole sociological movement tends. It was with this methodology in view that I said:

Sociology is no longer to our minds merely, or even principally, the particular phase of theory or practice which chiefly engages our individual attention. It is the correlated system of positive inquiry into human relations in which every variation of approach to real knowledge of social experience will ultimately find its place. . . . In the former aspect sociology is a much-to-be-desired organon of all the discoveries, and all the indications about social relations which are presumably within the reach of all the actual and

hereafter to be differentiated sciences that relate to society. It is the "far-off divine event" at the terminus of the human pursuit of self-knowledge.⁴

In the paper to which Dr. Hoxie replies I attempted to make it clear that I was talking about sociology in the methodological not the academic sense. That the use of the same word for two distinct orders of ideas is unfortunate, I confess. The mistake is due, however, to the chaotic condition of the social sciences in general, not in a peculiar sense to the sociologists in particular. The whole matter at issue is not an inter-departmental contest over rights, privileges, and dignities. It is a question between an uncentered and a concentered conception of knowledge in general. It is a question which it is an antecedent fallacy even to discuss from the standpoint of departmental subdivisions. It should be approached as a problem of social knowledge in the large, for which our academic subdivisions are trivialities. All the answers which we can get to the underlying methodological question are necessarily base lines for one subdivision of social science as much as for another. To vary the figure, the issue is not a tribal feud but a contrast of civilizations.

Before presenting another version of my own case in reply to Dr. Hoxie, I propose to offer a series of comments on the more important of his objections to my views of the methodology of the social sciences.

My first reaction then, upon Dr. Hoxie's paper was surprise that men whose work is in such closely related fields, and who are interested in such similar things, can have such difficulty in understanding each other. The debate reminds me of two ships in distress, each trying to make its condition known to the other, each supposing that it is using the code strictly according to rule, but each conveying to the other a completely confused impression. I am disposed to assume my full share of responsibility for the state of things in the present instance, without attempting to decide the proportion which my share bears to Dr. Hoxie's. Between us we have mixed our signals badly. The worst of it is that the botch is merely a sample of what occurs

⁴ *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, pp. 635, 636.

whenever different kinds of social scientists try to come to terms with one another. The degree of common understanding which they can reach is narrowly limited. That these things ought not so to be was one of the commonplaces which I attempted to emphasize in the paper to which Dr. Hoxie takes such strenuous exception.

My second reaction was astonishment that Dr. Hoxie could interpret into the paper which he criticizes so much of the very thing which it was a deliberate effort to discredit. Attempting to reduce my defenses by bombardment with the *tu quoque* type of projectile (p. 744), Dr. Hoxie assumes that the fundamental weakness of my position is a conception that *certain materials* are the subject-matter of corresponding sciences. More than the first half of his rejoinder is dedicated to quotations from the offending paper, and to argument that this fault is at the bottom of it. Although, as he gently expresses it (*loc. cit.*, p. 744), I "rail against" this notion in the document which he cites, yet Dr. Hoxie concludes that my whole reasoning rests upon the very error which I thought I was doing my best to expose.

I have simply to say on this point that if Dr. Hoxie is right I am frankly grateful to him for saving me from myself. There has been no methodological error which I have more industriously and monotonously belabored for nearly twenty-five years than the idea that the material of knowledge can be distributed among the sciences like the different parts of steers or hogs in a packing-house. If my contempt for that idea had been charged to me as an obsession, I should have demurred to the form of the indictment but not to the substance. The paper which roused Dr. Hoxie was intended to be a variation of the theme that it is partial and provisional "science" at best which sets up partitions between parts of knowledge. On page 13 of that paper I tried to put the idea so distinctly that I could not possibly be misunderstood, and it still seems to me that I was reasonably explicit. Again, the next paper which I published contained the most unequivocal statement on the subject that I knew how to make.⁵ Yet, because I tried to point out that political economists, along

⁵ *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, pp. 637-40.

with other particularists, have allowed this isolated-sphere-of-influence conception of their field unduly to influence their working conceptions of the scope and method of their division of labor, Dr. Hoxie interprets me as taking refuge in that perverted conception myself. This is accusing the policeman of larceny when he is in the very act of arresting the thief.

But while I protest against imputation of ideas which I am studiously doing all in my power to discredit, I sorrowfully acknowledge that I may have been supernaturally clumsy in expressing my thought, and that I may have left myself in appearance liable to the correction which Dr. Hoxie administers. If so I accept it with all the meekness I can command. In testimony whereof I hereby profess myself in complete accord with everything which he seems to have had in mind in this connection in the first eight clauses of his summary (p. 754).

My third reaction upon the rejoinder was wonder at the hypersensitiveness which could find in my argument so much else which I had taken extra precaution to disclaim. Dr. Hoxie feels bound to rebuke the supposed arrogance of the sociologists in desiring some sort of lordship over the social sciences. He gratuitously credits me with aiming to promote "a single all-inclusive social science" (p. 747). The evidence which he cites in support of this count is my elaboration of the proposition that "there is one great overtowering *task*" (not science) "of the human mind." I did not say that this task might, could, would, or should be covered by a single science. On the contrary, Dr. Hoxie continues the quotation while apparently overlooking its meaning, viz., to the effect that the task involves endless processes of analysis and synthesis. The main argument of the paper was that in the nature of the case we can make progress in performing the task only by intelligent co-operation. Innumerable divisions of labor in the field of social science must organize themselves into reciprocal helpfulness by means of their selfconsciousness of responsibility for parts of a common enterprise. As already pointed out, I even took the liberty of using the terms "sociology" and "sociologist" in a sense which included each and every historian, economist, political scientist, or other specialist who

does his work subject to this awareness that it is necessarily a detail in the whole task of interpreting human experience. I expressly disavowed use of the terms in the sense which would restrict discussion to the claims of conventional academic departments. The terms excluded simply those fragmentalists of whatever name, and applying to oneself the title "sociologist" by no means creates a particularly strong presumption that the person so designated will not be conspicuous in the excluded number, who are not effectively aware of what adequate correlation of social science involves. The proposition was that alleged social science of whatever name is merely provisional and tentative in the degree in which it remains unarticulated with all other analyses and syntheses which correspond with actual social relations. I said, "I distinctly do not intend to compare the sociologist to the architect, and other types of social scientists to the job-workers on the building in any sense that would imply that the sociologist has any function in the way of managing the work of other scientists" (p. 12).

Dr. Hoxie accuses me of wanting all the social sciences to "recognize the suzerainty and all-inclusiveness of sociology" (p. 739). What I actually argued was and is that each alleged social science must choose between falling into its inevitable place in the whole process of interpreting reality, and the only logical alternative of falling out into the limbo of pseudo-sciences. That is, each science must accommodate itself to the inclusive methodology of all science, or it becomes no science.

My metaphor, "sociology is the *attorney*, etc.," was evidently misleading. Dr. Hoxie seems to have understood it in a sense which I did not intend, and it appears to him to occupy an important place in the argument. After quoting it he apparently carries it in mind through a considerable portion of his discussion, for he quotes it a second time. The meaning which I attached to the phrase, however, no more implied a claim of managerial or supervisory right for sociology over other sciences, than the office of general attorney for the United States Steel Co., would imply a claim that the legal department of the organization could subordinate and supersede the multitude of

technical divisions which the operations of the company include. The attorney for the company represents its legal interests as a whole. My figure was perhaps ill-advised but my thought was and is merely that the sociologists are the only persons just at present who are alert for the corporate interests of social science, as contrasted with the specialized and abstracted interests of the subdivisions of social science. The essential methodological theorem amounts to a claim that there is frightful waste in attempting to interpret reality by means of inarticulate sciences only.

Another of Dr. Hoxie's phrases reiterates the same misunderstanding of my argument. His language is a variation of the principal effort to which the rejoinder is dedicated, viz., to magnify the principle of the "independence and authority of existing social sciences" (p. 739), as against the principle of scientific correlation. My suspicion is that the difference between Dr. Hoxie and myself at this point will turn out to be very largely verbal. There is apparently also a minor difference of emphasis, and then at last a possible irreconcilable remainder of difference as to plain reality.

The phrase to which I refer is casual in Dr. Hoxie's reply, but it is an important index to open questions of sociological method. In asserting incidentally (p. 449) that "there seems to be no scientific ground for any hierarchical arrangement of social sciences," Dr. Hoxie implies that I am contending for a "hierarchical" arrangement. Whether the term "hierarchical" fits anything that I claim, depends entirely upon the meaning which is put into the word. In one sense science must always be hierarchical. In another sense science can never be hierarchical. Everything depends therefore upon controlling the ambiguities of the term.

For illustration: By analogy in the former sense, every trade concerned in building a house is a member of a hierarchy. From the foundation up, the work has to be carried on in turn by specialized trades. The skill of none of these comes to its full result except as it is organized into the work of the others. In that sense the building trades are a hierarchy, and in the same sense

the sciences, both physical and social, must always constitute a hierarchy in the precise degree in which they construct a body of knowledge which coherently reflects reality.

On the other hand, no bricklayers' union can maintain a right to boss a carpenters' union, nor *vice versa*. Continuing the analogy, the trades are no more independent of one another, so far as government is concerned, than are the sciences. In the former case technical necessity sets the bounds of the liberty which the several occupations may enjoy. In the latter case objective reality decrees at last the extent to which one science may detach itself from all science. In this sense, and within these limits, trades and sciences are independent, not hierarchical.

More abstractly expressed, genuine science is necessarily a hierarchy, not in the administrative but in the functional sense. The methodology for which I am contending does not attempt to establish one science as a papacy over the rest of sciences. I meant to say, and I repeat, that the sociologists are just now more zealous than anybody else in calling attention to the utter futility of hoping to get the last attainable interpretation of social facts so long as we view them in detachment from the whole plexus of social relations.

I am not trying to take a change of venue in order to improve my standing in court. I am arguing in substance exactly what I urged in the paper with which Dr. Hoxie disagrees. In order to free my brief from a part of its ambiguity, however, I am putting the case in terms of "methodology" in place of "sociology." In short, then, valid science is dependent upon a valid methodology which correlates science. In one phase, methodology is to technique what architecture is to artisanship. Through valid methodology the last criterion is found which the mind can apply in distinguishing between true and false science, in appraising the comparative values of sciences, and in organizing the sciences into a basis for the conduct of life.

With this proposition in mind, I may again express entire agreement with Dr. Hoxie when he says (p. 450):

There seems to be no case where one social science can be said to be elevated above others, as being a classification of their classifications, or as

bringing together for examination the results of their individual examinations. Where such a relationship appears to exist, careful examination will show, I think, that the sciences are not hierarchically arranged, but lie, so to speak, in different planes.

It will, I hope, tend to clear the atmosphere to repeat what I expressed above in a different way, viz.: that sociology as an investigation of particular problems of social relations, has no more right than any other social science to pose as a classifier of the social sciences. On the other hand, the methodology which some of the sociologists are trying to represent, because it has received such stepmotherly treatment by other social scientists, "lies in a different plane" from the social sciences of a more concrete order, and by virtue of its generality is entitled to pass judgment upon the adjustment of the special sciences to one another.

What sociology may be a hundred or a thousand years from now does not distress me in the least. There are problems now waiting for solution in the methodology of the social sciences, and men who call themselves sociologists are accepting them as their division of labor. It is quite conceivable—indeed it is my fondest ambition as a scholar to promote progress toward this very event—that everything for which I am now pleading as an imperative need in social methodology may some time be absorbed into the common tradition and practice of all the sciences that deal with human relations. That consummation will arrive, however, only through radical transformation of the spirit of separatism in those sciences. This change will have given to them breadth which is not now one of their dimensions, and it will have organized them into a coherence which they now conspicuously lack.

What I still wish to add upon the question of independence vs. correlation of the social sciences may be combined with comments upon a fourth reaction produced by Dr. Hoxie's paper, viz., an impulse to accuse it of the fault which the Germans have taught us to describe as "defective objectivity." The question which it is pertinent to discuss is, *What is the thing to do, in order to carry research into the meaning of human experience to the limit?* The question which Dr. Hoxie raises is, in effect,

How may we guard the dignity of the particular programme of research in which we are primarily interested, and how may we restrain the excessive pretensions of alternative programmes? The mental attitude connoted by the latter question is not sufficiently cleared of self-interest to be severely scientific. It retains so much of the vocational bias, so much jealousy for the status of our own occupation, so much subconscious solicitude for the permanence of our own craft, that in proposing a question in this form we virtually confess judgment on the charge of disqualifying prepossession.

It is as though, on the eve of modern inventions, the producers of the various devices employed by the eighteenth century type of industries had held up the inventors while they discussed the question, What are the respective preserves of the wooden plough, and the spinning-wheel, and the stage coach? There is and was no prescriptive right of any technical device to any permanent preserve. The implicit problem always has been, and always must be, What are the conscious needs of mankind, and what technical resources are within our control for serving the needs? If wooden plough and spinning-wheel and stage coach are losing competitors in the struggle to satisfy human demands, they have no rights which rational men are bound to respect. They must disappear, and more adequate devices must take their place.

From the methodologist's point of view, the guiding questions in formulating the problems of knowledge about human experience are, first, What do we need to discover about human experience? second, By what processes shall we be able to approach nearest to the desired discoveries? It is neither inconceivable nor improbable, indeed I consider it altogether likely, that the social sciences which we know today are, one and all, compared with the social sciences of tomorrow, as wooden plough and spinning-wheel and stage coach to steam plough and power loom and locomotive. We are not competent judges of methodological values until we have so abstracted ourselves from our vocational interests that we can analyze alternative schemes of scientific procedure with as much freedom from heat or irrita-

tion or partisanship as we expect of an engineer when he is calculating the relative economy of types of construction.

The only perfectly fair way of putting the main problem of sociological methodology is this: If we could have our own way, if we could apply the best methods, with the best division of labor that we can imagine, to present problems of knowledge about human experience, would we be satisfied with the present neglect of "team work" in the social sciences, or would we move for improvements upon current methods? The moment we make the answer depend upon the conditions of the problems to be solved, rather than upon the supposed rights, dignities, and privileges of the incoherent conventions which we now call sciences charged with the duty of solving them, that moment we become aware that it is an obstruction of knowledge to permit predilection for any structural arrangement of the sciences whatsoever to prejudice our conclusions.

Dr. Hoxie's way of putting the question, viz., *not*, What are the problems to be solved in social science? but, What are the rights of the various social sciences? is a handicap that no scholar can afford to accept. It is, however, a typical incident of our stage of scientific experience. We are pausing "with timid feet" at the point of indecision where scientific youth and childhood meet. It is quite characteristic to plead for local sovereignty in science against federation. Whether in abstract science, however, or in concrete policy, it is always a false move to set up such an arbitrary antithesis. Both principles are always necessary, like force and resistance in mechanics. The real question always is: Upon which of these principles is it timely to increase or diminish the traditional emphasis?

Taking him literally, and without qualification, the "independence of the sciences" for which Dr. Hoxie contends, and the supposed right to establish that independence upon the alleged autocracy of interests, is merely a little more sophisticated form of the same under-interpretation of reality which produced alchemy and astrology.

Alchemy was in part an expression of one of the original get-rich-quick interests. The interest in getting gold as cheaply as

possible cannot dignify alchemy with the rank of a science, nor can any other interest whatsoever give any procedure the rank of a science except in the sort and degree in which the interest concerned is in active partnership with the whole system of rational interests. It is this capability of correlation with the mental products of all other interests, not the bare fact that it is the projection of any interest whatsoever, which makes the difference between vagary and science.

Astrology was a product of an interest not yet wholly eliminated, even from the most rational men. It was an attempt to meet the demand for an occult key to the mysteries of past, present, and future. If the whole world were united as one man upon this interest, astrology could not be made into a science. The reason is that, so far as our intelligence testifies at all, the connections between portions of experience are not occult but causal. Whether or not we can push back to the ultimate or even quasi-ultimate causes in a given case, we get to the last interpretation of reality of which we are capable through discovery of regularities in types of relation between antecedents and consequents. There is no penetration of the mysteries of the universe except in the degree in which we are able to report the whole interplay of antecedents and consequents which make up the universe. The fundamental difference between astrology and geology, for instance, which makes the latter a science and the former no science, is not that the one is a reflection of interest in the influence of the heavenly bodies or in the mysteries of the universe, while the other is not. So far as such a difference seems to exist it is apparent rather than real. The difference is rather that the one is essentially the licensing of a human interest to construct a universe that does not exist, while the other disciplines its prompting interest into recognition of the universe that is. However an alchemist or a geologist might define or describe his cult, the decisive difference between them is not to be found in a contrast between the interests that initiate them, but in the antithesis of procedures which they employ. Astrologer and geologist may be equally eager to unravel the mysteries of the universe. The one can preserve the semblance of verisimilitude

for his occupation only in the degree in which he can keep his methods isolated from those of all the other interests that seek knowledge of the universe. The other gains sanction for his pursuit in direct proportion as he articulates his initial interest with every other interest that interrogates reality.

In a word, an interest is scientific only as it is a function of all interests. A mere interest in the crust of the earth would be as unscientific as an interest in the philosopher's stone. The interest in the crust of the earth that is validly scientific is an interest that articulates itself with the whole sweep of the cosmic process between the point where the explorer's hammer strikes and the most elemental vapor of world-stuff on the shores of space and time.

To use an illustration within the field of the social sciences, an "independent science of wealth" is objectively, though not as obviously, as indefensible as an independent science of birds' eggs or even of birds' nests. Knowledge of these latter subjects can have scientific quality only as a fragment worth what it is worth in a science of ornithology running back into zoölogy and thus into general biology. Birds' nests or birds' eggs are relatively unexplained phenomena until they are expressed in terms of the general life-process. In the same way, wealth is merely a distorted mental concept until it is construed in its actual genetic and dynamic relations with the whole social process.

We have to discover the difference between genuine and spurious knowledge, between less real and more real knowledge, by long and laborious experience. Sooner or later, pursuits stimulated by futile or fragmentary interests reach their limitations, and then the way has to be retraced back to their point of divergence from the trunk line of real investigation and a new departure has to be taken. *The inclusive social reality, so far as we are able to fathom it at present, is the immemorial and illimitable process of human beings developing their personality. All social science is worth what it is worth as a contribution to knowledge of this prodigious process.* Whoever commands freedom to employ his mind according to his own caprice may exer-

cise himself in constructing more or less artificial systems of thought out of incidents in this process which any interest whatever, from the most frivolous to the most serious, may select. There is no adequate provision, for instance, in law, morals, or logic, to prevent a considerable section of the population from making the judicious grieve by a senseless cossetting of Teddy-bears. There happily remains, however, in the minds of a few, an obdurate objection against ranking that fad as an expression of the rational factor in human nature. It would be difficult to convince the French Academy, for example, or the British Association, that an interest in classifying all phenomena from the standpoint of the Teddy-bear cult would be entitled to enrolment in the list of sciences. But why not? If one interest may found an independent science why not another? Surely Dr. Hoxie is estopped from claiming that the relative importance of the subject-matter selected by different interests settles their right to scientific rank. That would be merely a recourse to the "material" or "subject-matter" criterion which he has repudiated. Unless Dr. Hoxie is willing frankly to accept the anarchistic horn of the dilemma, and to assert that sciences are simply and solely the projection of irresponsible subjective preference, he must cling in some way to the other horn of the dilemma, viz., an appeal to some sort of objective criterion to distinguish between the essentially scientific and the essentially capricious. Unfortunately for his complete freedom in forensic exercise, Dr. Hoxie is handicapped by an established reputation for sanity. He could not be taken seriously if he should choose the former alternative for the sake of argument. It makes no difference to me how he states the other alternative. It must be an admission of my main contention, to which I shall return in the second part of this paper, viz., Whatever independence may be asserted for parts of social science is merely relative, not absolute. The measure of the dependence of different parts of social science upon each other is not the interest of the mind in excluding or including aspects of reality at pleasure. Objectively valid science is knowledge of reality as it is articulated with all other reality. Snap shots at passages of experience caught at the impulse of desultory inter-

ests do not make objectively valid science. They are merely arbitrary collections of curiosities.

Of course it is a far cry from the sciences which provoked this discussion, viz., history, and civics, and political economy as we know them today, and these extreme cases which I have used for analogies. Of course Dr. Hoxie has no intention of promoting any mental construction which would be as abhorrent to reality as the historical and hypothetical samples to which I have referred. My argument is in a word that he must choose in principle between an intellectual anarchism which may easily be confuted by *reductio ad absurdum*, and an intellectual responsibility which requires of all pretenders to scientific rank credentials which satisfy certain objective conditions. The "anarchy of fundamental ideas" to which Comte traced all our social woes three-quarters of a century ago may be described in terms of the dilemma which Dr. Hoxie's contention has advertised. We have not yet decided whether reality is something to which our minds must in the end accommodate themselves, whether they like it or not, or merely a reflex of our own mental operations.

In this part of the paper I will refer to but one more of Dr. Hoxie's counts against me, namely, his accusation that through ignorance and otherwise I have misrepresented political economy. Whether the charge is just or not is a question of judgment, and I will not attempt to argue it, but will simply redefine my position. In brief my proposition is that the problem first formulated by classical political economy was an impossible abstraction. The question of ways and means to increase the output of wealth is a relatively clear problem of industrial technology. The question of the proportional influence which problems of wealth production deserve to exert upon the whole programme of national activities is incomparably larger than any mere problem of wealth. Economic science is bound to face the alternatives, and definitely to choose between them, viz., to be a technology of wealth production, and nothing more, or to be a term in the problem of human conduct, in which case knowledge of the conditions under which wealth may be produced is always a mere preliminary to the question, What ratio does the wealth

factor bear, in the given situation, to the other human needs which are factors of the same social problems?

My diagnosis of economic theory as we have had it for more than a century, and particularly of English and American forms of the theory, since the facts are somewhat different in Germany and even in France, is first, that current political economy is relatively materialistic rather than humanistic; second, that it is relatively particularistic, rather than co-ordinated with the rest of knowledge. To the former of these criticisms Dr. Hoxie's answer is virtually the protest of Hamlet's player, "I hope we have reformed that indifferently with us, sir!" To my implied exhortation, "Oh! Reform it altogether!" Dr. Hoxie responds by professing that political economy does not deal with wealth, but with "Men making choices in the market"! Behold the difference! The platforms of the parties in the next presidential campaign will also not refer to politics, but to men making choices at the polls! Fortunately for the *requiescat in pace* of the proposed substitutionary sacrifice, Dr. Hoxie's wit is retained for its defense, not for its arraignment. What a ragtime requiem he might have composed if he had come to bury this Caesar, not to praise him!

But seriously, disregarding the classical political economy, which I do not understand that Dr. Hoxie would attempt to defend against this charge, is it true that current political economy has transferred its center of attention from wealth to persons? This is a question of fact. A brief of the evidence would make a separate monograph. It is not practicable to include such a monograph in this paper. I merely note Dr. Hoxie's objection, therefore, with reassertion of my original position in these two propositions; first, I discover no sufficient ground for concluding that there is a consensus among economists to transfer the center of their science from wealth to people; second, if that transfer has been made, or if it ever shall be made, it will be merely a step toward that recognition of the evolution of human personality, as the correlating center for all the social sciences, which I claim to be inevitable.

To my second count against economics Dr. Hoxie sets up the

reply that the particularism of any science is its glory and its crown. I have already expressed myself at length on this view, and shall discuss it further in the second part of this paper. Of course it reduces the whole difference between us to the lowest terms. As I said in substance in the beginning, that there can be such a difference of judgment between people of similar mental type and of closely related professional activities is itself the underlying problem. The principal factors of the problem are not objective data assembled in evidence, but contrasted reactions of different persons upon the same data. For that reason I have attempted nothing in the way of refutation or rebuttal, but have simply tried to remove possible doubt about my own views upon the points to which Dr. Hoxie objects. Having taken notice of these objections I shall devote the second part of the paper to a more constructive statement of my position.

[To be concluded.]

PROPHYLAXIS OF SOCIAL DISEASES ¹

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I wish to express my appreciation of the honor of being invited to appear before this representative body of the medical profession, members of the State Conference of Charities, and of the State Federation of Women's Clubs. It is a source of especial gratification to find so many men and women engaged in different spheres of social activity, uniting with medical men in the discussion of a problem of preventive medicine which has such important relations with the interests of the social welfare. This composite gathering exemplifies the solidarity—the community of interest and responsibility existing between the medical profession and social workers in all questions relating to the physical and moral health of the community. The office of hygiene is not limited to the care of the health of individuals; its broader function is to develop all those conditions which conduce to public health and which in its highest expression is inseparable from public morality.

It is generally conceded that medicine constitutes the most important department of human knowledge; and its value to humanity is largely measured by the degree in which it is applied to the prevention of disease.

Those of you whose charitable activities are directed to the relief of the dependent members of society cannot fail to recognize that disease is one of the most important factors in the causation of the destitution which requires relief. The prevention of disease which transforms the bread winner into the dependent upon charity, has a most important economic as well as a humanitarian value.

¹ Read by invitation before a joint meeting of the Medico-Chirurgical Faculty of Baltimore, the Maryland State Conference of Charities, and the Maryland State Federation of Women's Clubs.

The medical profession has long recognized that the fight against communicable diseases is not simply a struggle against microbes, but a warfare, as well, against bad social conditions, and, further, that the conquest of these diseases is not possible without the aid and co-operation of social agencies which can effectively intervene in the correction of the bad social conditions through which disease germs are spread. The value of the combination of medical and social agencies has been most signally shown in the warfare which is now being waged against the Great White Plague; its success has been rendered possible only by the education of the public and the effective aid of social workers and public-spirited citizens in the improvement of the housing and living conditions of the people.

With tuberculosis, perhaps even more than tuberculosis, social diseases constitute the greatest social scourge of our modern civilization. This class of diseases has been aptly designated "The Great Black Plague." Working in darkness and disguise, protected by their privacy, their shame, and their secrecy, they infect unseen the social body. Without the pale of public interest or sympathy, unfettered by any semblance of sanitary control, they have been practically abandoned to their own evolution. Their neglect has always been considered the reproach, and their prevention the despair of sanitary science.

It is a sign of progress and a hopeful augury of success that men and women representing influential social organizations have signified by their presence here today their willingness to join forces with the medical profession in a socio-sanitary movement which it is hoped will limit at least the diseases we wish to prevent.

It is eminently fitting that women should interest themselves in this movement for the prophylaxis of social diseases. It is upon woman that the burden of shame and suffering, of disease and death, is chiefly laid—not so much, perhaps, upon that unfortunate class who are regarded as the chief agents in the propagation of these diseases, but upon pure women, who do not always find, even in the sanctuary of marriage, a safeguard against "the diseases of the women of the streets." By a strange irony

of fate, the diseases of vice transplanted to the bed of virtue often become intensified in virulence and danger; their worst effects are developed in fulfilling the functions for which marriage is instituted. It is not alone upon the virtuous wife but upon the children who are a part of her being that the blighting, destructive force of this social scourge most heavily falls.

Before an exclusively medical audience it would scarcely be necessary to refer to the pathological significance of the class of infections comprehended under the general term "social diseases," but before a mixed audience brief reference may be made to their extensive prevalence and their dangers to the individual and society, in order to emphasize the importance of the prophylactic work which it is hoped may be inaugurated in this city.

As these diseases are not subject to official registration, there are no available statistics which enable us to formulate the amount of venereal morbidity in this country. Competent European observers state that 75 per cent. of the adult male population have or have had gonorrhoea, and 10 to 18 per cent. contract syphilis. It would be a conservative estimate to state that the morbidity from both these infections would represent 60 per cent. of the adult male population in this country. While these diseases may occur at any period of life, they are essentially maladies of early life. Probably 60 per cent. of infections occur before the twenty-fifth year.

The danger of these diseases is measured not only by their effects upon the health or life of the individual, but upon the family and the race. Our conception of their pathological import has been singularly amplified by the acquisitions made to our knowledge within the last third of a century, especially of the serious nature of gonococcus infection in women. Gonorrhoea, in addition to its local inflammatory complications, is often the cause of permanent sterility in the male. It has a much wider range of morbid action than was formerly supposed; the gonococci are susceptible of being taken up in the circulation producing serious and deforming inflammation of the joints, and lesions of internal organs which may terminate fatally.

The significance of syphilis as a danger to health and life is

not measured so much by its immediate effects, as by the changes it sets up in certain internal organs essential to life; such as the brain, liver, heart, and arterial system, and which are the direct cause of death at a more or less remote period. Many of these serious manifestations occur after the tenth year of the disease and are especially liable to involve the nervous system. It is estimated that 90 per cent. of cases of locomotor ataxia, a large but indeterminate proportion of the paralyses and general paresis are caused by syphilis.

Recent investigations in the French insane hospitals show that 25 to 39 per cent. of deaths in those institutions may be traced to syphilis.

The chief significance of these diseases as a social danger comes from their introduction into married life. It is the popular impression that they are spread exclusively through illegitimate sexual relations. Unfortunately, a large proportion of men contract these diseases at or before the marriageable age. Many of them marry ignorant of the fact that they are bearers of contagion to their wives and offspring.

Gynecologists tell us that 80 per cent. of the inflammatory diseases peculiar to women, and 50 per cent. of all the operations performed by surgeons on the maternal organs are the result of gonococcus infection.

One specific effect of this disease upon the pelvic organs of women is to extinguish the conceptional capacity. It is estimated that 50 per cent. of gonorrhoeally infected women are rendered permanently sterile.

While gonorrhoea is not susceptible of hereditary transmission, it is liable to infect the eyes of the child at birth. Eighty per cent. of the ophthalmia of the new born, and 15 to 20 per cent. of all blindness is attributed to gonococcus infection, to say nothing of the vulvo-vaginitis, the arthritis, and other accidental infections of children in family life.

If the wife is infected with syphilis, in addition to the risks to her individual health already referred to, the disease may be transmitted in full virulence to the offspring, killing them outright, or resulting in physical and mental weaklings. From 60

to 80 per cent. of syphilitic children die before being born or shortly after birth; those that finally survive are subject to various organic defects and degenerative changes which are susceptible of being transmitted to the third generation.

It will thus be seen that this class of diseases, from their specific effect upon the reproductive organs, their damage to the procreative capacity, their deteriorating influence upon the offspring, constitutes the most powerful foe to the productivity, the vitality, and physical progress of the race.

It was the recognition of the significance of these diseases as a social peril that was the impelling motive to the inauguration of the work undertaken by the American Society of Sanitary and Moral Prophylaxis. It was believed by those who started this movement that it was time to break with the existing policy of silence and inaction and to organize a social defense against a class of diseases which are most injurious to the highest interest of society.

The basis of any intelligent scheme of prophylaxis is the adaptation of its measures to the causes of disease and the conditions under which it is spread. While sanitary science has been reproached for its utter inefficiency in evolving any practical scheme of control, it is evident that the prevention of social diseases cannot be treated as a purely sanitary problem. Their causes reside in conditions which lie entirely without the sphere of sanitary control, and their communicative mode cannot be reached by repressive measures. It was determined to enlist the co-operation, as far as possible, of all the social forces which could render effective aid in the correction of the conditions of which these diseases are the outgrowth.

From whatever standpoint this field was surveyed, the indifference of the public, the reckless and voluntary exposures to infection, the marital contaminations, the hereditary horrors, the most obvious causes seemed to converge and center in the focal point of ignorance.

The public is indifferent because ignorant of the extent and significance of venereal morbidity; the young who voluntarily expose themselves do not know the veritable danger of these

infections nor the imminence of this danger; the men who carry disease and death into their families are ignorant of the laws of venereal contagion, its varied and multiple modes; they do not know its terrible consequences to their wives and children.

While there are other and contributory causes, the basic cause is ignorance. The keynote of this movement, then, was sounded as a campaign of education, a crusade against ignorance. This ignorance on the part of the public is not surprising in view of the fact that both social sentiment and professional ethics have always united to cover up and conceal these diseases; all the educational agencies of our social life are organized upon a basis of silence as to their existence, even. On the part of the young, ignorance of the dangers which come from the irregular exercise of the sex function is compulsory; sound sex instruction is forbidden as improper; parents, teachers, and scholastic instructors are banded together, in a complicity of silence.

The public cannot be expected to seek deliverance from a hidden danger, the gravity of which it is utterly incapable of measuring, and the reality of which it scarcely suspects.

The first indication is to turn on the purifying light of publicity, to give to the public a knowledge of the facts which so vitally concern its interests—the extent and dangers of these diseases to the individual and to society, and their modes of contagion, direct and indirect. It is necessary to educate the conscience as well as the intellect of the people in order to create a public sentiment in favor of this work which will lead to an intelligent and active co-operation. It is only by opening up the humanitarian aspects of the situation, by exposing the dangers to the innocent members of society, that the conscience of the public can be touched and aroused to the significance of these social crimes and the moral obligation to aid in their prevention. There is needed not only a change in the apathetic attitude of the public, but a change of traditional ideas, of the mental attitude of the public toward the sex problem; a reversal of the policy of our educational system which now forbids instruction in the laws of life and sex.

The ideal of a good education to which most parents cling is

one which entirely ignores the existence of sex, that most important fact of life. All thinking men must recognize that the development of the sex function is intimately associated with the physical, mental, and moral growth of the individual. Sex is the physical basis of love, of the family sentiment, of the existence and prosperity of society. The object of education is to fit the individual for complete living, which includes not only self-preservation but self-perpetuation. From earliest infancy instruction is given concerning the functions of the body essential to its maintenance; the care of the stomach and bowels, what to eat and drink and what to avoid, but no word of advice as to the care, or warning as to the abuse or irregular exercise of that function, which, from a biologic point of view is the most important function of the human body.

One lesson, indeed, the majority of parents give, viz.: that the system of generation is a system of shame. This impression is so grounded and fixed in the mind of youth that it is apt to dominate his mental attitude throughout life. This sex instruction of their sons, so inauspiciously begun, is then committed to haphazard sources, to servants, to older and dissolute companions, to quackish literature, to be completed, too often, by harlots.

Our educational programme proposes to fill this glaring hiatus in home and scholastic instruction, to take account of the sexual organization of the individual, the origin and facts of life and sex which are now regarded as forbidden subjects.

As I have elsewhere said,

The function of the medical profession is to insist upon the value of this education and supply the requisite knowledge, intrusting its practical application to those who command the facilities and are better qualified by experience and a knowledge of specific methods. This education should be begun early, before sensuality is awakened and the curiosity of youth in regard to the mysteries of life and sex takes on a dangerous turn. Upon this foundation should be built, later, instruction in the physiology and hygiene of sex which should include the true purpose of the sex function, its essential dignity, and further, that its impulses should be educated, controlled, and directed in a proper channel. Later, he should be taught the dangers, both physical and moral, which come from the irregular exercise of the sex function. The high purpose of this education is to teach young men how to live according to the laws of a healthy nature by letting them know what those

laws are. It aims to promote clean living by cultivating a right attitude of mind toward the passions and appetites; its essential object is to promote continence as the surest prophylactic against venereal infection.

This innovation proposes to substitute sound sanative and wholesome knowledge of the sex function for the erroneous and demoralizing instruction the youth now receives from ignorant and often vicious sources.

Sound knowledge never does harm; it is knowing things wrong that does the mischief. A celebrated Grecian philosopher has said "the most needful piece of learning for the uses of life is to unlearn all that is untrue." This applies with especial force to the existing knowledge of young men of the present generation in sex matters.

It is important that the young man, who has had no sex instruction except what he has picked up from ignorant or vicious sources, should unlearn the untruth "that the sex function is given solely for sensual pleasure;" he should unlearn that "the exercise of this function is essential to his health and that he has a natural right to indulge his sexual impulse as he pleases;" he should unlearn all those physiologic fallacies upon which the sexual necessity and the conventional standard of morality are based, and especially should he unlearn the ethical heresy that one-half of humanity has imperious duties which the other half may repudiate or disclaim.

While proper sex instruction may trench upon the domain of morals, it is not suggested that the physician should usurp the function of the religious or ethical teacher. It is the province of the physician to teach the hygiene of all the functions of the body; it is his duty to warn against the exercise of any function under conditions which cause disease. The irregular exercise of the sex function, whether it is termed "incontinence" or "immorality," is the direct cause of that vast mass of misery and disease we are now considering. If continence in young men is healthful and compatible with the highest physical and mental vigor, if incontinence is the frequent cause of their physical and moral wreckage, it is the duty of the physician to warn against promiscuous cohabitation. "Physicians," declares Dr. Osler, "should be the apostles of continence." The teaching of continence does not imply, as has been asserted, a Pharisaical

assumption of superior virtue; it is an impersonal interpretation of the physiological laws of man's nature, as developed by science and confirmed by experience. In the matter of sex relationship the teachings of hygiene and morality are in complete accord.

In thus emphasizing the value of instruction in the physiology and hygiene of sex as a chart for the regulation of sexual conduct, we do not undervalue the teaching which properly comes within the province of the clergy. Hygienic teaching should be reinforced by an appeal to the conscience, so that the duty of clean living may be impressed with the force of a moral obligation.

We may now inquire what measure of preventive value we may reasonably expect from this education. No one indulges for a moment the illusion that it will prove an infallible corrective of incontinence. It is believed, however, that many young men when fully instructed as to the peril to the body, the mind, and the character which comes from licentious living, will choose the safer path of continence until they marry. The chief value of general enlightenment will be the safeguarding of marriage from venereal infection. It is inconceivable that the havoc wrought by these diseases in the home and family will continue when men realize the fearful consequences of marrying with an uncured venereal disease. An enlightened public opinion, which is the strongest force in the evolution of the conscience of the race, will no longer tolerate these social crimes.

I have thus dwelt, and I fear at a wearisome length, upon this, the most important feature of our programme because I believe that the chief hope of success in the work before us lies in the hygienic and moral education of the rising generation. Before dismissing this part of the subject allusion may be made to that cynicism which, masquerading under the guise of common-sense, declares that the impelling motive to licentious relation between men and women cannot be restrained by any considerations of health or morality, of consequences to themselves or others. This despair of educational and moral influences would paralyze all the efforts now being made in every department of social life

to correct its abuses, to raise its ideals, and to promote its welfare.

The prophylactic value of treatment is so evident to medical men that only the briefest mention of this part of the programme will be made. Its chief object is to prevent those already infected from infecting others by promptly sterilizing sources of contagion. To accomplish this object the provisions made for the treatment of these diseases should be enlarged and made available to all, not so much in the interest of the patient himself as in the interest of others he might expose to infection.

As the question of the "social evil" is to form the subject of another paper on the programme, I will touch but briefly upon what generally is regarded as the crux of the entire situation. Certainly there can be no intelligent or comprehensive system of prophylaxis framed which ignores the relations of cause and effect between the social evil and social diseases. It is well, however, to clear away a misconception which exists in the minds of many as to the measure of responsibility of public women for the spread of the diseases of vice. In the ordinary conception, the prostitute with her cortège of infections is the exclusive cause of their propagation: but while the prostitute is the chief source, she is by no means the exclusive agency in its spread; she is but the purveyor of the infection—she returns to one or several consumers the infection she has received from another consumer. It is not the prostitute but her partner who carries the poison home and distributes it to his family. It is the husband and father who is the responsible cause of the wreckage of the health and lives of innocent women and children.

Now the responsibility of the male factor in the spread of these diseases has always been minimized. This constitutes the radical defect of *règlementation* from a sanitary standpoint. No more inefficient or incomplete sanitary measure could be devised than the examination of public women with the view of eliminating sources of contagion, while the male factor in the spread of disease is entirely ignored. If the woman's body is found diseased, it is withdrawn from circulation until it can be certified as safe for the consumer, while the latter is permitted to contami-

nate other women without the shadow of control, and even to carry the contagion into his own family. Sex may qualify morality, but it does not qualify the laws of contagious disease. The sanitary feature of this system is condemned by its practical results, without reference to objections on moral grounds.

This same unilaterality is manifest in the condemnation of woman as the chief offender against morality. All the so-called "moral crusades" are directed against the women alone. In the descent upon disorderly houses the unfortunate women are fined and imprisoned, while the men who are there for the same immoral purpose are allowed to go scot free. I have long ago stated my conviction that the reversal of this one-sided policy—treating men and women precisely alike—would break up these houses.

In tracing the essential cause of prostitution we find that while socio-economic conditions are contributory causes, we must face the fact that the taproot of this evil is grounded in the polygamous proclivities and practices of man. More than the inherited tendencies to vice in certain women, more than the love of finery and luxury, the laziness, the economic dependence, the force of want that impels many of them along the road to ruin, more than all these and other alleged conditions, the chief cause is the unbridled instinct of man, which in seeking the means of its gratification creates the supply to satisfy the demand. The prostitute is largely the creation of man's sensual appetite. The methods of dealing with the social evil have been based upon a recognition of this demand as a necessity for men, and they fail because they endeavor to correct the effects without touching the cause.

As the work of the society has thus far been directed chiefly along educational lines, it can hardly be said to have a definite policy in dealing with the social evil, except that it rejects all measures which ignore the moral issues involved. My own personal view is that this problem should be approached through educational and moral influences, rather than by legislative intervention. Efforts should be directed not to making prostitution safe, but to prevent the making of prostitutes.

The first indication is to lessen the demand by influences and agencies which act upon the intelligence and moral sense of the individual, by education in the law of sex which teaches that the sexual instinct should be educated—restrained by reason, and directed into a monogamous channel—by exposing the danger to the physical health and moral character which are inseparable from licentious relations—dangers which may destroy his reproductive powers, or blight the health of his children. This instruction would be incomplete without impressing upon young men that the use of alcohol is one of the most powerful of all influences in the incitation of sexual debauch.

The second indication is to curtail the sources of supply by throwing additional safeguards around young women of the working classes and the large population of homeless and friendless girls from which the ranks of prostitution are chiefly recruited. This may be done through education and the aid of those social agencies which have been organized for the protection of young women.

A vigorous and unrelenting fight should be made against the purveyors of prostitution—the white-slave trade, the cadet system, the employment agencies, personals in the newspapers, against proxenitism in all its forms. Quack advertisements should be suppressed as one of the most powerful agencies in the spread of venereal infection. They minimize its dangers and, by giving deceptive assurance of cure, the victim goes on spreading the germs of danger in ignorance that he is the bearer of contagion.

In conclusion, brief reference may be made to the experimental work done by the Society of Sanitary and Moral Prophylaxis since its organization in New York over two years ago. It was recognized that this was a new and untried field and it was necessary, first of all, to study the situation. Since the evil we wish to correct is largely the result of ignorance, the first indication seemed to be the enlightenment of the public as to the magnitude and significance of the evil. The work of publicity has been especially difficult by the uncompromisingly adverse attitude of the newspaper press which excludes all mention of

this class of diseases. Through one channel or another, however, this knowledge is generally getting into circulation.

The next indication appeared to be the education of the rising generation in sex matters. Sex instruction, which contemplates an innovation upon the established educational system, was recognized to be not only delicate, but exceedingly difficult, as it ran counter to deeply rooted prejudices as well as traditional custom. Much study has been given to the character and scope of this education, the age at which it should be given, and the agencies through which it should be imparted. The education of the young men and women of the working classes and of the men of the army and navy service has also been the subject of careful study. The subject of throwing additional safeguards around marriage, ethical as well as legal, has been considered. The results of these studies appear in the transactions of the society, recently issued.

Since the ordinary channels of communication with the public are closed, the educational work of the society has been attempted through pamphlets, tracts, leaflets, and through conferences and lectures in schools, colleges, settlements, and in various social organizations. The instructors in the physical-training department of the Y. M. C. A. have shown a most cordial willingness to co-operate in this educative work. Many teachers, instructors, and pedagogists in various institutions throughout the country have exhibited, by letters of inquiry and commendation, a deep interest in this movement. Charity organizations, humane societies, and women's clubs are becoming interested. While physicians, generally, have not responded to the demands of this work with that spontaneity and enthusiasm which was hoped for, yet the best element in the medical profession and a large and influential lay element have become members of the societies organized in various cities.

The progress of this movement cannot fairly be measured by the results of actual accomplishment. Seed has been sown which it is believed will germinate and bear fruit later on. "Education within the Medical Profession," which formed the subject of one of the first papers read before the society, is

actively going on through papers and discussions in medical societies, clubs, and associations, and many physicians who had not kept pace with the recent advances made in our knowledge of the social dangers of these diseases are now becoming impressed with the importance of this work.

One result of this movement which serves to show the breach made in the walls of traditional prejudice is illustrated by this gathering here. Thanks to the change in professional and social sentiment, this forbidden topic which the medical profession has always discussed behind closed doors we have now the courage to bring into the open, to show this social scourge to the public face to face, even to pronounce its name without fear of shocking the sensibilities of a public audience.

Finally, the work in which your co-operation is solicited is difficult and, there is no disguising the fact, is unsavory—distasteful even. It will never receive the indorsement of fashion or society, nor gain the plaudits of the multitude; popularity will never perch upon its banners; it can be undertaken only from a sense of duty. This duty imposes upon the medical profession a responsibility which cannot be evaded, and upon all those interested in the social welfare a moral obligation which cannot be disregarded. It is a work not only in the interests of preventive medicine but for the good of humanity, and, in the words of the illustrious Pasteur, “when there is question of good to be done, our duty ceases only with our ability to do more or do better.”

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE

IV

THE INSURANCE OF THE FRATERNAL SOCIETIES

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These societies of the United States are similar in many respects to the Friendly Societies of Great Britain, but they are not confined, as in the mother country with its established social distinctions, to the so-called working classes. Indeed there is a strong inducement for professional persons, especially those who seek clients or votes, to belong to one or more strong fraternal associations for the acquaintance and influence which membership gives.

The characteristics which distinguish these brotherhoods are the following: (1) Each local lodge belongs to a system of similar lodges with common regulations. (2) Each lodge is an independent society for local purposes, and yet the rules which govern it are made by a legislative body composed of delegated representatives elected by the lodges, and there is a central administration by officials chosen by the federation. (3) Each fraternal organization has its own peculiar ceremonies, usually of a religious character, which gives expression to the sympathetic bonds of the members. The secret pass-words and signs and solemn forms of initiation provoke curiosity and attract new members. (4) Brotherly assistance is rendered to sick or helpless members. Many of the services rendered by a lodge to its members could not be formally prescribed in a contract nor reported in statistical tables. (5) All lodges pay something or render some form of aid to members who are wholly or partially unable to work. (6) Death benefits are paid to the bereaved family of a member who has died, or to his legal heirs. It is in this last point that the fraternal societies discover their chief social function, and it is this fact which makes them competitors of the ordinary insurance companies which carry on business for

profit. The strife between them is unceasing and often bitter, even if veiled under formal courtesy. If the financial basis of a fraternal society is sound it can continue to exist, even when the ceremonies and sociable features are lightly esteemed and are neglected; but if the administration is defective, the assessments unduly frequent and high, the economic burden excessive, then the society goes to the wall in spite of all its sentimental sympathies and its impressive ritual. (*Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the National Fraternal Congress*, p. 445.)

It is not easy to discover how large a proportion of the members of these fraternal societies belong to the wage-earning group. Statistical material for a judgment is wanting and the opinions of representative leaders vary according to their personal experience and observation. In some lodges the workingmen are more numerous than in others. Inquiries made among almoners of charity, friendly visitors, residents of settlements, collectors for the "industrial insurance companies," and officials of the fraternal societies themselves furnish evidence that the unskilled and low-paid workingmen do not constitute any large part of the membership, but that these are more likely to purchase, at high rates, a little claim on burial benefits from the industrial companies and to secure an imperfect provision for sickness in some club or mutual aid society with small dues. In the larger cities and in certain smaller industrial centers it is probable that the Catholic fraternal orders consist almost entirely of wage earners. The most important single investigation, so far as known to the writer, is that of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of Connecticut.¹

*Activity of the Fraternal Societies.*²—In the year 1905 there were said to be 168 societies of the kind under consideration in the United States. The first to be established dated from October 1, 1868, the youngest from September 30, 1904. How many in the meantime have dissolved it

¹ *Report of Bureau of Labor Statistics of Connecticut*, 1891; Article of E. W. Bemis in *Universal Cyclopaedia*, Vol. IV, p. 521.

² *Statistics of Fraternal Societies*, 1905, Rochester, N. Y.

Occupations	Societies with Per cent. Branches	Societies without Branches—Per cent.
In business.....	21.16	40.29
In professions.....	5.33	14.74
Well-paid mechanics.....	38.65	27.37
Lower paid mechanics.....	20.28	6.35
Clerks.....	11.20	11.25
Farmers.....	0.66
Housewives.....	2.72
Total per cent.....	100.00	100.00

is difficult to discover. On January 1, 1905, there were 87,758 lodges with a total membership of 5,111,480 persons, of whom 232,068 were "social members" who had no claim upon the life-insurance benefits of the lodges, while the great majority (4,879,412) were in the full enjoyment of these rights. During the year 1904 the number of lodges increased about 3,860, and the membership 137,049, and yet this very year was for all forms of life insurance organizations in the United States a year of unrest, suspicion, and difficulties. The insurance in force, at least on the face of contracts, was on January 1, 1905, \$6,665,-141.251. The expenditures during the year 1904 were \$64,-322,892. The assets on January 1, 1905, were stated to be \$51,-465,430.00, and the liabilities \$9,619,089.00. The total expenditures of all fraternal societies since their foundation, chiefly for death benefits, had been \$787,427,445; and in addition to this 13 societies which offer sick insurance had paid out for this purpose \$312,514,193. The total expenditures of all societies for all purposes had been since their beginning \$1,099,941,638.³

Costs of administration.—It is the boast of the fraternal

³ A national fraternal sanatorium association has been formed to provide for the treatment of members afflicted with tuberculosis. They have secured property in New Mexico valued at \$1,000,000, and an effort is made to endow and support it. The National Fraternal Congress and the Associated Fraternities of America have voted approval of the enterprise. It is affirmed that over \$9,000,000 were paid out in one year for those who had died of consumption, and it is believed that by curing and preventing the disease the cost of sick benefits and premiums for life insurance can be substantially reduced. The cost for caring for patients will be from \$7 to \$10 per week. The legislature of Illinois, in 1907, made it legal for fraternal societies to establish and maintain such sanatoria.

orders that their expenses of administration have been kept remarkably low. A comparison has been drawn between 25 of the most important insurance corporations with 25 of the largest fraternal. The policies of the 25 insurance companies had a value, on December 31, 1904, of \$8,541,899,611, while the smaller but more numerous policies of the fraternal had a face value of \$5,210,016,008. The costs of administration of the 25 insurance companies was 18.3 per cent. of the receipts, while the corresponding costs of the fraternal amounted to only 8.4 per cent. The representatives of the fraternal offer an explanation of the difference. In the first place the salaries of the officers of the fraternal are very low, while those of officials of the great companies are, in many cases, notoriously extravagant. In the case of the companies every policy holder has been won at considerable expense for commissions of solicitors, while in the lodges every member is a solicitor who works quite zealously without pay. Further the meetings of the lodges afford a method of collecting the premiums and dues without great expense.

National organizations.—The fraternal societies have federated themselves in two large groups called the National Fraternal Congress and the Associated Fraternities of America. The purpose of these federations is to discuss the common interests of the lodges, to explain the technical problems of insurance, and to influence legislation. The Catholic Fraternal Benefit Societies follow the same economic principles as the others, as explained above, and their statistics are included with those of other similar organizations. Naturally their members are of the Catholic church and many of the priests are very active in promoting the societies in their parishes. These Catholic orders have paid out during the past twenty-five years over \$65,000,000 in death and sickness benefits, and they have now over 400,000 members.

Objections and criticisms.—The Fraternal Benefit Societies are severely criticized by actuaries and insurance specialists in the United States, especially in cases where our societies have refused to learn from the history of the older English Friendly Societies and to reform their plans in accordance with experience. The

more familiar criticisms are the following: The premiums of the older members are in comparison with those of younger members relatively too low to cover the risk, and therefore the younger members must carry more than their share of the burden. Ordinarily the fraternalists have declined to provide reserve funds or have very inadequate reserves, and so the benefits must be paid out of assessments levied at or near the time of ripened claims. In consequence of these defects the rates of assessments rise gradually, and therefore the younger members, who must carry more than their proper share of the cost, fall away from membership, only older members remain; the burden becomes unbearable, and the brotherhood becomes bankrupt, unable to fulfil its promises or at least the expectations of the members. Once the older men are out of a fraternal society they find themselves too far advanced in years to buy insurance in regular companies, or the rates are so high as to be prohibitive. Furthermore, it is claimed by the representatives of the ordinary insurance companies that the salaries of the officials are so low that competent and skilful men will not accept the responsible administrative offices, and that, under imperfect management, the funds of the fraternal societies will be dissipated. All these arguments are used in the competition of the insurance companies to break down the influence of the fraternalists.

On the other side the importance and value of the fraternalists may be defended by the following arguments: The fraternalists have already demonstrated the general and growing interest of wage earners and persons of low salaries in industrial insurance; and the fraternal societies adapt themselves to the needs of the workmen with inadequate income. In spite of their defects, which may be acknowledged, these associations have already paid out enormous sums for sickness and death benefits. It is affirmed that in these societies men of ability can be found to administer the affairs of the insurance departments with fidelity and success, without having to pay them extravagant salaries. Naturally no one can claim that the administration is equally skilful and effective in all societies alike.

The problem of improving the working of the Fraternal Bene-

fit Societies has engaged general attention and called forth much discussion. How may the fraternal be made useful in forwarding industrial insurance? It is obvious that fraternal societies are not adapted to furnish accident insurance, at least without important modifications of present laws. It seems wiser to approach this matter from the side of the lawmaking employers liable for injuries suffered by the employees. The doctrine of the *risque professionnel* places the responsibility for compensation first of all on the men who direct and control industry, and therefore society ought not to require the workmen to take the initiative in this field.

In the field of sickness insurance the lodges have achieved considerable success, and they seem well adapted to this purpose. As already indicated thirteen of the fraternal have paid since their organization over \$312,514,193 for sick benefits; while the other societies have their sickness funds and aid families of members in case of illness and need. Evidently it should not be difficult to find a place for such associations in a system of compulsory insurance, if the time comes when society is ready for that measure. Such organizations have been utilized in Germany for just this purpose.

Some of the fraternal have sought to establish old-age and invalid insurance, but this is not general. The tendencies and results have not yet been clearly revealed. The fraternal are very similar to the French "mutualists," and in France the mutualist societies are carefully included in the government schemes of provision for old-age pensions. Whether the state governments merely regulate, subsidize, or compel insurance for old age and invalidism they may find ready to hand an administrative machinery which works at low cost and has roots in popular sympathies.

It is in the sphere of "life insurance" that the fraternal societies of the United States have thus far found their principal mission. As shown already in the statistics the fraternal administer their insurance schemes at very low cost—8.4 per cent. of premiums, as compared with 30 to 40 per cent. of the industrial insurance companies which do business among the workingmen.

This fact has awakened the hope in many minds that in the near future the workingmen will be able to provide for themselves reliable life insurance in societies which rest on the principle of mutuality and self-government.

State regulation.—It seems to be beyond reasonable question that the interest of the members and the future usefulness of the fraternal societies demand a degree of state intervention and control. The argument for this position is clear and strong. The vast majority of the members have not and cannot be expected to have expert knowledge of the business of life insurance, and the officers themselves are rarely actuaries of repute. The strength of the fraternal association lies in a certain sympathy, even sentimentality, which binds the members together in strong bonds, but which obscures the judgment of reality and hard mathematical facts, and is inconsistent with the necessary cold-blooded calculation and business direction which assures the wise management of funds. It is almost universally conceded that the other life insurance companies must be placed under **very** rigid control by the state, just as national banks are supervised and made to conform to regulations in the public interest; but it would seem that the majority of the members of the brotherhoods have made themselves believe that the law of gravity, the multiplication table, and economic forces and laws may be successfully set at defiance if only men love each other enough; and that such commonplace matters as tables of mortality and interest rates are applicable only to the insurance of rich men. Not seldom have state commissioners of insurance and actuaries who are true friends of the fraternalists given to the public and to the societies the necessary information and suggested the protective measures which must be taken in order to provide a solid foundation for their insurance methods. But such suggestions have only too generally been regarded with suspicion and hostility, and there has been a constant antagonism between the better and more outspoken commissioners of states and the representatives of the societies. When it was shown that the reserve funds and premium rates were inadequate and that the methods of administration must lead to bankruptcy, this was

taken, and often is still taken, to be a proof that the men who give timely warning are enemies of fraternal and perhaps in the pay of the regular life insurance companies.⁴ On the other hand

MORTALITY TABLES
DEATHS EXPECTED PER 1,000 MEMBERS

Age	Table of National Fraternal Congress	Actuaries Table	American Experience Table
20.....	5.00	7.29	7.81
21.....	5.04	7.38	7.86
22.....	5.07	7.46	7.91
23.....	5.11	7.56	7.96
24.....	5.15	7.67	8.01
25.....	5.20	7.77	8.07
26.....	5.26	7.89	8.13
27.....	5.32	8.01	8.20
28.....	5.39	8.14	8.26
29.....	5.47	8.28	8.35
30.....	5.55	8.43	8.43
31.....	5.65	8.58	8.51
32.....	5.75	8.75	8.61
33.....	5.87	8.92	8.72
34.....	6.00	9.10	8.83
35.....	6.15	9.29	8.95
36.....	6.31	9.49	9.09
37.....	6.49	9.69	9.23
38.....	6.70	9.91	9.41
39.....	6.92	10.13	9.59
40.....	7.17	10.36	9.79
41.....	7.45	10.61	10.01
42.....	7.77	10.89	10.25
43.....	8.11	11.25	10.52
44.....	8.48	11.70	10.83
45.....	8.87	12.21	11.16
46.....	9.29	12.84	11.56
47.....	9.75	13.52	12.00
48.....	10.27	14.26	12.51
49.....	10.82	15.40	...
50.....	11.44	15.94	13.78
55.....	15.71	21.66	18.57
60.....	22.75	30.34	26.69
65.....	34.39	44.08	40.13
70.....	53.65	64.93	61.99
75.....	85.48	95.56	94.37
79.....	125.35	130.07	131.73

*Error in table.

the state commissioners have denied hostility and declare that they desire nothing more than the essential basis for sound and

⁴ The grounds for rejecting the calculations of the fraternal societies are partly found in the discrepancies apparent in the mortality tables of the fraternal as compared with those used by insurance companies.

enduring insurance. An example may be cited. The commissioner of Massachusetts said in his report for 1904:

Fraternal insurance has come to stay. It should aim to get upon a basis that its results will be only good. . . . Why then should not this fraternal question be taken up and considered reasonably and without prejudice, for the purpose of securing through the legislatures a uniform measure of as wide application as possible, which will at least prevent the organization of new companies on lines which have been demonstrated over and over again to be faulty, and give the companies now in existence the benefit of a uniform code in all the states?⁵

The Insurance Commissioner of North Carolina said in 1905 (*Report* p. xiv):

In the opinion of the Commissioner it would be best that all associations and orders doing business in this state should be required to have and keep a certain number of members and a certain amount of business, or not be allowed to commence or continue business. It is not best, or for the protection of our people, that associations of this character should be allowed to organize with less than a dozen men, and no assets or capital or responsibility back of them.

The necessity of further legislation in order to prevent the entire ruin of the fraternal movement has of late been recognized quite generally by the enlightened men in the societies and by their advisers. Such facts as the following have startled many into action and already led to a certain improvement and reorganization. It appears that out of 114 fraternal benefit societies only 19 have accepted even the premium rates of the National Fraternal Congress; and of these 19 associations not one has adopted a rate which will cover completely the costs of administration and meet fully the claims of the beneficiaries. A report made to the National Fraternal Congress in 1906 made clear that during the year 1905, with a membership of 3,634,467, the increase in membership was only 58,344. Eighteen of the most important fraternal societies gained during 1905 only 96,877 new members and lost 106,373. The attorney and counsellor of one of the great societies has expressed very strongly the judgment of the competent leaders in favor of suitable state control and disclosed the nature of the crisis.

⁵ *Report for 1904, Part II, pp. xx.*

I do not believe that it is safe that the Fraternal Beneficiary Societies be left longer without proper legislative guidance in the matter of rates. I am sure that the officers and managers of fraternal societies recognize that relief must come soon, and that it must come from legislative enactments. It is nearly impossible for one or a few societies to adopt and apply adequate rates so long as other societies do not do so. There are a sufficiently large number of societies who do not yet appreciate the necessity for adequate rates to make it impossible to see a day in the future when all of the societies will have placed themselves upon a permanent basis.

In order to meet the needs and demands of the members of these societies, the legislatures must designate more clearly the character of contracts that may be made, and benefits granted by these societies than they have done in the past. It is essential to their success and perpetuity not only that they be required to accumulate adequate reserves upon level life contracts, but that provision be made whereby reserves are not appropriated to the benefit of persistent members, as in the past, but that a member who pays the reserve accumulation, shall recognize that he has an interest in it and that it shall be held sacred for the maturity of his certificate.

I recognize that this will be a new departure in fraternalism, because the theory of rates in these societies has been based upon an agreement between the members that, even if an accumulation of reserve was made, the withdrawing or lapsing member should leave his interest in the accumulation in order that persistent members might have insurance afforded them at less than actual cost.

It seems probable that the resolutions passed on October 4, 1906, by the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners indicate the essential points of the reform demanded by the enlightened friends of the fraternal organizations.

The laws governing fraternal societies should provide that where the hope of level rate is held out to the members, that such rates should be less than those shown as necessary by the American Experience Table of Mortality with interest at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum. This will work no hardship upon the members, for any excess can be returned each year by an annual accounting, thus guaranteeing that they will not have to pay more than the actual cost of their insurance while providing for the hope and permanency of the association. . . . We urge the enactment of laws providing as follows: (1) No society shall be organized in or admitted to any state after July 1, 1907, that does not collect adequate rates, according to the above-mentioned standard. (2) All societies doing business in any state should collect adequate rates from new members admitted after January 1, 1909. (3) Members paying inadequate rates should be placed in a class by themselves, but should be permitted to transfer to the adequate

rate class at attained ages, without expense or medical examination, within two years, and the funds of the two classes should be kept separate.⁶

The opinion of M. M. Dawson, the actuary, is worth citing. He believes that the reorganization now going on in the fraternal societies is sincere; that the leaders are in touch with actuaries and will ultimately be supported by the members; that the administration is honest and economical; that the medical selection is good; that the rates are being adjusted to the losses and the necessary reserves are being provided; that after the shock of reorganization the numbers will increase. (*Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1905, pp. 128 ff.)

The above report was signed by the Insurance Commissioners of Illinois, Pennsylvania, Maine, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, composing the Committee on Fraternal Insurance; and the report was unanimously adopted.

A rather intensive study of the working of fraternal lodges in the anthracite coal region has been made by Mr. P. Roberts (*Anthracite Coal Communities*, pp. 259 f.), and from that account certain illustrations are taken. In this region are found representatives of most of the countries of Europe. Roberts says that in the cities and towns there are some brotherhoods whose chief object is the cultivation of sociability, and the members of such lodges belong to the comfortable classes and to the professional people. But the brotherhoods of miners pursue a more practical and utilitarian object and their principal purpose is to provide sick benefits and life insurance for the protection of their families. These miners are not rich enough to spend much money on purely sociable organizations. They have a special repugnance to being buried at public cost, and they pay their dues regularly in order to be sure of the death benefit when it is needed. Beyond these two emergencies the average miner does not give himself great anxiety. An experienced insurance agent acquainted with these people estimates that 75 per cent. of the workmen pay insurance premiums, about 25 per cent. paying sick insurance premiums and 50 per cent. for life insurance on policies ranging from \$100 to \$300. All the brotherhoods have a religious basis, the Catholic societies having a close relation with the ancient church and having priests as

⁶ Carlos S. Hardy, *What Is Necessary for the Future of Fraternal Societies?* 1906.

leaders. The Slav miners have many societies which bear the names of race heroes or saints. Ordinarily these brotherhoods give sick benefits and burial money. The Irish and Slav beneficial societies have female members, and among the Protestant orders are auxiliary societies for women, as for example, the Daughters of Rebecca, Daughters of Pocahontas, etc. The Catholic orders are not so numerous and divided as the Protestant, and therefore the Catholic lodges are usually stronger financially. The individualistic spirit among Protestants shows itself in the brotherhoods as well as in the churches, and this fact makes the insurance burden heavier for their members. The financial administration of the lodges rests in the hands of the members and these officials handle considerable sums in the course of a year. The fact that betrayal of trust is very rare speaks well for the character of the workmen. It is impossible to make an exact statement of the income and expenditures of the brotherhoods of the region. In the neighborhood of Olyphant, with 7,800 inhabitants, it is estimated that the monthly payments are about \$1,-886. The monthly dues for each member range from 25 to 60 cents. When a member dies an assessment is levied of \$1 to cover the death benefit. In the cities of the anthracite region the fraternal orders flourish, and it is thought that their yearly receipts are about \$1,250,000. The weekly allowances for sick benefits range from \$4 to \$6 and receipt of benefits ceases with the third or at most the sixth month. After the first half of the period the benefit is reduced one-half and at the end of the limit all claims cease. After that the indigent member has no recourse but poor relief. In case of the death of a member the family receives from \$50 to \$125 death benefit, and the man whose wife dies receives half these rates for burial expenses. Roberts sees distinct advantage in the insurance work of these brotherhoods. The workmen find in the administration of the business of the lodge a great satisfaction. The business sessions call for discussions and explanations, for courteous conduct and tactful speech with much self-control under provocation; and this experience tends to enlarge the scope of thought, awaken the mind, and refine the manners. Independence, self-trust, and foresight are

qualities which elevate the social condition of workingmen, and in no circle of activity are these qualities so developed as in the meetings and business of the brotherhoods.

And yet these lodges reveal various defects. They are so split up into numerous small bodies that much of the energies and funds of the members are wasted. By combination and federation the efficiency of the societies would without doubt be promoted and the basis for security made deeper and broader. If the local risk could be joined with that of a wide area the insurance would rest upon a firmer basis in times of local epidemics.

Ordinarily we find in the statutes of the organizations a provision similar to that formerly a part of the German sickness insurance law, to the effect that insured persons who have become ill through their own fault, as by engaging voluntarily in fights, or by drunkenness, or venereal vice, lose their claim for benefit or at least lose it in part. The society protects itself against fraud by means of examinations made by a physician or by visits of committees. When a man is member of several societies and the sum of benefits is greater than wages he is tempted to simulate sickness in order to have a vacation at the expense of the funds. Some of the brotherhoods avoid this danger by having an understanding between the brotherhoods that the sum of all benefits shall not be greater than wages. This precaution is not always followed and neglect leads to occasional abuses.

The negroes have imitated the whites in the organization of fraternal benefit societies and their methods have peculiarities which correspond to race traits. When we consider the situation of the millions of these "brothers in ebony" who stand in sore need of insurance, without legal organization or protection, we can more easily comprehend the force of an argument for a national movement for compulsory insurance. For the negroes themselves compulsory insurance would be a school of economy and thrift. As a matter of fact many thousand of this race remain without any sort of aid in times of sickness and unemployment and they either become a burden on poor relief or suffer the effects of semi-starvation. As an illustration of certain aspects of

their societies we may cite a picture from a letter from Nashville, Tenn., by Miss Mary Woods, dated July 8, 1906:

There are many brotherhoods among the colored people. The Ladies of Queen Esther's Court on festival occasions wear purple hats and their queen wears a crown. At the funeral services of members there are ceremonies which remind one of children's plays. All the brotherhoods pay sick benefits and death benefits. Of late reports of dishonest treasurers have not been frequent, but formerly they were common, and probably there is still much imposition. The poor things are ignorant and easily fall victims to designing and shrewd men. One impostor was preacher, undertaker, and owner of a vault and cemetery. His enemies say that he had formed a partnership with certain physicians and hospitals by which he gained still more from the unfortunate people over whom he had gained power.⁷

⁷ Much detailed information about the actuarial problems of the fraternal societies is found in the *Consolidated Chart* (published by the *Fraternal Monitor*, Rochester, N. Y.); in *Analyses of Fraternal Societies and Illustrations of Premium Computations*, by Abb Landis, 1906; and in *Friendly Societies and Fraternal Orders*, by Abb Landis.

GLIMPSES AT THE MIND OF A WAITRESS

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Last June a friend and I, two teachers with a commingled yearning for adventure and philanthropy, resolved to submerge ourselves still further into the masses than we are by nature. For some time we vibrated between work in a laundry, a saloon, and a restaurant, but at last we took positions as waitresses. We secured them in a fashionable apartment house much frequented by army and navy officers, serving in the café connected with the house. Here we earned fifteen dollars a month and board and room. We had to do our laundry ourselves or pay for it, and we were required to wear white shirt-waist and aprons and to have them always clean. If we were not spotless our mistress, whom we will call Mrs. Jones for convenience sake, had no scruples about telling us so. Considering that she neither did the laundry nor paid the bills, this was but natural.

Our duties consisted in setting the tables, waiting on them, clearing them, and washing the silver and glass. After we had finished this work, we were given extras, such as polishing silver. Usually there were also trays to be prepared, taken to rooms, and later brought back and cleared. This fell to the waitress at whose table the person sat, and she was expected to prepare anything not on the bill of fare, such as toast or eggs.

We were expected to be in the dining-room about 7:30 in the morning, and at night, working as rapidly as possible, we would be through about nine o'clock. Every other afternoon two of us were relieved about three o'clock, and came up again about a quarter to six, while the others stayed to prepare the salad for dinner, answer the bell, and do anything that turned up. Sometimes we had an hour to ourselves in the morning, but more often not. That is, we had as a rule a thirteen-hour day, with a break of three hours in it every other day. We had no afternoon

off and we worked seven days in the week. This is literal. No time ought to be taken out for meals, for we had no table to sit down at, and ate on the run, so to speak. We filled a plate with what we could find, and perched on a stool, and gulped the food down amid the sights and smells of dishwashing, with dirty dishes all about us, and the pile of scraps growing bigger every minute as the dish-washer pursued his merry way. Under such conditions, fifteen minutes is a liberal estimate for the time spent in a meal.

For food we had what was left—which was not much. As soon as the last guest was served, cake, fruit, and luxuries that would keep, were locked away. I should not object to this if we had had plenty of other things, but Mrs. Jones never counted in her nine servants when she bought, and so as a rule some or all of us had meager pickings. For breakfast we could have an egg if we chose, and usually some bacon was left, so that we did not suffer then. At lunch, however, we had literally nothing but bread and butter most of the time. For dinner, there were usually some kind of meat, potato, and vegetables, all cold because the cook would not take the trouble to keep them hot for us. Sometimes we had dessert, sometimes not, according to its character.

As a matter of fact, we were not very hungry, for we were not allowed to eat until we were through serving, and by that time the sight and smell of so much food had destroyed our appetites. We did not really get enough to eat for the work we were doing.

The work itself soon made us lame and bruised from head to foot. The bruises came as the direct result of carrying trays about five hours a day, pushing forcibly through swinging doors, and knocking ourselves against table corners and other pugnacious articles of furniture. All of us could display choice collections of black and blue spots, especially on the right side, since we turned to the right to push through the doors. Our arms ached from finger-tips to shoulders, and our backs and necks were lame from the strain of lifting the trays. Our feet were sore, swollen, and in some cases blistered, from being on them

so many hours a day. These things were true of all of us, not simply of the two teachers.

What was the effect of this bodily condition upon our mind? Our first waking consciousness was an ache. By degrees this localized itself, and we cautiously tried raising our arms, closing our hands, and so on, to see just how much hurt we were. Then it would occur to us that we ought to rise, and we would crawl out resignedly or profanely, according to our temperament. If sufficiently desperate, we went to sleep again, creating confusion in the dining-room as others tried to do our work.

All day long the back-ground of living was an ache. This showed itself in an indisposition to do anything more than was absolutely necessary, to sit down at every opportunity, to stand laxly in the dining-room, instead of being brisk and alert—in short to act like the typical shiftless servant. We soon were that. We were not on the lookout for work. On the contrary, we came to have a vague feeling of resentment against our mistress, and enjoyed taking advantage of her. The one who did the chamber work filched black- and white-headed pins, hair-pins, and other small articles, and kept us extravagantly supplied with towels. We ordered desserts for guests who were not there, and ate them ourselves. We supplied ourselves with plenty of ice-water for our rooms. We took every opportunity of proving to our own satisfaction that though our mistress could work us for thirteen hours a day, we could even the score in the end. Still, this puts the matter too definitely, for only the teachers so framed the case to themselves, and that humorously. Rather, the truth was that with this constant ache in the background, our minds became dulled, the inhibitions which usually prevent such belittling tricks were removed, and the ethical tone was lowered.

In just the same way all of us were careless about personal cleanliness. Mrs. Jones kept us to a certain standard of appearances, but we were too tired and indifferent to do more. Even we teachers were, after a few days, sore put to it to force ourselves to a bath at night, though we had a nicely appointed bathroom. During all the time we were there, no one used the

tub but ourselves. I can understand, too, why the others did not. They were too tired, and they did not realize that the bath would rest them. Then too, they had no kimonos to wear and could not go through the extra mental and physical effort involved in partially dressing after undressing. When one's senses are somewhat dulled, it does not take long to become accustomed to the results of infrequent bathing.

The same general effect was noticeable in other ways. Bear in mind that for thirteen hours a day all our living was concerned with the paraphernalia of eating. We saw, heard, and touched nothing else. When our hour of leisure came, we had no time to go down town and were too tired to walk, so that usually we lay on our beds and dozed instead of getting new sights and sounds. The effect upon me, and I think it was much the same with the rest, was that my mind became more and more engrossed in the present. In dozing off to sleep, I saw endless processions of knives and forks and smelt the reek of hot dish-water. In the daytime, my thoughts of outside interests, my friends, my books, even my family, all such thoughts became far away and uninteresting. They lost their tang. I was too confused in mind and too dulled to care whether my friends objected to my neglect, and I was far too tired to anticipate any pleasure from seeing or writing to them. I became a creature ruled chiefly by sensations.

The wider bearing of this is easily seen. Such a girl is not one who can improve her condition. All of us talked of getting better places. One of us, who had been a stenographer, actually rented a typewriter and began to acquire speed. But the average girl came, stayed until she was desperate, and departed without knowing what she would do next. Some impulse of freedom would seize her one day, and before night she would be gone, conscious only that she must go.

How, indeed, can a girl in such a place be expected to retain anything of mental freshness or moral poise? What incentive has she to use her mind on her work? We were worked by the day. As soon as we finished one thing, we were given another, and a time never came when Mrs. Jones could not find more for

us to do. At first my friend and I did about twice as much work as the others, for we were quick and willing. The only result was the satisfaction to our mistress. We had more and more work, with no increase of wages or shortening of hours. Tired as we were, with no chance of promotion, we would have been fools if we had not become malingerers as soon as possible. What was it to us if the silver had a slight extra polish? An additional ache in our arms! So much for the virtue of conscientiousness in work!

But how many of the sterner virtues ought we to expect from a girl who looks forward to such work all her life? Fortunately, most of them do not. There is the ubiquitous "gentleman friend" the only topic of conversation outside of the dining-room interests. Naturally, for he is the golden bow of promise. He is their only avenue of escape. It is small wonder that they take the first one who comes, and are quite satisfied if they only have a chance to "lie around." No wonder, too, that many of them prefer cheap boarding-houses to house-keeping, after years of such work as ours. The young man is the ideal, the hope of better things, to such girls, and to leave him out is an impossibility.

What will happen, then, if a girl has no place in which to see him, as was the case with us? We had not even a kitchen, for ours was in use until nine o'clock or later, and no girl will receive company under a fire of stares from her companions. Nor will she give up seeing him, so that either she must take him to her own room, or go out with him to walk or to some place of amusement, as is usually the case. Either alternative is bad. The two cannot get acquainted under simple, open conditions, and if marriage does follow, they may find each other's real character far different from the one displayed in the unusual circumstances of their meeting. Still more, if you imagine the wild craving for excitement that sometimes surges up in a girl bound down to excessive and monotonous work, you will understand how easily she might yield to any form of temptation. It is surprising that so few girls of this class use liquor.

If the girl has no "fellow," her condition is even worse,

unless she has some other strong interest. Genuine religious belief saves her, since she looks for a reward in the life to come. Some one dependent on her saves her. But if she chances to be alone, if she has only drudgery to expect, it would seem nearly inevitable that she should feel so damned already that nothing else could be worse. Such girls become reckless, if they have any fire of youth. They are the ones who fall by the way.

How far is the mistress blameworthy? Mrs. Jones was not a harsh or cruel woman. She was soft-spoken and in many respects fair-minded. At times she found fault, but upon legitimate occasions and in a proper way, while at other times she showed patience and forbearance under considerable provocation. Once in a while she "nagged" somewhat, but only when she was unusually worried, and I think none of us laid it up against her. We are all human. Her fault did not lie in any of these things, but in a total failure to put herself in our place. She honestly did not know that we worked thirteen hours a day until I told her. She was openly incredulous of it until I counted up the hours. I have no doubt that she would have denied it with indignation if anyone unable to prove it had made the assertion, and quite probably she has forgotten it long since, she was so unwilling to accept it.

I think she never tried to imagine the state of feeling which work for so many hours brings about, nor could she have done so if she had tried. That background of ache and lassitude so changes the values of life that I believe something of a gulf will always exist between the woman who has and the woman who has not possessed it. But Mrs. Jones did not even try to imagine it. She came among us physically fresh, alert, brisk, bright-eyed, and could not understand how we could be bleary, slouchy, and slow. After our day of work, she would ask one of us to go to her room to massage her, and would keep her there rubbing her for an hour, because she was "so completely exhausted." She was, for she had much mental worry—but in what condition did she suppose we were?

If she had stopped to think of it, probably she would have said, "Yes, the hours are long, but the work is easy." I grant

that it is unskilled, that it requires comparatively little mental ability; but let us see about the easiness. For about five hours, we had to load and carry trays weighing about twelve pounds. The rest of the time, our hands and bodies were exercised in all the movements of washing and wiping dishes, putting them away, and so on. The occupation is about paralleled by light gymnastics with half-pound dumb bells, with occasional walking. How would a person feel after eight hours of such gymnastics with five of heavier work coming at intervals?

Further, as our mistress lacked ability to imagine our bodily feelings, she lacked it in understanding our great need for variety, for something besides dishes and food. Here again her attitude was most naïve. When we gave notice that we were going, she asked under what sort of people we would work, with utter simplicity, "for you know, you will not often have a home of such culture and refinement as this." She must have thought that sweetness and light somehow oozed through the walls of her private apartment into the kitchen. I cannot account for her idea on any other basis, for we never went into any rooms except the kitchen and dining-room, and she never conversed with us on any subjects save those connected with eating.

This mistress, then, sinned chiefly in inability to imagine; and it is the sin that I have found in most of the mistresses with whom I have talked before and since this experience. She had herself done housework and therefore felt that she could criticize freely, but either she had never done as much as she expected of us, or had forgotten how it felt. She needed to live in the kitchen again.

Some will ask, "Why did not the girls complain of the work?" I wonder too, for she was not entirely unamenable to reason. But I think that they only showed a trait common to most people. How many teachers will bring a complaint to the school board or even to the principal? How many employees will carry a grievance to their employer? All of them will grumble to their fellows, but a combination of motives holds them back from complaint to the employer, a fear of losing their position, dislike to being thought a grumbler, and most of all,

probably, the inertia coming from the overwork itself, which holds the generality of mankind in the "station to which it has pleased God to call them."

This same inertia makes it wellnigh impossible for such girls to organize themselves so as to command an eight-hour day and better wages. Any woman who should undertake this would need leisure, or a tremendous amount of vitality in order to do it after her long working-day. In either case, she would need strong personal qualities, to draw these tired girls out to anything so stupid as a meeting. As a class, they seem unable to better themselves and the greatest consolation that I find in looking at them is that for most of them the young man is lurking in the background.

But I would not forget that there is another side to the story. We were irresponsible and neglectful of our mistress' interests. It was not unusual for a waitress who had been engaged not to come at all, while many who came left without telling Mrs. Jones that they were going. In the course of a day they would turn up for the money owing them, and always received it. The average servant, as we saw her, has little feeling that anything is due from her to her mistress. I had none myself. Is it not possible that many of the faults of which mistresses complain, aside from ignorance, rise from the half unconscious feeling in the servant's mind that, after all, the mistress has taken all that she can grab, and that she can easily go without the rest? Is not this feeling justified to some extent by their indefinite hours of work?

What is the solution? It would be premature for me to attempt an answer on the basis of a single experience. I have been giving only a snap shot at reality. But I would quote Jane Addams. She believes that the most essential thing is stated hours for work, and my past aches and pains urge me to add that the hours stated should be eight in number. What reasons can be given for making the average servant's day from one-third to one-half longer than anyone's else, especially when she works seven days in the week? An eight-hour day and six days in the week! What will become of dinner? I don't know—nor would I care if I were the waitress or cook!

A CASE STUDY OF DELINQUENT BOYS IN THE JUVENILE COURT OF CHICAGO

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I. POINT OF VIEW AND MATERIAL

This statistical investigation of one hundred cases of delinquent boys has been undertaken in the spirit of a one-time professional worker among such boys and their families, as well as that of a student of sociology and criminology. It will constantly call up investigative methods, information, and point of view acquired during a year's employment in Syracuse, N. Y., by a society practically combining the work of charity organization with that of juvenile court probation officers. From a more academic standpoint, it will also be in line with a later study of juvenile offenders whose police records in the same city were of six to ten years' standing—the object being to ascertain present condition and status of ninety such boys; the method, detailed inquiry into the individual cases, involving a large amount of visitation.

In the present study the *object proposed* was the investigation of family conditions, in each case, as causally affecting the conduct of the child. In connection with the location of the family home this naturally ramifies into consideration of practically the boy's whole environment.

The writer fully realized that only comparatively superficial facts could be brought out in the time and with the opportunities at command; but experience had also taught the heart-breaking obviousness of causes of juvenile delinquency in very many cases, and inspired the hope that it might prove well worth while to set forth in tabulated form some of these same obvious causes. We all know that loss of parent, lack of home comforts and necessities, proximity of boy gangs or resorts of vice, etc., have a demoralizing effect on the young. But it has never been deter-

mined in what proportion these various causes act; and though for the present it is doubtless impossible to do so, still investigation of such a typical list of one hundred as forms the basis of this study can hardly fail to shed at least a ray of light upon the problem.

These 100 cases were taken from the juvenile court records for the summer of 1905, that being the time at which the investigation was begun. It seemed advisable to have the cases as fresh as possible, and also to include only boys paroled or sentenced in town, whom probation officers would be fairly sure to know, since these officers must be relied upon for most of the detailed data to supplement official records. On this principle a list of about 175 was made from the court cases for ten summer weeks in June, July, and August, excluding mere dependents, all boys discharged or sent out of town, and all the girls, since delinquency among girls is rather a matter of vice than incipient criminality, and constitutes a distinct problem, closely allied, indeed, to that of boys, but not most profitably studied when undifferentiated from it. These cases were then classified according to the probation officers involved, and used as a basis for specific inquiries made to them. The final result is a list of one hundred about whom sufficient information was obtained to admit of tabulation.¹

As a prime requisite for value in such investigation is that the material itself be typical, certain general comparisons have been made, by way of test, between statistics derived from this list and from the official report of the Chicago Juvenile Court for 1905. The latter includes 2,000 cases in all. These are, however, never summarized, but are given by first, second, third, fourth offense, etc. As the first offenders, 1,300, constitute about 65 per cent. of all, the statistics given for them have been

¹For my material as a whole I am absolutely indebted to the courtesy and detailed assistance of the officials of the Juvenile Court of Chicago. They have given me access to the record files, desk-room in their offices, kindness and courtesy on all occasions, advice and explanation wherever needed; and finally over twenty of the field probation officers have patiently gone through the entire list of cases with me, answering questions and giving detailed information with a care equaled only by their invariable kindness and interest. I wish to express my heartiest gratitude to them all.

used for comparisons of parental religion and nativity; for age and offense, however, where first offenders would not naturally show the same proportions as the whole list, totals for the entire 2,000 have been reckoned and used. The following tabulations summarize results:

COMPARISON OF AGES BETWEEN SPECIAL LIST OF 100 AND ALL CASES OF THE YEAR

Ages	Per Cent. of 100 Cases	Per Cent. of 2,000 Cases
7.....	0%	0.3%
8.....	2	0.9
9.....	4	2.5
10.....	3	4.9
11.....	10	8.0
12.....	9	12.7
13.....	15	16.0
14.....	19	17.0
15.....	19	23.4
16.....	18	13.5
17.....	1	0.8
	100	100.0

The grand average for the 100 cases is 13.51 years; for the 2,000, 13.48. As to age, then, we may consider that our list is fairly typical. This is true also of religious affiliation.

COMPARISON OF STATISTICS OF RELIGION

	For 100 Cases	For 1,300 Cases
Catholic.....	52.0%	54.4%
Protestant.....	36.5	34.6
Jewish.....	6.0	7.0
Unknown.....	5.5	4.0
	100.0	100.0

The only striking discrepancy is in the proportions of Poles, for which no explanation is at hand. For the whole 2,000 cases the percentage is 14.2, instead of 15.9.

In comparing the following statistics of offenses for the hundred cases with those of the entire year, it must be remembered that (according to Ferri *et al.*) crime always varies in the direction of more violence in the summer season. That is, with adults there is said to be less crime against property and more against persons in the heated term. Boys, especially the younger

element, are not likely to commit much personal violence serious enough to be so classed at any time; with them this seasonal crime tendency may rather be expected to take the form of more adven-

STATISTICS OF PARENTS' NATIVITY FOR 100 AND FOR 1,300 CASES

	100 Cases	1,300 Cases		100 Cases	1,000 Cases
German.....	19.0%	17.0%	Jewish.....	2.0	7.0
American.....	15.0	16.8	Slav.....	0.2
Irish.....	12.5	11.4	Great Britain.....	3.0	2.5
Italian.....	10.0	6.6	French.....	2.0	1.2
Polish.....	8.0	15.9	Greek.....	1.0	0.2
Scandinavian.....	7.5	6.9	Dutch.....	1.0	0.2
Bohemian.....	4.0	4.6	Swiss.....	1.0	0.2
Negro.....	4.0	4.2	Canadian.....	0.5	0.7
Russian Jews.....	4.0	Not stated.....	5.5	3.2
				100.0	98.8*

* The remaining 1 per cent. of the official list is divided equally between Austrians, Hungarians, and Lithuanians, none of whom appear among the hundred of our study.

turous wrong-doing, misdeeds in which there is larger element of risk and violence in general. Partly because of this fact that summer cases might be expected to differ from yearly averages, and partly through personal interest, the writer has extended this comparison to the cases formerly investigated in Syracuse, N. Y. The

COMPARISON OF OFFENCES FOR 100 AND 2,000 CHICAGO CASES AND FOR 87 FROM SYRACUSE, N. Y.

	CHICAGO		SYRACUSE
	100 Summer Cases	2,000 Cases for the Year	87 Summer Cases
Larceny.....	35.0%	38.4%	38.0%
Incorrigibility.....	27.0	25.0	25.0*
Burglary.....	13.0	5.8	3.5
Assault.....	6.0	7.8	7.0
Mischief.....	4.0	2.9	17.5
Breaking city ordinances.....	1.0	1.7	9.0
Disorder.....	3.0	13.3
Railroad depredations.....	10.0	1.6
Forgery.....	1.0	0.5
Robbery.....	1.8
Selling transfers.....	1.2
	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Classed as "truancy and vagrancy" and as "lack of proper guardianship" on Syracuse records, but actual incorrigibility by Chicago standards.

latter were almost all entered in the summer of 1892. The average age for 91 boys was 13.23 years, slightly lower than that of the Chicago cases—13.51 for the 100 and 13.48 for the 2,000—as boys over 16 were not then considered juvenile offenders. Statistics for the three series of delinquents follow, in tabular form, four of the Syracuse cases being omitted as giving no data under this head.

Of course, some of the differences between Syracuse and Chicago statistics are merely those of classification and nomenclature. For instance, "malicious mischief" in Syracuse would include "railroad depredations" and probably much of what is classed under disorder in Chicago. "Flipping cars" is the only specified offense against city ordinances in Chicago; while in Syracuse such offenses include playing ball in the streets, swimming naked, Fourth of July pranks, and such minor matters, practically none of which have been found on our special list; they might appear in analysis of the cases of disorder for the entire year. If we add together cases of mischief, disorder, and railroad depredations in Chicago, we have substantially the same percentages for the totals as that for mischief alone in Syracuse—17 for the 100 cases, and 17.8 for the 2,000, against 17.5 for Syracuse. This would be very largely, if not entirely, justified by the real correspondences behind the figures.

Contrary to expectation, disagreements between the two Chicago columns are seen to be accentuated rather than otherwise by Syracuse figures. These disagreements are in percentages of disorder, and of burglary and railroad depredations—the latter also technically burglary, as each of the ten cases consists in breaking the seal of a freight-car. In disorder the 2,000 cases lead; in burglary, etc., the 100 show a very disproportionately high percentage. No explanation has been found for the excessive amount in Chicago of burglary so classed in the table. It is, of course, of the shed and barn type almost wholly—no real professional house-breaking—but even at that the figures are appalling. One is left to the cold comfort that possibly the summer of 1905, with its protracted teamsters' strike and consequent preoccupation of the police and resulting "carnival of crime," was

unusually rich in suggestion to more serious offenses. It is, however, entirely possible that the 100 cases are not typical in this regard even for the particular season. The excessive number of railroad depredations would be raised still higher by addition of the 11 cases of stealing from railroads that, in accordance with the precedent of the official report, have been classed simply as larceny in the table. Five of these also involved breaking into cars—technical burglary. This makes 21 per cent. of all our cases of offenses against the railroads that run through the city—not local systems of transportation, but the freight-carrying roads. Undoubtedly this offense is really very common, so many of the poorer quarters from which young delinquents come being located along railway tracks where temptation is constantly at hand; but it must be explained that at just this time such offenders stood a much greater chance of being caught than did others, because the railroads had a special force of detectives in their employ whose exclusive business it was to protect their property. These men naturally were not concerned for the individual boy; whether or not he really belonged in juvenile court, or even was actually guilty, was a minor consideration; the main thing was to check the depredations. Then, too, finding the boys in groups, they would bring them all into court together, inferring the complicity of all in the guilt of one. The 21 boys were brought in in 12 groups; 5 of them are pronounced good boys by the probation officers, and 3 more are among those classed in our final chapter as not characteristically delinquent—young “accidental criminals,” so to speak. Such boys do not properly belong in a list of juvenile delinquents, so far as their morals are concerned; but, on the other hand, there is always likely to be just such a contingent in any list taken by chance selection from court records; and ours is not, therefore, the less typical.

It may be remarked in passing that only 19 out of the entire 100 were judged sufficiently hard cases to be sent to the city reformatory. The rest were simply put on probation or “continued indefinitely” (in 4 cases), which amounted to practically the same thing in these instances.

On the whole, then, we may regard our material as very fairly representative of the varieties of boy and of home that furnish us with juvenile delinquents, if not in the country at large, at least in Chicago, and presumptively also in our other cosmopolitan towns of sufficient size to exhibit vicious and congested quarters of considerable area. We may accordingly proceed to our study of conditions in each case, with reasonable hope that conclusions drawn therefrom will be valid in the main as to causes of juvenile delinquency under our American city conditions in general.

II. STATEMENT AND GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THESIS

The general thesis of this paper may appear too obvious to require proof. It is simply that particular abnormal conditions, easily discoverable in each case and of obviously desocializing tendency, are sufficient to account for the great bulk of our juvenile delinquency, leaving the inference that such conditions, on closer study, account for it all. That is to say, it is not natural depravity nor blind chance directly determining lawlessness or order that fills our rolls of young offenders; nor even is it chance determining which of those living under generally bad social conditions shall be the ones to show forth the evil effects of these in lawlessness. The last notion subsists in half-developed form with many who would scout one or both of the former. General demoralizing conditions and institutions are indisputably among the causes of crime; and we must recognize the wisdom of those who point out evil tendencies for juvenile delinquency in such things as the prevalence of dishonesty in high places and its advertisement through the sensational press, along with other crime and vice, or perhaps in lack of solid discipline for life in our modern schools with their anxiety to make things interesting and easy for the child, or the still more general desocializing tendencies in the adolescent impulses of even the normal boy. Such examples might be multiplied. These particular ones were given, each as the main cause of juvenile delinquency, by three of the nine probation officers who gave general theories on the subject in discussing cases. Now, undoubtedly these experts know

whereof they speak; such things as these are very likely chief causes—and in the end are probably easier to reach and ameliorate than others more particular; but what we are after in this investigation is *determining* causes—the reasons why Johnnie Smith is bad, while Willie Jones, whose father takes the same paper and who is of the same obstreperous age and goes to the same school, is good, or at least not flagrantly otherwise. And we declare that we can tell why; that it is not a case of chance; that similarities in a typical list of Johnnie Smiths are great enough to warrant inferences of essential connection. We proceed first to summarize and study these similarities of condition, thereby putting concrete content into our thesis, and, second, in a concluding section, to summarize our cases by their causes or their lack of cause, so far as information goes, in a final attempt to substantiate the thesis.

III. CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY AS EXHIBITED IN THE DATA TABULATED

To work out these statistics, our entire mass of data was first incorporated as 100 skeleton monographs in one huge table, each of whose columns held the facts for all cases pertinent to its heading. Of all these columns the most striking in its exhibit of abnormal condition was that headed "Conjugal Condition of Parents." Its content is summarized in the following table, which speaks so emphatically for itself that it scarce requires comment.

When we see that 37 per cent. of our cases lack the care of a man and a woman legally their parents, or even stepparents, and living with them, and that 11 more have stepfathers or stepmothers or adopted parents, it surely needs no argument to prove that these 48 per cent. are at very serious disadvantage in the matter of life-training. We cannot wonder that the juvenile court is left to furnish them with some of the restraining influences for which parents are properly responsible. It is significant that of the half-orphans more than twice as many have lost the father as have lost the mother, and that, when adopted and stepparents are considered, three times as many of these boys

CONJUGAL CONDITION OF PARENTS

Normal.....	53*	cases
Both dead.....	4	"
Father dead.....	21	"
(Stepfather in 6 of these)		
Mother dead.....	10†	"
(Stepmother in 4, adopted mother in 1, of these)		
Parents living apart.....	10	"
Father has deserted.....	2	
Mother has deserted.....	2	
Otherwise separated.....	6‡	
Adopted parents.....	1	"
Mother living with series of men.....	1	"
Total.....	100	"

* Parents still in Germany in 1 case; boy 16 years old.

† Father has deserted child, 1 case; stepmother and child, 1 case.

‡ Fathers merely away for treatment (1 insane, 1 consumptive) in 2 cases.

are without any sort of paternal as are without corresponding maternal care. Similarly of the 10 cases where parents are living apart, the boy is with the father in only 4. Apparently for the sort of "outbreking sins" that bring youngsters into court the father's strong right arm is a better preventive and corrective than the mother's gentle influence. But we must remember that, where there is no paternal support financially, the mother is likely to be at work for others either in her home or outside. In either case she is probably unable to devote her main time and attention to caring for and training her children, and they suffer lack of both paternal and maternal care. As will appear from the next table, 8 of the 15 widows indicated in the last, and 2 of those separated from their husbands, are known to be so employed.

Because of the obviously very great importance of the *mother's occupation* for the care and training of the child, it was made a special point for inquiry during the whole investigation. Results are summarized below, adopted and stepmothers being included in the list. It is a fact, as significant perhaps as the abnormal conjugal conditions just examined, that in hardly more than half—or 54 per cent. of the cases only—is the mother at home and even nominally free to make her family and household duties her sole business. Sixteen per cent. are either not living at

OCCUPATION OF MOTHERS

At home, not gainfully employed.....	20
At home, not known to be gainfully employed.....	34
Employed by the day at washing and cleaning.....	16*
Otherwise gainfully employed at home.....	10†
Otherwise gainfully employed away from home.....	4‡
Living in separation from the child.....	6
Dead.....	10
Total.....	100

*Five widows.

†Two widows, 1 separated from husband.

‡One widow, 1 separated from husband. The four are occupied: as domestics, 2; visiting nurse, 1; in tailor shop, 1.

all or not living with the child; 20 per cent., if we include the washerwomen, etc., are at work more or less regularly away from home. Of the remaining 10 per cent. that are gainfully employed at home, most, to judge by their occupations, would have their time fairly well filled by their various industries. Two are dressmakers (one a widow and one a drunkard's wife); another widow has an employment agency; a separated wife, possibly immoral, keeps a house for roomers; one woman is a janitress; one, a palmist; another keeps a small boarding-house; and three assist in their husbands' business—respectively, a store, a laundry, and cheese-making in the family living-room. The number known to be regularly employed away from home is unimportant, especially where we note that the tailoress' only son is grown, and that one of the domestics had her boy with her and might therefore be said to have taken the home along. But it is emphatically contended that both irregular employment for the mother for entire days outside the home (when adequate provision for the care of the children is less likely to be made than in case of regular outside work), and full employment with outside work of her conventional working hours within the home, are very great drawbacks in the training of the child. Not only when the tenement is full of people interested in palmistry or in getting employment, or of odors from cheese-making or laundry, but under any circumstances when the mother is trying to care for her house and children as a secondary business, disorder and

discomfort are likely to prevail. It may be that such an unhappy state of things would in any case be the normal one in these particular homes, and that the family is better off with the mother's extra wages than with her extra time, which would be largely wasted anyway in ignorance of what should properly be done. This contention is, indeed, made.² But most of us will cling to the conviction that the mother of little children would much better be on hand with extra time and extra nerve-force for the meeting of emergencies; that the child stands a distinctly better chance of being wisely handled by an untired, even if ignorant, mother than by one exhausted with double work; and that economic conditions making it better in individual cases for the mother to earn money are so much the greater evil.

The *number* in each family is worthy of attention for its bearing both on demands upon the mother's time and on the economic status of the family, the subject to be next considered. In only 76 of the 100 cases is this number given. The comparative lack of large families among them may be matter for surprise, but there is no reason to believe that the other 24 would average larger—rather the contrary. Of the 76 only 44 families have more than 5 members, including parents or guardians; only 3 of these have more than 10. Thirty-two, then, or 42 per cent. of all those known, have 5 or less than 5.

In this general connection it may be well to consider the *paternal occupations*, as indicating social and economic status rather than as directly influencing delinquency. The occupations are not found to be such as would put special temptation or evil example in the boys' way, save possibly in one or two instances. A general classification is given in the table that follows. The "entrepreneurs" are peddler, cheese-maker, saloon-keeper, cigar-dealer, junk-dealer, laundryman, and small storekeeper. The trades are 14, ranging from barber to engraver, and showing never more than 3 individuals. It would be interesting to know in how many cases the father's employment is irregular. Mr.

² See, for example, Mabel Hurd Willett, *Employment of Women in the Clothing Trade*, pp. 204, 205.

John McManaman, former chief probation officer in the Chicago Juvenile Court, in an article on "Causes of Delinquency of Boys" in the *Juvenile Court Record* for April, 1906, says that out of 100 cases investigated he found 45 where the offense was "due to irregular employment of the father and irregular habits in the home."

OCCUPATION OF FATHERS

Unskilled labor	37	cases
Skilled trade	21	"
Small entrepreneur	7	"
Miscellaneous	6	"*
Incapacitated	2	"
Dead	19	"
Unknown	8	"†
Total	100	cases

* Car-inspector (2 sons), street-car conductor, salesman, janitor, medical student.

† Half of these are stepfathers.

ECONOMIC CONDITION OF FAMILIES

Own property (usually the home)	13
Others on comfort level	43
Poor	20
Very poor (dependent)	16
Unknown	8
Total	100

Passing to direct evidence on the *economic condition* of our 100 families, we summarize in the above table the facts given. It should be explained that not all those classed as above comfort level actually live comfortably; most of them do so, and all are economically able to. Thirty-six per cent. of the boys come from homes that are poor; that is, homes where the children are presumably not well nourished, nor always hygienically clothed and housed. The significance of this would doubtless be obvious to most readers, yet it may add definiteness to quote here some recent statistics on the physical effects of poverty that have been worked out by the eminent Italian, Alfredo Niceforo, from measurements of Swiss school children, and set forth in his book *Les classes pauvres*, published as a volume in the "Bibliothèque sociologique internationale" in 1905. Niceforo measured 918 boys for height, weight, strength (pressure of the right hand in kilos), chest girth, and respiration; he also made head-measure-

ments of 703 boys. Considering as "poor" the sons of ordinary skilled workmen and day laborers, and as "comfortable" those whose fathers were clerks, merchants, and professional men, he summarized results in numerous tables, of which the one here given is typical:

FIFTY SONS OF MASONS (A) AND FIFTY SONS OF PROFESSIONAL MEN (B)

Age 9	Average Height	Average Weight	Average Strength	Average Chest Girth	Chest Expansion
A	122.5 cm.	21.8 k	12.3 k	58.4 cm.	4.7 cm.
B	129.3	25.5	13.7	58.7	5.1

Head and face anomalies also show a tendency in favor of the well-to-do. For example, among 70 of the poor children 135 such anomalies were found, as against 94 among 70 of the comfortable class.³ For a third intermediate class, the small tradesmen and lesser clerks (*employés*) were abstracted from the comfortable class, and parallel statistics were tabulated for the three types of children,⁴ indicating plainly that a degree of physical difference corresponds to each of the three degrees of economic comfort. Tests of endurance brought similar results: in making ten strokes of the dynamometer, the poorer children showed a marked relative falling-off in force after the fifth stroke.⁵ Psychic inferiority also is posited as characteristic of those reared in comparative poverty. Part III of the same work is given up to evidence and discussion under this head. Now statistics have also been assembled to show that juvenile delinquents are drawn more largely from the ranks of these slightly (or more than slightly) defective boys than from among normal and well-developed children. In evidence we may cite the testimony of recent reports of the Chicago Parental School (for truants) and the Child Study Department of the same city. In the former we have the statement,⁶ based on tables scattered through the report, "that about 17 or 18 per cent. of the truant class are decidedly below normal, physically and mentally, as against 10 per cent. of other public-school children." This is a statement of permanent defect, and

³ See *Les classes pauvres*, p. 55, table.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 30, table.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-43.

⁶ Report of 1904, p. 49.

not of curable condition due immediately to unhygienic life at home before commitment.⁷ The inferiority is manifest as defects in growth, in bodily functions, and in strength, and as disturbances in motion (over-excitability, sluggishness, or lack of co-ordination), and in sensation.⁸ Similar testimony comes from the John Worthy School, the Chicago city reformatory for boys, to which 19 of our cases were committed. In comparing measurements of 284 inmates "with the norms obtained by measuring normal children," it was found that the former were inferior in all physical measurements taken—an inferiority that seemed to increase with age.⁹

An essential connection between intellectual and physical conditions in children is pretty generally admitted. Dr. W. Townsend Porter's examination of 33,500 St. Louis school children in 1892 went far to prove it;¹⁰ and a further test of Dr. Porter's proposition by W. S. Christopher, M. D., with Chicago school children lent further confirmation. Dr. Christopher's report, as read before the American Pediatric Society in 1900, includes most instructive charts, showing the increased height, weight, vital capacity, and strength of grip of twelve-year-old children as they are found in ascending grades of the public schools. Defects among backward pupils he also discovered in marked number and degree.

This long digression may seem good evidence for the proposition that one argues most for the weakest point. It is not, however, intended to demonstrate that because 36 of our cases are poor, therefore those particular 36 are necessarily bad, but merely to show the general connection between poverty and delinquency by statistical methods, as well as by appeal to the popular judgment that a child who is undernourished, undersized, and defectively equipped mentally cannot be expected to

⁷ The amount of the latter is startlingly indicated by the statement on p. 10 that "a majority of these boys enter the Parental School distinctly below normal."

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 14; also tables, pp. 15, 23, 26.

⁹ See Report of the Child Study Department for 1899-1900, p. 4.

¹⁰ See Reports of the American Statistical Association for 1893.

take right views of what ought and what ought not to be done, or to exercise full will-power in resisting his temptations. The digression may serve a second purpose in substituting general averages for the particular figures of physical and mental measurements and tests quite impossible to make for our 100 cases.¹¹ Although we know positively of defects in only 10 of them—4 mentally subnormal to greater or less degree, 3 weak-willed, 1 showing results of opium-smoking, 1 with harelip, and 1 with a deaf ear—yet we may reasonably assume that a much greater number, though probably not the full majority indicated for boys actually committed to the Parental School, are really under smaller or greater handicap of this kind; and we must mentally reserve room for this point in our final summaries of causes.

Returning to the homes of our 100 boys (including but three pairs of brothers), we may spend a moment on the *condition of the home* as indicated in a rather general way by answers to the question whether or not the family is living under fairly hygienic conditions, in a state of reasonable order and peace, and apart from evil associations inside the home itself. A dark, unhealthy basement is not classified as good, even if the tenants manage with it as well as could be expected; but usually the condition of the home reflects pretty directly the character and efficiency of the parents. It was found to be good in 35 cases, fair in 31, bad in 30, and questionable, though not definitely known, in 3. One lad was homeless. In connection with parental character these data will be largely incorporated in the concluding section.

In classifying *neighborhoods* a more inclusive table has been made, showing not only the general character of each particular locality as good, bad, or fair from the standpoint of its probable moral influences upon the boy, but also the kind of street itself from a more external point of view, which will easily explain itself. The two classifications manifestly overlap; streets indisputably vicious would, of course, have a bad influence on the child living there; but so would a reputable street in or near which there are

¹¹ While, as summer cases, none of these were sent to the Parental School, yet they are distinctly of the truant type. Eighteen were officially reported truant, and only six were known to attend school regularly.

bad gangs, or where there are notable congestion and bad housing conditions, with their less direct, but perhaps equally certain, tendencies for evil. These two kinds of neighborhoods—or single street on the one hand and neighborhood on the other—should obviously not be classed absolutely as one.

CLASSIFICATION OF NEIGHBORHOODS

	Good	Fair	Bad	Un- known	Totals
Poor but decent streets not included below.....	3	15	11	..	29
Vicious streets	17	..	17*
Comfortable streets not thoroughfares.....	10	7	17
Thoroughfares (not vicious).....	3	5	8	..	16
Outskirts	2	10	..	2	14
Stockyard district.....	..	2	..	5	7†
Total	18	39	36	7	100

*Eight thoroughfares included.

†One thoroughfare included.

For a bit of possibly significant comparison a somewhat similar classification of neighborhoods in 91 Syracuse cases has been abstracted from the study previously referred to. This was a single classification in which those neighborhoods not unquestionably either bad or good were divided into thoroughfares, fairly comfortable and also poor streets not thoroughfares (classed together as "decent streets"), outskirts, and "Jewry" (a section of the town more analogous to the cheaper metropolitan business streets, including thoroughfares and some congested blocks). To reduce Chicago figures to a basis approximating this, we (1) add together those in the column headed "good;" (2) take the "vicious streets;" (3) the remaining "outskirts," and (4) thoroughfares (including one in the Stock Yards district), and (5) combine the remaining comfortable, poor, and Stock Yards streets.

Fully half the "bad" neighborhoods in the Syracuse column are not notably vicious, but they are miserable streets, not classifiable under any other of these heads. "Jewry" would include nearly all the thoroughfares and some "other decent streets." As between the good localities and outskirts in Chicago, it might perhaps be fairer to transfer from the former to the latter the

NEIGHBORHOODS IN SYRACUSE AND CHICAGO CASES

	Syracuse	Chicago
Good.....	13.0 ⁷ %	18.0 ⁷ %
Bad.....	19.9*	17.0
Outskirts.....	13.0	12.0
Thoroughfares.....	14.0
"Jewry".....	16.5
Other decent streets.....	31.0	39.0
Unknown.....	6.6
	100.0	100.0

*8.9 vicious; 11 wretched canal section.

two cases classed as both in the former table. In general, the standard for pronouncing a section good or bad was doubtless somewhat lower with the Chicago cases.

On the whole, similarity is close enough to waken interest, when we realize that one set of cases came from a town of 100,000; the other, from a metropolis of nearly 2,000,000. From both tables we may safely conclude that rather poor back streets and outskirts that are decent, but utterly uninteresting, furnish many more delinquent boys than do the vicious sections—apparently some three times as many. In one way this is not significant for the former sections have more than three times the population of the latter; but from another standpoint it is both significant and encouraging, for it is evidence that more boys need the positive help of direction toward objects of wholesome interest than need the practically impossible negative help of abolishing vicious quarters. The large percentage coming from thoroughfares in Chicago—and also presumably in Syracuse, where the vicious and the Jewish sections lie along thoroughfares—will hardly surprise those who know the street life and the lack of play space in such quarters.

Of the 17 from comfortable streets in Chicago, 4 are not characteristically delinquent; 8 lack the care of their own fathers, either through death or separation of the parents; 1 of these and 1 other have no mother; 1 has drinking parents; and only 3 are left for us to class as delinquent in spite of circumstances apparently favorable. One of the 3 would seem to be an instinctive liar, if such a thing exists; 1 has an apparently irresistible

impulse to steal; and the third, a boy with a harelip is a smoker and generally incorrigible. Of the 17, 2 are known to be members of a regular gang, and 3 others are influenced strongly by bad associates.

This brings us to the subject of *gangs* in general—that baleful influence that turns good neighborhoods bad, gives every member an excuse in every other member, and can produce a net result of youthful deviltry far ahead of any aggregate of misdeeds the members would individually commit. Of the 100 cases, 20 were brought in with one other (not all of the “others” appear in our final list), and 25 with more than one other—a total of 45 who were in gang mischief. Five more are specifically recorded as having bad associates, and in at least 4 other cases there is known to be a bad gang in the neighborhood. How many were regular gang members, we cannot tell—probably a number more than the 13 so reported. On this point, again, Syracuse statistics correspond with those of Chicago boys. Of the 70 cases in the smaller town where information under this head was available, 51.4 per cent. were brought into court with others.

SUMMARY OF APPARENT CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY

Death or absence of one or both actual parents.....	48 cases
Mother gainfully employed more or less regularly	30 “
(In 8 of which the father is missing)	
Very large families (more than 10).....	3 “
Poverty in.....	36 “
Bad condition of home.....	30 “
Probable ditto.....	3 “
No home.....	1 case
Bad neighborhood influences.....	36 cases
Apparent gang connection	50 “

Setting aside gang connections (which, after all, are result as well as cause, and temptation to which is too general to be reckoned on quite the same basis as individual family conditions), the leading cause of delinquency would seem to be the loss or absence of parents. Poverty, bad neighborhoods, and bad homes take practically equal rank in the list; often, of course, they occur together. Employment of mothers is a factor almost as

frequent, caused often by poverty, and itself leading to bad home conditions. It practically adds a considerable percentage to that indicating lack of normal parental care through loss of parents by death or separation.

This mass of causal factors discovered among 100 actual cases would abundantly justify the thesis stated in section II, if they could but be distributed evenly throughout the list. This, of course, they are not. They themselves are causally interrelated, and occur in many instances together. How nearly they do account for all the hundred cases will be made apparent in the concluding section. Meanwhile, they give us definite content for our general thesis, and we may accordingly declare, not only that most juvenile delinquency is due to obvious causes, easily discoverable in each case, but also that most prominent among these causes are loss of parents and bad home conditions, economic, hygienic, and social (or relating to neighborhood).

IV. STUDY OF THE 100 CASES AS EXHIBITING SUFFICIENCY OR LACK OF OBVIOUS CAUSE. FINAL DEFENSE OF THE THESIS

For this final study mere counting of cases that show abnormalities of condition will not suffice. It would be idle to fix an arbitrary number of abnormalities to be considered as sufficient cause in all cases for delinquency. We can but apply ordinary human judgment—trained, perhaps by experience with such boys and their parents—to each particular case in the light of all known data regarding it, and then classify it as having or not having sufficient obvious cause. Accordingly three classes have been differentiated, and a table of what seem the main causes made for each as an aid to more intensive study of them. The three classes include (1) those cases where conditions are obviously against the boy; where, in other words, delinquency would naturally be expected; (2) those showing somewhat less though still reasonably sufficient external cause, where the boy would apparently have about an even chance of keeping out of court; and (3) those where no reasonably sufficient cause has been discovered, taking into account all conditions known, and balancing advan-

tages with drawbacks.¹² It is by no means intended to imply that none of those classed under (3) have sufficient cause for their delinquency in the very parental and home conditions we have just been studying. Indeed, their records show just such abnormalities. Present knowledge merely does not warrant the statement that these abnormalities are with them effective causes of delinquency.

The classifications in the following tables differ somewhat from those previously used. The effort is no longer to find what are the causes of delinquency, but rather in how many cases is there indisputable cause of any sort. Therefore most inclusive terms are most convenient. For instance, bad homes as the immediate outcome of parental character appear only as such conditions are subsumed under general parental incapacity and neglect.

CASES HAVING SUFFICIENT OBVIOUS CAUSE

Parents or guardians incapable or neglectful.....	32
(One or both actual parents missing, 8)	
Parents separated*.....	3
Boy at hotel.....	I
Influenced by gang.....	I
Influenced by bad neighborhood.....	I
Home bad, largely through economic conditions.....	9
Father dead, mother at work.....	5
*Parents separated, mother at work.....	I
Low neighborhood.....	3
Bad neighborhood and gang.....	<u>I</u>
Total.....	45

¹² Our original monographic tabulation of all data would show in detail the grounds for our distribution of cases among these classes, and furnish our thesis better support than any statistics of the classes when differentiated. As the printing of this table is, however, impracticable, we give the more salient facts from the first cases assigned to classes (1) and (2) as types to indicate more concretely our basis of classification.

(1) I, orphan of 13 years, living with complainant, an immoral sister. II, boy of 14 sent to reformatory for stealing, home ill-kept, parents culpably neglectful in opinion of probation officer. III and IV, boys of 13 with inefficient fathers and wretched basement homes. One family (Polish) includes 7 children and ignorant, incapable mother; the other (Italian), 6 children, whose mother helps at cheese-making in hot and dirty living-room.

(2) 4 boys of 14 and 15. I and II have widowed mothers and bad associates.

CASES WITH LESS CAUSE

One or both parents dead or deserted	16
(Remaining parent remarried, 2)	
Unsuitable adopted parents	1
Special temptation	11
Into bad gang	8
Violent, drinking father (good mother)	1
Through apparently innate weakness or subnormality	3
Total	29

CASES WITHOUT SUFFICIENT CAUSE APPARENT

Delinquency not characteristic	13
Parents dead or not in the United States	5
Subnormal or easily led	2
(Also 1 under last head)	
Unexplained	6
Total	26

Of the last 6 cases very bad influences may have come from adjacent neighborhoods in 2; in 1 the immediate offense was due to race-feeling between Jews and Irish; 1 was that of a youngster fascinated with the trick of giving false fire alarms; 1 boy was the incorrigible "natural liar" previously mentioned; and 1, the son of a boarding-house keeper.

The three tables might be briefly summarized as follows:

GENERAL TABLE OF CAUSES

Guardianship inadequate	58
Through character of guardians	34*
Through lack of parent	24†
Home bad through poverty	9
(Fathers lacking, 6)	
Special temptation into gangs	9
Subnormality in intellect or will	5
Total	81

* Including adopted parents and drinking father from second table.

† Including 3 cases of separation from first table.

Thirteen of the remaining 19 are really not delinquent boys. Out of 87 cases, then, where explanation of delinquency may be

III lives near many vicious boys and has a brother also delinquent. IV has a violent drinking father not on good terms with the mother, and an older brother formerly delinquent.

demand, we have obvious and reasonably sufficient cause for from 74 to 81, according as we include or exclude cases of subnormality and lack of parents from the last of the three class tables. The bulk of the delinquency represented by our cases would surely seem to be explained—and almost entirely—by loss of parents and by home conditions. The latter, too, are in all but 12 cases¹³ internal conditions of the home itself, not relating to its locality, and are directly due to the character of the guardians or the loss of actual parents. The 12 cases of special neighborhood and gang temptations would presumably not have occurred were the home advantageously located. How many of the remaining 5 cases¹⁴ of subnormality are due to defective nutrition and training it is impossible to say. They are all cases apparently amenable to training, or they would not be undertaken by the court.

These conclusions may be disheartening to those who would fain go forth and remedy the causes found in such investigations. We cannot bring back dead parents, nor can we thoroughly reform and train the evil and incompetent. Nevertheless, home conditions can be greatly modified by numerous modern ameliorative agencies, each one a boundless field for extension and improvement. Such are all sanitary provisions for the building and regulation of the home or the health and safety of its inmates, together with economic measures like workingmen's insurance or the relief of fatherless families in their homes, and all reforms by which delinquent parents are increasingly brought to the cognizance of the court, or clubs and lectures are instituted for the less-favored fathers and mothers to awaken interest while instructing in parental duty, or by which, when as a last resort children must be given new homes, the placing-out system properly administered is substituted for the old "institutionalizing" orphanage. Besides all this, remembering that in most cases the immediate suggestion to a lawless act comes from without the home, we may turn hopefully to "preventive work" with the boys

¹³ The last 4 of the first, and the 8 gang cases of the second table.

¹⁴ Three in the second, and 2 in the third table.

themselves, seeking to develop healthy interests and power of self-direction and control. In this field we have the movements for play space and supervision, physical training, wholesome amusements, transformation of street gangs into orderly clubs, improvement of the schools with increased use of the ungraded room, and finally the extension and perfection of the whole reformatory system, as preventive for the future, with its special industrial and truant schools, its juvenile courts, and above all its probation officers, who supply directly to the largest possible circle of young offenders much of the good influence their natural parents lack.

Better than all these is undoubtedly a good home with two good parents; but where that is impossible, let us not despair. If the natural prop is gone, the normal limb removed, we have always to make the best possible substitute, thankful that we know definitely what is missing, and have not to fight blind fate or dark obsession; that, though the artificial limb can never be a sound live leg, yet with it the patient may get about to do his share of the great world's work.

THE OPIUM TRADE IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES

I

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Among the many grave problems which face the American government in the Philippines, one of the very gravest is the opium problem. Its solution depends on Congress, for whose information and guidance has been submitted the report of the commission¹ appointed by Governor Taft in August, 1903, to investigate the laws regulating the opium traffic in all oriental countries, the conditions of the retail trade, etc., and, most important of all, to give its views on the possibilities of restraining the opium habit. We learn from this report, as it was published a short time ago, that the commission recommends the traffic in opium being immediately made a government monopoly, with the object of gradually restricting the opium till, after three years, it shall be imported only by the government and for medical purposes.

Pending the action of Congress, a few words on opium in the Dutch East Indies, next door to the Philippines, may be acceptable.

The harmful influence of opium can be taken for granted. One of the most complicated drugs in the pharmacopeia, it seems that exactly this characteristic makes it so highly versatile in its action on the human system, affecting as large an area of nervous surface, with so much intensity and in so many ways, as its marvelous complexity would lead us to expect.² Testimony regarding its terrible ravages in China, India, and wherever it was brought (mostly by the kind offices of European "civilization": the English opium war etc., etc.), is certainly not wanting.

¹ This commission was composed of Right Rev. Charles H. Brent, bishop of the Episcopal church in the Philippine Islands, as chairman; Major Carter, president of the Board of Health of the Philippine Islands; and Dr. Albert, a Filipino, resident of Manila.

² Horace Day, *The Opium Habit*.

An unmitigated evil, the opium habit never loosens its grip, but insinuates itself ever more. The moderate and even the minimum opium-eater is a slave to the stimulant, as the moderate alcohol-drinker is not, says the *Lancet*. And the Malays say, in their picturesque way: "First the man eats the opium, and then, after a little while, the opium eats the man."

In Mohammedan lands the use of opium is proscribed together with the use of strong drink and, among the puritan Moslem, even the use of tobacco. Though not all so strict as Sultan Murad IV in his less indulgent days,³ we find, on the whole, that the native rulers in the islands of the Malay Archipelago, before the advent of the Dutch, did what they could, and often in a very radical manner, to protect their subjects against the baneful drug. The old historians of Java relate how Kei Aria, sultan of Bantam, determined to get rid of the "opium-suckers" in his dominion. A Javanese, who had sold some of the contraband stuff, suffered for it with the loss of both his hands and was banished to the Lampongs; the white traders, responsible for the import, were severely discountenanced.

The radjah of Lombok, to give another instance from another island where another religion prevails, took the same position against opium. In one of his ordinances we read:

The prince who rules in the land of Silaparang, wishing to issue regulations regarding the smoking of opium, in accordance with the counsel of his chiefs and nobles, together with the Bralmins and priests of Buddha and Siwa, ordains that it shall be forbidden to the members of the three castes and their posterity to use opium and all that is prepared with or originates from opium, because of the bad consequences which the use of opium certainly has. From the oldest times it is known that opium spoils the *hadat* (unwritten tradition) and brings the realm to destruction; that it is the very worst thing one can commit oneself to; it stains; it soils; it is far from producing a good disposition; on the contrary, it leads people astray; it makes that they consider only their lusts when all sorts of sinful thoughts are engendered; that they covet the possessions of others, and that many vices enter their bodies. Smokers of opium forget the duties handed down by their ancestors; they do not listen to the words of their sovereign; they neglect the teachings of God. They believe what they should not believe, they eat what they should

³ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire Othoman*.

not eat, they partake of forbidden meat and drink. It cannot fail that they must help to populate hell if they do not better themselves in purification.

These were no idle words. We have good authority⁴ for the statement that the radjah of Lombok was in dead earnest and that he did everything in his power to keep opium out of his island. No sooner, however, had the Dutch government ousted him, after the expedition (wonderfully characteristic in many respects) of 1894-95, than opium was officially introduced into Lombok, *pecuniae causa*, as it was introduced into Bantam and the Preanger Regencies; as the first building for public use, opened in Kota Radja, under the Dutch flag, when the Dutch government had got a foothold in Atjeh, was not a church or a school or some such sentimental institution—but an opium den!

Even in these days of new light on colonial science, the Dutch have yet to learn that whatever is morally wrong never can be politically or economically right. The native rulers before the time of the East India Company held more honorable and enlightened views on that subject *in re* opium than the present Dutch government. When we are told that the use of opium was known in the Malay Archipelago for centuries, as it was known in all oriental countries, we must add to this statement that, as far as can be gathered, the native princes and princelings saw the dangers of the opium habit clearly enough and did their utmost to protect their subjects against it, with notable success. They were far from trying to make money out of vice, like the Dutch East India Company first, and the Dutch government later, "drawing its millions of gold⁵ from a fatal abuse of its subjects."

The attitude of the native princes and princelings, wherever they had a chance, remained meanwhile strictly against opium. Instances of their acting upon that principle—except for the Preanger Regencies, of which I shall speak later on—are to be found, e. g., in the traditions of the *Vorststenlanden*, so called, of

⁴ F. A. Liefcrinck, at one time resident of Bali and Lombok, speaking in the *Indisch Genootschap* at The Hague, December 30, 1902.

⁵ *Tonnen gouds*, more than f. 17,000,000 a year: J. De Louter, *Handleiding tot de Kennis van het Staats- en Administratief Recht in Nederlandsch Indië*.

central Java; and T. Roorda relates⁶ that the princes of Java proper, in the writs of appointment, *piagem*, given to their different subordinate chiefs, *wedanas*, *klirwons*, *panerwoes*, and *mantris*, prohibited the smoking of opium, making it as penal an offence as gambling and laying wagers, falsification, the protecting of bad characters, and everything comprehended by them in the expression "evil-doing" (*slegt bedrijf*); the transgressors were threatened with "calamity" (*onheil*).

Thanks, then, to the native rulers, Java and the other islands in the Malay Archipelago, though opium was known, remained free of the opium *habit* up to 1600. Opium-eaters, afterward opium-smokers, could be met only sporadically in such harbors, on the coast of Atjeh, at Palembang, at Bantam, where foreign traders mingled with the population. The few cases on record in the interior always refer to some scion of the higher nobility, led to the vice by an exceptionally luxurious life and the contact with unscrupulous foreigners, whites more often than otherwise.

A marked change was brought about by the East India Company, not slow to seize its opportunities for gain, and as early as 1677 that honorable body made itself master of the opium monopoly for Java, declining, however, at first to enter into the details of the retail trade. The opium, bought in Bengal, was knocked down at public auction in Batavia, wholesale, to the highest bidder, who received a license for the importation into Mataram and elsewhere, and sometimes had to pay import duty in addition to his bid.⁷

But very soon all sorts of regulations became necessary to keep the retail trade in hand by controlling the license-holders and, especially, by repressing the smugglers who began to assert themselves as they have done ever since. The Dutch East India Company, later the Dutch government, securing a snug profit on the sale of opium to the natives, adventurous spirits, inclined to the faith of the *contrabandista*, did not see, and still does not see, why it should not turn what it considers just as

⁶ *Javaansche Brieven, Berigten*, etc.

⁷ De Louter.

honest a penny in the same business. Even the servants of the East India Company, and others who derived their income principally from the so-called *morshandel* (i. e., the private commerce, in all shades of illegitimacy, on the side of the crowning monopoly claimed by the company's board of directors), did not disdain the clandestine traffic in opium as a new road to wealth; and so we find, as early as 1678, an ordinance against the increasing luxury displayed by the burghers of Batavia—really an ordinance against their smuggling, and so understood in the light of an accessory measure, threatening the cause by attacking the effect.

Meanwhile, thanks to the efforts both of the East India Company and of the smugglers, the use of opium increased rapidly. It is estimated⁸ that it went up from 1/750 Amst. pound per year and per capita in 1600, when the East India Company began its work, to 1/54 Amst. pound in 1678, when the East India Company had taken charge of the entire opium trade by claiming the monopoly, and 1/39 Amst. pound in 1707. A good start! But not without some little drawbacks. The opium habit assuming its power, criminality reached a pitch formerly unknown. Many grave offenses against the law, and in particular many assassinations in Batavia, were traced to the influence of the drug. Therefore, and “because the slave who smokes opium is nearly always dishonest,” the smoking of opium, and of tobacco mixed with opium, was prohibited within the jurisdiction of the city of Batavia. The demoralization of the natives outside of the city of Batavia, where they could not molest the good burghers either by killing or robbing them, did not matter in the least. On the contrary, it meant money, and nothing was left undone to insure a higher revenue from that demoralization; exactly as at the present day, only with the difference that the government of Dutch India is less outspoken about it than the East India Company⁹—in fact, adds the Pecksniffian sin to its rapacity.

⁸ J. C. Baud, *Proeve van eene Geschiedenis van den Handel en het Verbruik van Opium in Nederlandsch Indië*.

⁹ nademaal het groote oogmerk van den amphioenhandel is, de

The expectations of higher revenue to be derived from the opium trade with the extension of the East India Company's territory were not realized, comparatively speaking. And again the authorities put the responsibility on the shoulders of the smugglers, then as now the scapegoats of official miscalculations in the matter of opium. Governor-General Van Imhoff, believing that free competition in the opium trade was the only way of saving the East India Company from the *cercle vicieux* in which it moved, presented a report to the board of directors, during his involuntary stay *in patria*, 1741, setting forth his views. The High Powerful Seventeen did not quite agree, but the final outcome was that Van Imhoff, after his return to Java, founded the so-called *Amfoen-Societeit*,¹⁰ a stock company, whose shares were held, at least for the greater part, by servants of the East India Company. This *Amfoen-Societeit*, supplied with opium from the company's stores, held the monopoly of the retail trade, and could not think of any better use of its rights thus acquired than to farm them out to the highest bidder; the first instance in the history of Dutch India of rights, monopolized by the foreign rulers, being farmed out.¹¹ The first opium farmer was Lim Beeng Kong, a Chinaman, as from that time all opium farmers have been, and most farmers in other branches of indirect government taxation! The city of Batavia was still closed for opium, and when Lim Beeng Kong began to dispense the drug in small quantities (the surest way of getting at the bulk of the people), opium dens, in the sense of those infamous, officially and semi-officially sanctioned institutions, now of such unsavory repute, where *madat* may be bought or leisurely consumed, were still unknown in the districts around Batavia—as unknown as, up to 1754, in East Java. The *Compagnie daarvan zooveel mogelijk te doen gaudeeren;*” because the great object of the opium-trade is to make the company profit thereby as much as possible.

¹⁰ *Amfoen*, *afioen*, derived from the Greek *σμός*, means generally the opium as it is bought wholesale, *opium crudum*. In Dutch India the pure opium, *opium depuratum*, is called *tjandoe*, and the pure opium further prepared for smoking purposes, *madat*.

¹¹ Cf. Baud, *op. cit.*

refinement in the wholesale poisoning of the people came only by degrees. Nobody could expect more, even with the help of Chinese opium farmers. Lim Beeng Kong did what he could, worthily filling his place at the head of a long line, with many side branches, of worthy successors. And the leading genii of the *Amfioen-Societeit*, emboldened by the financial success which marked the beginning of the farm system, took a step most illustrative of that national foible immortalized in the old rhyme:

In matters of trade, the fault of the Dutch
Is giving too little and asking too much.

They raised the price of their opium, with the natural consequence that immediately the smugglers were heard from. Section 40 of the *Amfioen-Societeit's* charter invested its managers with the power to equip armed vessels, using them for the repression of the traffic in contraband opium; but it seems that they never availed themselves of this privilege.¹² They left the waging of open war to the representatives of the East India Company as such. And the East India Company's representatives tried hard, but did not succeed very well. The extent of the trade in *tjandoe glap*,¹³ and the assurance of the dealers in that commodity, even at that time, may be learned from one of the company's orders, dated April 29, 1746, in which it is stated that the forbidden merchandise generally was landed on the island of Bawean, the place of rendezvous for the smugglers from Malacca, Djohor, Palembang, Bangka, Blitong, Bali, Bandjermasin, and other harbors on the coast of Borneo. Sometimes, when Bawean seemed too closely watched, they changed their arrangements and met at Balamboengan or at any other convenient point on the coast of Java, where the East India Company had no means of asserting itself; but the island of Bawean, not to forget Soemanap, was considered the great stronghold¹⁴ of the gentlemen who entered into competition with the opium monopoly.

When reading of the East India Company's inability to defend its monopoly, with the profits accruing therefrom, against

¹² Cf. Baud, *op cit.*

¹³ Dark, i. e., contraband opium.

¹⁴ Cf. Baud, *Konkelnesten voor smokkelaars en lorrendraayers.*

tjandoe glap, and finishing up with the information now imparted nearly every day, by any chance number of any newspaper, edited in any of the principal towns of Java, the first impression must be that history repeats itself. This will be made clear, *lucē clarius*, later on, as far as concerns the opium *regie* of the present government of Dutch India. As far as concerns Van Imhoff's *Amfloen-Societeit*, the above may suffice to show that it suffered a good deal from the clandestine trade, and when its own supply of opium was reduced from 1,200 boxes of 100 kati¹⁵ to 450 boxes, as a result of a quarrel between the English East India Company in Bengal and the Dutch East India Company in Java, it succumbed altogether. The *Amfloen-Societeit* was dissolved on the last of November, 1792. Sad ending of a dismal failure to reach the primary object of its foundation: suppression of the traffic in illicit opium, together with a minimum sale of licit opium, under a *soi-disant* monopoly, to the extent of 1,200 boxes of 100 kati per year! The following may serve as an illustration of the extraordinary pains taken for poisoning the population to, at least, that 1,200 boxes' limit. The opium farm at Batavia, for some reason or other, having reached the high-water mark, or rather the low-opium mark, of its capacity, momentarily unable to sell any more, one hundred boxes of the drug were sent to Celebes, with an accompanying letter for the governor of Macassar, requesting him to foist that invoice on the natives as soon as possible. Such requests had, as they still have, if not the form, yet the force, of a command, non-compliance with which would, as it still will, be construed into the acknowledgement of unfitness for advancement. But the governor of Macassar, who thought of his highest duties first, returned the hundred boxes to Batavia, informing his superiors that he saw no chance of disposing of the stuff, if they gave him three years for it. That governor's name, Looten, deserves to be remembered, especially in a time when advancement determines the average official's conduct, exclusive of all other considerations.

¹⁵ One *catty* or *kaddy* (Malay: *kati*) = 16 *taëls* (Malay: *tail*) = 1½ pounds avoirdupois.

The charter of the *Amfloen-Societeit* not having been continued, after long years of hesitation the exploitation of the opium monopoly was given into the hands of an *Amfloen-Directie*, composed of a director (one of the highest officials in the East India service), two administrators, a cashier, and a bookkeeper who, at the same time, acted as *scriba* or secretary. The instruction for the *Amfloen-Directie* shows that no great changes were meditated; the whole quantity of opium considered necessary for a year was to be sold in one lot at public auction; the retail trade was left to the farmers; 7 per cent. of the net gain was reserved for special purposes; one-sixth went to the governor-general, one-sixth to the director-general, and so on—a premium to stimulate the zeal of the high functionaries for the extension of the opium habit which proved so profitable.

Other people also, however, wanted a share of the profit. This had led, except for smuggling, to an increase in the price of Bengal opium, which went up incessantly, following the increased demand.¹⁶ Such experience, together with the unpleasantness, already referred to, between the Dutch East India Company in Java and the English East India Company in Bengal, made the High Powerful Seventeen bethink themselves of other and cheaper sources of supply. Opium traders, mostly sailing under the English flag, were encouraged to bring their merchandise direct to Batavia. An experiment was made with 15,000 pounds of opium, bought in the Levant; but with little success. The governor-general and council at Batavia wrote home, asking to be excused from putting Levant opium on the Java market. The opium-smokers did not like it, and they were afraid, moreover, that the shipping of the drug in the company's vessels, arriving from Dutch ports, would induce greedy persons to send contraband opium, as already had happened, in butter-kegs, in cans, like tinned meats or vegetables, and otherwise disguised.¹⁷

At an earlier stage of the disagreement with Bengal an

¹⁶ Baud gives, e. g., the following prices: for 1760, f. 222; for 1761, f. 278; for 1762, f. 326; for 1763, f. 375; for 1764, f. 402 per *maund*.

¹⁷ "In *verbloemde verpakkingen*."—Resolution of the Castle of Batavia, January 18, 1779, and January 12, 1780.

investigation had already been ordered to ascertain if no *papaver somniferum* could be raised in the island of Boeroe, or other islands of the Moluccas, without prejudice to the spice trade, because the increase in the use of opium in Hindoostan might lead to new difficulties regarding the supply from Bengal.¹⁸ The investigation ended in nothing, and somehow the notion of cultivating the papaver plant in the Malay Archipelago for a home supply of opium, however often the subject may have been broached since 1753, has never led to even an attempt in that direction up to this day. The government struck a negative attitude (its time-honored custom in so many different phases of colonial life), prohibiting the planting of papaver in private enterprise, under penalty of confiscation and heavy fines.

Smuggling, on the whole, went on as briskly under the régime of the *Amfioen-Directie* as under the régime of the *Amfioen-Societeit*. It became so general that even the commanders of British men-of-war, who touched at Batavia, were required to pass their word of honor that they had no opium on board their ships.¹⁹ More on this subject can be read in the account of an English sailing-master who, during the last decades of the eighteenth century, not only coasted and traded, but smuggled from port to port in the Malay Archipelago, and in his later days of *otium cum dignitate* felt a call, on the strength of his twenty years' experience, to initiate his compatriots into the (not all too) secret science of landing a cargo of five hundred boxes of opium on Dutch East Indian territory, under the noses of the Dutch officials.²⁰

The *Amfioen-Directie* lasted till the advent of Governor-General Daendels in 1808. The decrease in the foreign trade, a consequence of the Napoleonic wars, had also affected the opium traffic. At the public auction of 1794 the quantity of opium sold could not be made to exceed 973 boxes (which still gave a net profit of f. 1,378,887), and the Commissaries General, trying to restore the market to the point of selling 1,200 boxes,

¹⁸ Secret resolution of July 23, 1753.

¹⁹ Cf. Baud, *op. cit.*

²⁰ H. M. Ellmore, *The British Mariner's Directory and Guide to the Navigation of the Indian and Chinese Seas*.

expressed their opinion that it was better to make a certain given profit on a large quantity—in fact, on the largest quantity possible—than on a small quantity of a certain given commodity, *in casu* opium.²¹ The old policy of great gain on small business got a new twist to meet changed conditions. But the twist was not sustained by changes in other directions. The opium traffic declined fast, and remained declining till Daendels stepped in and perfected the farming system. The farmers henceforth had to buy their opium from the government at fixed prices. This was the general rule, but sometimes, by way of exception they were allowed themselves to import the opium they wanted, paying a very high import duty. New privileges accorded to the farmers with regard to the opening of places where *madat* not only could be bought, but also smoked in due style, worked like a charm—for the benefit of the exchequer. The net profit on the opium farm, reduced to f.250,000 in 1809, was soon doubled.

Progress indeed; but, compared with the days of great lucre under the East India Company, the state of affairs looked far from satisfactory. And this gave a chance to those few, Dirk Van Hogendorp in the first place, who wanted Holland to clean itself of the opium stain. Their views found more favor than before, seeing that, after all, there was not so very much money in poisoning the natives. Thus, e. g., we find it on record that Mr. Nederburgh who, in 1794, as commissary-general, had done his level best to raise the sale of opium from 973 to 1,200 boxes, in 1803, as a member of the commission appointed to draft a new charter for the Dutch East Indian possessions, with his fellow-members condemned the opium traffic in rather forcible terms and proposed, though permitting the opium trade at Malacca, under condition that no opium should be shipped from there eastward, to prohibit the import of opium into the islands east of Java altogether and to make the import into the island of Java itself subject to an express license; while the authorities should be directed explicitly to heed, under their special responsibility, that everything be done, whenever the local condi-

²¹ Resolution of Commissaries General of October 25, 1794.

tions warranted it, for repressing or, if possible, for abolishing the use of opium in the island of Java.²²

Dirk Van Hogendorp had preached what another enlightened man, a few years later, honestly tried to do—Thomas Stamford Raffles, the inscription on whose monument in Westminster Abbey truly says that

. . . . selected at an early age to conduct the government of the British conquests in the Indian Ocean, by wisdom, vigour and philanthropy he raised Java to happiness and prosperity, unknown under former rulers.

As the historian of Java, Raffles wrote:

The use of opium, it must be confessed and lamented, has struck deep into the habits and extended its malignant influence to the morals of the people, and is likely to perpetuate its power in degrading their character and enervating their energies, as long as the European government, overlooking every consideration of policy and humanity, shall allow a paltry addition to their finances to outweigh all regard to the ultimate happiness and prosperity of the country.

As the administrator of Java during the English occupation, Raffles brought his theory into practice, being of the opinion that the direct financial losses resulting from the repression of the opium habit could be more than balanced by the moral benefit to the natives, and, as a natural consequence, their material progress.

The flag of high morality in all relations with the native population, of late more ostentatiously raised under the motto of a special providential consecration of the Dutch government to colonial duty on earth as the foundation of an ethical Dutch colonial policy, has been continually waved since the days of Raffles by Dutch ministers of the colonies, whenever they wanted to distract attention from the real government slogan: *virtus post nummos*; but the English governor of Java, the first who really brought an ethical element into the colonial policy of the white man with regard to the population of that beautiful island, was perfectly sincere about it.

²² Report of the Commission for East Indian Affairs, August 31, 1803. Baud ventures the remark that no more is heard of the advocated restriction of the opium traffic in the regulations and instructions issued later on by this commission.

Too sincere to suit his superiors. He was accused of obstructing the machinery of the opium farm, disobeying the orders that had reached him from Calcutta in April, 1813, with the definite object of lowering the opium revenue to prepare the way for his arguments when he should come with the proposition of prohibiting the use of opium altogether. The dissatisfaction with his opium policy became more pronounced after his ordinance of September 1, 1815, providing that the use of opium, after the expiration of the still running contracts with the opium farmers, would be restricted to the towns of Batavia, Samarang, and Surabaya, and the *Forstenlanden*.²³ The authorities were afraid that such measures might prove harmful to the opium auctions at Calcutta and the sea trade between Bengal and the Malay Archipelago. They ordered Raffles to abrogate his offensive regulation, and he complied by regulation of January 25, 1816. When, in August of the same year, Java was restored to the Dutch with their other possessions east of Ceylon, the opium farm returned to them in full swing.²⁴

And the opium farm, run by Chinese opium farmers, proved such a success, with the modifications introduced by Governor-General Daendels, again resorted to, that it was gradually brought to the other islands also. In 1824 new concessions were made to the farmers; longer contracts and larger farm districts to work in; with the happy result that they felt willing to pay a higher price for the privilege of poisoning the natives. The opium habit, artificially fostered, promised much for the future.

Meanwhile the Dutch Trading Society (*Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij*) had been founded in the same order of ideas which led to the introduction of Van Den Bosch's culture system (*cultuurstelsel*) and on the first of January, 1827, the opium monopoly was surrendered to that commercial body for certain considerations. The Dutch Trading Society imported the drug wholesale, but left the retail trade to the farmers. As far as the population was concerned, its connection with the opium monop-

²³ Regulation III, 1815, for restricting the retail vend and consumption of opium.

²⁴ Cf. Baud, *op. cit.*

oly did not bring any change; and no change came either when, on the first of January, 1833, that connection ceased.

The opium farm held the field while, with or without reference to moral motives, *pour le besoin de la cause*, every few years improvements were made in that huge machinery for squeezing money out of the natives and degrading them at the same time—improvements according to the new lights of new official luminaries, sometimes more and sometimes less productive to the treasury for its immediate wants, but always injurious to the prosperity of the population and detrimental to the economic conditions of the country.

The government kept its wholesale price of opium as high as it could in supplying the farmers, who themselves, therefore, turned to smuggling, taking their chances of enormous profits when all went well, or loss, at the government rates of the licit article, when the illicit *tjandoe glap* failed to relieve the pecuniary stress. No wonder that the sums they stood ready to pay, from term to term, for the exclusive right of the retail trade under the government monopoly, in this or that farm district or opium parcel (*opium-perceel*), varied considerably. In consequence, the amount of the opium revenue, from year to year, became very uncertain.²⁵

To meet this uncertainty, the so-called *tiban* and *siram* system was introduced on the first of January, 1834—a new departure founded on the (quite erroneous) supposition that the quantity of opium which the population “needed” was approximately known. Conformably, the quantity of the drug which every opium farmer had to take for his lot or parcel, at a fixed and, of course, not too low price, became officially determined; this quantity was called *tiban*. The quantity which afterward, in addition to the *tiban*, might be required by the opium farmer to satisfy the “needs” of the population was called *siram* and held at his disposition by the government, up to a certain maximum, at the wholesale price which the government had itself paid. The opium farm went to the highest bidder—i. e., to him who

²⁵ De Louter, whose *Handleiding* is taken as a basis for the following short history of the opium farm.

promised to pay the highest sum for the privilege of the retail sale, independently of the prices exacted for *tiban* and *siram*. These prices and the maximum quantity of the *siram* changed continually with subsequent changes in the general effect of the system on population and treasury; but, in principle, it was maintained, after 1850 even with decreasing maxima of *siram*. In 1855 came Governor-General Duymaer Van Twist, who did away with the maxima and allowed the farmers as much *siram*, at the market price of opium, as they might "in reason" require. This measure was meant as an effort to get at an estimate of the real extent of the opium habit and, principally, to deal a hard blow at the traffic in contraband opium. But that blow proved very ineffective, and the only result was an increase in the sale of *siram*, its quantity trebling within five years, while the *known* use of opium jumped from 62,000 to 105,600 kati.

This experience led to the abandonment, in 1862, of the *tiban* and *siram* system, and the introduction of the maximum system, so-called. The maximum quantity of opium to be allowed for every opium parcel was officially determined on the basis of a maximum of 87,528 kati for the whole of Java. The opium farm again went to the highest bidder—i. e., to him who promised to pay the highest sum for the privilege of the retail trade, taking his supply from the government at f. 20 per kati, with the understanding that the fixed maximum should not be exceeded. Only once the farmers saw fit to come up to that maximum. At the same time, the number of places licensed for the retailing and smoking of opium was reduced, while the extent of the areas where the government did not allow opium at all was expanded—a reactionary movement, the first and the last, not only in theory, but also in practice, which Dutch India has known after the English occupation. But the result was wholly imaginary, thanks once more to that fatal indecision which characterizes the government even when trying its very best: the *known* use of opium, truly, went down to 70,478 kati in 1869, but the traffic in *tjandoe glap* reached alarming proportions. Instead of taking the necessary steps for opposing that illicit trade Governor-General Mijer resolved in 1870 to return

to the *tiban* and *siram* system with unlimited supply of *siram*, considering that making a little money out of the sale of government opium was preferable to leaving all the profit to the smugglers, against whom all laws and regulations seemed powerless. This same line of thought led to the opening for opium of some opium-free areas. The Preanger Regencies and the residency Bantam, however, remained closed; it was reserved for the twentieth century to witness the introduction of opium into those vast regions, under a ministry that waves the flag of a special Christian mission in the Dutch East Indies as no other ministry before.

In 1871 the *known* use of opium marked 200,000 kati on the government scale; in 1872, 266,500 kati. Qualms of conscience again had to be humored, and again the supply of *siram* was limited, this time to a quantity twice the quantity of the *tiban*. Governor-General Loudon, in 1862, as minister of the colonies, having identified his opium policy with the maximum system, so called, reintroduced it on the first day of January, 1873, putting the maximum supply for Java and Madura at 117,360 kati. Since his term on the regal throne, with many changes—too many here to be reviewed at full length (in 1890, e. g., a set of thoroughly revised opium regulations appeared in the official *Staatsblad*), the opium farm continued its work under the maximum system until the time was considered ripe for an opium *regie*, theoretically conceived as an improvement, and in its practical form—that is to say, in the first conception of its practical form—the creation of the minister of the colonies, W. K. Baron Van Dedem, who meant exceedingly well.

It seemed, indeed, imperatively necessary that something should be done against the growing opium danger. The evils of the opium farm grew apace, and not the least evil was the demoralization of the civil service. The government wanted the opium farm to bring in as much money as possible, and the Chinese opium farmers carried it with a high hand, knowing that few officials, having to choose between the interest of the population and their (the Chinese opium farmers') interest, which ran almost parallel to the financial interest of the government,

would dare to cross them. "Almost" parallel, not quite; for the opium farmers entered also with great gusto on the career of opium-smugglers, and knew how to ply their double trade with the connivance of powers and dominions, deities of official heaven: bribery and corruption reigned supreme. It did not help much that the penalties on the transportation, sale, and possession of clandestine opium were steadily made more severe; that steadily more branches of the civil service were called upon to enlist officials in detective work connected with the contravention of the opium laws. The opium-farmer-smugglers, next to almighty in their resorts, throning high above mere official influence, rejoiced in the government adding so many more servants to their staffs. The traffic in *tjandoe glap* prospered, in direct ratio, as it would seem, to the number of qualified or semi-qualified official or semi-official opium-hunters, as they were commonly named. Nothing could dishearten the smugglers, not even the appointment, in 1889, of a choice man to direct the government opium affairs—an "opium-hunter-general," so to speak; an official of high rank, with long authority and a correspondingly long title, especially detailed to confound the dealers, high and low, in *tjandoe glap*.

Meanwhile the maximum quantity of opium to be supplied to the opium farmers, at the rate of f. 30 per kati, was gradually increased (to 171,780 kati in 1894), and nothing was left undone to make the farmers pay as much for their privilege as possible. When their monthly payments came in promptly, the government did not look too closely into their sharp practices with regard to the population—e. g., the opening of unlicensed opium dens—quite a common and, by connivance of the officials, almost sanctioned contravention of the law. The number of licensed opium dens was officially decided for every residency. During the short wave of righteous indignation, already referred to, their number had decreased from 2,793 to 670 for Java and Madura, with an upward tendency after 1874 (to 864 in 1894, and so on); but everybody knew—except, apparently, those whose business it was to know and to prevent—that the opium farmers sold their *madat* wherever they chose, just as they bought their

crude material, their *tjandoe*, wherever they chose, only the relatively small quantities officially supplied to them having passed the government storehouses at Batavia, Samarang, and Surabaya. As a matter of fact, all the regulations existing on paper to protect the natives, and all the fine sentiments appearing, year after year, in the colonial reports, had absolutely no practical value; nothing but printer's ink, to use a word of Prince Bismarck. The opium farmers did exactly as they pleased, with the kind assistance of the officials whose services they knew how to requite; and the government, indifferent to their breaking of the law, insisted on one thing only: that they should make the opium business pay. This has been proved in many cases. Here I shall advance no more than a single instance.

Ho Yam Lo, a wealthy Chinaman of Samarang, having his eye on the opium farm in Solo, in 1889 instructed his legal adviser to ask the high authorities at Batavia whether or not the authorities in that residency would be directed to allow in future the sale of unprepared opium, which, thus far, had not met with any obstacle, though strictly forbidden by law. The answer of the secretary of the Department of Finance was characteristic. "The government," he wrote, "cannot allow, of course, any transgressions of the law to go unpunished, but otherwise there is nothing known at our department of *any intention* to make any change in the existing conditions."²⁶ The existing conditions, even when illegal and, moreover, in direct opposition to the interest of the population, never run any danger of change when there is a little money in it. This has been sufficiently proved, not only in the history of the opium farm and now again in the history of the opium *regie*, as will be made clear later on, but also in the history of many another government institution, notably in the history of the pawnshop farm—the collection of a tax on poverty through not over-scrupulously honest Chinese middlemen. Abolished in 1870, on considerations of a moral character, it was reintroduced in 1880, also on considerations of a moral character and, *mirabile dictu*,

²⁶ Translated as literally as possible. The original words are to be found in *De Indische Gids*, September, 1892.

exactly the same considerations, good enough to satisfy the curiosity of the general public, this way or that. The real considerations, of a strictly fiscal character, never come to the surface in documents given out for the perusal of the masses.

The opium farm gradually extended its grip to the external possessions, as the Dutch East India possessions outside of Java and Madura are called, but in a different form to meet different requirements. Thus, e. g., the maximum system was not introduced in the external possessions, except for a short time in Atjeh. It has already been remarked that, almost immediately after the taking of Kota Radja, a government opium den was opened in that place as a symbol of western civilization under the Dutch flag. The Lampongs were joined in one lot or parcel to the Batavia residency, and, with local variations, the opium laws and regulations in force for Java and Madura (or, rather, enacted, but not in force), especially those concerning the transportation, sale, and possession of clandestine opium, held good, officially, wherever the opium farm appeared. The import of opium into the external possessions was generally left to the opium farmer himself, according to his needs, subject to the payment of a high import duty. The export of opium was prohibited.

It must not be imagined that the government felt inclined to wait very long for the results of the opium farm in Java and Madura, before introducing and extending the opium habit, as a means of revenue, into the external possessions. The west coast of Sumatra offers a fit illustration, and in a letter written by Lieutenant-Colonel Elout in June, 1832,²⁷ we find the following:

As a means of revenue, the introduction of opium was promoted with the help of the bayonets; the officers [of the army] were put in charge of the sale. That disgraceful trade was conducted in this way: They sold the crude opium to the native chiefs, heads of the different districts, at a certain price for a certain weight, and there lay the profit pocketed by the administration. The heads of the districts sold to the lesser chiefs, and so on, everyone taking his profit, till the opium-smoker was reached. The officers therefore

²⁷Cited by H. J. J. L. Ridder de Stuers, *De Vestiging en Uitbreiding der Nederlanders ter Westkust van Sumatra*.

received moneys, and while ready cash was not always on hand, especially because two-fifth parts had to be paid in silver, they took all sorts of objects of value as security.

Mr. Van Swieten, at one time governor of the west coast of Sumatra, stated²⁸ that, urging the abolition of cock-fighting at a *koempoelan* (meeting) of native chiefs, they assured him of their willingness to comply with his wishes in that respect if he promised his good services, using his credit with the government, to deliver them from the evil of opium. He granted their request, and the native chiefs had their way, opium disappearing; but after a while the government changed its mind again, and decided that the natives had better smoke opium as before.

Mr. Van Coevorden, at one time president of the Padang Highlands, on the west coast of Sumatra, testifies to the reintroduction of opium as follows:

During my term in office one important measure relative to this residency was taken, which affected native life deeply. A few years before, the use of opium had been generally prohibited, at the request of the native chiefs. Without consulting them, the opium farm was reintroduced. The governor, understanding that this measure was sure to create a bad impression, ordered me to assemble the chiefs, wherever convenient, for the purpose of making them acquainted with the will of the government, telling them that the use of opium had not ceased after the prohibition, and that its continuance, in view of the impossibility to check the trade in clandestine opium, had no object; that, however, it was an evil thing for the chiefs and all honest, good men to be addicted to the drug. In consequence of that order, the necessary publicity (to the motives of the government as stated) was given everywhere; but I must say that most of the native chiefs were strongly opposed to the change.²⁹

As a pretext for the reintroduction of the opium farm, fostering the opium habit, the native chiefs were told that the government felt unable to check the trade in clandestine opium. The facts in the case are, however, that the governor of the west coast of Sumatra had asked, in 1867, the same penalties against smuggling as existed for Java, with imprisonment or forced labor at non-payment of the imposed fines; that *two years and a half* later the director of the Department of Finance

²⁸ In a meeting of the *Indisch Genootschap*, The Hague, November 8, 1876.

²⁹ *Uit de Loopbaan van een Nederlandsch Indisch Ambtenaar*.

answered him—having wanted so much time to reach the conviction, he said—that the object in view could not be obtained; that severer penalties also would be perfectly useless; that therefore the opium farm had to be reintroduced as soon as possible. But the penalties, considered useless for a system which served the interest of the population, were not considered useless—on the contrary, were at once enacted—to serve the interest of the opium farm; i. e., the interest of the treasury!

This was not the only time that governors and residents of Sumatra's west coast tried to interfere for the population, when reasonable wishes, just claims, old vested rights were slighted by the central government. It happened also, e. g., when the planting of the coffee by forced labor became an almost unbearable burden to the natives; and again, quite recently, when the decision was made that they should pay direct taxes, from which they are expressly exempted by the *Plakaat Pandjang*, their original agreement with the government, most solemnly entered upon and which the free-born Malays of ancient Menang Kabau and dependencies, adhering strictly to its spirit and letter, regard as their Magna Charta,³⁰ while the Dutch government, whenever it feels strong enough, does not scruple to disregard it, in keeping with its fatal, dishonest, more-revenue policy. The government dislikes such appeals of conscientious officials, and answers them with a hypocritically worded, red-tape-bound variant on a well-known historical saying: "D—— your consciences! Make them smoke opium, plant coffee, pay a maximum of direct taxes and leave us, high-priests of the exchequer, in sacerdotal glory and peace!"

The growing sense of the moral and financial disadvantages connected with the opium farm led, in the Netherlands, to the foundation of an anti-opium league, which tried to arouse popular feeling against that institution. It might have been considered strange indeed if the anti-opium movement in Great Britain, headed by the good Earl of Shaftesbury, had not found some imitation in Holland, always ready to copy foreign

³⁰ *Plakaat Pandjang* means almost literally *Magna Charta*.

countries in the display of popular feelings and emotions which, invariably, get diluted and more often than not, in their transplantation, turn aside from the original meaning. But, then, there is a splendid opportunity for public appeals; for the appointing of committees, getting one's name in the newspapers; for a good deal of pretentious, high-sounding talk, dear to the descendants of the florid, verbose *rederijkers*.

The *Anti-Opiumbond* in Holland never got beyond the first flourish. Actual action against an institution so productive of easy profit, still dearer to the Dutch heart than rhetorical display, could not be expected; and the scandals of the opium farm remained unchecked till Mr. W. K. Baron Van Dedem, as minister of the colonies, worked out a practical solution of the opium problem in the opium *regie*. That solution came slowly, and the father of the opium *regie* never lived to see its general introduction—perhaps a kind dispensation of Providence, for his benevolent theory got so distorted in practice that certainly he would have disowned a system which now intensifies the principal evil of the opium farm, leading in its grasping rapacity to new vexation of the natives. The word of Mr. De Roo, retired director of the Department of Finance, "God, in his compassion, save Dutch India from an opium *regie*!" sounds almost as a prophecy in the light of present revelations.

He was not the only one who foresaw that any new move on the opium board would surely mean a move in the wrong direction—i. e., the wrong direction considered from the standpoint of the charitable intentions, paraded in the States General. "We know," a member of parliament said, "where the blows will fall, when the battle between government opium and clandestine opium is going to be fought over the heads of the natives, without the opium farm as a buffer between the treasury that wants all the revenue a fostered vice is able to yield, and the smugglers who claim their share." Solemn promises, however, that the great object of the opium *regie* was the restraining of the opium habit, finally to stop it altogether; eloquent references to the benign disposition of an immaculate government, gained the day, proving a snare and a delusion afterward. Perhaps the

authorities meant the right thing at that moment. There is a bare possibility that they misled themselves, in foolish simplicity of mind, as much as they misled the nation at large; but then the reproach of Allan Breck comes in: "Ye're ignorant [of your own ways], and ye cannae see't."

The island of Madura was chosen for an experiment. Beginning on the first of September, 1894, the government itself, through its agents, was to retail the opium, prepared at a government opium factory situated near Batavia on the old estate Struswijck. The experiment proved not such an unqualified success as parliament had been led to anticipate, especially with regard to the expectation that the government, doing away with the middlemen, the opium farmers, now was going to pocket, not only the old profit on the wholesale trade, but also the middlemen's profit on the retail trade. This, though, might be adjusted in another way, presently to be discussed. The government, undismayed, continued in its reports to represent the future of the opium *regie* in brilliant colors, pointing to a truly seductive picture of dazzling statesmanship: the opium habit to be stamped out and, wonder of the age, the government at the same time to make so much more money out of the opium traffic. The government press intensified the brilliant colors still more, and Colonial Jan, the shrewd opium-dealer, appeared in its columns to the admiring public as an angel of light.

Under the shadow of his golden wings, spread as for a flight heavenward (which was destined to end in an ugly tumbling-down), Her Majesty the Queen Regent, then at Arolsen, on June 12, 1897, affixed her signature to a bill containing one single article. This article provided for a new item on the Dutch India budget, a sum of f.56,000 to cover the first expenses for the introduction of the opium *regie* in Java. The change came gradually, beginning with some residencies in the eastern part of the island, till on the first of January, 1904, the turn came to the residencies of Cheribon, Pekalongan, Banjoemas, and Kadoe, completing the abdication of the opium farm in favor of the opium *regie*.

Meanwhile, the general elections in the Netherlands, proving

disastrous to the "Liberals" so called, had brought another party to power—a party of views diametrically opposed to the "Liberal" principles in national politics. As to colonial politics all parties are of the same view, notwithstanding election claptrap and parliamentary rhetoric; i. e., the view that the colonies have to pay, in some way, first, second, third, and last. But it happened that Dr. Abraham Kuyper, the premier of the new cabinet, posing as a Christian cabinet *par excellence*, some time before, as editor of an Amsterdam newspaper, *De Standaard*, for this purpose or that, not knowing how he might be called upon to put his theory into practice, had pronounced sentence on the opium *regie* after his own emphatic manner, forcibly advocating the exclusion of opium where no opium had been tolerated before, and a strict enforcement of the system of the *verboden kringen*, closing for opium such regions where the opium habit had not yet taken a firm hold. *De Standaard* being a publication of decidedly religious character, Dr. Kuyper's editorial remarks were freely adorned with reproaches to a Christian nation, hypocritically tainted, he said, when it comes bearing Christianity to a population of millions and at the same time with opium that blunts in their hearts all ability to receive the gospel.³¹ The position of the government under the opium *regie* was decidedly more immoral than under the opium farm.³²

It might be thought that under a cabinet with such a Christian statesman as prime minister the opium *regie* ought to have seen its longest day; that, at least, it would be purified, shorn of its most disgraceful, most disreputable features. But no; it was, on the contrary, under the premiership of Dr. Abraham Kuyper, *ci-devant* head-editor of *De Standaard*, that the opium *regie* so loudly fulminated against, replaced the opium farm in the greater part of Java: not the opium *regie* in its first, theoretically beneficent shape, but the opium *regie* degraded in form and substance for "practical" purposes—i. e., for the greatest possibly pecuniary advantage to the ravenous exchequer; working worse havoc than the opium farm used to do, and bringing

³¹ *De Standaard* of November 14, 1888.

³² *Ibid.*, November 20, 1888.

opium, extending the opium habit, to large tracts of land where no opium had been allowed under the opium farm, the regions heretofore closed to opium, the *verboden kringen*, which the government had promised not only to keep intact, but to expand as a working-base for making the whole island of Java opium-free. This was the little device, held *in petto* to adjust the discrepancy between the great expectations of new gain on the retail trade of opium and the actual returns when again it became evident that the official administration, of no matter what, costs a good deal more than an administration without so much red tape, *in casu* the management of the opium business by opium farmers; when it became evident, also, that the opium-smugglers intended to have something to say on their own account.

The mountain district of Tenger, the residency of Bantam (7,326 sq. km.), and the Preanger Regencies (20,874 sq. km.), together about as large as the whole of the Netherlands and one-fourth of the island of Java, closed for opium under the régime of the opium farm, were opened for opium as soon as the government took the retail trade of opium into its own hands. This, to repeat it, happened under a cabinet, by way of distinction called a Christian cabinet, inspired by a Christian statesman who had thought fit, when in opposition to a former cabinet, to denounce the opium *regie* as a hypocritical artifice, pleading the extension of the areas closed for opium. A sound creed and a bad morality—that's the road to wisdom, Colonel Gordon might have added: and the road to success of a certain kind in politics.

The pretext was the same as in the case of Sumatra's west coast. The government asserted its inability to contend with the smugglers of contraband opium, its incapacity to enforce the regulations it had made. Everybody who wanted to smoke opium in the districts officially closed for opium might satisfy his desire with the greatest ease and perfect impunity. Notwithstanding the penalties threatened, opium might be had at any time in any quantity. The obvious conclusion that, if this were true, it seemed imperatively necessary to enforce the

regulations, penalties and all, much more strictly, found no favor with the government. Loudly proclaiming its impotence, the government considered the poorest excuse good enough to give the opium, under the opium *regie*, free ingress, where, under the opium farm, it had been excluded. The opium *regie*, from the government point of view, could be a success only when it brought at least as much money into the treasury as the opium farm. The Christian cabinet, talking to weariness of the ethical colonial policy it had inaugurated, showed its Christian hand by declaring opium-smoking good and lawful, the opium habit an excellent help for the purpose of moral education, higher civilization, if only government opium were used, at government prices, and not that horrid *tjandoe glap*. The vice of yesterday became the virtuous accomplishment of today, because the government saw money in it.

Under the opium farm no women had been suffered to smoke opium; they were not allowed in any of the licensed opium dens. As soon as the government took the retail trade in hand, under the opium *regie*, special opium dens were opened for women. Opium-smoking at once had become a crying need for a part of the female population; some women could not possibly do without, they *must smoke*—when it was no longer the opium farm but the government that supplied *madat*, pocketing the difference between wholesale and retail prices. The unnecessary, the uncommendable, the punishable by law, became the necessary, the commendable, the highly to be encouraged, because there was a chance of making a little more profit—welcome profit though dirty profit.

And—who will believe it?—the government maintained that all this was done simply to check the progress of the opium habit by substituting government opium for contraband opium! By a strange paradox the government claimed, and still claims, that opium can best be kept out by letting it in. And the dreaded effect, the spread of the opium in Bantam, the Preanger Regencies, and other tracts of land, is now actually produced through this wonderful attempt at prevention!

To condense the government argument: A certain area was

officially opium-free; non-officially contraband opium was to be had; the opium habit gaining ground, it was to be stamped out, not by teaching the smugglers respect for the law, but by entering into competition with them, bringing government opium on the market to chase out the *tjandoe glap*!

Official documents state naïvely that it will be easier to fight the smugglers in Bantam and the Preanger Regencies, restricting the opium habit, when those residences are open for opium, than when they are closed. The opposite seems more logical. Is it easier to defend a fortress with the enemy inside or outside the walls?³³ And the opposite is proved by what actually happened. Thanks to the high price of the government opium, the smuggler's trade is now in the most flourishing condition, his commercial star in the ascendant. For one transgressor who gets caught now and then (more often than not a low acolyte of the real transgressor, furnishing the capital and remaining out of sight), a hundred others are never touched. The government stands exactly as powerless against the smugglers as ever before; nay, more powerless under the opium *regie* than under the opium farm, for reasons later to be explained. Too parsimonious to organize an efficient police force on land, with a sufficient number of swift steamers, well manned and well armed, for a close watch on the coast line, everything is left to an opium service ridiculously equipped and most unreliable. The government of Dutch India has not yet learned that regulations are absolutely valueless without the will and the power to enforce them. This accounts also for the self-inflicted certificates of impotence it produced *in re* the opium regulations for Bantam and the Preanger Regencies, trying to explain the conflict between its good intentions, the theory of the opium *regie*, loudly proclaimed for foreign consumption, and its scandalous practice, poorly excused with a whining *non possumus*. Holland pleads inability to do what she should do as a colonial power: rule wisely and well; but proves withal such a sharp customer in money matters that even her shortcomings, in neglect of duty,

³³ W. Elout van Soeterwoude in *Nederland*.

are made a vindication of financial tricks, tending to injure the natives morally and physically through the propagation of vice. And all the while she poses as the colonial elect, intrusted with a special mission to civilize, to educate the natives to a higher life; her foul actions giving the lie to the Christianity she professes.

It has already been shown how the native rulers of Bantam stood with opium. A short sketch of the opium traffic in the Preanger Regencies may give supplemental information with regard to the attitude of the native chiefs at a later date, after the English occupation. When R. L. J. Baron Van Der Capellen, in 1824, began his campaign against opium in the Preanger Regencies, then under his care, he found the regents not only willing to help him, but very zealous indeed to further his plans, though the government, with cunning generosity, had interested them financially in the sale of the drug. Van Der Capellen belonged to the short-lived school of colonial statesmen, like Dirk van Hogendorp and Jean Chrétien Baud, who declared openly that they had "imbibed" their liberal principles of colonial policy during the English occupation.³⁴ This proposition, of course, was strenuously opposed by the authorities, especially by the director of the Department of Finance, whose objections, however, were met by such arguments as this, that the sale of opium in the Preanger Regencies did not amount to much anyway, and overcome, at last, by the consideration that the opium habit led to the smuggling of coffee—i. e., to the abstracting of coffee, planted by forced labor, from delivery at the government coffee *goedangs*. The natives, when they wanted to buy opium, sometimes sold the coffee they had to produce under forced labor (and for which the government paid them either nothing at all, or a very inadequate price with a very large margin for government profit) to coffee-smugglers (export), who harassed the government coffee monopoly as the opium-smugglers (import) harassed the government opium monopoly. This argument clinched; monopoly coming into conflict with monopoly, it was no longer a complicated problem of

³⁴ P. Mijer, *Levensbericht van Jean Chrétien Baron Baud*.

morality and "thrice darned sentiment," but a simple problem of arithmetic: which Monopoly paid best?

Financial calculations decided the government for coffee against opium. The native chiefs, whose financial interest was on the side of the continued use of opium, being in charge of the retail trade, from which they derived snug emoluments to encourage the opium habit, showed themselves above such calculations, and Resident Van Der Capellen could write to his brother, Governor-General Van Der Capellen, in a letter, dated August 24, 1824, that he found their attitude with respect to the sale of opium as generous as he possibly could desire, proving their willingness to co-operate with him, earnestly and faithfully, to oppose the use of opium through all efficient means. A little farther in the same letter the governor-general's attention was drawn to the fact that the regents, magnanimously sacrificing to some extent their own interests for the sake of contributing to the prosperity and morality of the population, "request Your Excellency to receive my [the resident's] proposition with favor, and pray Your Excellency to abolish the sale of opium in their regencies and to prohibit the importation of that drug in this residency."

We know the manner in which the government was brought to acknowledge the advisability of Resident Van Der Capellen's *mésure*; we know also its excellent effect upon the moral and material progress of the Preanger Regencies, soon a model residency. So much indeed that the words *verboden kringen* (areas closed for opium) became a sort of shibboleth, the policy of the closed door *in re* opium being systematically pursued. In an official communication of June 26, 1861, the secretary of the government, Wattendorff, called the reduction of the number of opium dens and the extension of the regions within which the use of opium was altogether prohibited, the *verboden kringen*, the two most powerful means for checking the opium habit. When the director of the Department of Finance, in 1870, beset by fiscal difficulties, wanted to touch these opium-free areas, the residents, whose residencies were affected by his proposals, rose

up against him as one man. They wanted, on the contrary, an extension of the *verboden kringen*.

The resident of Batavia pleaded for a prohibition of opium, not only in the districts of Jassinga and Tijibaroesa, but also in the districts of Buitenzorg, Paroeng, and Tjibinoeng; remarking that the government ought to prefer a loss of f.100,000 a year to the moral ruin of the population.

The resident of Banjoemas wrote that the native officials, during and after the new prohibitory regulations, had given themselves a great deal of trouble to fight the opium habit, and would feel *maloe*—ashamed—if the use of opium were again permitted.³⁵

The resident of Tagal wrote at a later date:

From this measure alone [strict prohibition of the use of opium] it is to be expected that a population which, in many respects, still must be considered in a state of minority, can find salvation against continuous degeneration, physically and mentally. And even if it be that, as a consequence, millions less are paid in (i. e., directly, for indirectly increasing prosperity and development of the country will prove sufficient to restore the loss), according to my conviction this financial drawback may not outweigh the much greater drawback that the population is demoralized in ever increasing degree (1).³⁶

Still later, November 28, 1889, the minister of the colonies, Keuchenius, said in parliament:

I have given the governor-general to understand how desirable it is again to increase the number of *verboden kringen* and not to augment the number of opium dens. The governor-general, in conformity with the advice of the Council of Dutch India, has created a few very small opium-free areas, in consequence of which measure the residency of Bantam, like the residency of the Preanger Regencies, from now on will be closed against opium. This resulted in the opium dens, there situated, being given up. And this is the only decrease in the number of opium dens brought about by this opium system. It was certainly impolitic to increase the number of the already existing opium dens there where the government wished to oppose the abuse and the extension of the use of opium. If there are more opium dens than [are] allowed by law, such opium dens are opened against the law, and it is left to the administration in Dutch India to maintain the regulations in this respect.

³⁵ Correspondence between the governor-general and the director of the Department of Finance.

³⁶ Communicated by Van Dedem in the *Indisch Genootschap*, The Hague, meeting of November 3, 1876.

The number of testimonies in favor of the beneficial effect of the *verboden kringen* might be multiplied indefinitely. Those already given seem, however, sufficient, and it may be worth while now to proceed to the proof that the government, using such a meager excuse as its inability to cope with contraband opium, when throwing open the Preanger Regencies for government opium, was itself the principal agent in clearing the way for the smugglers. Not only that they were encouraged by the slowness and laxity characterizing the (non-)enforcement of the regulations against which they sinned, but, as everything connected with the government proceeds in a slipshod manner, they even received a direct invitation to flood the Preanger Regencies with *tjandoe glap*.

This happened under Governor-General Otto Van Rees, when the so-called *Preanger-transport*—i. e., the privilege of the transportation of government produce and other goods, coffee, salt, etc., in the Preanger Regencies—was farmed out, for a period, beginning on the first of January, 1887, to a Chinaman—and which Chinaman? The opium farmer of Cheribon!

Everybody knew, except the authorities whom it concerned and who, no doubt, had their reasons for not knowing—everybody knew, some even were bold enough to say beforehand, what this necessarily must lead to. And it came as the inevitable comes.

Particulars are to be found in the newspaper press of those days (especially in *De Locomotief* of Samarang, the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* of Batavia, the *Soerabaya-Courant* of Soerabaya) and in the proceedings of the *Sockaboemische Landbouw-vereeniging*, an association to further agricultural interests, meeting Thursday, July 14, 1887, in the clubhouse Soekamanah at Soekaboemi.³⁷

The secretary, Mr. G. W. Eekhout, draws the attention of those present to the dreadful propagation of the opium evil in

³⁷ *Tijdschrift van Nijverheid en Landbouw*, Vol. XXXV, which also contains an account of the proceedings of the *Nederlandsch Indische Maatschappij van Nijverheid en Landbouw*, meeting October 12, 1887, at Batavia, where the same subject was brought up for discussion.

the Preanger Regencies. Everybody foresaw this when on the first of January (1887) the *Preanger-transport* came into the hands of the opium farmer of the residency of Cheribon, also interested in the transportation of the government mails between Cheribon and Bandoeng (capital of the Preanger Regencies); and the result has shown how well founded the apprehension was. Most of the opium cases in revision with the court of justice at Batavia (tried in the lower courts and sent up in appeal) originate in the Preanger Regencies, and every moment clandestine opium is confiscated in quantities, the one larger than the other. It is, however, worthy of notice that many of those confiscations take place near the post-cars used for the transportation of the government mails between Cheribon and Bandoeng. The most extraordinary tricks are invented to escape the vigilance of the police. And that vigilance leaves much to be desired. How, otherwise, is it possible that one of the secretary's acquaintances, at the principal locality of the district of Tjisondari, in the neighborhood of Bandoeng, could buy without any trouble, through his servant sent out for the purpose, one guilder's worth of *tjandoe*, from a Chinaman who did not even hold a license for being there at all.³⁸ This, of course, was reported to the authorities. But he (the secretary) asks: Is this sufficient? If in the Preanger Regencies, the smoking of opium can be restricted to a few Chinamen and Javanese,³⁹ there is not so very much harm done. But if the Sundanese⁴⁰ gets into the habit, and in consequence is depraved and ruined, the (European) planters (dependent on the natives for their labor supply) also have to face a future which most of them as yet can hardly realize. And there is a good chance for things to go in that direction; according to information from Bandoeng, the Sundanese are already beginning to smoke opium.

³⁸ Chinamen are excluded from the interior unless the privilege of settlement is specially granted; they even need a permit for a visit of ever so short a duration to the interior. But government regulations in Dutch India, theoretically excellent, have not the least binding force in practice.

³⁹ More strictly, the natives of Java proper, central Java.

⁴⁰ The natives of the "Sunda lands," the Preanger Regencies and contiguous regions in western Java.

A member (Mr. Burger) asks whether it is good policy to draw the attention of the government to the increase in the importation of opium into the Preanger Regencies. Might it not lead to the government to hit upon the thought of introducing there the opium farm?

The president (Mr. Mundt) considers this impossible. He does not believe that the government is capable of such a thing. It would be a most scandalous action.

The scandalous action of introducing opium into the Preanger Regencies under the opium *regie* was reserved for a Christian cabinet in the new light of the twentieth century.

The opium of the opium *regie*, it is true, must find its way, according to the theory of the new measure, not to the natives, but to the Chinamen (who, if the regulations were enforced, would be told that they had no business whatever in the interior of the Preanger Regencies), and to the soldiers of the different garrisons who "need" opium badly (just as women need opium badly since the government retails the drug). And the government considerations go on to state that the spread of the opium habit cannot constitute a danger to the Sundanese population because the Sundanese does not smoke opium. But this assertion finds direct contradiction in the statements of men who know the Preanger Regencies excellently well, members of the *Soekaboemische Landbouwvereeniging*, who have spent their lives there and are better acquainted with land and people than the government officials; in fact that, before the Bandoeng plateau was made a center of military activity; before the advent of opium—"needing" soldiers; before John Chinaman conquered the Preanger Regencies, calmly defying the regulations; before 1824, and the *mésure* of Resident Van Der Capellen, assisted by the native chiefs, opium had been smoked by the Sundanese population for the benefit of the East India Company and of the government, its worthy successor.

Chinamen and opium—supplementary articles of contraband! To what extent, may be read in an official letter, dated Bandoeng, August 4, 1887, from the resident of the Preanger Regencies to the assistant-resident of Soekaboemi. Opium and smokers of

opium, he says, are mostly found on the borders of those districts where the government not only tolerates but even supplies the drug; furthermore, in the capital and along the main roads, where Chinamen have settled and travel up and down. But farther in the interior opium is still rarely used, even scarcely known. Resident Heyting wrote this after close observation of the terrible ravages caused by the opium habit in central and eastern Java, and he declared his firm intention to defend the beautiful residency then in his charge (the Preanger Regencies) against the opium evil. But his firm intention broke down, because it lacked support from higher authorities. The want of purpose in government again became evident when, talking a good deal about protecting the natives, it neglected everything tending to keep the Preanger Regencies opium-free in fact. It was satisfied with big words in official reports which found their echo in parliament, meanwhile leaving a free hand to Chinamen and their official partners in the opium business. The result? A missionary pointed it out with sufficient clearness: "Some time ago we remarked in the presence of a member of the judiciary that the Preanger Regencies gave little trouble to the courts and the police. He answered: 'So it used to be, but things have changed—opium has come.'"⁴¹

⁴¹ J. L. Zegers, *Het Opium-Vraagstuk in Nederlandsch Indië*.

[To be concluded]

REVIEWS

Sex and Society: Studies in the Social Psychology of Sex. By WILLIAM I. THOMAS, Associate Professor of Sociology in the University of Chicago. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907. \$1.50 net.

Professor W. I. Thomas has endeavored to trace the psychological origin of some of the sex-relations in human societies in a series of interesting and suggestive essays which he has recently incorporated in a book entitled *Sex and Society*. The table of contents indicates the range of the study; a discussion on the organic differences in the sexes being followed by a series of chapters on sex and primitive social control, social feeling, primitive industry, and primitive morality. The psychology of exogamy, and of modesty and clothing, is dealt with; and finally there are two remarkably good chapters on the adventitious character of woman and on the mind of woman and the lower races.

A noticeable feature of the book is the recognition of the latest results of biological investigation and the psychological interpretation of personal and social phenomena. The late Dr. A. Bastian was always insisting on the importance of psychology in ethnological inquiries, and there is no doubt that he was perfectly right; for in all probability it is from this quarter that most of the solutions of our problems will come; but it must be the psychology which is based upon observation and experiment—a biological psychology—as opposed to the academic psychology of the old school. It is this broad outlook which enables the author to take a sane view of matters which too often have been the subject of vain theorizing. Take, for example, his treatment of mother-right or metronomy, so often erroneously termed matriarchy. He says (p. 66):

It has been very generally assumed that maternal descent is due solely to uncertainty of paternity, and that an admission that the maternal system has been universal is practically an admission of promiscuity. Opponents of this theory have consequently felt called upon to minimize the importance of

maternal descent. But descent through females is not, in fact, fully explained by uncertainty of parentage on the male side. It is due to the larger social fact, including this biological one, that the bond between mother and child is the closest in nature, and that the group grew up about the more stationary female . . . for the association of the woman with the child is immediate and perforce, but the immediate interest of the man is in the woman, and his interest in the child is secondary and mediated through her. . . . But while it is natural that the children and the group should grow up about the mother, it is not conceivable that woman should definitely or long control the activities of society, especially on their motor side. In view of his superior power of making movements and applying force, the male must inevitably assume control of the life-direction of the group, no matter what the genesis of the group . . . male authority is only thinly veiled or not at all (p. 69).

It is difficult for one who has studied natives in the field to believe that woman ever had any real authority. She may have been at one time the center of social interest and stability, but not of social activity. Wherever we find mother-right, there we find the predominance of the maternal uncle; and indeed the importance of this relationship often persists after a society has become definitely patronymic.

There is undoubted truth in the author's statement that "an examination of the early habits of man and an analysis of the instincts which persist in him show that he has been essentially a predaceous animal, fighting his way up at every step of the struggle for existence" (p. 97); but it appears to the present writer that he somewhat overemphasizes this struggle, or rather that he does not sufficiently recognize other factors in human social progress. For example, nowhere does Professor Thomas allude to the possibility of the progenitors of man having been essentially social animals. There is very good reason for assuming that the intelligence and altruistic behavior, if one may so term it, of such animals as beavers, many ruminants, and monkeys are due to their sociability. This seems to be a main determining factor, especially when it is combined with relative physical weakness. So far as the evidence of fossil man is concerned, there is no reason to believe that he ever was a well-armed or particularly strong animal, and it is extremely difficult to understand how he could have survived, not to say triumphed, in the struggle for existence, had not his intelligence and emotions been quickened by sociability and had he not remedied his individual weakness by co-operation. It is beside the mark to turn

for evidence to the higher apes, such as the gorilla or orang-outang; they do not appear to be particularly sociable brutes; but that is of less consequence to them on account of their great strength, powerful jaws and teeth, and fierce disposition. They may be regarded rather as similar *culs de sac*—forms which were never likely to lead anywhere, even if man had not appeared on the scene, because, being strong, they were self-sufficient, and, having abandoned the support of mutual aid, they were in danger of ultimate extinction after a longer or shorter period of success, this being the nemesis of individualism. May it not be that social habits combined with a specialization in braininess, the erect attitude, and the absence of protective and aggressive organs, were the main determining factors in man's elevation from not-man? All along the upward path there was the struggle against nature, the fighting with wild beasts, as well as internecine struggle; but all these never entirely swamped the earlier sociability—a sociability which is so marked a characteristic of many of even the less advanced of existing peoples—the chief exceptions to this generalization appear to be certain hunting tribes, such as the Veddahs and other jungle folk; but our knowledge of the social condition of these types is lamentably deficient. If this view be correct, the statement that “morality, sympathy, and altruism are of tribal origin, and have their roots in (1) the love of offspring, (2) the sensitivity connected with courtship, and (3) the comradeship which arises among men in prosecuting vital interests in common” (p. 120), is only partially true, as the rudiments of these social virtues must have long antedated a “tribal” condition.

The “prematriarchal stage” [or rather the “premetronymic stage”], where the people “live in scattered bands, held together loosely by convenience, safety, and inertia, and the male is the leader,” of Professor Thomas (p. 68) is practically the same as that which, according to Mr. Atkinson,¹ was evolved from “the Cyclopean family” of the semi-human stage, a family group, exclusive of adult sons, headed by the solitary polygamous [polygynous] patriarch. Professor Thomas believes “the Botocudos, Fuegians, Eskimos, West Australians, Bushmen, and Veddahs represent this primitive stage more or less completely;” but certainly the men of western Australia and the Eskimo have traveled very far from the autocratic, jealous males predicated by Atkinson and Lang.

¹ *Social Origins*, by A. Lang; *Primol Law*, by J. J. Atkinson (1903), p. 230.

It is probable that the premetronymic stage was carried over from the man-apes to the distinctively humans, and the metronymic stage may have arisen when man became more carnivorous in diet. When this took place, the men would have to roam farther afield, and the women would be more stationary; and here we may accept Professor Thomas' explanation of the rise of metronomy. There are, however, certain students who believe that mother-right was not a universal stage in the history of man, and they hold that, at all events in some cases, father-right was a natural development from the primitive monandrous family.

In arguing that "our susceptibility to the opinion of others and our dependence on their good-will are genetically referable to sexual life" (p. 113), Professor Thomas considers that "this view would be completely substantiated if we could show that the qualities of vanity and susceptibility in question are present in any species where it is impossible to assume that they were developed in connection with the struggle for food and as the result of the survival of types showing a tendency to combine and co-operate in the effort to get food." He instances the dog as having a "highly developed susceptibility to the appreciation of others," and adds "the species which he represents has had no history except a sexual history capable of developing this mental attitude" (p. 114). The sexual history of the ancestral dog may have contributed to his behavior "in a public-spirited or moral manner," but surely the social habits of wild dogs have also had a good deal to do with the traits which man has utilized and improved. So also with regard to man, while it is true that "it is certainly in virtue of susceptibility to the opinion of others that society works to bring the individual under control and make him a member of society" (p. 119), yet, from the point of view here advocated, the statement that "it is doubtful whether this could have been accomplished if a peculiar attitude of responsiveness to opinion had not arisen in sexual relations, reinforcing the more general and cognitive impressionability," seems to place this susceptibility on too narrow a foundation.

The statement that "the bulk of morality turns upon food rather than sex-relations" (p. 150) is perhaps true so far as the actual number of regulations is concerned, but certain sex prohibitions are of fundamental importance—so much so that, whereas most of the offenses of the nature-folk against individuals or property are more in the nature of misdemeanors, incest, or sexual intercourse

with forbidden persons, is regarded as a heinous crime, and we may safely regard it as the first "sin."

Surely Professor Thomas minimizes the amount of discipline that the youths of a nature-folk have to undergo. It is true they "do not generally punish children," but nevertheless they are instructed in good behavior, and the effects of wrong-doing are pointed out. Especially is this the case during the initiation ceremonies, when the lads are instructed and warned in a manner that is calculated to make a lasting impression. Discipline is generally of two kinds: mild and prolonged, or sharp and relatively short. From the nature of the case, "primitive" people are practically precluded from the former method. They certainly frequently succeed in enforcing the latter form of discipline, and as the education takes place at the most impressionable period of life, it is generally very effectual. The training of the young certainly encourages individuality, but a social constraint is generally apparent all the time, and this is strongly emphasized at the property ceremonies. Further, the narration of folk-tales tends to illustrate the benefits of well-doing and the evils resulting from anti-social conduct.

In the chapter on the adventitious character of woman Professor Thomas says:

The male in many of the lower forms [of animals] is very insignificant in size, economically useless (as among the bees), often a parasite on the female, and, as many biologists hold, merely a secondary device or after-thought of nature, designed to secure greater variation than can be had by the usual mode of reproduction. In other words, he is of use to the species by assisting the female to reproduce progressively fitter forms.

While there is a great deal of truth in the last sentence, the previous ones are open to criticism. Sexual differentiation appears among the Protozoa and occurs among all the Metazoa, however low in the scale; thus the male can scarcely be said to be "merely a secondary device." Where "economically useless" or parasitic males occur in some groups of Invertebrates, they are more frequent among the most specialized members of their respective groups; and thus any argument drawn from them has no weight.

Very suggestive is the hypothesis that the woman and child were the fixed point—the point to which the roaming, fighting man came back. The attention of woman was turned to industries, and she lived in the house she had built. "She domesticated man and assisted him in domesticating the animals." The occupation of man

had been almost exclusively the pursuit of animals or conflict with his neighbors, and in this connection he had become the inventor of weapons and traps, and in addition had learned the value of acting in concert with his companions. When game became scarce, man found himself forced to abandon his destructive and predaceous activities and adopt the settled occupations of woman. To these he brought inventive ability and a capacity for organized action, and in course of time he usurped the primacy of woman in the industrial pursuits, and eventually he reduced woman to "a condition of parasitism which, in our middle and so-called higher classes, has profoundly affected their physical, mental, and moral life." Professor Thomas is to be heartily commended for the manner in which he develops this theme with regard to the mental and moral characteristics of woman.

The foregoing remarks must not be considered in any way as indicating adverse criticism. We are all "feeling our way," and the present writer offers his sincere congratulations to his friend, the author of this valuable and stimulating contribution to sociological literature.

ALFRED C. HADDON

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American Legislatures and Legislative Methods. By PAUL E. S. REINSCH. New York: The Century Co., 1907. Pp. x + 337.

This volume contains a description and analysis of the methods of Congress and the state legislatures. The discussion of Congress is conducted by Dr. Steiner, while the state legislatures are examined by Professor Reinsch.

Due emphasis is placed in this volume on constitutional and statutory requirements, on rules of legislative bodies, and on judicial decisions interpretative of these formal regulations; but the important feature of the work is the attention given to the actual workings of legislative bodies.

It is important to know the constitutional and other legal facts regarding legislatures, but it is indispensable to know how the system really operates; for, as Professor Reinsch shows, there is often a wide gap between the theory of legislative action and the practice. It behooves students of politics to observe realities as

well as forms, and, since constitutions, statutes, and decisions do not tell the whole tale, to scrutinize the legislative phenomena themselves. This is a side of political science which has often been neglected or ignored for the study of the formal constitutional and legal facts, but it is beginning to receive attention commensurate to the importance of the subject. The fact that popular, and often sensational and unreliable, investigators have been allowed to lead the way in the study of political facts, pathological in nature, is not to the credit of political scientists. Studies like those of Haynes' *Representation in State Legislatures*, Goodnow on *Politics and Administration*, and now Reinsch's *American Legislatures*, indicate that the study of politics is to be in the future on more intimate terms with the actual facts. This does not involve neglect of constitutions, laws, or the decisions of courts, but the supplementing of such knowledge, to the end that a better understanding of the situation may be evolved.

Some of Professor Reinsch's conclusions indicate that he has carefully thought his way through the situation. Thus of the progressive governor he says: "The importance of the reform governors is based not so much upon their positions as heads of the administration, but upon their character as the authoritative interpreters of the public will" (p. 283). And again, in discussing the necessity of law-making based upon comprehensive information, he says: "Only gradually are the legislatures discovering the inadequacy of good intentions in this matter, as well as the necessity of conservative methods resting upon expert knowledge" (p. 313).

Errors of statement are difficult to avoid in a work covering so broad a field, and the following have been observed by the reviewer: The session limit in Delaware, North Carolina, and Rhode Island is not sixty days absolutely, but a limitation of compensation to sixty days (p. 131); while the limit in Nevada is not forty days, but sixty days. To the list of states in which the governor is granted power to veto separate items in appropriation bills, New Jersey should be added (p. 188). The question of calling a constitutional convention is no longer submitted every twenty years in Virginia, under the new constitution (p. 156). The limitation of the representation of New York is not that it "may never have over one-third of the legislature" (p. 199), but that "no two counties or the territory thereof as now organized, which are adjoining counties, or which are separated only by public waters, shall have more

than one-half of all the senators" (Art. III, sec. 4). The judges of the states of Georgia and Louisiana are no longer chosen by the legislature (p. 223), but are elected by the people. The act taking the appointment of the St. Louis police out of the hands of the governor of the state was vetoed by him and did not become law, as indicated on p. 271.

All things considered, Professor Reinsch's volume is an important addition to the literature of American politics. It is a contribution both to the understanding of the present situation and to the establishment of a better method for future studies of a similar character.

CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM

Les droits législatifs du président des États-Unis d'Amérique.

By HENRI BOSC. Paris: Libraire Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1906. Pp. viii+286.

In the introductory chapter of this volume the author traces the principle of the separation of powers through the Constitutional Convention, analyzing the various arguments advanced on that occasion. In Part I he discusses the power of the President as a positive agent in initiating, shaping, and compelling legislation. He concludes that, in spite of the fact that the President lacks the formal right of initiative, and that he has no direct representatives in Congress, his influence is always considerable and sometimes great. In Part II the author considers the negative function of the President, or the veto power. A detailed examination of many cases is made, and the various vetoes are classified and analyzed. Here, however, the author adds little to the earlier and still valuable work of Mason on the *Veto Power*.

On the whole, Dr. Bosc shows a good grasp both of the theory and the practice of the presidential veto, and his discussion of the subject is decidedly meritorious.

CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM

Race Culture; or, Race Suicide? By ROBERT REID RENTOUL.

London: Walter Scott Publishing Co., 1906. Pp. 182.

The *Journal* has already published an article by Dr. Rentoul on the sterilization of degenerates, and the book here noticed is the second and enlarged edition of a book which appeared in 1903. The

author is an English physician of repute who has long studied the problems of dealing with the defective members of society. In this volume the argument is fortified by new materials concerning the deterioration of the race caused by permitting the insane, feeble-minded, and others of related defect to have children. It is interesting to note that the Legislature of Indiana has, since the appearance of this book, passed a law providing a carefully guarded method of sterilizing persons who are manifestly unfit to be parents. The author is competent, and his plea deserves the consideration of all who are seeking to treat social misery by drying up its very sources.

C. R. HENDERSON

The Newer Ideals of Peace. By JANE ADDAMS. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907. Pp. xviii+243. \$1.25.

The congestion of our great cities has been generally regarded as an unmitigated evil. We condemn the movement of population from the country to the city. Especially we condemn the perversity of the immigrant which leads him to herd with his kind in the city slums while the great harvest of our western plains are crying for labor; and condemnation passes over into indignation when the inevitable appeal is made to charity and conscience to cope with the suffering and vice that seem to be the sole fruit of these "plague spots" in our municipalities. This attitude has become fixed and almost traditional, because it is intrenched behind what we regard as the most admirable responses of human nature—its charity and conscience. We accept as our interpreters either the interested politician or the moral reformer, and the actual human experience that exists in these proscribed localities is separated from our vision by spiritual distances which dwarf the physical stretches these immigrants have covered to reach America.

Pre-eminent among those who have traversed these distances and have come into understanding contact with these social groups stands Miss Jane Addams, whose interpretation of the men and women who live in the congested districts of our cities, and of the conditions out of which they have arisen, and of the conditions of the whole social life which they determine, is again presented us in the *Newer Ideals of Peace*.

The immediate theme of the book is the inadequacy of a governmental order that has arisen out of, and is still unconsciously

dominated by, military ideals to express the democracy of an industrial community. For these military ideals Miss Addams substitutes those springing from actual human relationships, which do in fact surreptitiously dominate the government of the slums by its police and aldermen. The political corruption and protection of vice that ensue Miss Addams traces to the helplessness of outworn political conceptions and the worse practice they involve. And finally the author affirms that our highest form of social emotion—patriotism—because it is dominated by warlike impulses and tradition is quite unable to sweep into itself the “finer spirit of courage and detachment” belonging to modern industrial struggles, although we defend warfare because it engenders these very qualities.

To seek our patriotism is some age other than our own is to accept a code that is totally inadequate to help us through the problems which current life develops. We continue to found our patriotism upon war and to contrast conquest with nurture, militarism with industrialism, calling the latter passive, and inert, and the former active and aggressive, without really facing the situation as it exists. We tremble before our own convictions, and are afraid to find newer manifestations of courage and daring lest we thereby lose the virtues bequeathed to us by war. It is a pitiful acknowledgment that we have lost them already, and that we shall have to give up the ways of war, if for no other reason than to preserve the finer spirit of courage and detachment which it has engendered and developed. (P. 217.)

The movement which would slough off warfare and usher in universal peace is perhaps more aggressively international than any other, unless it is the socialistic labor movement. It is then natural that a contribution to that movement should find its immediate motive in the international complex of our great city population, and of the laboring force of our great industries. Still, when the reader of Miss Addams' book recognizes the wide range of topic there considered, not simply the third chapter on the failure to utilize immigrants in city government, but the others ranging over the survivals of militarism in city government, militarism and industrial legislation, group morality and the labor movement, protection of children for industrial efficiency, utilization of women in city government, and the passing of the war virtues, one is struck by the constant appearance of the immigrant at the center of the author's treatment of nearly all these subjects. The conflict between the doctrinaire eighteenth-century ideals of government and present conditions, and the consequent reversion to the repressive measures of a military community, is illustrated by the immi-

gration problem. While immigration began in response to political impulses, and these still play some part, it has become in the main an industrial movement. The immigrant is imported to provide that fund of unskilled labor upon which our industries may draw at will. He comes ignorant and helpless before the system of exploitation which enwraps him before he leaves the old country and may last for two generations after he enters our gates. Our government has nothing to offer him by way of protection but the doctrine of the abstract rights of man, a vote he cannot intelligently exercise, and the police to hold him in his place. But in the cosmopolitan mass of which he becomes a part he enters into human relations with neighbors in the same uncomprehended struggle, with the alderman who can use his human needs and response to kindness, with the policemen who depend upon this alderman and have some comprehension of his daily life. All this social organization lies hopelessly outside of the governmental ideas and institutions. The so-called intelligent community, in its pity as well as its prudence, takes necessarily the attitude of the conqueror toward the conquered, because its government is purely repressive and legal. Our unconsciously military attitude prevents us from making any use of the actual social organization that is going on, and in fact this healthful process leads by its very human vitality to connivance with legal wrong, to protection of vice and municipal corruption.

The author does not, however, rest with this negative phase of the immigrant's condition. She sees the great positive losses to the community which its lack of comprehension of him entails. Just because the immigrant has torn himself loose from the old soil and comes with hope and fear to the new land, he brings with him a fund of emotion which is the precious material out of which social values and ends are built up. There are in addition the valuable habits, representing often the selective development of many centuries that our external repressive government is utterly unable to utilize. There is no encouragement for the combination of community life with agricultural occupations, which exists among Italian peasant groups. The Doukhobors have occasioned endless complications with the Canadian government because its fixed and inflexible legal and property concepts could not adapt themselves to the common ownership of land that represent the inherited morale of these people. Apart from the organized habits of these immi-

grants, there is their native readiness to assist each other, to co-operate in human fashion in meeting the exigencies that surround them, that would be of enormous value if an intelligent government could recognize these possibilities and use the social materials already there. But our municipal governments offer only repression, or the extra-legal or illegal assistance of the politician who finds in the human situation his stock-in-trade. What might be done toward building up, out of social habits already there and their human social instincts and susceptibility, a deeper and more organic community control, if our government had other ideas and methods than those of police to repress crime and courts to protect vested rights! Even the more frankly military governments of Europe have made longer strides in this direction than we. Their legislation not only protects, where ours ignores, but takes positive steps toward better housing, toward health, and insurance, that our democratic community is helpless as yet to imitate.

In discussing militarism and industrial legislation, Miss Addams gathers her argument about two recent strikes—that in the anthracite coal-fields and the Chicago Stock Yards strike. She shows that a purely repressive government which is unable to reinterpret its legal conceptions from a larger industrial point of view, is quite outside the real struggle for social control. The actual process of government takes place in the two camps of the employers and the employed. Representation, legislation, and executive administration, even the referendum, appear in these groups. And here the real issues appear—the issues of the standard of life, of economic efficiency—and actually control conduct. When, as in the anthracite coal-fields strike, the deadlock between the contending forces became unendurable, when the central government was forced to intervene and bring the issues before competent judges, the questions that were discussed were not simply those with which the military and legal type of government has concerned itself. On the contrary, the real questions, that everybody knew underlay the controversy, inevitably appeared in court:

Did the union encourage violence against non-union men, or did it really do everything to suppress violence? Did it live up to its creed, which was to maintain a standard of living, that families might be properly housed and protected from debilitating toil and disease, and that children might be nurtured into American citizenship? Did the operators protect their men as far as possible from mine damp, from length of hours proven by experience to be exhausting? Did they pay a wage to the mine laborer sufficient

to allow him to send his children to school? Questions such as these, a study in the human problem, invaded the commission day after day during the sitting. One felt for the moment the first wave of a rising tide of humanitarianism, until the normal ideals of the laborer to secure food and shelter for his family, a security for his own old age, and a larger opportunity for his children, became the ideals of democratic government. (Pp. 98 f.)

In the case of the Stock Yards strike in Chicago, the issue was found in the reduction of the wage of the unskilled and unorganized labor. Organized skilled labor attempted to fight the battle, with the mixed motives that always arise—the fight against a movement to reduce wages which would inevitably reach them, and a fight for the weak and socially less effective by the stronger and better-organized. False steps early in the contest, the unwieldy body of men to be controlled, endangered the hold which the labor-union strike managers had upon their men. The contest was a genuine one; the issue in terms of humanity took hold upon the Stock Yards community. The politician who understands dealing in human issues as the basis for his City Hall pull, tried to get possession of this struggle for the betterment of the condition of the underpaid unskilled labor. The real issue in terms of actual human conditions came to the surface, confronted the policemen on duty, the political leaders who controlled the repressive function of government. It was so real, this issue, that the strike managers almost lost it, so eagerly did the politician want to make his use of it.

The moral is evident that as long as the government remains within its military attitude, as long as the policeman, its soldier, is its sole executive, and its arbiter courts which will admit to consideration only the abstract and property rights which hide the vital issues, its legislation cannot deal with the actual social forces out of which social control must arise. It cannot identify with itself the social organization which arises in the labor union, nor draw out in patriotism the devotion with which the laborer responds to its call. Actual social control and social emotion are lost to this government.

Again, it is the immigrant that forces this problem upon us. The anthracite coal-field strike was but the climax of the long-drawn-out fight between the employer's power to import unskilled cheap labor, and the employee's power to assimilate him and identify him with the interests of his American fellows. In the Stock Yards strike, skilled organized labor found the lower unskilled

positions being given to the immigrants from among the most oppressed peasantry of Europe. Identification of their interests with those of these Slovaks and Lithuanians was the price of their position. It is the immigrant who comes in response to the call of our feverish industry and our innumerable machines, that is forcing the deepest problems of social organization and evaluation upon us. It is the humblest and the stupidest among our foreign-born citizens that are forcing upon us the problems of our industrial, non-military community. And those who meet them in their real human form are not the legislators nor the executives nor the judiciary of our government. They have in a large degree isolated themselves in outworn categories, though they are still powers to be used by those who are face to face with the real problems. The employer to whom the immigrant is an economic possibility, and the laborer to whom he is a threat of a lower wage, and a different and often a lower standard of life—they are face to face with the problem. The problem grows rapidly with its human content. It involves the whole question of wage, standard of life, education, and insurance against sickness and old age. It involves protected machinery, control of dangerous callings, hygiene in the factory and home and city. All these pressing questions come in the train of the immigrant.

In dealing with group-morality in the labor movement, Miss Addams emphasizes the shortcomings of the unions which arise from their own isolated character. They are as handicapped in meeting the social exigencies as is any small group within a larger one, which must still maintain itself over against the larger whole of which it is a part. Thus the labor union arrays itself as the enemy of the employers' association, and their contacts naturally become those of warfare until common interests bring them close enough to each other to force to the surface the principle of common action, until the employer backs up his control by the judgments of the industrial expert, and the union comes forward with the consistent demand for collective bargaining in their commodity—labor and skill. Meanwhile the very human interests and impulses which make the labor union possible compel its earlier history to be that of effervescence and conflict. Because our outworn governmental conceptions make it impossible to the community to recognize and frankly deal with the human problems that face the laborer, he must attack them from the limited point of view of his group.

Thus the machine is a social product for which no individual can claim complete responsibility. Its economic efficiency is as dependent on the presence of the laborer and the market for its products as mechanical structure is dependent upon the inventor, and its exploitation upon the capitalist. But the group-morality under which the community suffers, recognizes no responsibility of the exploiter to the laborer, but leaves him free to exhaust and even maim the operator, as if the community had placed a sword in his hand with which to subjugate. On the other hand, the laborer turns upon the machine with a hostility which assumes that there are no interests involved beyond his own which he is bound to recognize.

It is but natural that we should feel the loss, which a merely crime-preventing and contract-enforcing government entails upon society, most vividly in the case of the children; but the situation is rendered absurd as well as horrible by the fact that the community claims the right to give a certain education to the child, but regards itself as perfectly helpless over against the exploitation of the same child the moment he steps from the school. The very form of the machine has been adapted to this exploitation of the child as well as of the immigrant. This exploitation leaves the child worn out, and deprives not only him, but the community, of his inheritance of play, of imagination, and in so far of the great spiritual products of the play-impulses—art and aesthetic appreciation, with the life that depends upon them.

An equal inconsequence Miss Addams brings to light in the attitude of the state toward woman. Because our more or less unconscious definition of citizenship includes only the warrior who will defend the community on the battlefield, woman is politically irresponsible; and yet the whole industrial nature of the community relates her and her interests as closely to the process of social control as the man. Indeed, the fields within which municipal inefficiency is most pronounced and corruption most rank are those whose functions have been the province of woman from the beginning of society.

Over against the outworn conceptions of government which date from the military organization of society, Miss Addams places these ideals of social control arising out of the industrial nature of our community. It is the contrast of nurture with repression; of the living social relation with the abstract formula; the instinct

for workmanship with the drudgery of unrelieved factory toil; the standard of life with an economic wage; the value of the child to the community with his legal right to freedom of contract; the intelligence born of social function with the use of doctrinaire concepts in the service of special interests. These ideals spring from the very industrial character of the community. To recognize them is to come socially to consciousness. On the other hand, the whole process and paraphernalia of warfare are outworn and antiquated means of interpreting the social situation.

One does not feel, in reading Miss Addams, the advance of an argument with measured tread. I think in logical organization this book suffers more than her earlier writing. On the other hand, perhaps, nowhere can one find the social point of view, which we must assume, presented with so much inherent necessity as here. It is not the necessity of a deduction, but the necessity of immediate reality. It is not burdened with a creed nor with socialistic dogma. It is the expression of enlightened social intelligence in sympathetic contact with men, women, and children whose reality is all the more impressive because our eyes have been holden from them by economic and political abstractions. The thesis of the book is that social control, that government, must arise out of these immediate human relations.

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD

Amerikanisches Armenwesen. Von Dr. Jur. E. MÜNSTERBERG.
Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot, 1906.

In connection with his visit to the International Congress of Arts and Sciences in 1904, Dr. Münsterberg, director of poor-relief in Berlin, pursued his studies of philanthropic activities in the United States. He had already made himself familiar with the situation by means of documents and treatises, but by personal observation his impressions were made more vivid and sharply outlined. In this work he deals with the problems of immigration, public relief, organization of charitable agencies, state supervision, care of children, juvenile courts, and settlements. Even for American students and workers the collection of facts is valuable, while the criticisms, appreciative comments, and comparisons with German methods constantly provoke reflection. The analysis is itself scientific and calmly objective, but through all runs a note of intelli-

gent sympathy and human friendship which brings the distant colleague near to the workers on this side of the Atlantic. When the shadows are shown, defects exposed, and evils characterized, there is not a syllable to suggest an unfriendly attitude, or even lack of full understanding for the difficulties under which we labor. It is a sane, genial, accurate, and instructive treatment of the most recent phases of American Charity, of its works and its literature.

CHARLES R. HENDERSON

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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Strike Movements for the Month of September, 1906, in Belgium, England, France, and Italy.

I. *Belgium*.—(a) Number and extent of the conflicts: 18 new strikes involving about 2,472 persons directly and 750 indirectly, and 1 lockout in which about 15,000 laborers were involved. In addition, 4 old strikes and one lockout were continued. (b) Chief causes: demand for higher wages in 11 cases, the re-employment of discharged laborers in 3, the discharge of overseers in 2, the reduction of wages and change of labor conditions in 3. (c) Results: There were ended 14 new strikes and 2 old ones, and both lockouts—5 strikes and 1 lockout in favor of, and 10 without results for the laborers; 1 strike and 1 lockout were terminated by an agreement, and in 2 cases all the strikers were discharged.

II. *England*.—(a) Number and extent of the conflicts: There were 23 new conflicts, in which were involved 21,377 laborers. (b) chief causes: demand for higher wages in 9 cases, other wage questions in 6, questions concerning the employment of special labor classes or persons in 6, questions of labor arrangements in 3, refusal of organized labor to work with unorganized in 1. (c) Results: Seventeen new strikes and 9 old ones were ended—6 in favor of, 10 without favorable results for, the laborers, and 10 by compromise: the number of work-days lost by these conflicts during the month were 147,400.

III. *France*.—(a) Number and extent of the conflict: 82 new conflicts involving 11,265 persons; the average number of conflicts during the month of September for the last five years was 50. (b) Chief causes: demand for higher wages in 41 cases, opposition to a reduction of wages in 3, various other wage questions in 11, questions pertaining to the weekly rest-time in 12, the abolition of piece-work in 2, lessening the hours of labor in 2, concerning the arrangements of labor in 4, demands for the re-employment of discharged laborers in 12, and the discharge of managers in 10. (c) Results: 69 new conflicts and 12 old ones were ended; 18 were successful and 31 unsuccessful for the laborers; in 32 cases there was partial success or compromise.

IV. *Italy*.—(a) Number and extent of the conflicts: 122 new conflicts; in the 95 known cases there were 70,488 persons involved. (b) Chief causes: demand for a raise in wages in 65 cases, opposition to a reduction of wages in 9, shortening of labor time in 2, opposition to the lengthening of the time of labor in 1, various causes in 28, and unknown causes in 11. (c) Results: 99 conflicts were ended; in 23 cases the results were favorable to the laborers, and unfavorable in 22 cases; in 40 cases the laborers were partially successful; in 14 the results were unknown.—“Streikbewegung im Auslande,” *Soziale Rundschau*, November, 1906.

S. N. R.

Conditional Morality.—The occasion of the article is the book *Morality and the Science of Morals*, by M. Levy-Bruhl. The purpose is to clear away some of the confusion attending discussions of the relative or absolute character of morality. I maintain that rational morality is conditional, meaning by “conditional” the opposite of absolute. The precepts of morality must always be accompanied by an “if.” All conscious and reflective activity supposes one or more ends and the means necessary for their accomplishment. A regulative discipline, therefore, of voluntary acts should include two theories: that of obligatory ends, and that of the best means for their attainment. The theory of

obligatory ends, or ideals, may be called *teleology*. The theory of the means may be called *morality*. They constitute two different disciplines. Thus the Christian summary of the law—love of God and love of one's neighbor—is essentially a statement of ideal ends, a direction of the sentiment and the will. But it is not a rule of action, for it does not indicate how I may express my love to God or how I shall procure the good of my neighbor. A morality would prescribe definite acts. Similarly, the categorical imperative of Kant is a statement of an end, but is not a statement of morality properly speaking.

A teleology, while not sufficient in itself, is indispensable. Without it there can be no morality. The latter is an application of a theory of ends to a theory of art. No art in itself has any moral character. It is only in its relation to some particular end that it acquires this. It is here that the author of the book referred to above errs in substituting for morality a rational social art. One might understand social art perfectly and use this knowledge for detestable ends. Certain tyrants have possessed a very high degree of social art. And a scientific sociology, while being the necessary foundation of any effective social art, has in itself no more moral character than an empirical social art. In short, moral conduct rests upon a conception of an ideal, and at the same time upon a knowledge of reality and of effective laws. It is this latter, the means, that is conditional.

Teleological morality, as a theory of the comparative value of good ends considers only possible ends. It rests therefore upon psychology as one of its bases. Psychology points out what ends are possible; teleological morality evaluates these and arranges them into a hierarchy. There are apparent four such possible ends: truth or knowledge for myself, and for others; satisfaction for myself, and for others. There are different sorts of knowledge and different sorts of satisfaction, but we may neglect these differences in our consideration of knowledge in general and satisfaction in general as the ends of life. Either of these may be taken as an end by itself, but to pursue either one alone would be a narrow life. These two ends often come into conflict. In such cases, which shall prevail? Shall I tell the truth at whatever cost, or shall I sometimes sacrifice it for the pleasure or good of someone? Morality supposes a doctrine of the comparative values of these ends in such cases. Moreover, they come into conflict, not only in cases of veracity, but in deciding which shall have the chief part in one's life—the search for truth, and its communication to others, or the seeking for pleasure for others. These questions can be solved only on the basis of a teleology.

But we find that truth and pleasure are abstractions. Concrete reality is made up of the beings who know or are ignorant, who enjoy or suffer. Teleological morality should therefore furnish a theory of the comparative value of the subjects, or of the different values which result from the application of these objects, truth and pleasure, to different subjects. In doing so it must abstract from all differences of situation or circumstances in which individuals are found.

There are other differences of value than those which arise from our personal relations. Different individuals and groups will have different valuations of the same ends. Teleology should give some pronouncement on these differences of judgment. There will be found here four possible theories: (a) Identity of duties. Absolutely the same duties fall upon all individuals. (b) Equality of duties. While duties for different individuals may differ in quality, there is the same measure of good for all individuals. (c) Inequalities of acquirement. The conduct of men increases or decreases their duties. (d) Inequality of nature. People of different faculties have different measures of duty. The science and pleasure of a genius are of greater value than those of an ordinary man.

Though a teleology is necessary, it is not sufficient. It must be applied to reality by a system of rules. In this sense all theories of arts are a part of a complete theory of morality. What I call morality in itself, as distinguished from teleology, is the general theory of the best means in the service of obligatory

ends. This gives rise to such questions as the following: (a) What are the influences that determine our duties, the differences of situation relative to diverse individuals and groups? Teleology neglects differences. Morality gives them a large place. (b) What is the comparative importance of justice and charity in our treatment of people? (c) If charity or beneficence be assigned an important rôle in conduct, what direction should be given it—direct aid or such help as will develop the recipients? (d) Is the ideal of truth better realized by permitting free activity to the talents and energies of people, or by imposing certain limits and uniformities? (e) Is it advantageous for the development of character and talents that the greater part of young people should have the assurance of a patrimony which frees them from the care of daily effort? (f) Is it for the general interest or the contrary that there should be a directing class? With such questions as these, and with practical precepts of conduct, morality is concerned. It can give no absolute answer to any of them; there must always be an "if." For there are many different moralities, depending on the time, conditions, people, and social groups. Under different circumstances the same means will lead to different ends. Thus the moral systems of Christian societies, though excellent, are not immutable. New circumstances give rise to the employment of new means to secure the old ends. Sociology will help men to deceive themselves less often in the choice of means, to take less often the wrong road. It will establish, or at least consolidate, that rational social art of which I at least expect much good, provided it has for its primary foundation a teleological morality.—Adrien Naville, in *Revue philosophique*, December, 1906. C. C. N.

The Moral Aspect of Suicide.—In this article Mr. Gibbons makes the following claims: The reason why there were fewer self-murderers in ancient times than now was because they believed more in a personal responsibility to God than we do; that the suicide is a moral coward; that suicide is a more heinous crime than any other kind of murder; that we owe it to our fellowmen to live; that the only cure for this suicide mania is the application of the principles of the Master. The following brief extracts give the gist of the article:

"In the history of the Hebrew people as recorded in the pages of the Old Testament, and in the history of the primitive Christians as contained in the New Testament, I can recall the names of but five persons who ended their lives by their own hands. . . . The reasons for the rarity of this crime among those worshippers of Jehovah and of Christ are easily explained. Those people were taught that self-murder was a grievous sin, and that man was responsible to God in the life to come for the iniquities done in the flesh. . . . Whatever may be the immediate incentives to suicide, they can be primarily traced to moral cowardice and to absence of religious restraints. . . . I hold that suicide is a more revolting sin than the killing of another. The closer the ties of relationship between the murderer and his victim, the more atrocious is the crime. In the estimation of mankind, a parricide, or matricide, or fratricide, or uxoricide, is a more shocking criminal than an ordinary homicide; and as a man has more intimate relations to himself than to a parent, or brother, or wife, his deliberate self-destruction should excite more horror than the murder of a parent, or brother, or wife. . . . Voluntary self-murder is not only a violation of divine law, but it is also a crime against society. . . . I maintain, then, that a sovereign antidote against suicide is to be found in a strict compliance with the lessons set before us by the religion of Christ."—James Cardinal Gibbons, in the *Century*, January, 1907. W. S. B.

The Truth at the Heart of Capital and Socialism.—Capitalism and socialism are supposed to be direct opposites, and in a very important sense they are: one involves industrial aristocracy and the other demands industrial democracy. But in another and quite fundamental aspect capitalism and socialism are at one, since they both aim at the *organization of industry*. But capitalism wants *organization for private profit*, while socialism wants *organiza-*

tion for the public good. However much we may condemn the plan of organization proposed by socialists, and the means of propaganda and progress adopted or urged by them, we cannot refuse approval of the fundamental *purpose* they have set before us. But though we cannot accept all the capitalists do, nor all the socialists say, we must not close our minds to the great truths for which they stand. If the socialist and capitalist, and the great body of the people who are neither socialists nor capitalists, will look to the care of the matter, recognize the organization of industry as inevitable and desirable, and bend their energies to securing a union that shall contain the maximum of liberty, private initiative, and voluntary co-operation, and the minimum of mastery, in the form of either the individual mastery that prevails in capitalism or the mastery of the majority that would be carried to the limit under socialism, we may escape the dangers of capitalism on the one hand, and of socialism on the other, and attain a *mutualism* that will embody the unity at the heart of both socialism and capitalism, and avoid the evils of both extremes.—Frank Parsons, in *Arena*, January, 1907.

J. A. F.

Why I Am a Socialist.—I hate capitalism. Competition in the means of mere existence is war and begets hate; while socialism, co-operation, is peace and begets love. I object that others should profit by or exploit my labor without my consent. The present system of production for profit, and not for consumption, involves untold waste of wealth and labor. Wealth is produced alone by labor, and labor alone is entitled to the product. The present system is one of industrial slavery. I see about me everywhere graft and corruption—municipal, state, and federal. I believe in the collective ownership of the means of production and distribution. The only way to regulate the trusts is to own them. The people should own the government. The capitalist system is destructive of the home and family. Trusts, natural products of society, should be owned and conducted in the interest of society. I am an individualist. Socialism is the only practical and scientific philanthropy. Intemperance is the result of strenuous struggle for existence. The simple life is impossible in this age. The socialist party is the only all-embracing party that deals intelligently with economic cause and effect. I believe in placing measures above men. I am a patriot. I believe the destiny of man is to move onward and upward. The socialist party is the party of the people.—Ellis O. Jones, in *Arena*, January, 1907.

J. A. F.

The Economic Advisability of Inaugurating a National Department of Health.—There are four great wastes today, the more lamentable because they are unnecessary. They are preventable death, preventable sickness, preventable conditions of low physical and mental efficiency, and preventable ignorance.

It seems desirable that a United States National Department of Health should be established, having as its head a secretary, who shall be a member of the executive cabinet. The purpose of the department should be to take all measures calculated, in the judgment of experts, to decrease deaths, to decrease sickness, and to increase physical and mental efficiency of citizens. It should consist of the following bureaus:

1. National Bureau of Infant Hygiene: to investigate and regulate conditions causing infant mortality; to educate parents concerning care of the child, food, air, dress, etc.; to establish municipal milk stations, etc.

2. Bureau of Education, Schools and Children's Homes: to co-operate with local schools in (a) medical inspection of children and anthropometric measurements; (b) extension of the New York system of disease examination by permanent nurses; (c) municipal treatment of defective eyes, ears, teeth, and segregation of defective children; (d) inspection of buildings used and methods of schools, children's homes, etc., from sanitary and educational standpoints; (e) systematic education of children in right living along practical lines.

3. National Bureau of Labor Conditions: to investigate and frame legisla-

tion for proper conditions under which labor may be employed, the length of the working-day, hours of rest, etc., which legislation should be enforced.

4. Bureau of Sanitation: to investigate sanitation and ventilation; to establish standards for (a) sewerage systems; (b) water supply; (c) air purity, by regulating smoke and chemical pollution; (d) proportion of building and open spaces in cities; (e) condemnation of unsanitary and overcrowded house property; (f) regulation of dust danger in cities; (g) standards for factories and mines; (h) standards for public halls, theaters, and public conveyances, with inspection; (i) standards of sanitation of farms where dairy products are sold; (j) adequate legislation and inspection to enforce proper regulations and wide dissemination of useful information.

5. Bureau of Pure Food: to provide (a) standards of purity for all foods and drinkables; (b) meat and animal inspection.

6. Bureau of National Quarantine: to (a) provide means for handling epidemics with speed; (b) regulate quarantines against infectious diseases; (c) study and devise means of handling diseases transmitted by insects.

7. Bureau of Registration of Physicians and Surgeons: to have power to require (a) inspection as to curriculum and training of medical colleges and (b) registration of all physicians and surgeons; (c) records of all cases by physicians and surgeons on official blanks showing an analysis by department statistical record such as average visits per illness, cases per death, etc.; returns to be made of all organic or chronic diseases for use of Bureau of Organic Diseases; (d) licenses to be issued barring general practitioners from treating special diseases requiring skill above that evidenced by training; (e) that standard of the profession be raised by protecting the exceptional men and barring quacks, charlatans, etc.

8. Bureau of Registration of Druggists, Drug Stores, and Manufacturers of Drugs: (a) to regulate standard of drugs and to require drugs to be sold, as far as possible, in unbroken packages under seals; (b) to regulate "patent medicines" by requiring contents printed on labels, under government stamp, and severely punishing both newspapers and manufacturers for the insertion of false or fraudulent advertising matter calculated to deceive the public; (c) to regulate preparations of prescriptions by doctor and druggist, by fixing standards, and by summarily punishing substitutions; (d) to maintain competent inspectors and to enforce such regulations as shall accomplish the results; (e) to prepare and to furnish druggists, doctors, etc., with a weekly or monthly bulletin containing orders and instructions in a systematic educational campaign.

9. Bureau of Registration of Institutions of Public and Private Relief, Correction, and Detention: to investigate institutions and establish standards. The inmates should be the subject of experiments in diet, hygiene, sanitation, etc., and also of statistical inquiry.

10. Bureau of Immigration: to include, in addition to present service, provisions for the study of races, desirable immigration, mixture of races, and also distribution locally.

11. Bureau of Organic Diseases: to study returns by physicians, compile notifications concerning chronic and organic diseases, (a) educationally to ameliorate and advise by pamphlets; (b) to follow up and study causes and remedies; (c) to furnish practitioners with directions for treatment.

12. Bureau of Health Information: to disseminate reliable information, couched in plain language, concerning right living as widely and thoroughly as possible.

13. National Bureau of Research Requiring Statistics: Habits should be investigated to a far greater extent than hitherto. The highly exact methods of statistical analysis, involving the theories of variation, correlation, and regression, should be applied to this field on a larger scale. Correlation of food habits and alcoholism with mental and physical efficiency; value of foods experimentally determined by results in connection with mental and physical efficiency rather than laboratory theories; effects of longer or shorter labor day on

efficiency; correlation of the number of open windows and cases of sickness, etc.—such questions of vital interest can be determined to a finality by the new statistical analysis. The preparation of all blanks in use by all other departments should be subject to the approval of this department, which should have at its head exceptional men. The vital statistics of the census should be managed by the bureau.

14. National Bureau of Research requiring laboratories and apparatus: systematically to extend knowledge of remedies for deadly diseases which may be advantageously pursued by laboratory methods.

To equip human machinery, consisting of exceptional men, organized and kept in action for this task, with suitable apparatus and adequate supplies, at least one hundred millions of dollars should be annually appropriated by the nation.

The health department should receive its support (a) from licenses levied on persons and industries inspected, stamp taxes, and registration fees; (b) from national appropriations.—J. Pease Norton, address to American Association for the Advancement of Science, June 30, 1906. V. E. H.

Why Has the Doctrine of Laissez Faire Been Abandoned?—Perhaps the most remarkable change which economic opinion has undergone during the last fifty years has been the change from the extreme laissez-faire doctrine of classical economists to the modern doctrines of government regulation and social control. The abandonment has been gradual and unconscious. Laissez-faire was a natural doctrine when governments were weak. In America government regulation has taken on the form of a struggle with the "interests" for existence. The two fallacies in laissez faire are: (1) The individual, left to himself, does not know what is best for him; society undertakes to teach him what is best. Particular organizations teach certain things; e. g., the Society for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis. The difference between ignorance and knowledge is not a matter of opinion. Objections to imposing a religious creed on a party will not hold against teaching an ignorant class true knowledge as a subject. There is a distinction between what a man desires and what he should desire. A whole range of social betterment is opened up through the distinction. (2) The second fallacy in laissez faire is: A man, when left alone, in selling his individual interest does not thereby best serve the society. The act of one individual in destroying a forest does not thereby best serve society; he may serve himself. Individual action cannot be trusted to provide slow-burning construction in a city building. The government has a right to regulate railroad rates in the interests of the public as opposed to the particular interest. We doubtless today are in danger of too much socialistic experimentation, but the menace of socialism can best be met by understanding the evils it is intended to remedy.—Irving Fisher, in *Science*, January 4, 1907. S. E. W. B.

The Ethics of Corporate Management. — Monopolies are not new; they existed in Asia Minor and Sicily centuries ago; but our industrial methods have changed too fast for our ethics to keep pace with them. Charles Francis Adams, of the Massachusetts Railroad Commission, promulgated some time ago an idea essentially ethical, which was of great service at the time and has been the really vital force in all good schemes of corporate regulation ever since. His central principle was: In the management of a railroad the temporary interests of the road and of its various shippers are often divergent, but the permanent interests of the road and shippers come very much closer together than the temporary ones and can almost be said to coincide. The manager who looks to the future instead of to the present will put the local business on the same charge basis as the through business.

It takes a long time for a man to learn to transfer a principle of morality, which he fully recognizes in one field, to another field of slightly different location and character, particularly if it will injure his personal interests. The obligation of the corporation managers to the public is not yet as clearly recognized as their obligation to the stockholder.

We cannot look to machinery to solve the difficulties of strikes, etc., but to a wider sense of the responsibility on the part of directors and general officers. Subordinates must be selected, not only for their fitness to bring business results, but also for their ability to work with the public. Defiant officials can do more than almost any professional agitator to stir up hatred.

Industrial corporations grew up into power because they met the needs of the past. To stay in power they must meet the needs of the present and arrange their ethics accordingly. If they can do it by their own voluntary development of the sense of trusteeship, that is the simplest and best solution; but if not, one of two things must happen: vastly increased legal regulation, or state ownership of monopolies. Those who fear the effects of increased governmental activity must prove by their acceptance of ethical duties to the public that they are not blind devotees of an industrial past which has ceased to exist, but are preparing to accept the heavier burdens and obligations which the industrial present carries with it.—Arthur T. Hadley, in *North American Review*, January 18, 1907.
S. E. W. B.

The Socialist Movement in England.—The object of this study is (1) to trace the history of English labor organizations; (2) to analyze the new socialistic spirit that has taken the place of their old individualism.

The old unions desired to better the condition of their members by obtaining concession in regard to wages and hours of work, and they had no idea of any transformation of society. International unions of workers in the same trade marked the beginning of the socialistic spirit. The final step was the demand for public power in Parliament. The leaders—John Burns, Tom Mann, Keir Hardie, and others—attempted to turn the movement in the direction of socialism, and thus settle questions the solution of which was necessary, but impossible for private initiative: nationalization of the soil, mines, and means of transportation, old-age pensions, eight-hour day, etc.

The beginning of this movement was in 1893, when the Labor Congress adopted as its policy nationalization of mines and public utilities; from that time the differences between the neo-unionists and the old conservative unionists decreased. Several organizations contributed to this movement: (1) the Democratic Federation, founded in 1881 by Hyndman on the basis of Marxian philosophy; (2) the Independent Labor Party, founded in 1892; (3) the Fabian Society, which was not distinctively a labor organization; (4) the Labor Party, which was an outgrowth of the Independent Labor Party, but which represented in Parliament the laboring class. In 1900 the Labor Representation Committee decided that only members of the unions and men belonging to the Labor Party could represent it at the elections. This was the beginning of their real existence; but not until the January elections of 1906 did the working class depart from its long apparent political indifference; as a result, thirty members were elected to Parliament as representatives of labor. Of these thirty representatives about half are socialists, but the party is not made up, on that account, of two separate contingents. Its members may be socialists individually, but they are collectively and before all else trade-unionists.

This movement in England is only an extension of the political movement of the workmen of the continent, which has destroyed there the equilibrium of the parties and threatens to do the same in England. In its one year of real power it has not favored either the Radicals or the Conservatives, but has worked first of all for the laboring class, then for the general welfare of all England.—Maurice Alfassa, and Henry-Emile Barrault, "Le mouvement socialiste en Angleterre," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, December, 1906.

E. H. S.

Household Budgets or Actual Bookkeeping?—Gottlieb Schapper Arndt, who died a short time ago, was an earnest and conscientious follower of Le Play and spent his whole life gathering household budget statistics; but the vicious method of using a week or a month or even two months as a starting-point and

multiplying the result for a yearly budget, makes his work useless. Contrast the following table, calculated from the actual accounts kept with absolute accuracy for ten years by Karl von K. Taking the 120 months' average as 100, then the expenses are:

January	110.37	July	136.23
February	80.85	August	70.99
March	88.18	September	103.04
April	113.51	October	110.97
May	95.52	November	82.38
June	99.11	December	108.85

Furthermore, comparing three household expenses kept with care, two in Switzerland and one in Germany, we have this result of percentage of expenditures for various needs:

SWISS, 1876-85

	A	B	K. von K., 1896-1905
1. Food	46.3	44.9	31.3
2. Drink (at home).....	1.2	1.4	1.3
3. Household (rent, etc.).....	21.1	22.1	23.1
4. Clothing	11.3	9.2	0.8
5. Psychic needs.....	2.5	3.4	2.1
6. Pleasures	7.0	3.7	0.6
7. Cleanliness and care of body.....	2.8	1.9	3.2
8. Sickness and birth expenses.....	1.3	2.3	2.4
9. Foresight (insurance)	1.1	1.1	16.0
10. Taxes	2.6	7.5	2.1
11. Various (gifts, etc.)	1.0	2.5	7.2

Item 3 conceals great variations, such as from 9.8 to 21.7 per cent. for rent in different years.—Karl Bücher, in *Zeitschrift für Staatswissenschaft*, November, 1906. V. E. H.

The Criminaloid.—The real weakness in the moral position of Americans is not their attitude toward the plain criminal, but their attitude toward the quasi-criminal. The prosperous evil-doers that bask undisturbed in popular favor have been careful to shun the familiar types of wickedness. Overlooked in Bible and prayerbook, their obliquities lack the brimstone smell; and so the sight of them does not let loose the flood of wrath that rushes down upon long-attainted sins. The immunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of new sins has brought into being a class for which we coin the term "criminaloid." By this we designate such as prosper by flagitious practices which have not come under the effective ban of public opinion. Relentless pursuit hems in the criminal. The criminaloid, however, fortified by his connections with "legitimate business," may even bestride his community like a Colossus.

The key to the criminaloid is not evil impulse, but moral insensibility. The banker who lends his depositors' money to himself under divers corporate aliases, the railroad official who grants a secret rebate for his private graft, the labor leader who instigates a strike in order to be paid for calling it off—these reveal in their faces nothing of the wolf or vulture. Conscious of the difference between doing wrong and getting it done, he places out his dirty work. He is a buyer and not a practitioner of sin. He invokes a pseudo-Darwinism to sanction the revival of outlawed tactics of struggle. To win the game with the aid of a sleeveful of aces proves one's fitness to survive. The criminaloid is not anti-social by nature. Very likely he keeps his marriage vows, pays his debts, "mixes" well, and has a contracted kind of public spirit. The type is exemplified by Tweed, and other notorious looters, who are "good fellows." They shrink from robbing anybody; are equal, however, to robbing everybody. The criminaloid practices a protective mimicry of the good. He counterfeits the

good citizen. He puts on the whole armor of the good. He stands having his loins girt with religiosity and having the breastplate of respectability. His feet are shod with ostentatious philanthropy, his head is incased in the helmet of spread-eagle patriotism. Holding in one hand the buckler of worldly success, in the other the sword of "influence," he is able to withstand in the evil day and, having done all, to stand. The criminaloid plays the support of his local or special group against the larger society. The criminal can do himself no good by appealing to his group, for they have no social standing. The criminaloid identifies himself with some legitimate group, and when arraigned he calls upon his group to protect its own. The politically influential land-thieves stir up the slumbering local feeling against the "impertinent meddlers" of the land office. The labor grafter resents his exposure as a capitalist plot. The criminaloid flourishes until the growth of morality overtakes the growth of opportunities to prey. It is of little use to bring law abreast of the time, if morality lags. A statute has little force of its own. The backwardness of public opinion nullifies it. Fresh opportunities for illicit gain are ever appearing, and these are eagerly seized by the unscrupulous. The years between these new sins and the recognition of their heinousness are few or many according to the alertness of the social mind. It is in this gap that the criminaloid disports himself. The narrowing of this gap depends chiefly on the videttes that guard the march of humanity. It is the concern of the criminaloid to delay this growth of conscience by silencing these. To intimidate the molders of public opinion so as to confine the editor to the "news," the preacher to the "simple gospel," the educator to his textbooks, and the writer to his classic themes—such are the tactics of the criminaloid.—E. A. Ross, in *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1907.

The Ethical Problem in an Industrial Community.—The morality which appeals to men with the sanction of the ages is chiefly concerned with the relations of persons who know one another as individuals, or who recognize at least the claims of some mutual bond, whether of kindred or of mere propinquity. Thus the swimmer who refuses to spring into the water to the rescue of a drowning child earns the contempt of his fellows and on reflection probably concurs in the condemnation of his cowardice. But the most numerous and important relations in modern industrial society are to strangers, whom a man does not know, has never seen, and cannot love. It is useless to call such people neighbors. What is needed is to gain a right emotional attitude toward the anonymous crowd. This must be as tough and flexible as the sanctions which the good man respects within the little world of home and acquaintance. Why has a man today any more responsibility to the child struggling in the water before his eyes than he has to the fishermen in their storm-driven boats, struggling to reach the shore that has never been charted, where no lighthouses have been built, no bouys set, no warning bells fixed? It is required to find moral worth in a complex of relationships which seem wholly impersonal. If we shirk the ethical significance of the anonymous relations, the alternative is a species of Macchiavelism. He opposes the interest of the whole universality to that of particular persons, and identifies the whole universality with the personal aggrandizement of the prince.

If a broad distinction be made between town and country dwellers, over three-fourths of the population in Great Britain are living in urban districts—almost exactly the reverse of the conditions existing before the middle of the last century. This massing of peoples has had two results: (1) Normal relations are today between persons who are more unknown, and (2) although more unknown, these persons are more interdependent. The normal relationship, that is to say, is not so much between individuals as between groups. These groups are at once mutually unknown and closely interdependent. Note this in detail in the manufacture and sale of a pair of boots. This problem of our relation to the unknown is intensified by the claim of the known; as, e.g.,

when a mother finds her boy sick with a fever of the type that demands notification of the authorities.

Common life can be organized around an ideal end that is not too remote. A citizen can love his city. It is less easy to see how he can apply his civic enthusiasm to a population mass of forty millions. Yet this must be done. Social morality will disregard and so triumph over the lion form of the anonymous by crystallizing around the idea of justice, not as an abstract conception, but as an immediate and persuasive force. Justice or a love of humanity is a predisposition to love and act rightly toward individuals. How shall this attitude be secured? The inquiry finds its answer in the function of social knowledge and of social imagination.

Sociology has given us the social knowledge necessary to prove that the facts of physical interdependence and economic solidarity involve social responsibility. But the student of sociology deals largely with averages. Now, it is not possible to love an average—at first. But here comes in the function of the social imagination. The power of discerning the common quality of those who pass before our eyes, or who even pass only in the abbreviated sign of figures in a statistical list, is needed to vitalize the knowledge derived from averages. The ethical regard for the anonymous crowd depends equally on statistics and poetry. Statistics reduces all men to the level of averages. Poetry invests these averages in which our own personal acquaintances appear with the attributes of identical personalities. There is a certain advantage in the power of easily transferring the persuasion of human kindred from the familiar face to x , the average.

So long as social relations were of the simple personal types the need to discover a representative or symbolic quality in unknown persons was curious or speculative, but with the growth of industrial society the need has become an intensely practical one.—B. Kirkman Gray, in *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1907. J. K. H.

The Public School and Juvenile Delinquency.—The reform school has received its pupils from the hands of the courts and has administered to them an education of its own devising—an education with many most noteworthy features; and the public school has, when the incorrigible child forced its way (as it seldom did) within its walls, “suspended” or “expelled” him, and has taken little or no note of his subsequent career. Certainly the time has arrived when every education worthy of the time can emphatically stand for the position that it is the business of the public system of education to take account of the educational need of *all* children within the customary school ages. Between the public school on the one hand, and the court on the other, there is at present no place for classes of children fitted for neither.

In two essential respects the reform school will have to borrow from the public-school system—specially trained teachers and improved educational methods. On the other hand, the reform schools have evolved certain educational procedures which will ultimately possess much significance for public-school workers—classification of children according to like capacity and standards, and association of those together who profit best under the same treatment. In other words, segregation in reform schools is for much the same purpose that segregation exists in hospitals; it prevents contagion, but, possibly more important, it permits to each class its most effective treatment. They put the slow cases together and adopt for them the most appropriate treatment. They put together the hardened and the vicious, and then bring to bear upon them the discipline, the training, and the incentives that will cause them to undergo right development. The public school has also much to learn from the reform school in the matter of industrial work.

Every city and town has its wayward children, who, not bad enough for the reform school, are yet, for a variety of reasons, more or less unsuited to the public-school classes as now organized. Within the last few years we have seen the rapid rise of agencies calculated to deal with these children. But what is most needed at present is an integration of these forces, as was stated at the

outset. From the well-regulated classroom in the better school of today, through all the stages of ungraded class, special class, day truant school, juvenile court, probation system, reform school, parole system, and state schools for defectives, we are concerned with the education of children. Child-labor laws are ineffective without compulsory-education laws; and these are really of little avail unless special schools or rooms be provided for the children who do not fit the graded school system. The public school, through its department of supervision, is logically the center about which these various functions should be co-ordinated. Between the parent on the one hand (with the co-operation of his church), and the public school on the other (representing the state in its contribution to the custody and education of children), there should be no middle ground left to the unorganized efforts of charity and voluntary effort, however well-meaning these may be.—David S. Snedden, in *Educational Review*, April, 1907.

J. A. F.

Political economy has learned from the negative criticism and positive doctrine of socialism. In all essential points, German political economy is in general antagonistic to socialism. This is true in an especial manner of the leading academic teachers. Teachers must be free to teach what they believe, else they would lose the personal respect of their students—the necessary element in all teaching.

The socialistic agitation is the result of historic and economic changes, together with the forcing to the front of certain social questions. Scientific socialism is a new economic system, critical and dogmatic in character, whose conscious aim has been to oppose liberalism and individualism, as the latter formerly opposed mercantilism and the benevolent theory of the state. It was a long time before the refusal to accord to socialism and its authors due appreciation disappeared even in academic circles. We have learned from socialism to reinvestigate the economic conditions under the vaunted system of freedom, and also to reinvestigate the principles which underlay public and private law. Political economy came not to be socialistic, but to settle accounts with socialism. Neither socialism nor agitation *made* problems; practical life caused them to *become* problems. German scientific political economy has not surrendered the field to socialism, but rather followed it into the domain of these new problems, becoming neither adherent, nor believer, nor antagonistic, but the critic of socialism, as any older scientific school must be, when it meets a new one and is assailed by it. To the socialistic criticism of the existing system the economists oppose a counter-criticism of the socialistic conclusions and demands. That is the duty of a free science. Such an attitude leads to the recognition of the important scientific work, in spite of fundamental fallacies of socialism. It is a plain duty to add to political economy the correct teachings of socialism. We cannot reject a truth because it happens to come from the socialists. We must concede the truth in all their criticisms, but no more. They go the extreme of denying hero-worship; so they underestimate the influence of a guiding personality, or the entrepreneur. Their general one-sidedness is shown by the depreciation of directive enterprise. The intellectual work of the dogmatic teaching of economic socialism I would be the last to depreciate; yet I am unable to come to any other judgment than this, that the economic and social structure of socialism presupposes, as its material, men not only more perfect, but of an entirely different nature than men have been, are, or will be. The condition which socialism wants would be undesirable.

This will serve to weaken the criticism against German academic economists—that they have not the moral courage to make an open stand for what they know to be logical, i. e., scientific socialism. These economists mediate between economic individualism and socialism, hence antagonisms on all sides. It is the practical duty of statesmen to formulate this compromise from time to time. The theorists can only supply data. Industrial protection and insurance reforms in taxation, etc., show that the German Empire has not lacked practical statesmen, able to read the signs of the times, in economic and social matters.—Adolph Wagner, in *Fortnightly Review*, April, 1907.

S. E. W. B.

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POLITICAL VALUES OF THE AMERICAN MISSIONARY¹

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I

The diplomatic policy of the United States in the Far East always has assumed that those eastern countries ought, if capable, to be self-governing. That not every country is thus capable is a conviction of more recent growth; not welcome to an American, but forced upon him by later and wider comparisons of history. Always however it has been held, and still is held, by the American government and people that the autonomy and self-respect, and the reform on modern lines, of eastern countries should be fostered and not hindered by the West.

Although in this country the discrimination made against Chinese immigration has been exceedingly severe, in some respects unwise, and the administration of the exclusion law inexcusably offensive, yet no other western government has maintained a policy in the main so friendly as that of the United

¹ The following paper was written just before the opening of war between Japan and Russia. This will account for the form of statement in some passages, which, with this explanation, the writer thinks unnecessary to change. It is one effect of this war to give China the new opportunity she has needed, and the new convictions without which the opportunity could never be improved. For as the trophies of Miltiades would not suffer Themistocles to sleep, so the victories of Japan have disturbed the slumber of all Asia, and brought the age-long sleep of China to an end.

States toward Korea and Siam, Japan, and China. And this policy of the American government, so far from having been obstructed by missionaries from the United States, has always carried their cordial sympathy; if indeed it has not in a measure been inspired by their known sentiments and example. Alike by their general attitude and their particular services it has been strongly reinforced. In several conspicuous instances the political sentiments, service, and influence of American missionaries have been exemplified to the great advantage alike of the eastern countries and the United States; and of this a peculiarly good illustration is presented by Hon. E. T. Sheppard of San Francisco, sometime adviser in international law to the government of Japan, in his article on the late Dr. D. B. McCartee regarded as an "American Missionary Statesman."² But in view of many disputes it is proper both to inquire and to show *what political value the American missionary has in promoting international relations of reciprocal advantage.*

Christianity has always been a revolutionary force, and the world has sadly needed to have it so; revolutionizing customs and conduct, motives and ideals. Antagonism it must always meet, even in a Christian land, from those who will not yield to its uncompromising claims. But Christianity as such has had the smallest part in exciting the hostility of eastern nations to the West; the principal grounds of which hostility are now tardily beginning among us to be understood.³ The Anglo-Chinese scholar and ex-consul, Edward H.

² *Missionary Review of the World*, April, 1906.

³ A. H. Smith and Chester Holcombe. In the throng of ephemeral publications called out by the Boxer troubles at least two books were produced of lasting worth. These are *The Real Chinese Question*, by Hon. Chester Holcombe, New York, 1900, for many years the very able secretary of the American legation at Peking; and *China in Convulsion*, 2 vols., by Rev. Dr. Arthur H. Smith, (New York, 1901), who is generally acknowledged to stand in the first rank of writers on that country. Both of these books are written with ample knowledge of the conditions which led to that climax of fury in China; and both do rare justice to the several great factors involved: religious, commercial, political, native, and foreign. While quite independent of each other, these two witnesses agree in all of their leading conclusions, and answer well the opposing conclusions found elsewhere. The work in two volumes by Dr. Smith presents a comprehensive study of antecedent conditions, followed by a full narration of the Siege of Legations,

Parker, speaks of the missionary hospital at Canton as "this magnificent hospital which is, in a way, the chief civilizing influence in south China"⁴—testimony the more useful in that the witness has no concern for the religious aims and motives without which this hospital, and many another, would never have existed. It was begun in 1835, and was long served by Dr. Peter Parker, who in 1844, with the missionaries Bridgman and Williams, were agents in negotiating the first treaty between China and the United States. Their function in this negotiation is very imperfectly described by their official designation as secretaries and interpreters. They were interpreters in a large sense of the word, not mere linguists and amanuenses for the transaction of clerical business. They were men of very high character, wide learning, and large practical resources, who already had made a most favorable impression upon the Chinese mind. Informally they were the fit advisers of our first minister in this matter, as he freely acknowledged; and advisers no less of the native imperial officials. A notable tribute to the political value of Christian missions, inspired by his obligations to these men, was afterward penned by Minister Caleb Cushing, which may be found in the *Memoir* of Dr. E. C. Bridgman,⁵ reprinted from the journal in which it first appeared. That the conclusions of Mr. Cushing have been illustrated and confirmed by the whole history of American Diplomacy in the Orient may be seen in

in which the author had part. Perhaps he wrote a little too near the later events that he describes to see them in adequate perspective and a little too hurriedly to show the usual finish of his style. By revision he can make the book a classic of its theme.

The shorter work by Mr. Holcombe shows an intimate official acquaintance with important facts, and a mastery of material. The writer's views have been long considered and are admirably expressed. As an effective, lucid, trustworthy, and brief account of the chief ingredients of the Chinese situation and prospects in 1900, *The Real Chinese Question* is not surpassed. In this book, moreover, China ceases to be the wholly inscrutable problem she is commonly made to appear. There are some few persons who understand China better than most persons do their own land.

⁴ Edward H. Parker, *China Past and Present*, London and New York, 1903, p. 101.

⁵ Eliza J. Gillett Bridgman, *Life and Labors of Elijah Coleman Bridgman*, New York, 1864, pp. 131-34.

the recent volume of this title by Hon. John W. Foster.⁶ But in the case of the American missionary this value was never of the sort so much resented by all Orientals as a perpetual menace to their national independence.

For ten years, while continuing his arduous medical work, Dr. Parker acted, in the sense shown, as interpreter to our several commissioners; and he also was five times *chargé d'affaires*. In August, 1855, Dr. Parker was himself appointed minister, holding that office until August, 1857.⁷ And in 1855 Dr. S. Wells Williams, after twenty-two years as a missionary-publisher, editor and author, doing work which placed under lasting obligation every foreign missionary, merchant, scholar, and diplomat in China, entered the American legation to be for twenty-one years its secretary, and nine times its *chargé d'affaires*. In this position his scholastic work went on, important papers were written, and his second great *Dictionary of the Chinese Language* completed; while the final revision of his encyclopaedic volumes on *The Middle Kingdom*⁸ was made and published after his retirement to the United States. That he was never appointed minister himself, although the best qualified man for that post his country had, might be explained by party politics; but it was attributed by Secretary of State Seward to the fact that Dr. Williams was so wholly irreplaceable in the office that he held. In company with Dr. William A. P. Martin, Dr. Williams aided Minister Reed in negotiating the Treaty of Tientsin, of which treaty the famous Toleration Clause was entirely Dr. Williams' work. He was regarded by that minister with profound respect as the most learned, most godly, and most unselfish man that he had ever known, besides possessing a masterly wisdom in dealing with the Chinese. Without him Minister Reed, by his own confession, could never have accomplished with any satisfaction his extremely delicate task.⁹

⁶ John W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, Boston and New York, 1903.

⁷ G. B. Stevens, *The Life of Peter Parker, M.D.*, Boston, 1886.

⁸ S. Wells Williams, LL.D., *The Middle Kingdom*, 2 vols., New York, 1847; revised ed., 1882.

⁹ F. W. Williams, *Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, Missionary, Diplomatist, Sinalogue*; by His Son, New York, 1889, pp. 274, 294.

Dr. William A. P. Martin, considered by many to be the most learned scholar and the foremost American in China today, not only rendered to his own government important help in the treaty negotiations of 1858 and 1860, but for twenty-eight years, personally or through his writings, he has been a leading instructor in international law of many Chinese diplomats and attachés of embassies, who have been sent abroad. And from 1869 to 1900, as president of the first Imperial College for Chinese students in western science and language, Dr. Martin has been in requisition from time to time as an expert adviser of the Chinese government. Besides many other publications of great value in Chinese and English, he has created a whole literature of political science in the Chinese language, and has been very influential in disseminating that knowledge of which the fruit will soon appear in a great national party of New China. He reached that country first in 1850; and eighteen years of very effective missionary life prepared him for all this later work, literary, educational, and political. He lives and labors still, a veteran pioneer of the renovated empire soon to be; undiscouraged by the reluctance of China to change her ways, and undismayed by the temporary triumph of destructive reaction.¹⁰

United States Minister Allen of Korea entered that land originally in 1884 as the first medical missionary to arrive. In this capacity he quickly won that confidence of the sovereign, which to this day he worthily retains. No other American has been better fitted to represent his country in distracted Korea than Dr. Henry N. Allen,¹¹ who until lately has held his appointment with great acceptability, under several successive administrations.

In Japan, among many foreign helpers, none ever did so much to inspire and guide her unexampled national transformation as the missionary Verbeck. No other foreign resident ever was so honored by the government of that land. The envoys of nations envied his opportunities, but no ambassador from America or Europe at the Mikado's court ever sustained with that

¹⁰ Wm. A. P. Martin, D.D., LL.D., *A Cycle of Cathay*, New York, 1896; *The Lore of China*, 1901; *The Awakening of China*, 1907.

¹¹ Foster, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

court relations of confidence so intimate as those of Dr. Guido F. Verbeck. From 1859 his first ten years were largely spent in teaching the New Testament, the Constitution of the United States, history, and international law to the Samurai who reorganized the public polity of Japan. Then through him was founded the University of Tokio, which now ranks among the most important in the world; and then for some years he acted informally as privy counsellor of the government, trusted, sought, and heeded by the statesmen nearest to the throne; several of whom had already been his pupils. He was a man of cosmopolitan training, sympathies, and experience, and his biographer rightly says of him that "Dr. Verbeck for years stood to the new government in place of the great corps of expert advisers which were afterward assembled."¹² Like Dr. Martin in Peking, he directed and aided the translation of much standard political literature: *The Code Napoleon*, Bluntschli's *Staatsrecht*, *Two Thousand Legal Maxims*, with Commentary, *The Constitutions of the States of Europe and America*, *Forest Laws*, compendiums of forms, and hundreds of other legal and political documents. Having been a civil engineer before becoming a clergyman, he could even give counsel upon fortification, while as a Hebrew and Japanese scholar he made a superb rendering of the Books of Psalms. It was he whose advice and plan sent the great embassy of 1871-73 around the world to open the eyes of Japan more fully to her needs; and upon his own visit to America in 1878 the editor of the *Tokio Times* wrote:

His long residence has been an unceasing benefit to alien dwellers of all nations in ways of which he can never have been conscious; for the unexerted influence of such men goes far to counteract, in time of need, the impulses of anger inspired by the more frequent examples of selfishness and prejudice which the people of this country have had to encounter.

His last years, by his own choice, were given to the strictly evangelical work which lay always nearest to his heart. He was the only foreigner then in Japan treated as a citizen. In 1898 his funeral was attended by a representative of the imperial

¹² Wm. E. Griffis, *Verbeck of Japan*, New York, 1900, p. 282.

court, and its expense was defrayed by the emperor. A company of soldiers escorted his body to the grave, and a perpetual lease was granted to his family by the City of Tokio, of the plot in which he lies. All this was done for a man who never once sought public office nor private fame; but only wished to help the Japanese in every way by which they might be brought to understand through the Christian faith their own chief good.

Occasionally, it is true, some missionary who has missed his calling has sought a commercial opening or civil office, not always succeeding better in his later occupation than he has done in his first. But times without number an effective missionary who has loved that calling, has, in some official capacity not sought after by himself, given the most efficient kind of help to the United States, or to the country of his residence. And often, as might be supposed, such a man's knowledge of the language and people, combined with a varied experience, a trusted character and tact, has made him far superior as an officer to the average appointee of that system of spoils by which America is still disgraced. He may even surpass the agents of a better civil service, when their proved ability is devoted to ends of private ambition or gain.

Dr. Divie Bethune McCartee very unwillingly at first turned aside from his chosen work to take on civil functions; and nothing but the exigencies in China of his own government ever led him to this step. But, in his own words, he held that his calling as a missionary did not absolve him from his obligations as a citizen of the United States. Such was the estimate in which his character and ability were held by the native citizens of Ningpo that before an American consulate was established in that city, the Chinese themselves begged him to act in a consular capacity, and frequently employed him as the adviser of their own officials in matters which concerned their dealing with foreigners. Later, so highly did Minister Burlingame value his consular work in Chefoo, that he urged his permanent attachment to the legation at Peking, though Dr. McCartee never would consent; and to the Department of State Mr. Burlingame described him as exhibiting all those qualities which the American government should aim to

secure in every consulate, and to employ in every important negotiation held in China.¹³ When later still the missionary doctor became foreign adviser, with official rank, to the first Chinese legation in Japan, United States Minister Bingham regarded his appointment as cause for congratulation to three governments; and so reported it at Washington.¹⁴ The testimony of these ministers is corroborated by both Chinese and Japanese officials, and one of the most remarkable tributes ever penned in China to the official service of an American citizen was written of Dr. McCartee in 1877 by the American consul-general at Shanghai.¹⁵

In every one of these instances, and many more, it was the equipment and the spirit of these men as missionaries of the Christian faith which qualified them in a rare degree for all the civil and political service that each rendered. It is characteristic of all these missionary diplomats and government agents that while serving their own government with exceptional efficiency they have at the same time done everything in their power to promote the highest welfare of those oriental lands in which they lived and served. That any antagonism exists between the real welfare of the Orient and the real interests of the Occident they have neither discovered nor assumed. They have believed in the practice between nations of a genuine reciprocity, that highest word in Chinese ethical thought. The splendid statesmanship expressed in the rule of the first Marquis Tseng, a modern viceroy of Nanking, they all would have approved: "What is beneficial to us, and not injurious to you, I demand. What is beneficial to you, and not injurious to us, I concede."¹⁶ But they all went farther than this; for so far as the conduct of business has been in their own hands they have acted sincerely upon the Golden Rule, which has been their own rule of diplo-

¹³ *U. S. Foreign Relations* (1866), Burlingame to Secretary Seward, pp. 425-35.

¹⁴ *U. S. Foreign Relations* (1878), John A. Bingham to Secretary Evarts, December 17, 1877.

¹⁵ A *Memoir* of Dr. McCartee is now in course of preparation by the present writer.

¹⁶ *Cycle of Cathay*, pp. 429-30.

macy. Not one of them was an eye-servant; not one a hireling, although they received wages; not one sought the office that he held, but in each case office sought the man; not one preferred the honor that comes from men to the glory of God; but every one of them has enjoyed such a merited confidence as is given to few men in public life.

And it is a further fact of large importance that the special work of these American missionaries in government employ has reflected the prevailing sentiments and general influence of American Protestant missionaries in those lands, even if individual exceptions may be found. So far from being a leading cause of international disturbance, American missionaries, and British, as they outnumber all other Protestant bodies in their several fields, have both in their political and their ordinary functions commonly done more than all other agents to promote good-will between Asia and the world at large. Pre-eminently they have been interpreters of each people and each culture to the other, of West to East and of East to West. They have interpreted each at its best; and, with some exceptions, they have been the best interpreters in the field, because the most sympathetic, and many times the most intelligent. They have not written all the learned books; for the civil service of several lands has produced fine orientalists; but no others have done so much as the missionaries, including Roman Catholic, to disseminate widely among Occidentals accurate information about the East. Missionaries are mostly scattered in a dense population of whom the greater part has no direct acquaintance with their actual doings and aims; a people easily misled if their rulers and leaders are also misinformed. And so missionaries have suffered not a little from the hatred engendered by the forcible aggression of foreign commerce, arms, and jurisdiction, because by an ignorant people and by mistaken officials, they have often been identified with a national policy which they have only abhorred. Again, the ecclesiastical assumption of magisterial place and power affected by agents of the papacy has reacted severely upon these very agents, and upon Protestant missionaries as well; although

by the latter, from the beginning, this policy too has been abjured as being altogether mischievous.

Able, scholarly, and noble men are not infrequently found in missions of the papal church; and that they have done much good in pagan lands can never be questioned by those who are properly informed. But the inextinguishable claim of the papacy to universal dominion is applied to temporal no less than spiritual things; and to the limit of opportunity the claim is always pressed. It leads to practices most obnoxious to the national sensibilities of an Asiatic people; and that this has been a source of endless trouble in the political relations of Asia with the West is beyond all possibility of doubt. To most persons who are not members of the Roman communion, or of the French and German governments, this claim and these practices vitiate the political quality of papal missions, however good in other respects their influence may be; and the radical difference of the Protestant policy in this matter, although it marks every branch of the Protestant church engaged in foreign mission work, has not been always understood. But the readiness of the governments named to make the murder of a few missionaries an excuse for armed invasion, for the seizure of territory, and for extortionate demands, has involved all missionaries in the indiscriminating odium felt toward all occidental foreigners alike, as being untrustworthy intruders, dangerous to native liberties and rights.

Yet despite the misunderstandings which have arisen there was never any lack of varied and convincing evidence that the true Christian missionary is the most indispensable nexus between the people and civilizations of the Orient and the West. With rare exceptions Protestant missionaries have not lived abroad for any private advantage they could get out of the people among whom they lived; but for the benefits which they could confer. The benefits actually conferred are widely manifest, and often acknowledged by native recipients. They are not only most varied, but they are of the most vital kind that one people ever can give to another—healing, education, a new literature, the foundations of new science, a boundless human sympathy, mag-

nanimous appreciation, devoted and disinterested service, and all the best ideals of life, society, and state that the most favored nations can impart. It is the function of the Christian missionary to provide and teach and exemplify these things. This work was always done by the missionary enterprise of Christianity, and throughout the nineteenth century conspicuously so. If genuine altruism is exemplified by any human enterprise it is certainly exemplified in this; and if a good understanding between nations is promoted by any foreigners in Asia it has been promoted by the Protestant missionaries of all countries and denominations for a hundred years—not least of all by the Americans. There is not a single country in Asia in which American missionaries have long dwelt where testimony to this effect has not been repeatedly pronounced as the estimate not only of such of the common people as have had direct experience of their work, but also of such high-placed officials, native and foreign, as have been well situated to judge. This is true even in the Turkish Empire, the government of which is committed to sentiments of deadly antagonism toward the Christian propaganda. It is true of Japan, and freely confessed by many of her statesmen, who themselves owe to the teaching, example, and stimulus thus derived a large part of what is best in their new ideals and aims. It is true of Persia and Siam and India; and whole volumes could be filled with concurring testimony from unimpeachable witnesses already published in many scattered books.

India has the least homogeneous population of all Asia, so internally split up by language, race, religion, and rigid social caste, that no one federal government ever had control of all the land before the advent of the British.¹⁷ Only once, and for one brief century—the seventeenth—has an approximation to such complete control existed; and that was under a foreign Tartar dynasty. But good as is the British government in India today, it is the government of a conquered and an Asiatic land, restive under the best European domination, while

¹⁷ Sir William Hunter, *A Brief History of the Indian Peoples*, 23d ed., Oxford, 1903.

too much divided still in its native elements either to effect a successful native revolt, or to replace the present government with a better. That a dangerous undertow of discontent with all European rule, however good, pervades the native mind of India is not an undisputed fact, nor one that the Indian government is forward to acknowledge; yet it is attested by some of the closest observers of that land. It is strongly put by Meredith Townsend throughout his weighty, though, in part, misleading, book, *Asia and Europe*.¹⁸ That, under certain quite possible contingencies, Indian loyalty would be highly problematic at the best seems obvious enough for reasons given by Archibald Colquhoun,¹⁹ directly corroborated by others, and implied by the testimony of many. In such a state of things the British government has no more welcome nor more necessary support than it derives from the missionary bungalows, of which many are American, scattered over all that empire. Banish every Protestant missionary from that vast domain, and all the native elements of disaffection would more easily break loose. The enterprise of British government in India might become too unprofitable to last; for in such banishment there would be lost a moral influence of immeasurable weight and scope, making continually for patience and peaceable restraint, and conciliating the proud natives of that conquered country to an occidental rule. Such a view of missions in India, if not expressly asserted, is implied by the words of not a few persons who have been high placed in the Indian government. Sir William Mackworth Young, connected with the Indian service thirty-eight years, has lately said:

If the natives of India have any practical knowledge of what is meant by Christian charity, if they know anything of high, disinterested motives and self-sacrifice, it is mainly from the missionary that they learn it. The strength of our position in India depends more largely upon the goodwill of the people than upon the strength and number of our garrisons, and for that goodwill we are largely indebted to the kindly, self-sacrificing efforts of the Christian missionary. It is love which must pave the way for the regeneration of India, as well as for the consolidation of England's power.

¹⁸ Meredith Townsend, *Asia and Europe*, London and New York, new ed., 1904.

¹⁹ Archibald Colquhoun, *Russia Against India*, London and New York, 1900; cf. pp. 127, 136, 148, 154, 159, 197, *et passim*.

The people generally know that the missionaries are their friends, and trust them. But even yet should native India become a national unit like Japan, neither England nor any other foreign power could profitably rule for a single day those 294,000,000 people. The directors of the East India Company a century ago called the sending of Christian missionaries "the maddest, most expensive, most unwarranted project ever proposed by a lunatic enthusiast." But a hundred years of Indian hate, inspired by the rule of those directors, culminated in the Sepoy Mutiny and frightful native revolt of 1857-59, when this company, which at grievous cost to justice, had cared for dividends alone, encountered its nemesis and became extinct. In 1858 the direct government of India was taken over by the British Crown, and the administration, since that time, has doubtless been one of extraordinary merit. Old wrongs are not entirely uprooted, and Indian gentry are not wholly pleased. They would of course like best to have things in their own hands, and do things in their own way; although they have not well assimilated, like the Japanese, the western culture and ideals in which, for a much longer time than the Japanese, they have been highly trained. But since the Mutiny one thing has been settled: the estimate placed on Christian missions not only by the British governors, but also by the natives best informed, has generally coincided with that of Sir Augustus Rivers Thompson, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, who says that "Christian missionaries have done more real and lasting good to the people of India than all other agencies combined. They have been the salt of the country and the saviours of the Empire."

In China, on the other hand, there exists a people not only the most numerous, but also the most homogeneous in the world, devoid of caste, and united by race, language, literature, traditions, institutions, ideals, and fundamental conceptions in religion; politically a single, federal organization, respected as such in every province; an autocracy, yet one limited by the universal prevalence of popular liberties and local rights; the most democratic and least despotic of all oriental states, whether now extant or known to history. Of all great countries China is perhaps the most mis-

understood, for want of adequate sympathy or knowledge. Even men who write excellent books about Japan will say some ridiculous things of China. And so it is not at all uncommon to find it spoken of as wholly wanting in national unity, a mere conglomeration of disjointed provinces, hardly fit to be called either a nation or a state. But with all its vicissitudes of history, its defects of government, and its need of great reform those best acquainted with the empire of China are inclined to regard it as possessing a fundamental unity of both blood and ideas unparalleled elsewhere; a federal system, that, on the whole, has not only persisted longer, but has accomplished the ends of government with more success than any other pagan empire, not excepting that of Rome; and a continued vitality, physical, intellectual, and moral also, which promises a national future greater than the past. Nor, when all is considered, does it appear to be a just cause for surprise that the Chinese should hesitate so long to try new ways, to set aside long-tested institutions, to acknowledge any other state as greater than their own, or take lessons from those whom they are forced to view as enemies of their national liberties and ideals. For, unlike India, they have a faithfully recorded history, and know well what they have accomplished in the past: how inexhaustible their resources and powers of recuperation hitherto have been, how invariably they have surmounted each political disaster in its turn, and how many surrounding nations have acknowledged them as the earthly fountain of learning, art, and power.

That the Chinese should resist so long as they dared the unwelcome invasion of the West is neither surprising, exceptional, nor inexcusable, though often represented as all three. There is no solitary instance to the contrary in any Asiatic land, and they have done only what every occidental land would do if the tables were reversed. In every time and place this invasion has been either effected, or accompanied, by fraud, robbery, violence, and insolent disregard of native rights and wishes standing in its way, and a supercilious assumption of superior moral and social worth on the part of the invading foreigners. This last feature of the entire movement has not been the least exasperat-

ing of all, and these things are true of every European power that has sought to force its trade and jurisdiction upon an oriental land; true in the Philippine Islands since first they were taken by Spain in 1543, and true of China since the first visit of the Portugese in 1514. If the duplicity, cruelty, and contempt which has been shown by Europe in Asia has been perfectly matched with that exhibited by Orientals in return, yet it never was outdone; nor has the more culpable obliquity of the less favored lands been hereby proven.

Until one century ago the Chinese powers of resistance had suffered no serious decline; and the empire, so far from being in a condition of decrepitude, had but recently experienced the culmination of its outward greatness. This was under a monarch whose personal qualities not only made him the peer of any contemporary sovereign, but one who would have been considered great in any period of history—"Chienlung the Magnificent," well so called.²⁰ The decline of China began under his successor, whose dissolute reign coincided with the smuggled importation, and swift extension, of a dangerous narcotic, by the excessive and injurious use of which the strength of China has received more harm than from any other single cause. But the revenue from this import, gathered by the first of Christian and naval powers, seemed so necessary to the maintenance of its colonial prestige that finally, without apology, this drug was forced upon the protesting and obstructing pagan government of China by the superior arms of the most Christian and most mighty of all lands. This indeed was not the only nor ostensible purpose of the war, though it was not disclaimed in the negotiations that ensued. Rather it was only a highly requisite side issue, to secure which no pretext came amiss, and without which the actual hostilities would have been quite in vain. The name which ever since has clung to this unhappy war was never liked by the aggressors, though it never will be shaken off; and its victims will scarce know it by another. A treaty made, the unreasonable pagan monarch refused to profit by the vices of his subjects, and declined to legitimate a traffic of whose enormity he was con-

²⁰ By Dr. Martin, in *The Siege in Peking*, New York, 1900, pp. 25, 26.

vinced. Accordingly he was set down for a singularly obstinate man; and the contraband poison continued still to be smuggled into the land under the aegis of most Christian guns; until, worn out with despair of remedy, the enfeebled government of a deeply wounded state yielded to a choice of evils, and removed the ban from a dreaded import that it had no power to exclude. Speaking of the course of trade for some years after the Treaty of Nanking, the experienced British Consul Parker, although, like so many members of the British service in China, ready to excuse the traffic on commercial grounds, yet, with some excess of moderation, says:

We rather shabbily took advantage of Chinese stupidity to legalize the trade, at least in this negative way, that it went on unchecked by us as before. China has since taken to growing opium, and the combined result has undoubtedly been to sap the Empire's strength.²¹

From the damning evidence of these indisputable facts small refuge lies in the circumstance that a little quantity of native opium had already been produced in one inland province before the importation was begun.²² For it was by this importation that the floodgates of misery were opened wide for a hundred years. A strong, enlightened power has enriched itself by debauching and impoverishing a weaker; while the victims of an officially fostered vice have been mulcted to pay the expenses of another conquered land, which with all the fabulous resources it was counted once to hold, has somehow never been able to pay for itself in any more honorable way. The first forcible encroachment of Europe upon Chinese rights and territory to succeed, after other attempts that failed, was so recent as this one in 1840. For the Portuguese occupation of Macao under a tax was tolerated by the Chinese, as something they were well able to throw off, had they so wished, at any time prior to the English war; and the advance of Russia was effectually stopped by Chinese arms for more than a century and a half from the time of Peter the Great's accession, in 1689. So began a long series of injuries and exactions, of which the equity has doubtless been at least as high as the consciences of the men who made them.

²¹ *China Past and Present*, p. 60.

²² Archibald Colquhoun, *China in Transformation*, New York. 1898.

But, as in India a century of accumulating hate flamed out in the Sepoy Mutiny, so a century of hate in China burst into the Boxer Revolt and the Siege of Legations; and there are those who say: It must be the missionaries who have stirred up all this trouble, and so miserably hurt our trade. On the contrary, the Chinese hate was directed blindly against all Occidentals alike. The missionaries and native Christians suffered most because most widely scattered and exposed; but suffered far less for being Christian, whether foreign or native, than because of their supposed complicity in a general conspiracy of the West to extinguish the liberties and customs of the East. Yet notwithstanding the murder of 212 missionaries and their children by infuriated Chinese mobs, those missionaries had no better friends than many of the Chinese, of whom not fewer than 5,000 laid down their own lives sooner than recant the Christian faith.

There have been no foreigners in that empire at any time whose moral influence alone has done so much as that of China's Protestant missionaries to make the presence of Occidentals even tolerable to her wantonly robbed and brutally injured people. Banish every true missionary from that land tomorrow, and the task of America and Europe in securing profitable intercourse with China would speedily prove too much for the combined powers and intelligence of all nations, so long as China remains unconvinced that her due place among the nations is only to be won by acquiring the new equipment. If this would seem to be a large claim to prefer yet its large probability might be made good by a multitude of indications which cannot be presented here.

Everywhere Protestant missionaries recognize the *de facto* government; and however desirable a change in it may seem they strictly avoid all meddling in its affairs, and all instigation of revolt. But inevitably the ideals of Christianity and humanity conveyed by the teaching of Protestant missionaries, British and American, strengthen in any civilized and historic race the native desire and capacity for self-government upon constitutional lines. This result may be discerned clearly in Japan, as also in Bulgaria; which latter country has been strongly influenced

by the American missionary institution, Robert College, on the Bosphorus. American missionaries generally would prefer to see every country govern itself that has any proved capacity for so doing, without destroying its own welfare, or becoming an injury to other people. They do not think that every country is so fitted. They do not think the Philippine Islands are so fitted, whatever they may ultimately become; and for much the same reasons that obtain in India. The people of those islands are not a nation, but an assemblage of discordant tribes, that apart from foreign control have never shown the least capacity for united action, nor the first rudiments of a common understanding. Except as common institutions, popular liberties and stable government are conferred upon them by a suzerain power, they must go without; so far as the analogy of history can show.²³

But Japan, in the first years of her intercourse with the West after 1858 had few foreign friends so favorable to her autonomy, or so intelligently hopeful of her future as the American missionaries. As shown already, one of these took precedence of every other foreign adviser in the intimate counsels of the state; but the influence and help of others, colleagues and associates of Dr. Verbeck, made continually for the same effect. These missionaries, and Christian friends connected with them in the United States and England and elsewhere, taught the Japanese those highest principles that enter into their new national life, and convinced the Japanese that among western people they had some true friends, ready to help them in all practicable ways with disinterested service. Native testimony to these things from many sources and of much weight, has often been pronounced. One witness only will be quoted here, the foremost living statesman of Japan. His words are the more remarkable because he is not known to have identified himself personally with the Christian faith, and because he has been known, in former years, to disparage all religion. The Marquis Ito has said that "Japan's progress and development are largely due to the influence

²³ Arthur J. Brown, D.D., *The New Era in the Philippines*, New York, 1903, pp. 52, 53.

of missionaries exerted in right directions when Japan was first studying the outer world." ²⁴ And again he has said that, "The only true civilization is that which rests on Christian principles; and consequently, as Japan must attain her civilization on these principles, those young men who receive Christian education will be the main factors in the development of future Japan." ²⁵

So to the same effect, the king of Siam has said: "American missionaries have done more to advance the welfare of my country and people than any other foreign influence." ²⁶ Prince Malcolm Khan, the Persian minister, has said: "I have always considered the presence of your missionaries in Persia a providential blessing." ²⁷ Even the French government of Madagascar regards the Protestant mission enterprise in that island as "a network of philanthropic efforts deserving all admiration and help." ²⁸ That Protestant missions are invaluable to the new civilization and commerce of Korea is the explicit verdict of Sir Walter Hillier, lately British consul-general there. ²⁹ Is it then of the missionaries in China alone that an able writer upon British interests in that land can pretend that, "with their lives they risk the cause of civilization?" ³⁰ In February, 1904, when opening the Anglo-Japanese Museum at Tientsin, Sir Ernest Satow, British minister, did not hesitate to say that "of all the many classes of people who come to China the missionary was and is the most useful." But it was under the personal influence and instruction of the American missionary Samuel Robbins Brown in Tokio, and with well-used opportunities of understanding missionary work, that Sir Ernest began his distinguished career as orientalist and diplomatist in the Far East. ³¹

²⁴ *The Outlook*, New York, 1904, p. 866.

²⁵ Sidney L. Gulick, *The Evolution of the Japanese*, New York, 1904, p. 288.

²⁶ *The Outlook*, *supra*.

²⁷ *Ibid*.

²⁸ J. C. Bracq, in *The Outlook*, August 3, 1903.

²⁹ Mrs. Isabella Bird Bishop in Preface to *Korea and Her Neighbors*, London and New York, 1897.

³⁰ Harold E. Gorst, *China*, p. 173 ("Imperial Interest Library"), London and New York, 1899.

³¹ W. E. Griffiths, *A Maker of the New Orient—Samuel Robbins Brown*, New York, 1904.

II

The question proposed for examination at the outset of this article was that of the political value attaching to the American missionary as an agent in promoting international relations of reciprocal advantage. To this a partial answer has been given. But incidentally another question is involved, namely: *What influence will the missionary, and more especially the Protestant missionary from America, exert upon the political future of oriental lands?*

In India proper the British and American missionaries recently numbered 3,315, and about one-third of these were American. The *de facto* government is British, and the missionaries, with Americans included, strongly approve it, as being more conducive to the welfare of native India than, in the present condition of the land, any native substitute could be. For they see nothing in the present condition or past history of India to warrant the belief that a just, humane, and united native administration ever can be organized and maintained until Christian ideals of the social order have made a far more vital and general impression upon the native mind, especially that of the educated classes. This impression is continually being made; but the process is far slower than it has been in Japan, where already a large assimilation of these ideals has obtained. What in particular these ideals are, how they have been received by the Japanese, and how that nation has been newly molded by them, must be learned from many sources in order to be rightly understood; but perhaps from no one book to better advantage than from S. L. Gulick's *Evolution of the Japanese*.³² This admirable book, although marred by some internal inconsistencies, affords a perfect refutation of Meredith Townsend's leading thesis that no Asiatic race ever can be radically changed in social and political ideals by the influence of the modern West.³³ Mr. Townsend's conclusions are principally based on his studies of the Indian and Mohammedan world. He has misunderstood Japan, and also China. He has even failed to see how much already has been

³² Sidney L. Gulick, *The Evolution of the Japanese*, New York, 1904.

³³ Meredith Townsend, *Asia and Europe*, London and New York, 1904.

done to undermine old systems of Indian thought; and although this is still a work of undermining, much progress has been made, and that even since some chapters of his book were written. Incongruously with his main contention he does indeed reflect upon that "shaking of all Hindu beliefs which is the marked fact of the day" (p. 60), not seeing how greatly Christianity has to do with this marked fact, as even Hindus who are not Christian have frequently confessed. But he clearly discerns and impressively displays the past conditions and the existing obstacles to national transformation in the Middle East. These obstacles are varied, but principally moral, above all a moral obstruction in the ruling minds of native India to the free acceptance of new conceptions of human duties and relationships. The remedy for this obstruction is, or should be, Christianity before all else; and this Mr. Townsend believes. But the effect already produced by Christianity in India he has not adequately gauged. It is such an influence as cannot fail powerfully, and in the best way, to affect political conditions. For, as Rev. Dr. R. A. Hume, of India, has said: "The principal thing which the missionary is doing is to make a new moral climate." Indeed the one century past of Christian missions over all the world does not compare unfavorably with the first century of Christianity in the empire of Rome, which resulted later in the transformation of all Europe.

It is true that the social structure of old Japan gave no promise of a change so rapid or so radical as that which has occurred; but conditions ethnical, political, and religious were much more favorable to it, and less complicated than in India, as might easily be specified in detail. For twenty years, however, there was a violent struggle in Japan before the new conceptions fully won their right of way. But the ruling minds of old Japan were far more open to the change than the ruling minds of India ever were. Nevertheless even in India, where the influence of missionaries so much helps the British government, their own teaching and example have the double effect of conciliating the natives to that government, and of preparing their minds for ultimate independence. Yet that government can find no fault with

them for this; for in so far as the British government, in ruling India, does itself exemplify Christian ideals of duty and humanity, its own example but confirms that of the missionary and his teaching. And furthermore, all that teaching in western history and science, provided by government for the Indian people, adds still another influence toward the disintegration of native systems, social, political, and religious and toward a community in modern thought. Thus from these sources of influence, that of the missionary being most fundamental, a spirit of national unity may arise more capable of good national organization than anything known of India in the past. Similar causes acting in the Philippines will make for similar results, modified by whatever differences local conditions may present. That the missionary's work is truly fundamental to any lasting benefit which may be hoped from modern principles of government is witnessed further in weighty words by Sir William Macworth Young, lately lieutenant-governor of the Punjab, who has been already quoted; and also by the late Sir William Hunter, one of India's greatest historians and civilians. The former has recently given utterance to these words:

As a business man I am prepared to say that the work of missionary agency in India exceeds in importance all that has been done by the British Government since its commencement. What has been the most potent influence working among the people since annexation fifty-four years ago,⁸⁴ is Christianity as set forth in the lives and teachings of Christian missionaries. I do not undervalue the forces which have been brought to bear on the races in the Punjab by our beneficent rule, by British justice and enlightenment. But I am convinced that the effect on native character produced by the self-denying labors of missionaries is far greater.

Sir William Hunter said, addressing the Society of Arts in London:

It is not permitted to a lecturer here to speak as the advocate of any creed. But on this, as on every platform in England, it is allowed to a man to speak as an Englishman; and speaking as an Englishman I declare that English missionary enterprise is the highest modern expression of the world-wide national life of our race. I regard it as the spiritual comple-

⁸⁴ The Punjab was annexed in 1848.

ment of England's instinct for colonial expansion and imperial rule. And I believe that any falling off in England's missionary efforts will be a sure sign of swiftly coming national decay.

What is thus said applies equally well to the missionaries from America. In London, recently, to an English audience at Exeter Hall, Lord Reay uttered convictions, which he had already expressed as governor of Bombay, that both the Indians and the government of India were under great obligations to missionaries, and especially to those from America. Such testimony can be duplicated many times, and should be weighed against the contrary views of hasty travelers, and of those who have no wish to see the oriental world made Christian.

The final issue of these several influences would naturally be an independent India, but not necessarily an India alienated from Great Britain. The political change might be brought about by mutual concessions and consent; while England might discover herself to be much better off in friendly relations with India free than in sovereign relations with conquered India, and discontented, while expanding and uniting with new thought. There are those who say that the old strife between the East and West is only a conflict of races, inevitable, and certain to prove fatal to the weaker race. But others believe it to be chiefly a conflict of ideas which can be minimized in proportion as different races are molded by the same ideas, and ended when the ideas of all men become truly Christian. Those western ideas and ideals which are most necessary to the social harmony of races are carried by Christian missionaries to the ends of the earth—especially those missionaries who never meddle with an existing government, nor demand magisterial prerogatives for themselves.

In China, with few or no exceptions, both British and American missionaries wish to see the ancient independence of the land preserved. There are many foreigners in China who, although they may live there many years, never come into close contact with the people, nor reach an intimate knowledge of their institutions, history, and mind; who grossly misconceive the country, and circulate their misconceptions far and wide. But whether as

missionaries, or in civil service, invariably those who know the Chinese best acquire a strong admiration for the high qualities and capabilities which that people exhibit, and the actual attainments they have made. For the national independence and federal system of China not only antedate those of all existing nations, but have persisted to this day despite rebellions, invasions, dynastic changes, and disasters numberless of every sort. China, not merely as a race of men, but as an organized state, has outweathered more political storms than any other nation known, and survived all the same infirmities of human nature that beset the remainder of mankind. Dr. Martin is entirely right in saying that the Chinaman "has equalled the Roman in his conquests, and surpassed him in the permanence of his possessions."³⁵ And Dr. Williams wrote in 1864:

The Chinese race has perhaps risen as high as it is possible in the two great objects of human government—security of life and property to the governed, and freedom of action under the individual restraints of law; and it presents now a subject worthy of study to the philosopher in tracing out the reasons why unaided human teachings have been so much more useful and durable here than they were in the hands of Zoroaster, Seneca, Socrates or Longinus.³⁶

There are no foreign scholars who rank above these two in knowledge of Chinese history and institutions.

As no country in Asia, with anything higher than a tribal system, has shown less capacity for federal organization and self-government than India, notwithstanding the physical and intellectual equality of her dominant native race with any in the world, so no country in Asia has shown more of such capacity than China, notwithstanding the contempt into which her government has lately fallen. No other Asiatic empire can show net results of civilization comparable with those produced by the Chinese; such results as cannot possibly appear without a great deal of good government. Nor can these claims be set aside by the fact that for some five centuries, long ago, the northern half of China was separately ruled by Tartar sovereigns; nor by the

³⁵ *Cycle of Cathay*.

³⁶ F. W. Williams, *Life and Letters of S. Wells Williams*, by His Son, New York, 1889, p. 352.

fact that twice only, and for 350 years all told, out of a credible history of 4,000 years, foreign dynasties have ruled the entire realm. These dynasties have been practically no more foreign than some dynasties that have governed England and Russia; and they have been less foreign in administration, for they have only ruled by rigidly conforming to the native Chinese principles and institutions; which principles and institutions, like the race to which they belong, have exhibited perdurable qualities of a wholly exceptional kind.

With their general recognition of these facts it is not strange if British and American missionaries, despite moments of discouragement, should commonly believe China to be quite as capable of modern reorganization by her own people as Japan; and if, for her own welfare, they wish to see an autonomous reorganization of that great empire take place. If China can thus govern herself, and can adapt herself to new conditions as Japan has done, they think she should by all just means be permitted and encouraged so to do. The classical ethics and sociology of China are, as a whole, not only very remarkable and deserving the best attention of modern students, but, with some defects or deficiencies, they are the most advanced, most nearly Christian, and of all pagan systems and ideals the most adjustable to the new demands, untrammelled by either caste or hierarchy or any feudal claims. It is this very excellence and success of their native institutions in the past, witnessed to by all profounder students of the history, together with their enormous natural resources, their acknowledged primacy among eastern nations, and their measureless resentment at the insolence and injury of European intrusion during near 400 years, which things largely have made the Chinese so exceedingly slow to change their ways, and to recognize the necessity in self-defense of adopting the equipment of the West. This necessity the Japanese learned in much less time than it has taken the Chinese, not because at first the Japanese liked it any better than the Chinese do, though often mistakenly represented so; but because in much less time they reached the end of their resources and power of resistance; and saw the independence of their country doomed

if the change were not made speedily. All that China has been waiting for is to have this same conviction take possession of the imperial court and the official class, as now at last seems likely to be done.

Now the bearing of these facts upon the political value of the missionary in China, and especially the missionary from America, is very significant. As large numbers of the Chinese already are convinced, the missionary is there not to profit himself but to profit China. This indeed is the chief ground of his offense with such of his own countrymen and other foreigners as consider any man a fool who does not make his private pleasure and temporal profit the sole end of his existence in this world. Others again, who admire, as an abstract rule, the altruistic aim, identify it wholly with an ascetic life; and cannot believe that it ever truly actuates any married missionary living in a comfortable house, and setting before his Buddhist or Mohammedan neighbors the example of a refined and Christian home. The missionary spirit forsooth must be discredited in whatever degree it may depart from an ascetic life. This is only the old story of the market-place again. For this generation, too, is just

like children sitting in the market-place, and calling one to another and saying: We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced; we have mourned to you, and ye have not wept. For John the Baptist came neither eating bread nor drinking wine; and ye say he hath a devil. The Son of Man is come eating and drinking; and ye say: Behold a gluttonous man, and a wine bibber. And yet wisdom is justified at the hands of all her children (Luke 7:31-35).

What the Chinese need more than new furniture and machinery is a new conception of their own best good, and how to attain it, in their ideals of life. To give them this is the first object of every true missionary in that land; to help and not hinder the advancement of that people on the plane of the highest ideals, in the political no less than in the social and religious fields. For these three fields are so inseparably connected that improvement in one can never take place without improvement in all. And the missionary, so far from being out of sympathy with the people, commonly has an immense admiration for all the good to be found in the native ideals of family, society, and state. So far

from wishing to do away with these he would vitalize their excellences and supplement their lack. As Chinese history warrants belief in the native capacity for good self-government the American missionary deeply sympathizes with the native desire to keep the independence of the land; and the total effect of his teaching and example is to strengthen and prepare the native mind to maintain this independence, and to recover it if lost. Happily in this sympathy the American missionary and the American government are entirely at one. Each helps the other, and both are helping China to this end. Now let it be supposed that the imperial court, and the official mind of China generally, become once thoroughly convinced, as many natives long have been, that these things are truly so, and how quickly would official antagonism to the missionary cease, and how plainly would the missionary appear in his true light as the best existing bond between the civilizations of China and the West!

A certain amount of antagonism on religious grounds would still remain; for the Chinese do not like to repent of their sins and renounce their idolatries, any better than the rest of us. But this does not prove that it is not better for the Chinese to have Christianity brought to their doors, and offered to their uncoerced acceptance. The Japanese also thought it once to be a wholly evil thing, and have found out now that it is only a blessing. Christianity in China meets with no objections on religious grounds, but such as for several centuries it met and overcame in the empire of ancient Rome. Yet there may be persons who think the world would be better off today if this religion never had been preached. There is good reason for the statement of Clive Bigham in his volume on the Seymour Relief Expedition: "No social revolution, and no intellectual education could so thoroughly advance the moral and material civilization of China, as the willing adoption of the Christian faith."³⁷ Yet the Christian faith brings with it both the social revolution and the intellectual education, to say nothing of a market for trade. Dr. Arthur Smith, who by common consent has best described the personal characteristics of the people, says: "It is true of China more

³⁷ Clive Bigham, C.M.G., *A Year in China*, London, 1901, p. 45.

than of any other non-Christian people that they have never been profoundly moved by other than moral forces.”³⁸ Writing in 1868 of an interview with members of the Privy Council in Japan, who had consulted him upon a revision of the national constitution, Dr. Verbeck says:

It was interesting to see how their own reasoning, with a little guiding touch here and there, led these men to the conclusion that at the bottom of the difference in civilization and power between their own country and countries like ours and England, lay a difference of national religion.³⁹

In the weightiest foreign estimate save one ever written of the United States, de Tocqueville said:

There is no country in the world in which the Christian religion retains a greater influence over the souls of men than in America; and there can be no greater proof of its utility, and of its conformity with human nature, than that its influence is most powerfully felt over the most enlightened and free nation of the earth.⁴⁰

The first American secretary of state to foresee the present international position and prospects of the United States in the Pacific was William H. Seward, who one time said that “the whole hope of human progress is suspended from the ever-growing influence of the Bible.” Every Chinaman, whatever other doctrine he may hold, is fundamentally a Confucianist; but, happily for the missionary, there are no ancient teachings less incompatible with the Bible, and which require less modification or subtraction to be still useful to the modern world, than those of Mencius and Confucius. When this is once well recognized on all hands, friction in China upon religious grounds will shrink to a minimum. It is the Bible more than blood that unites the English race today; and if that book should ever dominate China, as it has England and America, with the same liberty of interpretation, it would unite China with the English race in bonds more deep than those of any political convention.

It is not the western creed but the western greed which has made most of the trouble between China and the Occident in the

³⁸ Arthur H. Smith, D.D., *China in Convulsion*, New York, 1901, Vol. II, p. 737.

³⁹ Wm E. Griffis, *Verbeck of Japan*, New York, 1900, pp. 174, 175.

⁴⁰ Alex. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Vol. I, pp. 332-35.

past; while it is entirely susceptible of proof that the creed, and the men behind it, from both England and America, have done more than all other instrumentalities to make possible such degree of amicable intercourse as hitherto has actually existed. Perhaps the lowest valid estimate of missionary worth in political and international relations may be given in the words of United States Minister Reed to Secretary of State Lewis Cass, June 30, 1858, after concluding the Treaty of Tientsin:

Having no enthusiasm on the subject I am bound to say that I consider the missionary element in China a great conservative and protecting principle. It is the only barrier between the unhesitating advance of commercial adventure and the not incongruous element of Chinese imbecile corruption.

In this brief statement is expressed not only one service that the missionary renders, but one ground of the hostility that he incurs. Many an envoy from the government at Washington has gone to his post in China and other eastern lands, having no enthusiasm whatever on this subject, who before he has left his post has put on record in the diplomatic correspondence of his country his explicit and emphatic and most sincere approval of Christian missions, and his sense of a deep obligation, personal and national, to his own country's missionaries in those lands.

That official correspondence, accessible to every student, would alone, if carefully and largely read, be quite enough, were there no other evidence within reach, to stop all honest doubts of the incalculable international benefits arising from this Christian enterprise. Moreover the lesson of those reports has been condensed by Hon. John W. Foster in his notable and timely volume on *American Diplomacy in the Orient*.⁴¹ It is not in the least necessary to pretend that missionaries are exempt from human infirmities and mistakes in order to make good such claims as have been thus presented for their usual, and often conspicuous influence and service in the adjustment of relations between the United States and the countries concerned.

Nor is it to be understood that between this religious enterprise and that of honorable trade any hostility exists. Incident-

⁴¹ John W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, Boston and New York, 1903.

ally Christian missions always do so much to make a way for commerce that dishonorable trade may follow in their wake, from the effects of which, though they are guiltless, their interests can but suffer. Again, unprincipled adventurers, promoters, traders, may go before the missionary and make his subsequent work much harder, and his foreign face less welcome in the field. All the worst features of occidental life invariably reach less favored lands with blighting harm; and, but for the missionary, would bring those lands into a far worse state than that in which they were found. Between a traffic like that in opium and Christianity there can be no truce. It is probable that every missionary in China, British as well as American, Roman Catholic as well as Protestant, regards the British trade in opium as an unmitigated curse to the nation that has unwillingly received it, and also to the government that has unblushingly imposed it. Certainly it is so regarded by every victim of the drug, though ready to blame himself; and by the entire body of those missionary physicians who are very well known to be the most competent judges in the matter.⁴² But as that self-blinded government, so excellent in so many other things, is unrepentingly committed to this folly, whose nemesis cannot possibly be escaped, it was easy to frame such a commission of investigation as would return a report favorable to this trade, and so drug the conscience of British parliament. In behalf of vested interests there are extenuations of evil and suppressions of truth which easily pass among men, but which will very hardly pass with "that Judge whom no king can corrupt."⁴³

In the years 1831-33 Charles Gutzlaff, missionary, made three voyages up and down the coast of China, and from Bankok to Manchuria, to find openings for Christianity and trade. Being

⁴² Edward H. Parker, *China Past and Present*, London and New York, 1903, pp. 182, 189. Also *Opinions of over an Hundred Physicians on the Use of Opium in China*, compiled by Wm. Hector Park, M.D., Shanghai, 1899.

⁴³ Since this article was written the government of China has notified the government of Great Britain that within ten years the importation of opium must cease; and has begun to employ drastic measures for the suppression of the native product and consumption. Moreover the British government has for the first time now begun to find its conscience in this matter, and has expressed a measure of consent to the Chinese action.

a rare linguist and a wise explorer, he gained the information sought; and in 1833 the account which he wrote of these voyages was published in London and New York.⁴⁴ By this publication, for the first time, a general attention was aroused to the religious and commercial opportunities of the Far East, and many undertakings quickly followed. A great volume of commerce grew out of this little volume from a missionary's pen, now almost forgotten, with its author.⁴⁵ But this is only one chapter of the tale.

A boy in Scotland named David Livingstone read the appeal of this same Gützlaff made for China; and it determined the bent of his whole life. And when, on that April day of 1874, the body of Livingstone was buried in the Abbey among kings, all England knew that the great continent of Africa had been opened to the world more effectually by the life and death of this one man of God than by all the colonists and explorers of four nations and four centuries. But who remembers such trivial obligations as these to Christian missions, and where are the merchants or the governments to repay them? Yet these are only notable examples of what goes on all the time; and Hon. Chester Holcombe, long secretary of the American legation at Peking, is right in saying that, "In point of fact the entire missionary body is a most valuable ally to every form of legitimate foreign trade."⁴⁶

Happily, in a true sense, the real founder of both British and American missions in China was no clergyman, nor physician, nor woman, nor church, but an American merchant who invited, and who conveyed in his own ships at his own cost, the first missionary from England that ever entered China, Robert Morrison, in 1807, and the first from America, E. C. Bridgman, who went in 1830. D. W. C. Olyphant, of the long honored firm Talbott and Olyphant, was one of the first founders of American commerce in the Far East, as he also was of Protestant missions.

⁴⁴ Charles Gützlaff, *Voyages Along the Coast of China*, New York and London, 1833.

⁴⁵ S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom*, New York, 1882, Vol. II, p. 329.

⁴⁶ Chester Holcombe, *The Real Chinese Question*, New York, 1900, p. 154.

His whole life was identified with both trade and missions, but with trade in order to missions, not missions in order to trade. He perfectly exemplified the normal relations of a Christian merchant's trade to the gospel. He understood the debt to Christianity of western civilization; and he established bonds of union between China and America that remain today and never can be broken. If foreign merchants in mission fields generally recognized, as some of them do, the obligations of their own business to the missions, those merchants would become the principal supporters of missions. If the missionaries are "almost entirely ignored and too often derided by the mercantile community," as appears in some lands to be the case, it is not surprising that "the Chinese ask themselves why men who teach persons how to be good are not more appreciated and respected by their own people." The ex-British consul from whom these words are taken shows the same personal indifference to the religious aims of missions as that which he ascribes to the foreign mercantile community; and yet he testifies that, "Quite apart from religion all missionary influence in China has a purifying effect upon the undisciplined natives; and this fact deserves more general recognition than is usually given."⁴⁷ He does not seem to be aware that "apart from religion" no such purifying effect ever would or could have been exerted, nor the humanizing and civilizing effect to which he also gives emphatic witness. To all intents and purposes Mr. Olyphant was quite as much a missionary to the Chinese as any one of the many clerical, medical or other auxiliary workmen who received his constant sympathy and co-operation.

The greater part of what has been written in this paper applies to the work and influence of Protestant missionaries generally throughout the world in their ordinary though manifold functions as such. It would also apply to not a few agents of the papal church but for their fatuous assumption of magisterial rights, their frequent political intrigue, and that "Borgian and Medician" policy of their respective governments, well so named by Mr. Parker,⁴⁸ which has used these missionaries as mere instruments of foreign aggrandizement. When a missionary

⁴⁷ Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 70, 97, 360.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

assumes extraordinary and civil functions in the open and formal employment of his own government or that of the country where he lives, as in the cases cited at the beginning of this article, he then simply carries into those other spheres of labor the intelligence that first fitted him for strictly missionary work, together with the missionary aim and spirit. Thus David Livingstone's travels and scientific researches, geographical, ethnological, zoölogical, botanical, were all conducted with the missionary equipment, aim, and issue; yet it was in the official capacity of a British consul, and as an agent of the Royal Geographical Society, that all the latter half of his work was done. And so it may be seen that the political value of the Protestant missionary as such, in his ordinary functions, is contingent in part on his very isolation from all civil and political affairs; and his value when formally engaged by a government in official capacity is largely due to the missionary equipment which he takes into those affairs.

And it may also be obvious that some of the qualities and functions and influence which enhance the political value to England, America, and also to China, Korea, and Japan of a missionary from Great Britain or America, would make him the more objectionable to Russia and France. Nor is it to be supposed that Protestant missionaries from England or America will ever be tolerated in any Asiatic country over which either France or Russia now possesses, or may secure, a decisively paramount control. It is conceivable that the discrimination against American missions experienced in the Turkish Empire may be due in part to Russian displeasure, as well as Turkish; for on those same regions Russia has obvious designs, while powerfully influencing the Porte. No other agency exists in any oriental land comparable with that of the Protestant missions for developing an enlightened patriotism among the natives, or for introducing ideals of life and state congruous with the best ideals of England and America. These very facts may cause these missions to appear as dangerous to the aims of certain other foreign governments; while England, America, and the native races concerned, can but view these facts with entire complacency when once they are fairly understood. In India and Japan they are

so viewed already; and their day of full recognition is coming in China too, if not in every land.

That enterprise of Christian missions which the East India Company obstructed at every turn, and despised as a consummate madness, has by many high members of Government been pronounced the strongest safeguard of British interests in India, the best instrument of the native welfare, and the highest modern expression of the world-wide life of the English race. The attitude of the East India Company is easily explained by the parallel history of that company and of missions. To that company, almost deserving to be called a company of chartered thieves, may be traced the springs of both Sepoy Rebellion and Boxer Revolt. For the same company intrenched in China, until its powers there were canceled in 1834, was the chief procuring cause of all international provocations and complications between China and the West after the nineteenth century began. Its long career of commerce without conscience exposed China to all the subsequent developments of ecclesiastical politics and territorial aggression with which her weakened and distracted government has had to deal. If that government has itself been corrupt and culpable, needing calamity to purge its soul, what shall be said of those more enlightened governments which have defended and pursued, in the interest of their own aggrandizement, these arrogant, sordid, cruel, and hypocritical aggressions? If these modern instruments of heaven's chastisement fling justice to the winds, and boast themselves, like the axe against him that heweth therewith, the victims of their injustice may outlive them yet, and be great when they are small. For "Jehovah of Hosts hath purposed to stain the pride of all glory, and to bring into contempt all the honorable of the earth." (Isa. 23:9). There is "a Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness," as even the pagans and agnostics know; and those nations which have one law of right for their private action and quite another for their public action have yet no strength nor subtlety to escape the judgment that hangs forever over such duplicity; and which will be precisely proportioned to their guilt.

But the work of Christian missions will not cease until the

law and gospel of Christianity have been set before every tribe and community of men on the face of the earth. The Christian church, by its origin, genius, and sanction, is irrevocably committed to this enterprise, which today is carried forward as never before by the Greek and Roman and Protestant divisions of that church. Each division has methods, merits, and mistakes that are all its own; all open to honest criticism and amendment. But the results are invariably best in proportion as the Christianity exemplified and preached approaches most near to the original New Testament type. In this proportion new life and vigor are communicated to every people who receive Christianity on its own terms.

Many scornful things and foolish predictions are uttered regarding the mission enterprise by persons grossly ignorant of its history, and ignorant of all but superficial aspects of the long history of Christianity. By many persons it was readily believed that the principal victims of the great Chinese uprising must have been the principal cause of provocation. At last, it was thought, the missionaries in China perhaps would learn that they were not wanted by the Chinese there, were only impediments of trade, were inexcusable disturbers of the peace, and were in everybody's way. No particular favor need be shown them from their own governments, and no special protection sought from the government of China. Trade, at any cost to China or the West, must be protected and advanced; and all the control of it possible vested in foreign hands. But missionaries would do well to keep exceedingly quiet, or else to get out of the way.

Through the Sepoy Rebellion, as well as the Boxer Revolt, a terrible loss to missions was incurred; but the missionary societies only doubled their efforts; and Lord Lawrence said that they did more for India than all the civilians and the military together had done. Never before were missions in India so prospered as in the period which that dreadful crisis introduced, beginning about 1860.

Exactly so again has it been in China. Never in that empire have the fruits of missions multiplied so fast; never was the welcome extended by the people to the missionary so pronounced;

never were the Chinese so eager to learn what he would teach, as since the fateful year of 1900. The trouble is not ended, and it may continue until the reorganization of China is attained. But at last new convictions are taking a deep hold on the whole nation and the imperial court. Never were the prospects of an autonomous New China so good as now, provided that country be left free for ten or fifteen years to follow the example and inspiration of Japan. Nor need any man doubt the issue even if bloody revolution intervene. No other nation on the rolls of time has survived revolution so often or so well as China, with so little impairment of her unity and strength. Twenty-four successive dynasties, and more or less revolution between all, yet the same old China still, with inexhaustible vitality; her fundamental integrity as a nation, and as an autonomous state, essentially unchanged from the days of Abraham and Hammurabi until now. All of her ancient contemporary states have passed away, or had their historical continuity far more broken than her own. Such a diminished exception may be found in Persia, and perhaps in the primeval kingdom of Ethiopia to whose traditions Abyssinia is heir. Ancient India never knew racial nor political unity after the Aryan invasions first began. She never was one nation nor one state. Japan is but a parvenu to China, and Korea but a child; while to China only was it given in her sole career as an organized state to span the whole career of all the nations through four thousand years at least.

China is a loaded dice, which, shake it how you will, turns up the largest number every time; and, with all her shortcomings, that which really makes her weight is her specific moral gravity. Be the faults of China what they may, and admitting the decadence of her early virtues, the Chinese people never sank so low as any one of the fallen nations of antiquity, nor, so low as any other pagan or Mohammedan nation still extant. The Chinese people as a whole retains today a better moral standard, a better moral quality, and a better sociological ideal than can anywhere be found outside the Bible, and apart from those people who best have reflected its teaching.

China, reorganized after the analogy of Japan, must inevitably recover all that she has lost, and more, as first among the nations of the East, and the equal of any Power in the world. The incredulity with which men have regarded the possibility of such a change is the issue of their ignorance or of their fears. It is identical with that encountered by Japan but a little while ago, and shown even to this day in the blank amazement of Europe at her recent deeds. But the reasons for expecting such a reorganization of China are stronger than they ever were for Old Japan, and lie in the parallel history of the two countries; where also may be plainly seen the reasons for China's long delay. That parallel history has been almost ignored when the prospects of those countries have been mooted; or else the comparison has been limited to recent decades, when it should be made to cover centuries. But when that portentous change arrives China will dictate her own terms to all nations regarding her own affairs, and the time for those nations to repent of injustice is now. That her terms may not become a menace to all nations there is nothing more needful to the universal good than that her new ideals shall be such as the Protestant missionary imparts.

But whatever the agency and aims of men may be in the world-wide movements of time, no Christian missionary can be found, Greek, Roman, or Protestant today, who would not hold with Jean Paul Richter, that it is "Jesus Christ who has lifted the gates of empire, and turned the course of history into other channels." And whatever changes or distresses among nations lie between this present evil age and that glorious one to come, there is no true missionary who is not sustained, whatever toil or trial or martyrdom his lot, by the assured conviction and blessed hope that the God of Heaven will yet set up a kingdom in this world which shall never be destroyed nor left to other people (Dan. 2:44); that all the kingdoms of this world shall yet certainly become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ, who shall reign forever and ever (Rev. 11:15).

The true missionary is the best uniting bond between the Occident and the Orient only because he is, first of all, the best between the earth and heaven. Of a true social order, as he

believes, the sole foundation is Christianity, which must underlie everything else. That Christianity is best which is nearest like its own original, and those politics are best which spring from the best religion.

It suits the pleasure of this hasty and superficial day to speak well of morals, and lightly of religion. Good morals, it is said, make all the religion that men need, and Christian morals are good when you can find them. Very well; so be it. Religion itself is morals, if nothing more; but it is morals on the cosmic plane, including, inspiring, and controlling mundane morals, as the greater the less, by right and power of eminent domain. The Christian religion assumes moral relations between man and his Maker, which, when they are normal, render normal the relations between man and man. Christian morals at their best are the best known to human experience, or to human ideals. But Christian morals, and the politics that go with them, never did and never can, prevail in the absence of the Christian religion. These things are, in the social domain, a part of cosmic law; and hence the sociological value that belongs to the gospel of Christ.

The missionary at his best is always a statesman, who takes a high and cosmic view of the duty and destiny of nations; nor is there any other man to whom the solidarity and brotherhood of the human race are less a pleasing abstraction, and more an imperative fact. Well said John Milton, the lord protector of England's secretary of state: "There are no politics like those which the Scriptures teach."

NOTE.—As the defender of any much controverted thesis is properly required to show his evidence, the present writer will state, in the first place, that, besides having spent his first years in China, and subsequently having visited Japan, he has through fifty years been associated with many persons possessing a varied and intimate first-hand knowledge of oriental matters in several lands; and thus the background and atmosphere of the Far East, more particularly, have been his native and familiar heritage. And, for the literature involved in this discussion he is primarily indebted to the official volumes of Diplomatic Correspondence and of Foreign Relations, from the beginning, between the United States and the countries of Asia concerned; incidentally, to the publications referred to in this paper, as cited in the footnotes, and many more, not named nor quoted, which have been the reading of a lifetime.

The writer has aimed to make no leading assertion of fact that he is not prepared to confirm with much more testimony of weight than could be exhibited in this place.

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE
V
THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY LAW

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The only forms of strictly legal relief of workingmen in case of incapacity for labor caused by accidents are poor relief and indemnity secured under the law which makes employers liable for damages caused their employees through negligence on the part of the employers. The right to poor relief is not one which can be enforced by legal process, and when such aid is granted it is insufficient, humiliating, and destructive of self-respect, so that it is dreaded and hated by every man who is not already pauperized in spirit. We have here to outline the chief facts in relation to the rights of injured workingmen under the liability law.¹

I. THE LAW

The basis of all legislation and "judge-made law" in this field is the ancient English common law governing relations of masters and servants. According to that law the employee upon entering service was supposed to assume the ordinary risks of the occupation—the doctrine of "assumption of risk." It was thought that a free man entering into a contract of service would

¹ References: F. J. Stimson, *Handbook to the Labor Law*, 1895, pp. 161 ff.; *Report of the Committee on Relations between Employer and Employee*, Massachusetts (1904); *Tenth Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, Labor Laws (1904), and later *Bulletins* of the Bureau of Labor; S. D. Fessender, "Employers' Liability in the United States," *Bulletin of the Department of Labor*, No. 31, November, 1900; E. Freund, *Police Power*, secs. 322, 633; C. B. Labatt, *Commentaries on the Law of Master and Servant* (1904); W. G. Clay, *Abstract of the Law of Employers' Liability and Insurance against Accidents* (1897); *Annual Report of New York Labor Statistics* (1899), Vol. XVII, pp. 555-1162; C. Reno, *Law of the Employers' Liability Acts* (2d ed., 1903); *Industrial Commission, Report*, Vol. V, pp. 76-87, Vol. XVII, pp. 970-1135, Vol. XIX, pp. 932-39; *Bulletin of the Department of Labor*, No. 40 (Weber); H. A. Schaffner, *Railroad Coemployment* (1905).

usually be acquainted with the dangers attending that occupation and would have no claim upon his employer if he were injured. If, however, there were extraordinary dangers which should be known by the manager but not by the employee, such risks were not supposed to be assumed. It would be the duty of the employer to make these unusual dangers known to the workman, and if he failed to do so and harm resulted, the employer would be liable.

Another famous doctrine was the "fellow-servant" interpretation. According to this principle the employer could not be required to pay indemnity to an injured workman if the accident and hurt came from the carelessness of a companion in the service. This doctrine is of comparatively recent origin. About the year 1840 this rule was developed by courts in England and in the United States and employers were exempted by judicial decisions from payment of damages where the fault lay with a fellow-workman. Nor was this unnatural, if one starts from the idea of personal culpability; for in no proper sense is an employer directly to blame for an injury caused by another. The fact that the principle works hardship indicates a fault in the law itself, not in its logical application.²

There is another aspect of the case, however, which introduces doubt: the employer is responsible for his agents, since he selects them and may be negligent in this selection and in giving them power to control the action and fortunes of subordinated workmen. In this view the negligence of a fellow-servant who is in position of director of others is the fault of the original manager and proprietor. Many decisions have turned on this fact and made the employer liable for indemnity if the fellow-servant was unfit for his position, incompetent, drunken, or negligent so as to cause injury. It is not strange that judicial opinions should differ and that the course of legislation should be crooked. Thus we have in one direction the language of Justice Field (C., M. and St. Paul Railway Company vs. Ross, 1884, 112 U. S.,

² Pollock, *Law of Torts*, 7th ed., p. 96; Field, U. S. Supreme Court Reports (112 U. S.), p. 3867.

377) ; in holding that a corporation should be held responsible for the acts of a servant exercising control and management :

He is in fact, and should be treated as, the personal representative of the corporation, for whose negligence it is responsible to subordinate servants. This view of his relation to the corporation seems to us a reasonable and just one and it will insure more care in the selection of such agents, and thus give greater security to the servants engaged under him in an employment requiring the utmost vigilance on their part, and prompt and unhesitating obedience to his orders.

The United States is the only country now where this labored dispute has any significance; for with the introduction of the laws relating to the absolute liability of employers without regard to negligence and with the compulsory insurance laws the idea of negligence of fellow-servants has no meaning.

It is the duty of employers, under the common law to provide in a reasonable way such machinery, buildings, and appliances as will insure safety. Only ordinary care is obligatory, and the law does not demand the impossible in asking absolute security against harm, nor even the use of the most recent and costly devices, but only such as are found in a well-arranged establishment. If a defect is known to exist the employer is not held liable, although he may be required to give indemnity if it is shown that the injured workman has repeatedly called attention to the danger and asked for protection.

Another rule is that of "contributory negligence;" an injured workman in order to recover damages must prove that he did not bring harm to himself by his own carelessness. The employer is under obligations to instruct a new employee in regard to any special dangers of the occupation, and this requirement is more strict where the employee is young, inexperienced, or of inferior mental capacity.

According to the common-law rule a difference is made between the case where the employee is instantly killed and that where he survives for a time. In the former case the legal representatives of the victim cannot recover damages from a negligent employer. This rule has been modified in the statutes of some states. It is said that an action for damages on account

of homicide could not be maintained prior to Lord Campbell's Act in 1846 (9 and 10 Victoria, C. 93).

A few of the states have redefined the main provisions of the common law. In some states only corporations, and in others all employers, are liable for injuries to employees caused by defects in machinery or plant or by negligence of employers or their representatives.³ California and Montana, which have adopted the general codes prepared by the late David Dudley Field, attempt to recast the common law in still greater detail.⁴

Gradually the common law has been displaced or profoundly modified by statutes as well as by judicial interpretations. On the whole the changes have been in the direction of making the law more severe for the employer and to extend the protection of the workingmen. In order to counteract the tendency among employers to induce or require their employees to release them from liability by a contract clause in the agreement to hire, some states have enacted statutes making it illegal to make such contracts; but the courts have annulled them even in the absence of express statute.

In order to correct the injustice of the common law which denied indemnity in case the workman was instantly killed, a law has been passed, as in Massachusetts, securing for the survivors right of action in a case where such right would have existed had the person lived for some time after the accident. The amount which can be recovered may or may not be fixed by the statute.

The Employers' Liability Act of Massachusetts, as summarized by the commission of 1903, may be taken to represent the effort of legislators to extend the right of employees to recover damages. According to this statute employees may recover for any defect in the condition of the ways, works, or machinery of the employer caused by negligence of the employer or of some one in his employ whose duty it was to see that the same were in proper condition or properly repaired. Employees may recover for the negligence of a superintendent, or of one

³ Mass., 1894, 499; Col., 1893, 77; Ind., 7083; Ala., 2590.

⁴ Stimson, *op. cit.*

acting as superintendent under the authority of the employer. On railroads the company is liable to the employee injured through the negligence of a person having the charge of any signal, switch, locomotive, engine, or train. In the event of the death of the employee his legal representatives have the right to recover damages against the company. If death was not instantaneous, or was accompanied by conscious suffering, the widow, and if no widow the next of kin, dependent on the employee at his decease, may recover damages against the company. If there are two suits, one by the legal representatives and one by the widow or next of kin, the total amount recovered shall not exceed \$5,000, to be apportioned by the jury. In the laws of some states the sum which may be recovered is not fixed or limited, but left to the discretion of the jury. Employees themselves suing under this act can recover an amount not exceeding \$4,000. In any case under this act resulting in death, which follows instantaneously or without conscious suffering, the amount recoverable is not less than \$500 and not more than \$5,000, to be assessed according to the degree of negligence of the person for whose negligence he is made liable. Notice must be given the employer within a given period after the accident. Employees working for subcontractors upon the machinery, ways, works, or plant of the employer have the same rights against the employer as have other employees. To have right to recover indemnity the employee must have given due notice of the defect which caused his injury. An employer who has contributed to certain insurance funds for the benefit of injured employees may prove in mitigation of damages recoverable by an injured employee under this act, the proportion contributed by him to the benefit received by such employee. This act does not apply to injuries caused to domestic servants or farm laborers by fellow-employees.

Contracting out.—Even without statute it would appear to be illegal to make a contract releasing the employer from his common-law responsibilities; but some states have enacted laws expressly nullifying such contracts, with the purpose of preventing employers from using their superior power as employers to

make such agreements the basis of granting employment.⁵ In some states such contracts are void only where the injuries arise from the negligence of the employer or of someone who represents him.⁶

II. CRITICISM OF LIABILITY LAWS

It is almost universally agreed among persons of experience that the liability laws, whether common or statute, are not satisfactory to either employers or to the employed. On the one hand we hear complaints from the employers who affirm that legislatures, under pressure from trade unions, are steadily making statutes more drastic and severe upon employers and more favorable to employees; that juries award verdicts without regard to justice, measured more by what the defendant can pay than by the earning power of the person who has suffered loss; that employees are more eager to resort to litigation and persistent in pressing suits; that dishonest lawyers take advantage of the situation and for contingent fees urge injured workmen to prosecute claims, many of which are without foundation in justice; that to protect themselves from ruinous risks they are compelled to pay enormous sums to casualty companies for premiums, and even then cannot afford to pay premiums large enough to carry the entire risk; that employers of moderate means may be crippled or utterly ruined by the awards of juries and by the costs of litigation.

On the other hand the employees offer objections from their point of view. They assert that they are denied speedy trial in courts, owing to the crowded condition of dockets and the tricks of attorneys of defendants; that in addition to their employers they must fight powerful insurance companies who resist their claims to the bitter end; that these companies are even more pitiless than the employers; that an ordinary workman has no chance when pitted against the shrewd claim agents, expert attorneys of employers, and insurance companies; that before they can

⁵ Ohio, 1890, p. 149; Ind., 7083; Tex., 1891, 24; Wyo. Const., 10, 4, 1891, 28; Flor., 2346; in Ohio the law applies to railroads only.

⁶ Mass., 1894, 508, 6; Ala., 2590; Minn., 1887, 13.

hope to recover damages years of deprivation and misery must pass while the suit is appealed from court to court and their rights are denied; and that even if they are fortunate enough to recover indemnity, after long waiting and suffering, the costs of litigation have consumed most of the award. Meantime they have been kept out of the interest on what was justly due them. An extreme instance is known to the writer where a great corporation, after twenty-one years of resistance was finally compelled to pay, but meantime the interest which they retained was equal to the full amount of the award to which the injured man had a right from the moment he was hurt.

III. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANIES

A natural product of the working of liability laws, under modern economic conditions, is the rapid and enormous growth of private companies which undertake to relieve employers from the dangers and burdens of lawsuits instituted by injured workmen or by the heirs of those killed in industrial accidents. We have said that this form of insurance is a natural outgrowth of the situation, artificially created by the law, an inevitable effort to protect the solvency of employers against the ruinous effects of damage suits. The employers offer a defense of their action which is relatively just and yet sounds like an indictment of the law itself. They say, that without such insurance their business credit might be hopelessly compromised; that a certain class of lawyers, known as "ambulance chasers," lurk about the neighborhood of works where accidents are frequent with the hope of securing clients by offering their services without hope of fees unless a suit is won for the poor plaintiff, in which case he takes the lion's share of the award, while the workman receives a paltry sum. In sheer self-defense they resort to the insurance company for protection. When a workman refuses to make settlement without litigation they feel justified in turning him over to the tender mercies of the foreign corporation and let them fight out the battle. Even so the employer is not entirely free from danger, since in practice he does not feel able to pay the premium required to purchase entire immunity, and sometimes, as in a

case where the award is \$20,000 and the policy guarantees only \$5,000, the employer may be severely worsted after all.

The extent and cost of employers' liability insurance may be seen from the following figures. In the five years between 1894 and 1898 ten companies received in premiums from employers \$19,401,511 and paid out in losses \$9,382,689; the premiums received were more than twice the payments for protection.

How much of this \$9,382,689, after paying their lawyers, ever reaches the workingmen for whom the law intended it should be paid? ⁷ In the state of Illinois, in one year, 15 of these companies collected in premiums from employers \$1,825,467.51 and paid claims to the amount of \$876,940.95.⁸ It must not be supposed from these figures that the insurance companies are reaping inordinate profits from these transactions, and we may accept their explanation of the figures that the expenses of doing business are actually extremely great. It is claimed by friends of the companies that the rate of commission alone for securing business will average between 25 and 30 per cent., to which must be added salaries and traveling expenses of special agents; rent and other expenses of branch offices; cost of surveys and inspections; home office expenses; rent, clerk hire, and a multitude of other small charges; so that the expenses average about 50 per cent. of the premiums, and the margin of profit left is about 10 per cent. of receipts.⁹ When we compare this enormous cost with that of German compulsory accident insurance, or even with that of French syndicates or private companies under recent laws, we can see that the industry of this country is subjected to a burden which is beyond reason; and it does not seem possible that a large body of shrewd business men will very long tolerate such a law and the conditions which it creates.

This form of insurance began to be used about 1887, and the volume of business increased from \$150,000 in that year to \$14.-

⁷ *Report of Industrial Commission*, Vol. VII, p. 78.

⁸ *Thirty-seventh Report of Insurance Superintendent of Illinois*, 1905, p. xvii.

⁹ W. F. Moore, "Liability Insurance," *Insurance*, published by Annals of American Academy, pp. 328, 330.

700,000 in 1904; but these figures include all kinds of liability policies excepting steam boiler policies.

IV. INDIRECT CONSEQUENCES

One effect of the employers' liability laws, in connection with other motives, is the very common custom of paying the expenses of medical care after an accident, and even of continuing the wages or part of them during temporary incapacity. How far this custom extends it is impossible to determine, but correspondence proves that it is quite wide and rapidly growing. One example may be cited. In the state of Michigan during the year 1905, according to the report of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics, reports were secured on this subject in relation to more than 400 cases of accidents in factories and workshops in the state. The average duration of disability was 33 days. Out of 348 injured workmen 172 of them received their wages during the time of disability.¹⁰ Only in part is this beneficent action due to purely philanthropic motives; probably we must suppose the constant pressure of fear of damage suits on the part of employees urged on by lawyers in quest of contingent fees. As quickly as possible after an accident the representatives of the firm visit the wounded man, show him kindly attention, provide for urgent needs, or send him to a hospital. In due time, not always immediately upon the heels of the conciliating gift, comes the legal agent of the firm with a document for the employee to sign giving a full release from all liability in consequence of any possible neglect on the part of the employers. As a rule there is no legal claim, and the contribution is a pure gratuity, but experience shows that such "smart money" has a soothing and conciliatory effect upon the mind of the injured man. Furthermore there is economic advantage in securing prompt surgical and medical care, because the chances of certain and speedy recovery of a wounded workman are increased by such measures. Of course the employee profits by the custom. But he has no legal claim, and the charity feature is objectionable and irritating.

¹⁰ *Twenty-third Annual Report of the Labor and Industrial Statistics of Michigan*, 1906.

The establishment of benefit clubs in factories and shops, with or without subsidies from the employers, as described in another chapter, is often largely due to the natural and proper desire of employers to avoid the irritation which increases friction and so litigation. Here also the perception of the value of timely and competent medical care in restoring and conserving the industrial efficiency of workers has much to do with the favorable attitude toward such organizations. The humane motive must also have its place. It has been asserted, though without adequate data for proof, that many of the great railroads and other corporations already, and without legal requirement, pay out in benefits to wounded workmen all that they would be required to do under the British Compensation Act. All of these facts go to show that, under the liability law, the cost and burden of insurance is already quite heavy on employers, and that the burden would for many of them not be greatly increased if the compulsory insurance of workingmen were at once introduced. But the measures just described are without true legal authority and are for this reason not socially equal nor fairly distributed. It is natural that some more satisfactory legal method should be sought.

V. THE MASSACHUSETTS BILL

On January 13, 1904, a very competent committee recommended to the legislature of Massachusetts a modified form of the British Compensation Act of 1897. The legislature had, on June 5, 1903, instructed the governor to appoint this committee of five persons to make recommendations for laws on the relations between employer and employee. The text of the bill offered by them was printed in their report. This bill was rejected and nothing was done, and yet the discussion thus awakened served an important educational purpose and public opinion was strongly directed to the problem.

Serious and perhaps insurmountable legal objections have been urged against this bill. The proposed law has been summar-

ized and criticized very clearly and strongly by Professor E. Freund:¹¹

The bill makes every employer belonging to one of the classes specified by it liable for any personal injury happening to an employee while performing duties growing out of or incidental to his employment, unless the injury is due to the employee's own wilful or fraudulent misconduct. The employment must be on, or in, or about a railroad, a street railway, a factory, a workshop, a warehouse, a mine, a quarry, engineering work, or any building which is being constructed, repaired, altered, or improved by means of a scaffolding, temporary staging or ladder, or being demolished, or on which machinery driven by steam, water, or other mechanical power is being used for the purpose of the construction, repair, or demolition thereof. The act provides for the payment of lump sums in case of death, and for weekly payments in case of total or partial incapacity. Maximum amounts are fixed, and the weekly payments are subject to review from time to time. All questions arising under the act as to liability to pay, or amount or duration of compensation, are to be settled by arbitration. The employee has his option to proceed independently of the act to recover damages, where he has a cause of action by common law or by other statutes.

Professor Freund and others have raised the following constitutional objections to this form of law: (*a*) The bill makes no provision for trial by jury, leaving the settlement in disputed questions to arbitration; (*b*) There seems to be no principle of classification in determining the occupations included in the bill or excluded from its operations; (*c*) It is objected that this bill lays an unjust and intolerable burden on the employer of small means and income, making his liability absolute although his ability to meet the demand in case of serious accident is not comparable with that of rich corporations. All these errors can be corrected in a revised bill. "The necessary provision for jury trial would probably not seriously interfere with the operation of the act; a more intelligible principle of selection of employments could easily be found; and, above all, employers on a small scale should be relieved."

A somewhat different line of objections has been brought forward by other legal authorities. Thus it has been attacked on the ground that it is class legislation and casts upon employers

¹¹ *Green Bag*, February, 1907, pp. 80 ff.

of certain selected classes a burden not imposed on others. In proof and illustration of this contention the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois is cited:

Liberty, as that term is used in the constitution, means not only freedom of the citizen from servitude and restraint, but is deemed to embrace the right of every man to be free in the use of his powers and faculties and to adopt and pursue such avocation or calling as he may choose, subject only to the restraints necessary to secure the common welfare.¹²

These cases show that legislative enactment cannot deprive a man of his right to pursue his calling in his own way so long as he does not encroach upon the rights of others. As an example the case is cited where a statute prohibiting contractors to allow their employees to work more than eight hours a day on public work was held unconstitutional.¹³ It is affirmed, in the same course of argument, that the police power of the state cannot be made to cover legislation not necessary to the health and safety or welfare of the community. One might be justified in replying to this argument that it is precisely the health, preservation, and welfare of the people which is the object of this legislation.

Another objection to the compensation law is based on the idea that, if its enactment meant the repeal of the right to secure redress for injury due to the employers' negligence, it would be unconstitutional because it would deprive the employee of a remedy which he now has under the common law. This form of the argument has much weight with employees and hinders the progress of progressive legislation in the direction of insurance. It would be amusing if it were not so tragically serious to hear what legal principle is quoted in this connection; the splendid periods of the Bill of Rights are introduced to give solemn weight to the argument for the common law as against modern insurance laws which offer a vastly more adequate remedy not only in case of negligence but in all cases of accidents. It sounds like sarcasm to quote these words and then bring them into connec-

¹² *Braceville Coal Co. v. People*, 147 Ill., 660; *Bassette v. the People*, 193 Ill., 344; *Powell v. Pennsylvania*, 127 U. S., 678; *Allgeyer v. La.*, 165 U. S., 578.

¹³ *Bailey v. the People*, 190 Ill., 28.

tion with the daily facts of life in any industrial city of this country. The fundamental ethical principle is indeed worthily expressed:

Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or reputation. He ought to obtain it by law, right, and justice freely and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay.

This is the sublime doctrine of our law; but what is the brute fact familiar to the very judges who cite these sonorous phrases in instructing juries and rendering awards? Every one of them knows, and many of them confess with shame, that the actual working of the law is in constant and notorious contradiction with every phrase; in practice there is burdensome cost to the workman who sues, and he must pay his attorney perhaps half of the award to conduct his suit; the delay leaves the disabled man for at least two years without resources, although the law gives him a right to instant succor; the issue is not certain, but a mere gambler's chance; and in the vast majority of cases, that is those not traceable to negligence of the employer, yet due to the occupation itself, the workman has not even the promise of legal relief. The situation has a natural tendency to make every workman regard laws and courts as his natural enemies, and this has really been the effect, until there is positive hostility to these salutary institutions. There is no cure for this hostility in quotations from venerable documents to which actual experience gives the lie direct.

Beneath the juristic objections are certain economic difficulties which give meaning to the legal criticism of the compensation or absolute liability principle. These objections were successfully urged by the manufacturers of Massachusetts and were influential in the defeat of the bill before the legislature. In the United States there is entire freedom of trade between states and competition is unrestricted by state barriers. The employers, assuming that the cost of insurance is a financial burden or that compensation without reference to negligence would be, declare that the premiums for insurance would handicap the employers of the state which should adopt the law in

their competition with employers in similar lines in other states. It is difficult to prove that this objection is without weight. Elsewhere the various aspects of this problem are considered, but the difficulty if not impossibility of securing national and thereby uniform and equal requirements makes a satisfactory solution very remote.

VI. EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY OUT

There are some encouraging aspects of the situation. It will still be possible, under judicial rulings, to make insurance contracts of a certain kind which may develop a system of voluntary protection much more satisfactory than anything yet known. It is quite clear that an employer under the law may make a contract with his employees which will release him from common law liabilities in cases where the injured employee accepts the terms after the accident. But it is not yet clear that an employee can contract out of his rights as a condition of employment or even in advance of actual injury.¹⁴ Insurance arrangements of the relief departments of the railroad companies are on the basis of these legal principles. In the bill offered by the Industrial Insurance Commission of Illinois in 1907 another method was recommended: to offer to employers who would contribute at least half the cost of accident insurance immunity from all other liabilities, in case they could induce their employees to sign a contract to accept these terms. It was thought by the commission that the freedom from uncertain liabilities and danger of vexations and costly litigation would be inducement enough for most important employers to adopt this course without further legal constraint. On the other hand it was hoped that the employees would see it to be to their interest to agree to such a contract since they would thus be assured of a certain indemnity or benefit in all cases of injury, whether there was show of cause under the plea of negligence or not, and thus they would have absolute protection in all forms of disability without losing employment and without paying half or more of rare awards for lawyers' fees. It is not yet known

¹⁴ See 77 N. E. Rep., p. 248; 169 Ill., 312.

whether the employees will take this view of the matter, nor what the legislature will do, nor what the courts would do in case a law of this kind were put to test. But the Commission was advised by some of the most competent authorities in the country that the essential features of the bill were legally and actuarially sound and would, if accepted in good faith, relieve the situation and be a substantial benefit to employers, employees and to the general public. If this is true the idea will yet be tried in some states and have a chance to prove its worth. The Illinois bill left the method of insurance optional with the contracting parties, that is with the employers; and the employer might select a casualty company to provide the machinery for protection, or might under suitable conditions create his own insurance fund, or might join with others in the formation of a mutual insurance association. It would be unwise to exclude casualty companies from this business in the present situation and equally unwise to give them a monopoly of the business.

In the year 1899 an effort was made in New York to introduce some insurance measure, but it failed on account of the contemporaneous demand for more stringent liability law. The bill offered included the British principle of absolute liability and compensation in all kinds of accidents.¹⁵

In the year 1902 Senator David J. Lewis introduced into the legislature of Maryland a bill intended to encourage or practically compel employers to provide insurance for their employees in certain dangerous occupations. There was in the law a drastic provision extending the scope of liability, and then the employer was permitted to avoid this liability by paying given sums to the State Insurance Commissioner for the creation of a fund out of which a death indemnity for a thousand dollars should be paid. The law was passed and a number of death benefits were paid out by the Insurance Commissioner. It was declared unconstitutional in an inferior court on the ground that the law gave judicial powers to an administrative officer. No case has been carried up to the Court of Appeals and the final test has not been applied. The author of the bill thinks that the

¹⁵ See article of M. M. Dawson in *Railway Age*, 1904, p. 415.

indifference of employers to the law was due to the fact that the number of cases attributable to negligence is so small that freedom from liability under that clause is not sufficient motive to induce them to go to the trouble to insure their employees.

In the meantime it is interesting to study the growth and advance of instructed minds on this subject as illustrated in various messages of President Roosevelt. He seems to have uttered his first plea in connection with an urgent request to Congress to grant disability and old-age pensions to members of the life-saving crews along the rivers and coasts. In his message of December 3, 1906, he goes farther and reaches the ground of the British compensation act of 1897:

Among the excellent laws which the congress passed at the last session was an employers' liability law.¹⁶ It was a marked step in advance to get the recognition of employers' liability on the statute books, but the law did not go far enough. In spite of all precautions exercised by employers there are unavoidable accidents and even deaths involved in nearly every line of business connected with the mechanic arts. This inevitable sacrifice of life may be reduced to a minimum, but it cannot be completely eliminated. It is a great social injustice to compel the employee, or rather the family of the killed or disabled victim, to bear the entire burden of an inevitable sacrifice. In other words, society shirks its duty by laying the whole cost on the victim, whereas the injury comes from what may be called the legitimate risks of the trade. Compensation for accidents or deaths due in any line of industry to the actual conditions under which that industry is carried on should be paid by that portion of the community for the benefit of which the industry is carried on—that is, by those who profit by the industry. If the entire trade risk is placed upon the employer he will promptly and properly add it to the legitimate cost of the production and assess it proportionately upon the consumers of his commodity. It is therefore clear to my mind that the law should place this entire risk of trade upon the employer. Neither the federal law nor, as far as I am informed, the state laws dealing with the question of employers' liability are sufficiently thoroughgoing.

Still more recently in a speech at the Jamestown Exposition, June 11, 1907, President Roosevelt has been even more explicit,

¹⁶ This law has been declared unconstitutional by two courts and affirmed by one federal court. Judge Evans, in Kentucky, *in re* United States v. J. M. Scott, 1906, declared adversely. Until a case has been carried up to the Supreme Court the value of the law is in doubt.

and published the opinions which no doubt have long been waiting in his fertile mind for the right moment for utterance in a responsible way: "Workmen should receive a certain definite and limited compensation for all accidents in industry, irrespective of negligence." This doctrine he would have Congress apply at once in statutes governing railroads; no doubt with the hope that state legislatures would speedily follow the example set by the federal legislature.

ARE THE SOCIAL SCIENCES ANSWERABLE TO COMMON PRINCIPLES OF METHOD? (*Concluded*)

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Having replied in the first part of this paper¹ to certain specific criticisms in Dr. Hoxie's "Rejoinder,"² I shall now attempt to express more positively two or three rather elementary methodological principles. I am not yet sure whether there is a real difference of judgment about them between Dr. Hoxie and myself, or whether the argument amounts only to an incident in the race-hatreds between vocabularies. In either case, no better way of approaching an understanding is in sight than the frankest possible use of the words at command on both sides.

In reviewing the scope of this discussion I am impressed with the necessity of appeal to primary principles which the social sciences can hardly repudiate. As I see the situation, the occasion for such a discussion as this arises from the degree of inattention to formulation of these principles which has become habitual. It is hard to believe that responsible scholars would deliberately deny their substantial validity. I have the best of reasons for believing that Dr. Hoxie's own practice, for example, is a salutary object-lesson in consistent respect for the very principles about which we find ourselves disagreeing in the abstract. As I said in the first part of this paper, we seem to be unable to use words in a way that makes us sure of each other's ideas. The removal of the misunderstanding, I repeat, is probably not feasible through a process of logical proof. It must be chiefly through increased attention to conditions or elements of the scientific process which are out of sight when we

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIII, pp. 1 ff.

² *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, pp. 739 ff.

attempt to calculate methodological values merely from the standpoint of a specialized interest.

In the first place, I appeal to the principle that *science can never be in the strict sense an individual pursuit*. No man could be a scientist in a proper sense who should actually cut himself off from other men's interests, and should utterly disregard the reaction of other men's minds upon reality. One of the temptations of the very conditions which on the whole are necessary for the utmost promotion of science—viz., relative detachment from all other interests except desire to investigate our own problems—is the impulse to imagine that science is wholly a matter of our own choice. We are tempted to assume that we are at liberty to plot any plan of research whatsoever, regardless of its relation to anyone's else researches, and that our interest in this isolated pursuit will qualify it as science if we are only industrious enough. It sometimes follows that academic men so lose the sense of proportion that they withdraw from the real scientific movement and pursue curious but profitless quests which merely cater to pedantic or dilettantish whims. Busy puttering about the unrelated and the unrelatable is not science. Genuine science is always a division of the world's labor of discovering the facts and the connections of facts through which men may become intelligent about themselves and their relations with the rest of the universe. It is as vicious for a man who assumes the functions of a scientist not to keep strictly within the limitations of "things-as-they-are," as it would be for a train dispatcher to absolve himself from precise regard for the movements of his trains, and to substitute a hypothetical manipulation of trains thought of in some abstraction from their working relations which his speculative interest might conceive.³ Every real scientist is virtually a deputy of his

³ As will appear later, when I refer directly or by implication to "things-as-they-are," I mean that concurrence of processes which we call "the visible universe," or any section of it which may be concerned in a given inquiry, as it interprets itself to the means of knowledge at present within the control of mankind. I have no thought of a metaphysical *Ding-an-sich*, nor of any other conceivable "ultimate reality" in a metaphysical sense. I am speaking strictly within the lines of those assumptions about the reality of the phenomenal world,

fellow-men, intrusted with the task of finding out some fraction of the truth about "things-as-they-are," which may at last be authenticated and evaluated by fitting into its place in the whole ascertainable system of truth. Curious intellectual pursuits which are not amenable to correction by correlation with all other investigations of truth are at best prostituted science.

This being the case, every attempt to state science in terms of independence and autonomy is in its way a repetition of the blunder which we are slowly unlearning, of trying to state human life in terms of a socially and psychologically impossible individualism. So far as we have found it out, the system of "things-as-they-are" with which our knowledge problems are concerned is a system of interlocking processes. We have to know partially a little something of a narrow range of these processes before we can know more of the wider sweep of the same or other processes; but each extension of our knowledge from the more partial to the less partial must involve, as one of its elements, some recognition of the dependence of the processes which we have observed more upon other processes which we have observed less. Putting the generalization, for instance, in terms of the particular problems with which this discussion is concerned, there can be no "science" of "men making choices in the market," which is not at the same time partly constructing and partly constructed by science of men making all other choices, and that in turn related in similar fashion to science of men in all the other activities which are the conditions or consequents of voluntary choices; and these approximate sciences again are always tentative expressions of processes that run into and out of the processes by which men are related to the physical cosmic process.

In a word, since reality as we know it is a plexus of interrelationships, the sciences which attempt to interpret portions of and about the competence of our practical reason to get acquainted with it, which are the necessary premises of all voluntary action. I am contrasting reality within the meaning of those assumptions, with liberties taken by individual or group fancy in disregard of those assumptions. The occasion for this explanation is stated in the passages referred to at the beginning of this note, i. e., pp. 207, 219, 220.

reality are bound to interpret each and all of them subject to what can be ascertained about their conditioning interrelationships. Scientific abstraction, therefore, is legitimate only on the condition that whenever a given abstraction is no longer necessary for the particular forms of inquiry which it facilitates, the question shall recur, By what connections with the whole are the relationships modified which have thus been abstracted for partial examination?

The second elementary principle which Dr. Hoxie's "Rejoinder" moves me to enlarge upon has been implied in what has already been said. It may be expressed in this way: *Science as a whole is the total result of the combined efforts of men to explain all that takes place within the range of human observation. A science is properly so called when it is such an explanation of particular types of occurrences that it tends both to interpret and to be interpreted by the whole of contemporary science, or when it brings to light phases of reality which call for reconsideration of more or less of what had previously ranked as science.*

The point now is that while science is a function of human intelligence as a whole, not an irresponsible amusement which individuals may shape to suit themselves, the objective side of science is a whole not subject to human wills. It is a plexus of conditions which hedge all men about. Whether men are scientists or not, they cannot flee from these conditions. Everything that is knowable is a function of this whole objective process. All knowledge or science is relatively complete, therefore, in the degree in which it interprets a phase or phases of these objective conditions in the relations which actually exist between it or them and all the surrounding conditions.

Suppose some physical convulsion had destroyed all the books in the world, and had made the memory of all of us a blank, so far as that could occur and still leave us in possession of our present grade of intelligence. Suppose that all recollection of pure science, both its content and its formal divisions, were effaced. Suppose that the living generation retained the rudiments of manual and mental technique, with all that we now

understand by the phrase, "the scientific attitude of mind," while the other results of science, including prepossessions about divisions of scientific labor, were swept away.

I will not say that I know what men in general would do under those circumstances. I can only say that I can imagine but one course of action that would be thoroughly appropriate. If the situation which I have supposed would leave men suggestible by realities only and not at all by conventionalities, it seems probable that it would be less difficult under those circumstances for men to take the appropriate course than it is now for conventionalized men to modify their preconceptions.

The intelligent procedure in the supposed situation, for men capable of scientific thought, would be to assemble in committees of the whole, or by representatives, in the most accessible centers in different parts of the world, to confront each other with a matter-of-fact summary of the conditions, and to take council together upon the most desirable courses of action.

In brief the situation would be this: Here we are, so many people, mysteries to ourselves, under mysterious limitations, prompted by miscellaneous active impulses. The immediate question is, *What is the thing to do?* Consultation would not go on long—assuming scientific intelligence without scientific knowledge—before it would be evident to all that the question, *What is the thing to do?* runs back to the questions, *What is the thing to know?*

So far as I am able to imagine the probable course of thought among men using merely the best scientific insight which the race has developed, with none of the impedimenta of accumulated opinion, they would conclude that the thing to know must embrace all the information to be had about all the consequences that must be depended upon to follow from all the different variations of circumstances, and of human conduct with reference to the circumstances, that can occur within human experience. Then the preliminary answer to the first question would amount to this: The thing to do consists of all the actions which our discovery of consequences shows to be useful toward

making the circumstances yield the most to satisfy a rational consensus of all our wants.⁴

If we were actually confronted with the task of tackling the whole problem of life, with neither help nor hindrance from accumulated beliefs, but merely in the exercise of our evolved physical and mental fitness to cope with reality as we encountered it, the assumption does not seem extravagant that all the men whom we now regard as scientific would presently reach a working agreement to this effect: We have a life to live, and we need to find out how to live it. The first step must be to ascertain the conditions of the life which we may or must live. Life will then consist first of accommodating ourselves to the conditions. If there is more to life, the scope of that more will doubtless appear in due time if we proceed to do our best to learn the inevitable conditions of life, and the main lines of adaptation.

Under those circumstances, knowledge would be appreciated from the start as relentlessly independent of men's hopes or fears or wishes or tastes or purposes. Knowledge would be understood not as something that men create and fashion to suit themselves, but as a reflection in men's minds of objective relations which the mind merely reports. It would be evident that knowledge is genuine rather than fanciful in the degree in which it resists capricious shapings of the imagination, and corresponds with actual relations in the world of experience.

Under those circumstances too, knowledge would get its correlations from the kind and degree of its pertinence to actual life conditions. It seems to me consequently highly probable that knowledge would be divided very early according to the degrees of generality and invariability in the relations which it attempted to set in order. At one end of the scale, for instance, we should have the absolutely invariable relations of quantity, capable of exact formulation as mathematics. At the other end of the scale we should have the highly inscrutable mutations of men's moods

⁴ From our present standpoint we will interpret this phrase in the supposed case as implying a point of view that would lead at last to a content for the concept "wants" from which nothing would be omitted which we now find it necessary to include; i. e., the whole gamut of physical and spiritual wants.

and whims, capable of classification in qualitative categories, but utterly incalculable in detail. Between these two extremes real relations would be found to interpenetrate one another in diminishing degrees of generality and constancy.

Following this perception, it would be necessary for men exploring the conditions of life to render the first discovery in another form, viz.: *Relations about which we need knowledge may be arranged systematically according to the number of other relations which must be known in order to explain them precisely.* Some relations may be understood approximately with very little reference to other types of relations. For example, when we try to account for the motions of the heavenly bodies, we find ourselves at first approach dealing with a single kind of relations, and it is needless to inquire about other relations. If we try to understand relations of other sorts, we find ourselves obliged to make out an ascending ratio of coworking relations. For instance, when we try to account for the distribution of plants on the surface of the earth, we find that the relations involved greatly outnumber those encountered in the movements of the planets. Again, when we try to account for the distribution of human beings over the earth we find that more relations are concerned than in the case of the plants. If we go still farther, and try to account for the varieties of structures in the human groups so scattered, we find that still more relations are concerned than in the case of their mere distribution, etc.⁵

Having recapitulated the previous experience of the race to this extent, it seems to me that the positive scientists in our hypothesis would very soon add one more rudimentary principle to their methodology, viz.: *The credibility of any proposed explanation of specific relations depends in part upon the credibility of the accompanying explanation of all their reactions with other relations.* That is, men would discover sooner or later that real knowledge is to be gained not by forays into experience and then retirement into isolation, to treat the fragmentary booty of these expeditions as though the rest of experience did not exist. Men would discover that real knowledge consists of

⁵ Sociologists will recognize in the last two paragraphs a partial paraphrase of Comte.

advancing step by step in the process of finding the functional connections between any portion of experience whatsoever and the total of experience which the combined observations of men have encountered.

The foregoing illustration has this bearing: As a link in a process of logical proof it would have neither force nor relevance. The point is not whether my guess about the conduct of hypothetical men in hypothetical conditions is probably correct. This would be a vain question. Whether or not real men, under the conditions of the hypothesis, would behave as I have imagined, the conduct which I have outlined in the illustration reflects, so far as it goes, the principles of positive science as I understand them. In a word the first presumption of science is that in the process which we call consciousness mind encounters some point or points of contact with a boundless extension of relationships which may be represented for convenience by the phrase "things-as-they-are." The second presumption of science is that real knowledge, or thought corresponding with reality, is to be gained only by tracing relation into relation so far as such discovery can go within the range of "things-as-they-are." In other words, the concept "science" is built up around the presumption that the human mind is responsible and reliable only in the degree in which its activities report and reflect relations which are discerned, not created, by the observing mind. This by no means excludes from the concept "science" the thousand-and-one direct and indirect devices for detecting relations within "things-as-they-are," which may be frustrated oftener than they succeed. The criterion for them is not whether they arrive or not, but whether they are in effect species of trial-divisors, eliminating hypotheses not strictly in accordance with reality, and thus narrowing down the line of approach to the precise relation sought.

With this explanation the fictitious situation which I have exploited at such length has a certain illustrative value. It furnishes a quasi-concrete background for more literal discussion of the two cardinal points involved in Dr. Hoxie's contention, viz., first, the positive theorem that sciences are, and of right ought to be independent and autonomous; second, the negative

theorem that, if it were desirable to correlate sciences, no principle can be found which could justify itself as a means of correlation.

With reference to the former of these contentions, I may first compress all that need be said into the single proposition that whenever a man of Dr. Hoxie's acumen uses an equivalent of the phrase "independence of the sciences," he grossly deceives himself if he thinks he wants to be taken literally. It is as impossible for sciences to be independent in a strict sense as it is for citizens of a state to be literally free. It would be a gratuitous affront to charge Dr. Hoxie with ignorance of this fact. It is as axiomatic to him as it is to me. Just as civic freedom is a condition in which each man's liberties are limited by every other man's rights, so knowledge is a condition in which each science is limited by every other science. Indeed, we imply this in all our later attempts to define science. When used intelligently the term means *such an arrangement of all that has been observed within the range of experience which has been critically investigated, that each part or phase of that experience helps to interpret each other part or phase of the whole experience.* We assume that we know anything only to the extent that we know all the ramifications of relationship of which the immediate object of knowledge is an incident or detail. What we call knowledge is to a considerable extent a process of judging kinds and degrees of interdependence between more immediately and intimately known relationships and less immediately and intimately known relationships. That is, there is no trait of knowledge, or science, which is more obvious than its constant and manifold relativity and dependence.

These things are no more familiar to me than they are to Dr. Hoxie. How is it possible then for him to affirm the independence of the sciences, and for me to deny it? Simply, as I showed in the first part of this paper,⁶ by unwittingly smuggling different meanings into the same words, and then assuming that we are contradicting each other when one of us uses the positive sign and the other the negative before these identical

⁶ *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIII, pp. 9, 10.

verbal symbols. It requires but a moment's analysis to discover that the independence of the sciences which Dr. Hoxie affirms is a quite different affair from the independence of the sciences which I deny.

An analogy may serve to illustrate the difference. Three companies may operate, the first a steel plant, the second a glass factory, the third a flourmill. Legally and economically these three industries are independent of one another, but neither of them is independent of the facts of physics and chemistry. While no physicist nor chemist not an owner of these plants has a right to enter one of them and to order changes in the processes, any physicist or chemist who inspects one of the plants has a right to point out the fact, in case this, that, or the other process ignores or misapplies a law of physics or chemistry. In a precisely parallel way, no scientist functioning merely as a scientist has a right to give orders to other scientists. Every scientist has, however, a right to point out the inconclusiveness of any process of any science which fails properly to qualify itself by reckoning with relationships which are primarily the affair of other sciences.

Dr. Hoxie evidently interprets me as claiming for sociology the right of a superior officer to overrule the acts of inferior officers. In reality, what I am claiming for the methodological division of sociology, which is all that is here in question, is that it has a function parallel with that of the expounder of American Constitutional Law, in his relation to civic officials. With no civic authority whatsoever, the constitutional lawyer points out the relations of the different members of our complicated legal structure, from the petty local magistrate to the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the federal government. All sorts of malfeasance in office might go on indefinitely, unimpeached by any act within the legal competence of the academic expounder of the law. In a legal sense the officials, good or bad, are utterly independent of him. In a wider moral sense they are derelict if their conduct in office disregards his interpretation whenever it correctly represents the Constitution. The professor of Constitutional Law is merely one of the factors which work

together in forming the public opinion and the national standards to which all officials are responsible. In like manner the sociological methodologist makes no claim to prerogative over other scientists except in a sense in which each of them has a prerogative over him. It is his division of labor to study the relations of function to function within the whole federation of scientific processes which the progress of knowledge has created. Whether other scholars pay him any attention is a matter which their own judgment decides.

Even this statement, or an equivalent, always provokes opposition. Most men who are primarily interested in analytic rather than in synthetic phases of science usually regard the methodological division of labor as offensively presumptuous. They assume that it implies a claim to encyclopaedic information which other scholars do not possess. This is as absurd as it would be to set down the profession of the American constitutional lawyer or the astronomer as impossible, on the ground that the former would have to know all the local ordinances of all the towns and cities, and the statutes of all the states, as well as the federal constitution and laws; while the latter would have to know all about the whole visible universe. I presume that the fallacy of such suppositions is plain to everyone who reads this argument, but such false conclusions are of the same type with refusals to recognize the function of the methodologist. The fact is that nobody can undertake any scientific investigation whatsoever without tacitly assuming some sort of a methodology. Instead of being exceptionally presumptuous the methodologists are exceptionally humble. They accept the burden of the conclusion that phases of scientific relations, which must sooner or later be the common law for everybody, deserve serious study by somebody.

Returning to the main proposition, that sciences are necessarily interdependent, not independent, and recalling, not as an argument but as an illustration, the hypothetical case of society obliged to rediscover knowledge from the elements, I would point out that the two questions which I put in the mouth of imaginary men represent, so far as we can see, the chief impulses of all

science. Inverting the proposition, all science is directly or indirectly the product of attempts to answer the question, *What is the thing to do?* and the involved question, *What is the thing to know?* Everything that has been learned so far is apparently but a small part of the truth within reach; and we have only a relatively cloudy view of the bearings which the different portions of our discoveries have upon one another. By comparison with the least cultured types, to be sure, modern civilized men have gone far in exploring the conditions of life. Measured on the other hand by what remains to be explored and explained, in spite of our brave conceit of sophistication we are still babes in the wood. At worst some of us who profess scholarship are contentedly settling ourselves to sleep in the softest spots we can find. It requires no extreme effort of the imagination to picture scholars at best as rather piteously crying themselves toward the light.

The main question, *What do we need to know?* sets to words the most helpless infancy of our ignorance. We have reached a stage at which we are able to ask this primary question of science in the more generalized form, *What are the conditions of life?* This widening of the terms of the question implies a tremendous advance from the first stage, and an enormous increment of wisdom. Involved in this wider vision and deeper insight is the conviction that nothing can be counted in with science unless it has some presumptive value as a factor in the explanation of "things-as-they-are." Everything that has scientific value is entitled to it by virtue of relations through which it both interprets and is interpreted by the rest of "things-as-they-are."

Expressed in another way, science is reality registered in the human mind. Whatever be the metaphysics of the relations between these two factors, about which I shall say a qualifying word later,⁷ the two terms, "reality" and "mind" are correlates in the human situation. Neither can be ruled out of consideration without reducing the motions of science to an absurdity in comparison with which clowns' stunts in the circus would be

⁷ Cf. below, pp. 219, 220.

rather rational performances. Science is not what the scholar would like reality to be, nor what the scholar chooses to think of reality as being. Science is the relations of the real world thought faithfully as they are found to occur in actual experience. Without stopping to enlarge on the truism that science must always at best be partial and approximate and provisional, the essential item in the present connection is that, no matter what our subdivisions or classifications of science may be, if they are scientific at all each of them must be dependent upon all the rest, because each deals with relations which are incidental to the whole of reality. Those incidents cannot be known as they are except in the degree in which they are interpreted in their functional and proportional relations with the whole of reality.

Waiving consideration of those factors in the conditions of life which furnish the problems of the physical sciences, what do these latter propositions mean for the social sciences?

For the matter now in question they mean that no type, nor group, nor series of relations, whether of men to things or of men to men, can be abstracted from the total conditions of life, and treated, except in a merely provisional way, as though they existed of, for, and by themselves, without thereby and to the extent of that abstraction falsifying science through misrepresenting reality. For technical convenience the ethnologist may devote himself to one type of relations, the historian to another, the political scientist to another, the economist to another, the sociologist to another, etc. If however, either of these specialists goes so far as virtually to ignore the meaning of the other types of relation, and to treat the relations to which he is partial as though they could be regarded by themselves as constituting reality, or if he assigns to them more than their proportional value as determined by their part in all the processes which make up "things-as-they-are," his pursuit to that extent ceases to be science and becomes mere sport. In such a case, a distinct and decisive function in the constitution of science is omitted, viz.: the reuniting of each factor analyzed out of reality with all the ascertainable functions of reality.

When a process of genuinely scientific research begins, the

phase of reality to be investigated presents itself to the mind as a relatively undifferentiated mass. Analysis breaks up that mass into components. The scientific process does not end with microscopic inspection of some or all of the components. It ends by reconstructing the components in such a way that the same mass reappears no longer as a mass but as a unit. Each complete scientific process traverses this cycle. It is the final stage in this cycle which the methodologist particularly desires to promote.

In a word then, it seems to me that the chief reason why Dr. Hoxie and I cannot see things alike in this connection is that there is a real difference of emphasis, which has the effect of a difference of structural principle, in our fundamental conceptions of science. I find the ultimate criterion of science in the inviolable constitution of the reality which the mind tries to explore. Dr. Hoxie's argument runs straight back to the assumption that the decisive criterion of science is the interest of the mind that encounters the reality. The more openly we recognize this antithesis the better. It is as old as human thought; and it is apparently as true of the individual mind as of the racial mind that it has to grope its way through the theological stage, and the metaphysical stage to the positive stage in getting itself settled. There is some truth on both sides of this *cause célèbre*, viz., the things to be known vs. the mind that tries to know. Neither side alone is the whole truth. The interests of the exploring mind are of course the active agents in creating science, but the constitution of objective reality, mind of course included, is the ultimate condition which at last dictates the science which can be created.

If it were necessary to carry the argument into further detail, I think I could show that when put on the defensive the interest criterion always has to fly the signal of distress, and to accept deliverance at the hands of some kind of objective criterion, so soon as it is taken at its word and required to explain why it balks at rating as science a long list of constructions produced by interest in the bizarre and the trivial.⁸

It is time to point out that this fundamental principle of the

⁸ Cf. *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIII, pp. 13-15.

necessary interdependence of all positive investigations of human experience is not an esoteric doctrine. It is not a novelty. It is not a speculation. It is merely a digest of the practical conclusions which have been reached in more specific forms, first by the physical scientists, and then less consciously by the social scientists. Perhaps the most instructive history of social science in the nineteenth century which could be projected would show this line of development: first, reaction from a-priori treatment of the facts; second, substitution of an extreme attention to typical details so arbitrarily abstracted from the actual conditions that the so-called sciences of society were in effect speculations of a new order upon microscopic sections of reality; and third, the most instructive account that could be given of the social sciences during the last quarter century would "feature" the fact that their gains have been largely through return from this extreme abstraction and extension of their correlations into one another's problems, instead of persisting in the policy of splendid isolation.

A single illustration will show what I mean. In 1874 the historian Von Treitschke published in *Preussische Jahrbücher* an elaborate indictment of Professor Schmoller upon the charge of propagating socialism. The accused was then in the earlier years of his progress toward his present secure position in the first rank of economists. Time has shown that Von Treitschke's charge was not only misdirected but grotesque. Schmoller however felt called upon to defend himself. His reply is one of the conspicuous mile stones along the route of later progress in social philosophy. Without generalizing to the extent which has been necessary in this discussion, Professor Schmoller implicitly rests the special case upon precisely the principles which I have been stating. A single paragraph is sufficient evidence. He says:

Every economic organization is determined by two series of relatively independent causes. On the one side are the "natural" causes, upon which the older national economy fixed its attention exclusively. On the other side are those causes which have their source in the psychical and moral life of peoples. These have been mentioned now and then, to be sure, but their meaning for national economy has never been systematically investigated. There never will be a science of national economy in the strict sense of the term until not merely the first but also the second series of causes

is thoroughly investigated. The first series of causes constitutes the natural substructure, the foundation of economics. The causes that belong in the other series constitute a much more movable underpinning (*Zwischenbau*) so to speak, upon this foundation. The two together are necessary for a decisive result. Only upon the two together can a definite economic structure rest. A very large part of all economic investigations up to the present made the great mistake of attributing this last result, i. e., definite economic conditions, directly to the first series of causes. They forgot or disregarded the whole intermediate structure, and consequently heaped false conclusions upon false conclusions. They were continually vitiated by the attempt to make technical and natural antecedents explain what is back of all technique. They declared that from definite technical facts a given social order and legal system must necessarily follow. The truth is, as history abundantly shows, that these antecedents and consequents may greatly vary. That is, they misunderstood the nature of morals and of law, the power of ethical sentiments and cultural ideas, which also determines the whole economic system.⁹

But I will rest this part of the argument here. Further considerations in point will occur in connection with Dr. Hoxie's second main count, viz., *the supposed impossibility of discovering a synthetic principle*.

It is necessary to note in passing that Dr. Hoxie has twice in his rejoinder employed against me the rather obvious device of attributing to an opponent views which he repudiates, and for which he is in no way responsible. Having given my name to a very weak specimen of the genus man-of-straw, it is no trick at all to demolish him. Without wasting time to enumerate the different types of mental principles to which I do not appeal, I will again try to state my argument as directly as possible.

I start with the postulate that science at a given moment is so much of an answer as men have up to that date succeeded in giving to the companion questions, *What is the thing to do?* and *What is the thing to know?* I assume that the thing to know consists of all the real relations that have to be counted on, in the manner and degree in which they have to be counted on, in human experience. I assume that, at every stage, and every step of every stage of the process of developing science, every tentative knowledge of a particular relation is liable to correction

⁹ *Ueber einige Grundfragen des Rechts und der Volkswirtschaft*, p. 42.

by what can be ascertained about all other relations. This may be generalized into a formal expression of the most rudimentary principle of scientific synthesis, viz.: *Every supposed real relation acquires scientific precision and finality in the degree in which its articulation with the whole universe of objective relations is ascertained.* Or more simply expressed, every phase of reality is a function of reality as a whole, and science is not merely knowledge of detached phases, but of the ways in which these phases are related to one another. More simply still, we cannot know all that is possible about anything until we know all that is possible about its connections with everything.

In these propositions I am again not exploiting a novel theory. I am simply repeating in my own way the alphabet of positive science. In some form or other these things are as axiomatic as the multiplication table to every full-fledged physical scientist. It is only among men who deal with the humanities that anybody who ranks as a scholar betrays uncertainty about these fundamentals. Physical science is not physical facts arranged merely to suit the mental side of the reaction between mind and "things-as-they-are." Physical science is the mind's accommodation of itself to physical facts. Suppose we had every molecule of matter that ever had been or ever could be examined in a given chemical laboratory, and every vital cell that could ever be examined in a physiological laboratory, arranged each in a labeled pigeonhole of its own, in a block of pigeonholes like the boxes in a post-office. Those areas of labeled pigeonholes would not be a science of chemistry or physiology. Such a display of chemical or physiological specimens might suit some minds and serve some purposes, but reality is not arranged in that way, and whatever we think about it, we must learn to get to reality as it is before we shall have achieved science. The physical sciences have done what they have done toward interpreting their phases of reality by falling into line with this inevitable principle. Time was when men told what purported to be the truth about the stars by constructing them into fabulous constellations. We now know that there are no constellations in the picture-book sense, and we are interpreting what goes on in the

most distant and vaporous nebula as a part of the same process which turns our water-wheels and boils our teakettles. We have found out that there are orders of relations inorganic and organic, which recur according to constant laws, and which are variants of one another in partially ascertainable ways. So far as these relations are made out, they constitute a system of the known. The inexorable law of synthesis or correlation in physical science is that no apparent discovery of a new fact or relation can be recognized as a permanent part of science until it has either reconstructed the previous synthesis or made it probable that it has a place somewhere within the synthesis. Physical science has partially answered the question, *What is the thing to know?* or *What are the conditions of life?* by charting a physical universe that is not discontinuous, nor heteronomous, but a complex unity of forces which act consistently from atom to planetary system. Every item of supposed knowledge that aspires to the rank of science must show credentials that admit it to a place in such a universe.

When we turn from the physical to the moral division of reality, do we pass from congruity and coherence and consistency and regularity and interdependence and unity, to incongruity and incoherence and inconsistency and irregularity and independence and anarchy? If we select groups or types or series of human actions, and arrange them in pigeonholes according to any arbitrary fancy whatsoever, will the result be a science? I have never seen nor heard of a scholar in the social sciences who would deliberately answer these questions in the affirmative. I have occasionally met scholars who were agnostics as to *ascertainable* laws of coherence in human affairs, but so far as I know scholars as a rule believe that human conditions and actions conform to laws after their kind just as truly as the waves of the sea conform to the laws of physics.

It is not a part of my present task to schedule those laws. The question which Dr. Hoxie raises is whether there is any principle by which human relations may be so co-ordinated that common laws of those relations may be discovered. My answer is that the principle by which human relations may and must be

correlated, until we discover a more comprehensive principle, is a projection of the principle under which physical phenomena are scientifically unified, viz.: *The laws of physical and chemical and vital causation and correlation continue their sway in the affairs of men, with the added variant of the laws of psychical causation, whatever these may prove to be.* Just as only pseudo-physical science can come from attempts to systematize material relations in disregard of the laws of physics and chemistry and biology, so only pseudo-social science can result from attempts to systematize human relations in disregard of the laws of physics and chemistry and biology, plus the peculiar variant of human conditions—the laws of psychology. Just as there is no type nor phase of physical phenomena which can be constructed into a physical science except as it is correlated with the general laws of physics and chemistry and biology of which it is a resultant, so there are no types nor phases of social phenomena which can be construed into social sciences except as they are correlated with the general laws of physics and chemistry and biology, and in particular of psychology, of all of which they are resultants.

When we are dealing scientifically with any portion of human experience whatsoever, our problem is to interpret a segment of that portion of reality in which inorganic and organic evolution have passed into psychic evolution. *The human phase of reality consists, so far as we can see at present, of the evolution of types of interests, the evolution of types of individuals combining the interests, and the evolution of types of association between the individuals in pursuit of their interests, the whole succession of cycles proceeding in constant interrelation with the play of cause and effect which constitutes the physical conditions of the human process. Everything that deserves rank as social science must find its correlation somewhere within this cycle.* The processes peculiar to psychic evolution are variations of knowing and valuing and willing in the individuals who carry on the processes. Any cross section, or combination of social relations which is not co-ordinated with this process of psychic evolution is at best science gone wrong. No matter how large the abstraction may

bulk which is thus dislocated from the actual human process, it is not a positively justified science, any more than one "science" of red cows and another of black cows and another of brindle cows would be maintainable divisions of zoölogy. The human reality is men swirling through the cycles of evolving interests, evolving personalities, evolving associations.¹⁰ Human science is valid interpretation of any portion of this process, *always presuming that it is treated at last as a portion of the larger process, not as a detached entity*. Any systematizing of human phenomena in such a way as to wrest them out of their functional correlations with the whole human process is, to the extent of that insulation, a miscarriage of science.

The leading principle then by which partial knowledge of human experience must be correlated with all the knowledge of experience that is attainable is not an a-priori assumption of any sort. It is a generalization which expresses algebraically the sum total of our present insight into one dimension of reality, viz.: *For our intelligence the most central process within the range of experience is the evolution of human personality; for our intelligence therefore every separable phase of human experience must get its meaning and valuation from the connections which we discover between it and the central process of the evolution of persons.*

In conversation with Dr. Hoxie since this discussion began I have learned that in his mind my argument is fallacious because it involves disregard of "pragmatism." As I confessed in the first part of this paper, I can make no defense against the charge that my meaning is obscure. If I have not made my thought plain the fault must be my own. In fact, however, I have not intended to imply in this argument anything whatever which is in controversy between pragmatism and not-pragmatism, whether the reference is to psychological or logical or meta-

¹⁰ While expressing the relation in this way, I am conscious that, for the sake of emphasis, I am using figurative language which is open to serious objection. I should be contradicting myself if I spoke literally of "men" as fixed factors going through a process. The "man" in the case is of course a variable, quite as much as his relations with the other variables in the whole process.

physical types of the former doctrine. If any division of science or philosophy discovers a principle or a particular of knowledge which has a bearing upon interpretation of social relations, my whole argument requires that the discovery should have full faith and credit in the construction of social science. I am unable to see, however, that anything material to the present argument would be changed in the least if it became necessary to restate it in terms either of pragmatism or of not-pragmatism. Questions of epistemology do not fall within the present inquiry. It deals with reaches of phenomena about which, for the purposes of the social sciences, we assume that we have trustworthy sources of information. The grounds of that assumption present problems for other sciences, but, without prejudging those problems, everything which I have urged is maintainable for all purposes upon the plane of the social sciences.

Dr. Hoxie scents danger and dogma wherever I use any variation of the idea of "final" or "ultimate" criteria for science, in particular for social science. He understands me to be claiming right of asylum in an arbitrary metaphysical concept. On the contrary, my argument is in that respect of the same logical type with the everyday legal judgment in the United States that a decision of the Federal Supreme Court is the law of the land. It is "ultimate" and "final" *within its sphere*. At the same time there is no denying that the law of the land is only relatively final. It may be *casus belli* to other nations tomorrow, and the day after it may be repealed by the law of the bigger stick. Or the law of the land as it stands today may be a law which presupposed conditions which will be superseded by different conditions tomorrow, and then constitutional enactment or extra-constitutional revolution may substitute another law. Nevertheless, although the law as determined by our Supreme Court is merely of a piece with the relative and transitory character of all finite affairs, yet it would be hypercritical to raise a point against lawyers' use, for strictly legal purposes, of synonyms of the terms "final" and "ultimate" in connection with the law of the land. In a precisely parallel way, human experience reaches out to a certain circumference of relations which our knowledge can

neither ignore nor overstep if it pursues a strict program of positive science. Within this circumference there are certain relations that are just as "final" and "ultimate" in their way as the law of the land is in its sphere in its way. It is just as hypercritical to challenge the use of the terms "final" and "ultimate" in their obvious accommodation to the recognized limitations in the latter instance as in the former.

To remove Dr. Hoxie's suspicion that I am surreptitiously anchored to some assumed metaphysical ultimate, I am perfectly willing to admit that, for all I know, there may be millions of worlds in each of which, measured by some standard of which we have no knowledge, something is going on infinitely more important than the whole sum of experience on this planet. If we had means of knowing this conceivable situation to be actual, with no more ability than we have at present to imagine a content for the actuality, my argument would not have to be altered in the least. I am not attempting to make formulas to fit ultimate or abstract realities in the metaphysical sense, nor am I proposing generalizations of cosmic scope. I am insisting on the fact that the phenomena of human experience as we actually observe them are not independent one of another, and the mental constructions of those phenomena as though they were independent of one another falsifies the reality of our experience instead of interpreting it.

Nor am I in any dogmatic sense resting my argument, thus limited in scope, on the alleged finality of the correlating generalization which I may abbreviate in the form: "the evolution of human personality." I am squinting toward no logical police ordinance on which I am relying to prevent the supplanting of that generalization by a wider and truer one. Again, for all I know to the contrary, a more far-seeing interpretation of the human phase of reality than is at present in sight may be offered before this paper is in print. If this deeper and broader look into reality should occur tomorrow, unless it should upset present calculations by showing cause for interpreting human experience as uncentered instead of centered after all, the substance of my claim would be undisturbed; viz.: *Each*

passage of human experience is somehow a function of all the rest of experience, and it will not be known scientifically until it is interpreted in terms of its relations with all the rest that is occurring within the range of human knowledge.

I make no apology for having gone so far afield to explain my version of the method by which the true meridian must be found as a base line for all social science. The upshot of the whole matter is this: The social sciences are not called upon to adjudicate the metaphysical question "appearance vs. reality." There is a true sense in which things are what they seem. Within that sense all the sciences have their vocation. Viewed from the psychological angle of approach, all the sciences are responses to that imperative in men which may be cartooned as a crusade for answers to the question, *What is to be known?* in the interest of the question, *What is to be done?* To change the figure, the sciences are not direct attempts to legislate for men, yet the sciences must be the tables of stone on which the world's most lasting decalogues will appear. One of the deepest motives of science is an impulse which makes toward expression in this form: "Know all men by these presents: Through and through the apparent instabilities and irregularities of the knowable there are certain relative stabilities and regularities. These we set in order to guide all sorts and conditions of men. Under similar circumstances certain relations will surely recur. You may doubt this prophecy, and you may ignore it, but it will return to trouble everyone who is not wise in his generation." The sciences whose division of labor is the aspects of reality which converge in the evolution of mankind have their place as a corps of the grand army of discovery. Their indicated line of operations is merely a detail of the general strategy. It is their business primarily to find out how things actually work together in the concrete physical and social conditions which make up the human lot. It is their business in the second instance to demonstrate a scale of values among the types of activities possible in different situations, on the basis of their ascertained effects upon the ultimate process thus far visible to us, the evolution of persons and of reciprocal personal relations. If one accepts service within the ranks of the social

sciences one is bound to conform to the discipline of "things-as-they-are." In the degree that any programme of social science claims liberty to abstract itself from complete correlation with knowledge and valuation of "things-as-they-are," it falls in the class with a conceivable neo-mathematics, which might start from the major premise that, for its purposes, two and two should be supposed to make five.

THE OPIUM TRADE IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES

II

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Opium has come to stay, thanks to the indolence, if not worse, of the government, which permitted, not only the traffic in contraband opium by contraband Chinamen, but also the opening of clandestine opium dens in a country where the opium habit as yet was at a discount,⁴² preparing the field for the next step, the supply of government opium, under the pretext that the drug could not be kept out—as if an earnest effort had ever been made in that direction, except when it threatened the coffee monopoly. The arguments, however, which won the day in 1824 against the opium farm did not affect the introduction of the opium *regie* in 1902, coffee as a source of revenue being already for years and years in steady decline.

Under the circumstances, the rapacity of the mother-country, aided by the slovenly administration, having totally upset the fiscal balance, the new scheme, favoring the breeding of opium-smokers in the Preanger Regencies as in Bantam, for an artificial increase of the opium revenue seemed a financial *coup de maître*. Promises that “opium *regie*” mean restriction of the opium habit in the first place, good intentions, if they were ever genuine, now were completely forgotten. The authorities did not even consider it worth while to consult those most concerned, the population, through their chiefs. It was probably a consciousness of guilt which withheld the government from going through that formality, if not a feeling of shame in the knowledge of the answer to be expected from the native chiefs; in any case it was fully determined to make the Sundanese smoke opium, irrespective of any protest.

⁴² *Indische Gids*, Vol. II (1887).

So the native chiefs were not heard in the matter—the regents, sons and grandsons of the regents who, as Van Der Capellen wrote, sacrificed their own interests to contribute to the prosperity and morality of the population by abolishing the opium traffic.⁴³ The native chiefs were neglected, slighted in their rights by a government which, under the opium farm, in circular after circular had spoken of the evil consequences of the opium habit; had called for their assistance in warning the people against the use of opium; and now, under the opium *regie*, taking the retail trade in its own hands, without any other excuse than its incapacity to enforce its own regulations, opened for opium two residencies, together almost a fourth part of the whole island of Java, with a population of about three millions, formerly opium-free!

The native chiefs, though the innovation, intended to benefit the treasury at the expense of their people, directly encroached upon their old, vested rights, were simply ignored. And everybody acquainted with the native character will understand why, being ignored, they did not enter a protest on their own initiative. They knew perfectly well that the government, with all its show of excellent intentions, was determined to do wrong for the sake of more revenue; that their protest would not have the least influence, would tend only to impair their standing; the government does not like to be contradicted, and least of all in money matters, even when it does ask the advice of its officials as a mere formality. There is a word on record of a native chief, illustrating this tendency in a very characteristic way. When-

⁴³ How sympathetic the attitude of the regents was may be gathered from the official correspondence between them and Resident Van Der Capellen. The following letter from the regent of Sumedang, Koesoema di Nata, dated August 8, 1824, can serve as a specimen:

"I have received your letter of the 5th instant, and arrived at a full and clear knowledge of the contents. You wish, namely, that for the benefit of the inhabitants of this residency, from the regents and their families down to the heads of the districts, and from the latter down to the common people, the smoking of opium be abandoned. My wishes in that respect are in perfect accordance with your wishes, and I assent to everything that can be done with that object in view. I even leave it to you whether the five balls of opium I asked a few days ago shall be sent to me or not, as I still have three balls in store."

ever his advice was asked, he, with the other regents, pronounced in favor of the government proposition. On a certain occasion he, again with the other regents, officially declared the government perfectly correct, while it was known that, non-officially, they held a quite different opinion. When challenged he said: *Betoel—benar kapada dia . . . tapi boekan benar kapada kita*; which means: "Certainly—correct in *their* view [that is, the view of the government] . . . but not correct in *our* view." A remonstrance following, he answered: *Apa bolch bocwat?*—"What can we do, what does it matter!" And really, what can they do? What do their objections matter? The government goes its fiscal way—the way considered most profitable financially, correct or incorrect.

The reports of the residents and assistant-residents with regard to the introduction of the opium *regie* into Bantam and the Preanger Regencies have never been published. But it is known that the majority of the civil-service men in the opium-free regions were against the new measure—at least non-officially. This word, as in the case of the regents, is used advisedly, for the non-official opinion and the official opinion, especially in fiscal matters, often diverge widely, not only among the natives, but also among the white officials in the service of a government, whose primary, almost sole, object is revenue, and whose gauge for determining the usefulness of its servants is their ability for swelling the revenue. They know what the government expects of them, if they want advancement. And they act accordingly, having bad reminiscences of their younger years when, untrained yet to government methods, they took the good intentions of the government seriously, much to their disadvantage. They learned better; once bitten, twice shy. Yet, one of them at least, to my knowledge, an assistant-resident in one of the residencies now afflicted with opium through the paternal care of the government was able to declare:

I have done everything I could to keep the opium away. And I am pretty sure that the resident did the same till he found out that Batavia and Buitenzorg [i. e., the central administration] did not want to listen to reason. In my section are a hundred Chinamen; seventeen years ago there

was not a single Chinaman. The opium they smoked was bought in Batavia from the opium farmer's men [before the opium regie brought it to their doors]. I never heard of contraband opium in this neighborhood.⁴⁴

This is in direct contradiction with the statements made by the government to cover its iniquitous course. And in direct contradiction with the good intentions underlying the opium *regie* as a means for restricting the use of opium is also its introduction into Lombok as soon as the Dutch flag was hoisted there, after the deposition of the legitimate radjah, who, like his ancestors, had done his duty to his subjects, not only by prohibiting the use of the drug, but also by enforcing that prohibition which the Dutch government declares itself unable to do.

And this Dutch government, with its corrupt opium policy, would have brought opium to Dutch New Guinea, where it hardly yet could claim actual occupancy, if luckily the move in that direction, for poisoning the Papuas as a first-fruit of western civilization, had not been checked by public opinion, disgusted with the scandals that already had followed the opium *regie* in Java—apt illustrations of the wide difference between the words of the government and its actions. The cleft is, officially, bridged over by a more or less eloquent reference to the exigencies of the treasury; but no one who occupies himself, in a spirit of fairness, with the principal sources of revenue in Dutch India can feel happy about the manner in which the natives are made to pay, not for their own good in the shape of a just and wise administration, but for the luxuries and superfluities, the colonial excesses, of another people, strangers and enemies.

Among the sources of revenue the land rent stands first on the budget of Dutch India, with f. 21,065,000 (for 1904); followed by the import, export, and excise duties (f. 18,641,000); the opium monopoly (f. 17,235,000); the government railways (f. 14,425,000); the salt monopoly (f. 11,403,000); etc., etc. It is here not the place to examine these items in detail, beginning with the land rent, a tax carried up to the highest point the

⁴⁴ To repeat: A pretext for the introduction of opium was that Chinamen cannot do without the drug, and that they will smuggle it in, if not supplied in the legal way, the government being unable to prevent the smuggling.

population can stand. But in general it may be stated that the taxation is excessive. Too many taxes—these three little words alone furnish a key to the colonial policy of the Netherlands, especially when we keep in mind that, besides the direct and indirect financial advantages derived by the metropolis from the exploitation of the colonies, on a budget with a total expenditure of f.167,300,000, not less than f.50,400,000, or 31.3 per cent., is paid for military purposes, against f.5,100,000, or 3.2 per cent., for education, more than half of this sum going to the white men's children, a mere handful among millions and millions of native children, virtually without schools. And it is certainly highly significant that more than 17 per cent. of the whole revenue is derived from the taxation of salt, one of the first necessities of life, and from the sale of opium, a poisonous drug, tending to demoralize the population.

But the government wants money, and always more money, for colonial wars; for keeping up its colonial state with colonial pomp and circumstance; for making the colonial business a paying concern, notwithstanding colonial waste and piracy in colonial finance. Revenue is the last word of colonial wisdom, and all sources of revenue are clean.

O just, subtle, and mighty opium! Just and altogether justified because profitable; ever more just and more justified when more profitable. Reason, probably, why good care was always taken that the revenue derived from the opium monopoly did not decrease, notwithstanding a show of holy abhorrence for the opium habit! In 1822 the opium monopoly brought in f.1,500,000; in 1855, f.5,700,000; in 1870, f.9,400,000. Since then, under the farm system, there was a gradual increase; and now, under the opium *regie* starting on a basis of f.17,000,000 a year, the government sees to it with unscrupulous cunning that it shall not lose by the change, giving new facilities for the purchase, if not actually encouraging the use of opium as a matter of practical colonial policy, while denouncing the opium habit as a matter of theoretical ethics, saving its official face.

The minister of the colonies, Van Dedem, declared in 1876 that nobody in Java was in any doubt about the opium policy

of the government having for its sole object the getting of as much money out of the monopoly as possible. The opium *regie*, replacing the opium farm, according to his plans, was destined to meet that reproach by the repression of the opium habit in dead earnest through decreasing the number of licensed opium dens and, in the first place, through extending the *verboden kringen*, the regions where the use of opium was strictly prohibited. The opium *regie* had to derive its power for good from a courageous and honest endeavor to fulfil its beautiful task. Only when thus understood, could it be the foundation-stone of a healthy, salutary opium policy which, at last, would gain everybody's respect.⁴⁵

Dutch ministers of the colonies lead short official lives. Since Van Dedem we have had as ministers of the colonies Bergsma, Cremer, Van Asch, Van Wyck, Idenburg. And when, at last, the opium *regie* was introduced, shorn of everything that could have made it a more moral expression of the opium monopoly than the opium farm; when the number of licensed opium dens, at its introduction, was not decreased, but increased, the regions where the use of opium was prohibited, the *verboden kringen*, were not extended, but suppressed, the minister of the colonies then in power declared in parliament, with an appeal to his conscience, that the good intentions of the government had remained intact, though the practice of the opium *regie* under him, Minister Idenburg, was exactly the reverse of the theory of the opium *regie* under its official father, Minister Van Dedem. The original idea, tenderly nursed by the minister of the colonies, also men with consciences, whose terms of office separated the attractive theory from the vile practice—the original idea, handled and rehandled by so many high functionaries, had only lost its spirit of moral improvement; that was all. Minister Idenburg's ministerial conscience felt perfectly satisfied with a further appeal from his conscience to the consciences of his illustrious predecessors, together constituting the conscience of government, *e pluribus unum* (better:

⁴⁵ Taken from the report of Mr. Groeneveldt, who had been sent to Indo-China for studying the opium problem under its French colonial aspects.

nullum), as an excuse for the strange and unaccountable manner in which, during the course of so much conscientious see-sawing, the great good, announced with a tremendous flourish of trumpets, had become a great wrong—the customary result of the customary game of hide and seek between official consciences on colonial lines.

Nothing is so easy as to delude a parliament when it serves the purpose of the strongest party, and when the delusion serves all parties of the mother-country without distinction. By assuring more revenue to the colonial treasury, the deluding minister has a light task indeed, if only he stoops to deny the most obvious truths which may stand in his way, *in casu* the truth that the opium habit cannot be discountenanced, but is countenanced, by bringing opium where it was not before, and, where it was before, by increasing the number of opium dens. A Dutch minister of the colonies, playing the most sensitive chords on the Dutch parliamentary keyboard, skilfully pulling the national purse-strings, is always in the right. With money in sight, truth and justice can go hide themselves. The government monopolies especially work like charms in colonial debates; and opium, the best-paying government monopoly, possesses most magical influence and power. Opium, De Quincey said, though in a somewhat different sense, can overrule all feelings into compliance with the master-key (in this case, more revenue).

While the retail trade of opium was left in the hands of the farmers, the number of licensed opium dens in Java and Madura steadily diminished, from 2,792 in 1848 to 579 in 1900.⁴⁶ As soon as the government itself took to retailing opium, new opium dens were opened. In 1902 their number was already 694⁴⁷ in Java and Madura, not including the residencies of Surakarta, Djokjokarta, Pekalongan with Tagal, Kadoe with the Bagelen, Cheribon and Banjoemas, where at that time the opium regie still had to be introduced. How sincere the intentions of the government were relative to the suppression of the opium habit may be seen, e. g., from its doings in Madioen. Successive residents advised the central administration, for the benefit of the population,

⁴⁶ *Staatsblad*, No. 251.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 267.

to decrease the number of places set apart for the sale of the drug, when changing the opium farm for the opium regie. There was no need of so many retail shops, which tended only to promote the opium habit. The government answered by increasing the number of licensed opium shops from 64 under the opium farm to 80 under the opium *regie*!

The government cannot escape the indictment that, for the sake of revenue, it "breeds opium fiends," to use the characteristic expression of a man who knows the situation. It does so within its own jurisdiction, in the so-called government lands, and it is trying hard to do so where its power is more limited, as, for instance, in the *particuliere landerijen*—the private estates whose owners exercise almost feudal rights over the population.⁴⁸ Opium, of course, was kept away from the private estates as much as the free intercourse with the contaminated government lands would allow. Opium dens, where the drug might be bought in any required quantity, were not permitted. The landowners knew their advantage well enough not to encourage the opium habit among their laborers. But the government held the opinion that they should benefit the treasury by demoralizing their people, following its example of the government lands. The official in charge of the opium *regie*, whenever a new residency was added to the sphere of his salutary action, at once proceeded to annex the opium-free *particuliere landerijen*, as the government itself had annexed Bantam and the Preanger Regencies to the great poison area, now extending over the whole island. The owners or managers of Koeripan, Semplak, Tjiloeur, Kandanghauer, not to mention other private estates, were invited to establish opium dens for the benefit of their villagers.

The case of Koeripan being a good sample of the rest, it may

⁴⁸ These rights, in many instances rather indefinite, date back to the sale of large tracts of land by the government to private persons, the first on record (at least the first of any magnitude) being the sale of Depok and Seringsing to a member of the High Council, Chastelein, in 1705. The practice was stopped in 1836, and the peculiar condition of the *particuliere landerijen*, many of which now are in the hands of Chinamen, has led to extraordinary complications, especially in the last decades; e. g., the Tjiomas affair in 1886-87.

be given in a few words. On a certain day, without previous warning, an official of the opium service appeared on the scene and ordered that an opium den should be opened on the *pasar*, the market-place of Tji Sè-èng, near the owner's residence, then occupied by the administrator. A protest followed immediately. The owner pointed out that among a population of 18,288 only three were known to use opium occasionally; and, as it seemed most unjustifiable to lead so many thousands into temptation simply for the sake of an easy supply to three possible customers, who might debauch all the others, he earnestly requested the government not to open an establishment for the retail sale of opium on his estate. This request went through the red-tape mill in the usual fashion, and after a while he was told that the government would keep his interests in mind when opening an establishment for the retail sale of opium in the district of Paroeng, as intended—no escape from the opium den! And it came. Not on the *pasar* of Tji Sè-èng, or even on Koeripan (the authorities had promised to keep the interests of the landowner, if not of the native, in mind!), but on a little piece of government land, a small reservation between the private estates, exactly on the boundary. And the population of Koeripan, like the population of the other private estates around there, is now taking to opium quite nicely, quite satisfactorily for the interests of the treasury!

The pretext for the establishment of that opium den was the alleged smuggling of opium at the *pasar* of Tji Sè-èng—a fact absolutely unknown to the owner and the administrator of Koeripan, who certainly are better acquainted with the doings of their men than outsiders; a fact, moreover, that ought to have led to a stirring-up of the government police instead of to a supply of government opium in addition to the visionary contraband opium.

As the government did with Koeripan, it did with other private estates, establishing opium shops, on this or the other side of the boundary lines, for the "benefit" of people who thus far never touched opium, saving them from the clandestine article by forcing them to take the government stuff! Quite pertinent,

under the opium *regie* still more than under the opium farm, is the remark of W. Elout van Soeterwoude: "In opium affairs we are accustomed to surprises; every time new iniquities come to light."⁴⁹ Experience, however, makes it inadvisable to speak of such iniquities in too loud a voice. The landowners are perfectly well aware that the government, through its officials, has or can make many opportunities for breaking them of the bad habit of opposition. Dutch India lives under a sort of *terreur*, and publicity is the very last thing the government wishes; the government takes nothing worse than criticism of its actions in the press; the government has at its disposition a special press law to curb publicity, and does not scruple to use or abuse its power whenever it sees fit. Conclusive proof of its readiness in this respect was given again precisely with regard to the scandals of the opium *regie*, confronted as it became with the disagreeable truth that its opium policy now is even more immoral than in the time of the opium farm, when the Chinese opium farmers had to swallow all the blame which really belonged to their principals.

Plus cela change, plus c'est la même chose: the tricks of the Chinese opium farmers are equaled, if not surpassed, by the tricks of the government officials to make the opium *regie* pay. And the trick of tricks came from the government itself, when the doors of Bantam and the Preanger Regencies, closed for opium, were opened for opium as wide as possible—to deal the opium habit a death-blow!

Such extraordinary logic, if it means anything, is nothing but an insult added to the injury suffered by the native population; still more so when viewed in the light of some details, given by official documents. They refer to the pretext that the government opium dens established in Bantam and the Preanger Regencies are accessible only to Chinamen having reached the age of seventeen years, and to soldiers in uniform. In his observations regarding the budget for the year 1903, the minister of the colonies said:

⁴⁹ *Indisch Genootschap*, meeting of November 8, 1876.

The idea broached last year, to post in the establishments for the sale (or consumption) of opium a sufficiently clear warning against the use of opium, has been discountenanced by the governor-general, in accordance with the advice of the official in charge of the opium regie, who asked for the opinion of the residents in whose residencies the regie had been working for a year or longer. They do not approve of the idea. They draw attention to the fact that by far the majority of the individuals who frequent the mentioned places are not able to read. And some of the residents believe that many of them would discover in such a warning an inconsistency with the fact that the government itself takes the retail sale of opium in its hands.

"Some of the residents" hit the nail exactly on the head in stating this; and they might have added that such a warning would also be altogether inconsistent with the fact that the government opium *regie* sells opium where the sale of opium was prohibited in the time of the opium farm, and with the fact that not only Chinamen having reached the age of seventeen years, and soldiers in uniform, but *everybody*, is invited to partake of the government opium—specially invited by means of a sign over the door of every opium den, with an inscription in three languages, as prescribed by the new opium regulations: in Dutch, in Chinese, and in the language spoken by the majority of the natives inhabiting the place where the opium den is located—Malay, Javanese, Madurese, Sundanese, or whatever it may be. The posting of a clearly worded warning against the use of opium is discountenanced on the ground that the majority of the natives cannot read; but for whom, then, the clearly worded invitations (*Ima Paranti-nja Djocwal Madat* and *Tampat Oedocd Madat*—Malay for the Malays, Sundanese in the Preanger Regencies, or Javanese, Madurese, etc., elsewhere), if not for the new customers *in spe*, spared by the opium farm and now to be sacrificed to the opium *regie* for the benefit of the Dutch treasury and the higher glory of the Dutch colonial name! Such signboards with such brazen inscriptions remind one of the signpost before the infamous gin-shop in St. Giles': "Here you may get drunk for a penny, dead drunk for twopence, and straw for nothing."

Only this difference: the keeper of that gin-shop did not pretend that he plied his trade solely for the physical, moral, and

spiritual welfare of his customers. The Dutch government, as keeper of low opium shops where the natives are poisoned, body and soul, does. The Dutch government, especially under the present clerical cabinet, responsible for such hypocrisy, leaves no opportunity unused to declare solemnly that the Netherlands are preordained for a high mission in Netherlands India, civilizing, christianizing. Indeed, when the devil goes to church, he is not satisfied before he sits on the high altar, trying to corner all the incense for his own exclusive use.

It has been truly said that no other vice produces such appalling ravages as the opium habit.⁵⁰ There is scarcely one instance known of escape from its toils, when once it has fairly enveloped its victim. A wonderfully dangerous power lurks in the use of this drug, to attract and to captivate, holding out a temptation far more intense than that of any other intoxicating agent. But the Dutch government, not wanting to know what everybody knows, dealing with opium only from the commercial standpoint, pretends to repress the opium habit by making it as general as possible, improving upon the opium farm by an opium *regie*, turning its light into shadow, dispensing the drug from now on to women as well as to men—to the Sundanese, who had remained abstainers, as well as to the Javanese, the Madurese and all the others, tainted long ago to make the colonial game pay.

It has been denied, and it is still denied, by the government that the establishing of special opium dens for women will increase the opium habit among women; that the opening of Bantam and the Preanger Regencies for opium will increase the opium habit among the inhabitants of these residencies or among the natives in general. Such an irrational process of reasoning is only a blind, covering the real object: increase of revenue by increase of the opium habit. And now already it is a matter of public notoriety that, thanks to the opium *regie*, the opium market widening, opium is continuously in greater demand, the native population of Bantam and the Preanger Regencies consuming ever greater quantities; so much so that the smugglers,

⁵⁰ N. Allen, *Essay on the Opium Trade*.

sharing the supply with the government, do a tremendous business. And the opium *regie* was to put a stop to smuggling!

This desideratum might be reached by an efficient police, strictly enforcing the regulations. But the government prefers another method—a method which can be appreciated from the following statements, made by Dr. Kohlbrugge at a meeting of an industrial and agricultural society:

At the introduction of the opium *regie* the officials got hold of the books of the Chinese opium farmers, showing the quantity of opium sold every month. This became the standard of the opium official, who reasoned: "If the Chinese opium farmer sold so many tails of opium, I have to sell about as much." In case he sold a smaller quantity than that, it seemed natural to reason again: "If I sell less there must be smugglers around; for I cannot admit that a man who used to smoke opium under the opium farm does not smoke opium under the opium *regie*. Without doubt he gets his supply from somewhere else than the government opium shop." So he goes for information to the native chief whom it concerns, and asks: "Is there any opium-smuggling going on, *wedono*? I have investigated how much opium was sold here formerly, and now I sell less than that. I cannot admit that the opium-smokers use less; do they get their opium from somewhere else?"

The native chief does not know, but promises to look into the matter. He calls his assistants and asks: "Who used to smoke opium and have quit opium-smoking?"

The assistant answers, after another investigation: "Such and such persons."

The *wedono* summons them to appear before him. They do appear, and he asks: "Did you smoke opium?"

"Yes."

"Do you smoke opium now?"

"No."

"Why not?"

"Because I want to get rid of the opium habit."

"Nonsense! You smoke as much as you ever did, but you take contraband opium now. Your not buying government opium at the government opium shop is a sign of illegal practices."

And so the man who wanted to get rid of the opium habit is forced to begin again and consume at least as much opium under the opium *regie* as formerly under the opium farm; for, so reasons the *wedono*, the government has to sell its opium, otherwise it is not satisfied (and I will get myself into

trouble). In this way the officials of the opium regie have become the persons who, instead of repressing the opium habit, encourage it.⁵¹

The writer, himself had the following conversation with the *mantri* (a native) in charge of the government opium shop at Kebajoeran, near Batavia, on June 27, 1903:

"Are you alone selling opium here?"

"No sir, I have an assistant, because we keep open from six in the morning until eleven at night."

"How much opium, on an average, do you sell every day?"

"About twenty guilders' [eight dollars'] worth."

"Does the sale decrease or increase?"

"I shall have to sell more."

"Why?"

"Because the 'contrôleur opium' [official of the opium regie] is not satisfied."

"What does he want?"

"He wants the sale to go up all the time."

"He ought to be happy, on the contrary, when people smoke less opium."

"They don't smoke less, he says, but they use more *tjandoe glap* [contraband opium]."

"Indeed?"

"Yes, and he told the *demang* [highest native authority in that neighborhood] that he was responsible."

A bon entendeur!

From a letter received a short time ago I translate the following: "Even our [native] servants complain that the opium habit is growing, among women as well as among men, with all its bad consequences; lack of safety, unreliability, poverty, distress all around."

The servants in that family are descendants of old-time slaves who had thrown in their lot with their masters and refused to leave them when slavery was abolished, as their children and grandchildren now cling to the children and grandchildren of the old-time slaveholders. The government has done away with slavery; there was no money in it; but it holds on, and ever more tenaciously, notwithstanding a yearly display of noble intentions and high-sounding phrases whenever the Dutch India budget

⁵¹ *Nederlandsche Afdeeling der Nederlandsch Indische Maatschappij van Nijverheid en Landbouw*, The Hague, November 24, 1900.

comes around, to the paying opium monopoly, productive of more misery and evils than slavery ever was.

"They who traffic in opium inflict injuries to obtain profit, scheme after wealth to the destruction of human life, show themselves destitute of the slightest principle of honor."⁵²

The parliamentary debates, when read between the lines, are most instructive on this point of colonial honor. During the discussions relative to the budget of Dutch India for 1904, several members of parliament drew attention to the fact that the opium *regie* failed in its ostensible primary object, repression of the opium habit; that it encouraged instead of checking the use of opium, the sale of government opium, at the same time, becoming less—by far the worst feature of all! The minister of the colonies answered reluctantly that the smugglers were responsible for the increase in the use of opium, with a decrease in the sale of the government commodity. The members of the opposition, reminding the minister that the opium *regie* was supposed, among other good things, to kill the traffic in contraband opium, recommended a better organization of the opium police. The minister of the colonies promised to look into that matter; and, after a touching duet, parliamentary conscience joining ministerial conscience in the national song of more colonial revenue, his excellency struck the right chord by repeating the words of his elucidating statements, made when presenting the budget, that the opium *regie* certainly would compensate the former receipts from the opium farm, as soon as it had been introduced, on the first of January, 1904, into the residencies of Cheribon, Pekaeongan, Banjoemas, and Kadoe, bringing the whole of Java with Madura under the new system. Parliament was satisfied, and the minister of the colonies was left in peace for another year.

During the discussion relative to the Dutch India budget for 1905, the opium *regie* continuing to prove a financial failure, by reason of the high expenses involved in the new system,

⁵² Second proclamation of the Chinese high commissioner to foreigners, giving four reasons why they should make speedy surrender of their opium; nineteenth year of Taonkwang, 2d moon and 22d day (March 26, 1839).

which more than counterbalance the higher receipts through artificial stimulation of the opium habit, again the moral side of the question (in public debate a more proper basis for colonial jostle than the financial side) was chosen as the point of departure for a few questions. Why, in the name of colonial morality, had Bantam with the Preanger Regencies been opened for opium, if it did not even pay? The minister of the colonies, Idenburg, answered that he did not defend the bringing of opium into regions formerly closed for opium; that personally, and in principle, he considered this to be wrong;⁵³ that the measure had been decided upon by his predecessors in office, and was considered necessary to put a stop to smuggling.

But smuggling has not been stopped; on the contrary, smuggling was never carried on so extensively and so boldly as now. And what shall we think of a minister who carries out a measure which, personally and in principle, he considers wrong, simply because a predecessor considered it necessary for reaching a secondary object, also a failure? And also a pretext! The real object is: more revenue! No amount of idle ministerial talk, with or without appeals to the ministerial conscience, can white-wash that. It has been called an overstatement that the art of politics consists simply in the art of being honest. It certainly is an overstatement with regard to Dutch colonial politics; and especially the manipulation of the opium monopoly casts as much reproach upon Dutch colonial methods now as when the prices paid by the opium farmers for the privilege of the retail trade were called less favorable or more favorable in direct ratio of their being lower or higher, fluctuating with the chances, by application of bribery and corruption, to fleece the population.

⁵³ The minister had been reminded of a speech, delivered by him when not yet in office, for the benefit of his election to the States General, in which the opening of Bantam and the Preanger Regencies for opium had been strongly disapproved. Not a year later, as minister of the colonies, he turned completely around, following the example set him by the prime minister, and sanctioned the evil act with an appeal to his conscience. And now again his conscience, then in tune with the consciences of his predecessors, turned around to denounce their action as wrong in principle, though right because necessary for accomplishing something which was not accomplished!

The theory of the good intentions which gave birth to the opium *regie*, reduced to practice, shows better than anything else the incompetence of Dutch colonial policy. It is the misfortune of all countries ruled after a parliamentary system that personal rivalry and the intrigues of lobbyists, unavowable trickery on the seamy side of power, discolor the best-intentioned policy, give a wrong direction to the solution of even the gravest, most momentous questions of national repute and honor. Where parliamentary indifference caps such disadvantages as in the case of the relations between Dutch India and the Netherlands, still greater wrongs must follow. The new manifestation of the opium monopoly in the opium *regie* is certainly not the least. And whenever parliament finds fault with it, the attack is not directed against the bad principle involved, unless for show, in a desultory, ineffective way, but against details of execution, standing between the measure, disavowed by everybody, yet by nobody in the last instance condemned, and the ultimate object, more revenue, hypocritically veiled by good intentions never realized.

The cry sometimes raised against the opium *regie* does not originate in its encouraging (under pretext of repressing) the opium habit, but in the fact that its profits, compared with the profits formerly derived from the opium farm, do not come near the expectation. The principal causes of this disappointment are: that the government opium *regie* is hampered by a much more intricate and expensive administration than sufficed for the Chinese opium farm; that the traffic in contraband opium, far from decreasing under the opium *regie*, increases, and for obvious reasons.

The government, in all the branches of its management, seems bent on spending the greatest possible amount of money for the smallest possible amount of real service to the state. The government administration is conducted in a slovenly but expensive way by officials who do not care the least how much they disburse (it is not their money; but the natives'), while caring very much that they and their friends shall not lose on any transaction on any account, while holding on to the bureaucrat's *beau*

ideal of a government position, dividing a one-man job among two, three, four, or more men, their salaries increasing with their superfluity. The Chinese opium farmers, on the other hand, with the true mercantile instinct of the Chinaman, worked at a minimum of cost. Rational business methods in the retail opium trade made place for the irrational, careless, slipshod, unbusiness-like, unmethodical ways of a government reveling in red tape; and the opium *regie*, to reach the same net profit as the opium farm left, had first of all to make up for this difference, in cash—a difference growing as the expenditure grows. The opium *regie* being one of the new hobbies of the government, it was provided for in an extra-liberal way with an extra well-paid head inspector, equally well-paid inspectors, acting inspectors, adjunct inspectors, acting adjunct inspectors, and (innumerable) lower officials, replacing the Chinese opium farmers with their henchmen. There is some talk now of removing a few of the more useless officials of the opium *regie*—a measure quite justified in the light of a most impolitic stinginess in other branches of the government service, especially where a little more liberality would profit the natives. But even if this talk leads to something, it may be safely said that the government administration of the opium *regie* never will approach the Chinese administration of the opium farm in the business methods that secure a maximum income at a minimum outlay.

And its efficiency in the great fight with contraband opium?

The opium *regie* under its double aspect, either the theoretical one of repressing the opium habit or the practical one of filling the treasury, stands or falls with an effective suppression of the traffic in contraband opium. The opium *regie*, more yet than the opium farm, requires a police force, diligent and incorruptible, strong enough to compel obedience to the regulations; the opium *regie* more yet than the opium farm, because the interest of the opium farmers and their acolytes made them stand on the side of the government against the smugglers, as far as they did not smuggle themselves; while now, turned out of a good living, they stand against the government, knowing all the tricks and intricacies of the clandestine traffic, with plenty of

money at their disposition to venture in the illegal trade—the large Chinese capital formerly invested in the opium farm and now lying idle, waiting for profitable employment. The government, proclaiming itself unable to cope with the smugglers under the opium farm, certainly will be unable to keep up more than a show of resistance under the opium *regie*. This was often repeated by the press in Dutch India, before and after the introduction of the opium *regie* had been decided upon. Common-sense urged that a potent opium police should be organized by the government, which, in the great battle against *tjandoe glap*, was on the point of losing its most powerful allies, the opium farmers, who, on the other hand, now might be expected to go and side with the enemy. Common-sense is not in favor with the government, and the opium *regie* has to depend upon an opium police just as poor as ever in every respect. Meanwhile the circumlocution officers at Batavia and Buitenzorg, mending things after the bureaucrat's fashion, go on wasting paper and ink, in this matter as in all others, setting a shining example of the bureaucrat's double art: how to write about things and how not to do them.

The result? The result may be found from day to day in the Dutch India newspapers. Here is a sample:

The diminished sale of opium in the opium shops of the opium *regie*, by public opinion rightly attributed to the appalling increase in the traffic in contraband opium after the introduction of the *regie*, rouses the authorities to give more attention to the clandestine trade. With little success. The great smugglers seem too clever for the gentlemen of the police. If they make a haul once in a while, it is the little fish they catch; the big ones somehow take care to make good their escape.

If the government, a luxurious spendthrift at one end of its fiscal policy, its own end; insatiable, unjust, and cruel in the middle, where the natives have to pay; incredibly stingy at the other end, the colonial end, where the *économie des bouts de chandelle* reigns supreme—if the government neglects to reorganize the opium police, at present a sad caricature of what the name implies, most naïvely relying on the official assistants of

the smugglers to crush smuggling, that opium police is not less ingenuous in its methods, *ménageant la chèvre et le chou*. These methods, in sweet harmony with the methods of the smugglers, are simple in the extreme, much simpler truly under the opium *regie* than under the opium farm, because the business habits of the government are so much less business-like than the business habits of the opium farmers, who, indeed, smuggled themselves, but then against *tjandoe glap*, not their *tjandoe glap*, kept a well-drilled gang of opium spies, supplementing the government police, supplying the government officials with the necessary information; who, in fact, managed the whole opium concern with the government police and the government officials, from the lowest to the highest, in their service, if not in their pay. That was a bad state of affairs. But the state of affairs under the opium *regie*, thanks to causes already referred to, is worse. Bribery and corruption remained; the efficiency of the opium police fell almost below zero; the opium habit increases. Even if in some places less opium is used, according to the official returns, this means only that the use of government opium has decreased, generally against the will or wishes of the officials who know the main road to advancement. It goes without saying that, while everything is done to sell at least as much as the opium farm used to sell, such returns are ostentatiously paraded as proofs that revenue is only a secondary consideration; that the government, with the opium *regie*, means to kill the opium habit and—succeeds!

But the government cannot deceive those acquainted with its antecedents *in re* opium, whose experience has taught them that everything connected with the opium monopoly finds ministerial comment, this way or that way, according to the needs of the moment. An illustration may be permitted: the minister of the colonies, Sprenger Van Eyk, endeavoring to explain why, in 1886, less smuggled opium was confiscated than in former years, said that this favorable result must be put to the credit of the vigilance of an excellent police, which had instilled such a terrible fear into the hearts of the smugglers that they did not dare to continue their illegal trade on the old footing.

His successor, Keuchenius, endeavoring to explain why, in 1887, much more smuggled opium was confiscated than in former years, said that this favorable result must be put to the credit of the vigilance of an excellent police, foiling the tricks of the smugglers, who, it seems, by that time had got over their terrible fear for the redoubtable men, according to common repute always willing, for a consideration, to look to the right when *tjandoe glap* was announced from the left, and vice versa. In the Dutch parliament the same arguments, or what passes as arguments, are accepted pro and contra, on condition only that it serve the good cause: more revenue.

Even when a minister of the colonies says that he does not know, getting as near the truth as he can,⁵⁴ hard pressed and put *au pied du mur*, it does well enough. The great question is how it affects the revenue. And occasionally we find such unconscious but telltale slips of the official pen as this "If, at first, the sale of opium, in the places newly opened for that purpose did remain below the former sale of the opium farm, now there is a favorable change: the sale increases every month."

It must be pleasant for a minister of the colonies to be able to speak of a *favorable change* like that. It shows the future (of the treasury) in a brighter light, and he can dispense with unpleasant explanations concerning the question why, in practice, the opium police does not come up to the "reasonable state

⁵⁴ Notwithstanding frequent investigations, *enquêtes* so called, leading to endless talking and writing, the extent of the opium habit in Netherlands India—yes, in Java and Madura, the amount of opium actually consumed—is *not* known. We are now as far from an exact estimate as the servants of the East India Company when the opium monopoly was created, as Daendels when he abolished the *Amfoen-Directie* and introduced the opium farm on a changed basis. In this respect the introduction of the opium regie was nothing but a leap in the dark. More than twenty years ago the writer learned from Mr. W. H. Read, consul-general for the Netherlands at Singapore, that from the Straits Settlements alone, according to his information (and Mr. Read had unexcelled opportunities for getting at the truth on such points), a quantity of opium was shipped to Bali Boeleng and other ports used by the smugglers who supplied Netherlands India with *tjandoe glap*, five times as large as the quantity taken by the opium farmers from the government for the official supply. And it is quite safe to say that now, under the opium regie, more contraband opium finds its way to Dutch India than under the opium farm.

of efficiency" claimed for that branch of the opium service in theory, according to the statements of the colonial report—an official publication, issued yearly to maintain all sorts of colonial fictions. He can also dispense, ignoring the real cause—increased supply of clandestine opium—with ascribing the decreasing sale of government opium to the diminished prosperity, otherwise stoutly denied. But such are the difficulties besetting a minister who has to account for "less revenue," the only subject on which a real answer is expected to a real question, that often he finds escape impossible without a side-glance to the economical condition of the natives, growing almost desperate, even preventing their buying opium, notwithstanding all encouragement, not to say pressure, from the authorities. And so, through a back-door, we get at the truth: Dutch India economically, the government intellectually and morally, out of breath—trying to repair the financial distress, to swell the revenue, not by a broad policy of development for the country and education for the people, but by draining the one and demoralizing the other—by ruining both.

All the time our ears are dinning with magnificent phrases in praise of an "ethical" policy, pursued by a government which founds its rights of colonial empire on a special charge to bring civilization, progress, and enlightenment to distant climes!

The keepers of this charge, behind their attractive show-windows, righteousness on their lips, deal over their counter in opium and other tainted commodities, at the most exorbitant prices in money, in physical, intellectual, and moral welfare and happiness. The whole government business is conducted with a view to immediate profit—more revenue, always more revenue; *et après nous le déluge!*

Not only the officials directly connected with the government monopolies—opium, salt, or whatever it may be—but *all* officials, to whichever branch of the government service they are assigned, very soon find out that they are expected to look especially, almost exclusively, after the interests of the treasury. The rest is of no consequence, at least of no consequence in the eyes of the authorities who influence their advancement. More

in particular the officials of the civil service discovered, after the introduction of the opium regie, that their duties were considerably increased on fiscal lines. Slaves of the central circumlocution office, bound hand and foot themselves by the red tape which strangles out of the tender babe prosperity so much (so little) miserable life as the greed of the "mother"-country might leave, their time was already wholly taken up, not by earnest work for the good of the natives, whose cause they are supposed to further, but by trifling with the issues in hand, writing endless reports, statements, memoranda, etc.; filling in endless blanks; answering endless questions, often of the most useless and silly description, but tending to keep the government paper-mill going; to sustain the fiction that a country can be governed alone by the consideration, reconsideration, and re-reconsideration of ways and means, drowning all action in ink. Or, as Challey-Bert said, after his visit to Java: *Les fonctionnaires européens se noient dans le détail; ils sont débordés de toutes parts et ni leur éducation, ni l'opinion qu'ils se font de leur rôle, ne leur permet de trouver un remède à cet envahissement.*⁵⁵ Under these circumstances the officials of the civil service are obliged to give part of their time, in some districts most of their time, to control the administration of the *mantris*, etc., in charge of the government opium shops, and to assume the delicate functions formerly falling to the share of the farmer's opium spies. Entering a protest (anonymously, because he did not want to sacrifice his future by openly defying the government), one of the residents expressed his astonishment that a measure could be carried through which betrayed such a perfect ignorance of the practical side of the administration or such a perfect indifference for the interests of the native population; his surprise that the officials of the civil service, whose principal duty is, according to the fundamental law regulating the relations between Dutch India and the Netherlands, to assist the resident in protecting the native population against oppression by whomsoever,⁵⁶ now, on the contrary, are ordered, by controlling and promoting the sale of opium, to bring one of the worst evils

⁵⁵ *Java et ses habitants.*

⁵⁶ *Regeeringsreglement*, art. 55.

upon that native population—deadly enemies under the mask of friendship.

The government, in fact, calls the officials of the civil service away from their alleged task, the protection of the native population as it was then performed under the stress of red tape and other causes of disability, to control and stimulate the opium traffic, to watch that the little money still to be squeezed out of the poor native, before he becomes utterly destitute, is properly spent in opium for his final demoralization and ruin, for the benefit of the colonial treasury and the satisfaction of the Dutch purse at large.

The natives do not make an exception to the general rule that men, for changes which affect them closely, seek their own explanation when the proffered explanation is deemed unsatisfactory. Good intentions, with a burning desire to suppress the opium habit altogether, being wholly unsatisfactory as an explanation of the opium *regie*, introduced in this manner, they are of opinion that “government,” never to be trusted, and least to be trusted when most profuse in promises and virtuous protestations, *promesse lunghe e fede corta*—that “government” stands in Dutch for *koerang wang* in Malay: chronic impecuniousness, coupled with a loathsome craving for money by hook or by crook. Not far from the truth in this view, they keep their own counsel, however, hoping for a day of reckoning, which may come soon if the Dutch do not look out, heeding their own proverb: “The pitcher goes to the water till it breaks.” Even in the Preanger Regencies where the native chiefs, whose prerogatives were set aside with the introduction of the opium *regie*, have more cause for complaint than the native chiefs elsewhere, little is heard openly of the oppression made. But under that smooth surface, as different occurrences have already proved, the deep waters are moving in so much stronger currents—such is the native character.

And public feeling in Holland? Occasionally some little talk (opportunities for talk are always welcome), enough to throw some new light on the exact value of the ministerial statement that the opium *regie* meant opium revenue with honor, corrected

by the statement that government being subject to perpetual change and modification, the men who represent government perpetually have to adapt their measures to circumstances—in *casu* to the circumstance of the “mother”-country, with a great distaste for duties which cost money, entertaining its own ideas of honor when the colonial revenue is concerned. The ties uniting the colonial finances and opium are stronger, more intimate than ever; the colonial treasury is more dependent than ever upon the extension of the opium habit. The few who conscientiously, in action as in words, wanted to make the opium service a clean service, a working-base for the final abolishment of the opium habit, have striven in vain. The arguments of Dirk van Hogendorp, who called the opium monopoly one of the most hurtful and injurious features that dishonor the administration of the Dutch East Indies; of Minister of the Colonies Rochussen, who put opium on a line with the plague; of Minister of the Colonies Loudon, who classed it with poison; of Minister of the Colonies Sprenger Van Eyk, who spoke of its use as a great evil; of Minister of the Colonies Keuchenius, who characterized it as a means to debauch and ruin the population—all these arguments could not prevail, even with those who brought them forward when their colonial politics needed some moral leavening, against the consideration that there is money in opium. The Dutch colonial spirit, to quote Dr. Schaepman, is the spirit of trade—trade in the second power, carried on with an approach to genius, but in an ironically dangerous way. *Trade before everything!*

Trade, indeed, trade before everything, is the foundation of Dutch colonial policy, at present no less than in the time of the East India Company; for a colonial empire at this hour of day a rather flimsy foundation, it must be confessed, especially when one looks into the character of that trade. A rather narrow policy, too, under the new conditions of colonial life, and sure to bring trouble when not developed into something of broader conception, more in keeping with the great movement of expansion on principles, up to now practically ignored by Holland. In colonial matter she has confined herself to a very limited circle of thought,

almost afraid, in her sense of backwardness, to look beyond: her horizon in colonial ideas determined by her little height of colonial morality, colonial dignity, and colonial stamina on the international scale. The mark points ominously down.

The opium problem in the Philippines is brought up for solution, and Congress will have to decide upon the course recommended by the commission already referred to, which submitted a plan for the abolishment of the opium traffic within the time of three years.

Those who asserted the futility of prohibitory laws have now the example of Formosa to alter their views. When Japan, having taken the island in the war of 1895, retained it after the conclusion of peace, one of the first improvements that followed under the new régime was the stamping-out of the opium habit, setting a precedent to western civilization. In Formosa no flourishing of good intentions, immediately prostituted as the good intentions of Holland in the Dutch Indies, under the pretext that "facts which cannot be changed" had better be acknowledged and made most of for the benefit of the treasury—a mask for indolence and the unholy desire to coin money out of the misery of the natives. Nothing but a simple prohibition, without any talk of a special divine mission; and—the principal thing—a strict enforcement of that prohibition. The "facts which cannot be changed" in Dutch India, because the Dutch government does not want to change them, *did* change in Formosa. With the exception, perhaps, of a few miserable slaves of the drug, victims of the old régime, too far gone for reclamation, no opium-smokers or opium-eaters are found in the island at this moment. The opium habit is there a thing of the past.

Japan, in Formosa, has given a lesson to the whole world, more especially to the colonial powers of Europe; a lesson of the purport that in national expansion the true ethical policy, not only in theory, but in practice, has to stand for something, under penalty of national failure. In colonial matters new thought

is breaking way, and new thought leads necessarily to new conditions.

The instinct of America cannot be disregarded, and that has always been strongly opposed to England's course in dealing with the opium traffic in China, and will be strongly against any regulations which seem to give national sanction to the opium traffic in the Philippines.⁵⁷ Every man in this world is, in a certain sense, his brother's keeper. And when the white man sets up as commissioned by the divine will to conquer the earth, this holds doubly good. Yet the civilization he brought to his unprotected, unwary, and confiding brethren in the East was like a visitation of the Evil One, his treatment of them a sink of iniquity. Of late we hear a good deal about the "yellow peril"—certainly not an imaginary peril, but a peril of our own making. The yellow peril of the future—and the rapidly developing events in the Far East may make it a peril of the very near future—is nothing but the child of that white peril the Asiatics know so well.

America, in ever closer touch with the Far East, facing new problems as a colonial power, may remember the word of Pompey, who said, when a Spartan king pronounced that commonwealth happy which was bounded by the sword and the spear: "Yea, rather that commonwealth I esteem truly happy which on every side is bounded with justice."

But, leaving justice and sentiment out of the question, even the material interests of the United States of America and the other great powers, now obeying the law of expansion, the West encroaching upon the East, require a radical change in the old, musty colonial policy of which Holland as warden over the Dutch East Indies represents such a shameful instance: *virtus post nummos*.

NOTE—J. F. Scheltema, M. A., was born in 1855 at Macassar, island of Celebes, where his father was president of the Court of Justice, and got his education in Europe. After a short stage of seafaring, he entered the service of the government of the Dutch East Indies. Being appointed post-agent at Singapore for the supervision of the Dutch mails entering and leaving that port, he received an offer from Siam to take charge of the

⁵⁷ *The Outlook*, July 25, 1903.

organization of the post and telegraph service contemplated for that country. Conditions, however, not proving acceptable, after leaving the government service in 1883 he entered journalism and had some rough experience as a war-correspondent in Tongking, during the Franco-Chinese troubles. Wounded, he returned to Java and was appointed chief editor of *De Locomotief*, at Samarang. His different periods of editorship of leading papers has been interspersed with periods of travel for study and recreation, east and west, roaming through the five parts of the world, the old and the new. In 1903, then being chief editor of the *Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad*, Batavia, Java, he was imprisoned for the publication of some observations on the opium-policy of the Dutch government, too true to be tolerated in a Dutch dependency. After his release, he visited the United States of America at the occasion of the St. Louis World's Fair, and, at the end of some more traveling, principally in the western and southern states, including Mexico, settled for a year at New Haven, Conn., continuing his studies at Yale University, whence personal matters called him again to Europe.

SOME PERMANENT RESULTS OF THE PHILADELPHIA UPHEAVAL OF 1905-06

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We must pause occasionally and take account of stock, if we wish to appreciate the full extent of political development and advance. If we look only at the events of the moment we are apt to get an inadequate or a distorted view. So in considering a series of events such as transpired in Philadelphia between the time of Mayor Weaver's break with the Philadelphia "Organization" in May, 1905, and the inauguration of his successor on April 1, 1907, we must take into reckoning the conditions existing before and after that period.

So much happened between May, 1905, and April, 1907, that we fail to realize fully just how much has been gained. In the matter of the reform of the state's electoral machinery the gain has been little short of enormous. I can best illustrate the extent of the improvement in this connection by giving what we may appropriately call a "before and after" picture of electoral conditions in Pennsylvania, and especially in its metropolis, Philadelphia.

In a letter to Mayor Weaver, dated October 22, 1904, the Electoral Reforms Committee called his attention to the way in which the houses of policemen, firemen, and certain other city employees in four typical wards of the city were utilized for assessing fictitious names, the letter summarizing the facts as follows:

That from twenty-two houses occupied by policemen in the Second Ward, there was a total of one hundred and twenty names registered, of which fifty-seven were ascertained to be those of voters who were reported as actually residing in those houses, and sixty-three names believed to be fraudulent;

That there were seven houses occupied by firemen in the same ward, from which a total of fifty-one names was registered, of which twenty-five were ascertained to be those of voters who were reported as actually residing in those houses, and twenty-six believed to be fraudulent;

That from the houses of two policemen and two firemen in the Second Ward information was refused, and none could be obtained from other sources;

That from nineteen houses occupied by policemen in the Third Ward there was a total of one hundred and twenty-one names registered, of which forty-nine were ascertained to be those of voters who were reported as actually residing in those houses, and seventy-two names believed to be fraudulent;

That from four houses occupied by firemen in the same ward there was a total of thirty-one names registered, of which eight were ascertained to be those of voters who were reported as actually residing in those houses, and twenty-three names believed to be fraudulent;

That from four houses occupied by other city employees in the same ward there was a total of thirty-seven names registered, of which four were ascertained to be those of voters who were reported as actually residing in those houses, and thirty-three names believed to be fraudulent;

That from three houses occupied by policemen and one by a fireman in the same ward information was refused and none could be obtained from other sources;

That from eleven houses occupied by policemen in the Fourth Ward there was a total of sixty-seven names registered, of which thirty-one were ascertained to be those of voters who were reported as actually residing in those houses, and thirty-six names believed to be fraudulent;

That from three houses occupied by firemen in the same ward, there was a total of seventeen names registered, of which eight were ascertained to be those of voters who were reported as actually residing in those wards, and nine names believed to be fraudulent;

That from seventeen houses occupied by policemen in the Fifth Ward there was a total of one hundred and three names registered, of which forty-five were ascertained to be those of voters who were reported to be actually residing in those houses, and fifty-eight names believed to be fraudulent;

That from three houses occupied by firemen in the same ward there was a total of thirty-three names registered, of which twelve were ascertained to be those of voters who were reported as actually residing in those houses and twenty-one names believed to be fraudulent;

That from four houses occupied by city employees in the same ward there was a total of twenty-two names registered, of which eleven were ascertained to be those of voters who were reported as actually residing in those houses, and eleven names believed to be fraudulent;

That from the houses of two policemen, one fireman, and one other city employee in this ward, information was refused and none could be obtained from other sources.

In reporting on the question of purging the assessor's lists,

which for years had been the effective source of fraudulent names for corrupt politicians, the Civic Betterment Association of Philadelphia declared in September, 1904 (less than three years ago), that:

In one of the divisions in the Twenty-fourth Ward receiving its first revision at the hands of the association, sixty-eight names were stricken from the list and thirty-nine (erroneously omitted) were added.

An informal canvass of an adjacent Twenty-fourth Ward division showed more than sixty errors.

In a Twenty-second Ward division thirty-two names were stricken from the list and twenty-three added.

At the beginning of the Municipal League's vigorous fight for personal registration, as far back as 1898, the Philadelphia *Press*, then as now a strong Republican paper, although then its independent proclivities were almost *nil* as compared with its later attitude of vigorous dissent from and opposition to the local Republican "Organization," stated that the assessors' lists of voters in Philadelphia had been padded to the extent of 75,000 to 80,000 names. In September, 1904 (issue of September 17), the *Press* declared that—

It is several years since any real effort has been made to purge the lists and this fact has not only encouraged carelessness on the part of assessors, but in many instances has enabled them to pad the enrollment without danger. This is done less for the purpose of fraud at elections than to increase the representation of wards in Councils.

While there was a difference of opinion as to why the padding was done, there was none as to the fact that there was padding. In a personal conversation with the chairman of the Electoral Reforms Committee, a leading councilman admitted that the padding of assessors' lists had been carried into every ward of the city, and that there was no place in Philadelphia free from it.

While Philadelphia furnished the most flagrant cases of padded assessors' lists and frauds in connection therewith, the evil was not confined to that city. The other cities of the commonwealth afforded instances of padded lists.

The report of the Seventh Ward Democratic Committee in Philadelphia disclosed the following facts:

That an honest and thorough canvass has been made of the qualified voters in all of the twenty-seven divisions of the Seventh Ward, save one.

In that division we have some doubt as to whether the canvass was made independently of the assessors' list, but in all of the other divisions we are able to report a house-to-house canvass.

In two of the divisions we have been unable as yet to compare the returns of our canvassers with the assessors' lists, but omitting these two divisions the difference between the number of voters as returned on the assessors' list is 1,263. The divisions in which the greatest discrepancies exist are:

Twenty-sixth, 122; Twenty-fifth, 120; Seventeenth, 117; First, 107; Sixth, 90; Sixteenth, 87.

In the Twenty-fifth division there are seven voters registered in the house of a policeman on the city force, and there are probably only two or three qualified voters residing at the place. Definite information was refused to our canvasser. In this division there are also a number of employees of the city hospital registered as voters, although their names also appear as voters in the Twenty-seventh Ward. In the Twenty-sixth Division information was refused the canvasser at a number of houses. In the Sixth Division there are ten voters registered from the house of a City Hall employee who was formerly a member of the Democratic committee in the ward.

In the Sixteenth Division eleven voters are registered from a Republican club, which is believed to be a speak-easy, and which is known by the name of a prominent leader of the majority party, and in the Seventh Division there are a large number of voters registered from a barber shop, in which it has been humorously said that the barber votes his cups.

The Philadelphia *Ledger* in 1904 published the following statement concerning the increase for the last seven assessments in four of the divisions of the Second Ward.

The greater portion of this increase is shown in the Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-third Divisions. The following table shows this in detail:

TABLE I

ASSESSMENT	DIVISIONS			
	8th	9th	13th	23d
May, 1902.....	363	330	253	307
September, 1902.....	393	304	268	323
December, 1902.....	417	332	288	335
May, 1903.....	423	342	286	303
September, 1903.....	445	378	304	303
December, 1903.....	496	401	336	347
September, 1904.....	545	455	385	385

Between the May, 1904, and the extra assessment in September of the same year (and these figures and these dates are selected because they are for the electoral period just preceding the break of Mayor Weaver in May, 1905) for the whole city there was increase of 16,650. This increase in four months would indicate an increase of 49,950 in one year, and such a growth would be at the rate of $13\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. a year, or 130 per cent. in 10 years! To show how great the padding was, the Electoral Reforms Committee said:

We need only recall that between the census of 1890 and that of 1900 the population of Philadelphia increased but twenty-three and one-half per cent. If, as is generally conceded, the population is five times the number of voters, the September registration in Philadelphia would indicate a population of nearly 2,000,000. The returns of the extra assessment in September would indicate that there had been an addition of 83,200 to the population in four months. This would amount to an increase of 249,750 in a single year, although the census of 1900 showed less than that for ten years, the increase from 1890 to 1900 being 246,733.

It will be interesting and instructive, as showing the possibilities under the old law, to take up some individual instances collected from various sources, the truth of all of which have been admitted by those who are in a position to speak with authority.

An actual canvass of the Eighteenth Division of the Thirteenth Ward prior to the election of November 6, 1900, disclosed that there were 35 assessed from the house No. 301 North Ninth Street, though traces could be found of but nine residents, from the house No. 309 North Ninth Street twenty-three names were registered, of whom traces of only four could be found; from the four houses 307, 309, 311, and 313 North Ninth Street there were eighty-two voters assessed of whom only twenty-one could be found.

As illustrating the looseness of the system of registration prevailing in Philadelphia the following instance is given: Canvassers, as they went through a district several years ago, calling at various houses, asked if certain well-known politicians lived there. As those who attended the door had been previously instructed to answer "Yes," to every inquiry as to voters in the house, it was found that the then Director of Public Safety,

Abraham L. English, was, according to the testimony of those of whom the inquiry was made, the resident of eight houses in the same division; as was General Frank Reeder, the chairman of the Republican State Committee. The same was said of other prominent politicians.

The following experience, gathered in a previous campaign, is illustrative of the same class of facts: With sealed envelopes addressed to the names upon the assessors' list, canvassers went to suspected houses and inquired for the assessed voters. They found that the people of whom they made inquiries had been posted to answer that the supposed voters lived there. The residents of the houses where fraudulent names were registered were easily trapped by such a series of questions as this: "Does George D. Baker live here?" "Yes." "Does I. W. Durham live here?" "Yes." "Does Charles F. Warwick live here?" "Yes." "Does John Hogan live here?" "Yes." "Why, you are deliberately falsifying," was Hogan's reply. "I am John Hogan; George D. Baker lives in the east end of the ward; George S. Graham is the district attorney and lives in the Twenty-ninth Ward; Mr. Durham lives in the Seventh Ward, and Charles F. Warwick is the mayor," etc. This announcement was sufficient to end the interview and to reveal the fraud that had been practiced. Hogan met just such experience as this in three-fourths of the places visited.

Several years ago the city was startled by the statement that a pug dog had been assessed in the name of William Rifle, and that in one of the wards a barber had voted his cups at the last three or four elections. In the case of *Commonwealth vs. Hogan et al.*, in 1900, in which the defendants were sent to jail and served out their terms, it was disclosed that out of 251 votes returned in the division less than 100 were legal.

Prior to the election in February, 1904, Mayor Weaver made an effort to curtail the fraudulent voting in the Fifth Ward, and as a result of his action there was a reduction of 1,654 in the total vote of that ward, or more than one-third.

Under the constitution of 1874 effective personal registration of voters was impossible. The Municipal League of Philadelphia

appreciating this fact and the great need for personal registration in the cities of the state, in 1896 drafted an amendment to the constitution of Pennsylvania which made such registration possible.

This amendment was introduced into the legislature at the session of 1897 by the counsel of the League who was then a member of the House of Representatives. It failed to secure the necessary number of votes in that session. The amendment was reintroduced at the session of 1899 (again by the counsel for the League), and was passed by the house and senate, but vetoed by Governor Stone.

Proceedings were at once instituted by the League to test the right of the governor to take such action upon a proposed amendment to the fundamental law of the state. The Supreme Court unanimously sustained the League's contention and overruled the governor's veto. As required by the constitution, the amendment was reintroduced in the session of 1901, and passed again by the house and senate.

It was then ready to be submitted to the voters of the state and in November, 1901, the amendment was adopted by a vote of 214,798 in its favor, and 45,601 against.

The way being cleared for personal registration in the cities of the state, a bill to establish a working system was prepared with great care and after consultation with leading lawyers and publicists. This measure was indorsed by a long list of prominent men and newspapers, by the Pittsburg Chamber of Commerce, the Scranton Board of Trade, and other leading business organizations, and by a number of labor organizations.

The bill was introduced in the session of 1903 by Representative Hutt, but it was killed in the Committee on Elections, which refused to take any action on the bill or to report it to the house for consideration. Mr. Hutt expressed his judgment to be that those opposed to the measure could not prevent its passage much longer. Nevertheless the Electoral Reforms Committee declared that unless the people of this state clearly and emphatically renewed their demand for relief from the corrupt practices which then prevailed in the matter of the assessment of voters in the

cities the legislature of 1905 would not feel inclined to give any more heed to the demand for personal registration than that of 1903. Nor did it. If anything, that session treated the measure, this time introduced by Hon. John O. Sheatz (now the Republican candidate for State Treasurer), with more contempt than did its predecessor. Not only was the urgent demand for a hearing ignored, but the effort to secure consideration of any kind was flouted and jeered.

Then something happened! In that very same year the Republican "Organization" was defeated and deprived of its hold on the Philadelphia situation and on the state treasury, and Governor Pennypacker, who had been showing signs of discontent and dissent from the policy of the leaders of the Republican "Organization" called an extra session of the legislature to meet early in 1906.

This body, which was composed of the same men who had made up the regular session of 1905, met and proceeded to enact not only all of the rejected reform measures of 1905, but more, which had been prepared in the meantime, and also undid some of the bad work of the regular session—namely, repealed the notorious "ripper bills."

The personal registration bill which was enacted was the one approved by the reform forces of the city and state. The leading members of the Electoral Reform Committee played a prominent part in securing the legislation, and Mr. Hutt's prophecy of 1903 was fulfilled. "By this measure," to quote the *Philadelphia North American*, "Philadelphia will take a greater advance toward pure elections than by any other legislation that could be devised. Personal registration, in fact, is the absolutely necessary foundation of honest voting." This was the opinion expressed by all the leading papers and publicists, both at the time of the passage of the act and after it had been put into force and effect. Governor Pennypacker appointed four representative men to carry out the law in Philadelphia, a stalwart Republican, an independent Republican, a City Party man, and a Democrat. Thus were the four political elements in the city recognized. This board, which was charged with the important duty of appointing four registrars

(to do the actual registering of voters) in each of the 1,137 election divisions of the city, at once entered upon its work. A wide latitude and a considerable informality in the matter of making suggestions was allowed because of the unfamiliarity with the act, and the short time which the board had to make the appointments and instruct the registrars in their duties.

To facilitate the examination of applicants and to make sure of having all interests adequately represented, the representatives of the several party organizations in each ward were invited to attend and give the board the benefit of their knowledge and suggestions. In addition to these ward representatives, the several city committees were represented by attorneys and by clerks who greatly facilitated the business in hand.

This competition of the several political organizations and the fact that every applicant was carefully scrutinized by a representative of the opposite party, aided materially in weeding out undesirable persons and in securing a high grade of appointments. The several party organizations were officially complimented upon the generally good character of the men suggested and for the earnestness and heartiness with which they co-operated with the board in securing capable men for the initial operation of the law.

On August 1, out of 4,545 places to be filled, but 108 remained vacant, of which number the Republicans were entitled to 36, the City Party to 36, and the Democrats to 32. The month was utilized in securing the presentation of proper persons to fill these vacancies, and in making changes incident to removals and rejections. On September 3, when the board completed its list of appointments (the law allowing the majority party two registrars to each division) there were 1,863 Republican registrars, 1,015 Democratic, 1,659 City Party, 1 Prohibitionist, and 1 Socialist, distributed as in Table II.

Ample opportunity was given to all the parties to file objections to the appointees, who were tentatively announced, but comparatively few were made, the bulk of these being made by the Committee of Seventy (a reform body which had taken an active part in securing the passage of the measure).

Comparatively few objections were filed to the tentative appointments made by the board, by far the largest number being made by the representatives of the Committee of Seventy.

There were six objections in the First Ward, of which three were sustained, and one was withdrawn; two in the Second Ward, one of which was withdrawn; seven in the Third Ward, of which

TABLE II

Wards	Republican	Democratic	City Party
1.....	62	29	33
2.....	47	14	35
3.....	38	17	17
4.....	34	18	20
5.....	33	9	29
6.....	10	19	7
7.....	50	23	37
8.....	25	12	31
9.....	22	1	25
10.....	39	18	27
11.....	20	10	10
12.....	23	14	15
13.....	46	17	25
14.....	28	19	23
15.....	70	40	65
16.....	33	13	22
17.....	33	13	26
18.....	52	27	37
19.....	81	41	54
20.....	70	30	51
21.....	44	29	39
22.....	50	42	92
23.....	34	23	35
24.....	52	39	60
25.....	68	34	54
26.....	70	35	47
27.....	43	30	47
28.....	44	33	63
29.....	61	47	58
30.....	46	21	25
31.....	53	29	38
32.....	30	29	60
33.....	38	22	47
34.....	65	27	72
35.....	16	9	21
36.....	60	32	32
37.....	20	23	36
38.....	36	24	36
39.....	64	32	32
40.....	32	20	40
41.....	27	10	18
42.....	24	10	30
43.....	30	24	46
Total.....	1863	1015	1659

two were sustained and five withdrawn; three in the Seventh Ward, of which one was sustained; one in the Ninth Ward, which was withdrawn; three in the Tenth Ward, of which one was withdrawn; two in the Twelfth Ward, of which one was sustained; one in the Seventeenth Ward, which was sustained, and one in the Thirty-seventh Ward. In a number of instances the objections were based on the ground that the appointees were ineligible because they held some other public office.

There were three days of registration, September 4, September 18, and October 13, all of which passed off without serious trouble, and practically no disorder. The following table shows the effect of the law as compared with the assessment taken under old law.

Immediately succeeding the last day of registration, October 13, the board made arrangements to hear the applications of those who, for the reasons set forth in the act, were unable to attend at any of the days of registration, and to hear appeals from the several boards of registrars. Many questions brought before the board for consideration in these hearings were of the most complicated and important character, involving rulings as to naturalization, citizenship, taxes, and residence. Many cases were heard and ably contested by attorneys for the parties in interest. The work in this connection was completed November 1, in order that those who wished to appeal from the action of the Board of Commissioners to the Court of Common Pleas might have an opportunity so to do.

Four hundred and eight-two petitions to be registered and appeals from registrars were filed, of which 326 were granted, the remainder being refused. Less than a score of appeals were taken to the courts, and in one instance where the board was overruled by the lower court, it was sustained by the Supreme Court.

These hearings resulted in the settlement of a large number of disputes heretofore left to election day for determination. No small part of the quietness and general good order of the general election on November 6, was due to the fact that the list of voters

had been made up in advance and passed upon by an impartial tribunal whose decisions were subject to review by the courts.

It was generally conceded by all parties interested, the candidates (both the defeated and the successful ones), the political

TABLE III

Wards	State Treasurer November, 1905	Sheriff November, 1905	Magistrate February, 1906	Assessment for 1906	Governor November, 1906	Total Registration 1906
1.....	6,109	6,494	6,188	7,867	5,627	6,281
2.....	3,099	3,323	3,283	4,246	3,062	3,317
3.....	2,070	2,235	2,129	3,147	2,023	2,274
4.....	2,043	2,230	2,157	3,174	2,001	2,324
5.....	1,843	1,975	513	3,262	2,072	2,291
6.....	1,197	1,245	970	1,406	1,074	1,162
7.....	5,007	5,220	4,442	8,119	5,024	5,444
8.....	2,653	2,810	2,795	3,675	2,526	2,815
9.....	1,239	1,282	1,342	2,046	1,232	1,362
10.....	4,004	4,138	3,255	6,185	3,795	4,268
11.....	1,618	1,695	1,653	2,079	1,464	1,599
12.....	2,010	2,213	1,687	2,928	1,906	2,132
13.....	3,025	3,259	3,059	5,204	2,976	3,510
14.....	3,517	3,665	2,977	5,696	3,214	3,600
15.....	8,626	9,122	6,395	12,033	7,769	8,547
16.....	2,480	2,645	2,269	3,207	2,308	2,543
17.....	2,740	2,953	2,406	3,662	2,534	2,768
18.....	5,710	6,082	4,903	7,470	5,420	5,809
19.....	10,202	10,960	8,873	13,560	9,762	10,840
20.....	8,862	9,240	8,086	12,273	8,355	9,266
21.....	5,923	6,236	3,603	8,063	5,323	5,783
22.....	11,445	11,978	9,956	15,301	10,395	12,365
23.....	5,394	5,621	3,761	7,097	4,686	5,147
24.....	9,562	10,176	7,308	14,455	8,544	9,640
25.....	9,277	9,805	7,108	12,803	8,794	9,606
26.....	8,203	8,688	7,771	12,275	8,572	9,382
27.....	7,316	7,492	6,680	11,139	7,649	8,401
28.....	8,537	9,192	6,668	13,195	8,154	9,016
29.....	11,166	12,122	9,153	15,665	10,387	11,532
30.....	5,555	5,860	4,988	8,112	5,194	5,763
31.....	6,378	6,676	6,196	8,560	6,165	6,660
32.....	6,172	8,655	6,359	11,463	7,566	8,404
33.....	12,515	13,376	4,333	9,474	6,062	6,806
34.....	10,982	11,495	8,890	18,017	10,433	11,642
35.....	1,942	2,100	1,885	2,717	1,883	2,070
36.....	7,705	8,229	6,489	11,673	7,431	8,086
37.....	5,136	5,371	4,235	6,803	4,798	5,266
38.....	6,651	7,039	5,652	9,533	6,286	6,607
39.....	7,386	7,602	7,142	10,835	7,421	8,281
40.....	4,880	5,132	3,940	7,217	4,838	5,439
41.....	2,356	2,454	2,340	3,022	2,187	2,383
42.....	2,845	3,054	2,370	4,215	2,810	3,086
43.....	4,949	9,034	6,099	6,721
Total.....	237,306	251,513	201,774	341,825	225,823	250,719

organizations, the newspapers, in fact, by all who examined the returns, that the election of November 5, 1906 (which was most vigorously and hotly contested), was practically free from fraudulent voting, and that the registrars' lists of voters contained only the names of qualified voters. This consensus of opinion, which was reflected in the press, in the formal statements of both successful and unsuccessful candidates, and in the utterances of the party organizations, fully justifies the wisdom and the necessity of the law.

The fact that the Committee of Seventy after painstaking efforts discovered only eight cases of violation of the law that in its judgment should be prosecuted, may be cited as further evidence of the thoroughness with which the law was enforced and the completeness with which the result was watched by the several party organizations.

And all of this took place within two years of the date when the numerous frauds hereinbefore described were not only possible, but actually prevailed; and what was true of the November, 1906, election, was equally true of the February, 1907, elections, and bids fair to be true of the next and all succeeding elections. The establishment of honest lists of voters is an accomplished and accepted fact, not only in Philadelphia, but in all the cities of the state; for all that has been said about the success of the law in Philadelphia can with equal truth be said of Pittsburg, Allegheny, Scranton, and of all the rest.

According, however, to the official report of the Philadelphia board—

Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the law, experience demonstrates that in several respects it needs amendment in order to be still more efficacious. The Board has given very careful consideration to all the suggestions which have been made to it by registrars and those who have studied its operation.

The hours of registration should be changed from the present ones to from 7 to 10 A. M., and from 4 to 9 or 10 P. M. There has been no difference of opinion on the part of registrars as to the lack of necessity for sitting between the hours of 10 and 4 in the afternoon.

At the present time no elector may be challenged on the day of election except on the ground of identity, or on the ground that he is no longer

a resident of the division. An additional ground of challenge must be had for the February election, because a man may possess the tax qualification in November and lose it by expiration or limitation before the February election.

The Board has not required a person whose father was naturalized while he was a minor to present his father's naturalization papers or a certified copy of them, but has allowed him to make affidavit to the fact. This has been this Board's interpretation of the law, but the Erie County Court, to whom a case was appealed, has decided otherwise. The present provisions of the Act should, therefore, be so amended as to make the legislation perfectly clear. This Board favors such a provision as will sustain the position which it has taken.

The Registration Commissioners should have full power to name their own clerks and to purchase their own supplies, in order to prevent any possible misunderstanding or conflict with the City Commissioners.

The compensation of the registrars should be increased. Not only are the duties onerous and exacting and to be increased, requiring care, tact, and discretion, but the fact that they must appear before this Board for examination and must perform other duties in addition to sitting on the three days, justifies the contention that their pay should be increased.

This Board believes that the registrars should be authorized by law to make the assessment for the purposes of taxation now made by the assessors, and, moreover, should be made deputy poll tax collectors so that electors could have a minimum amount of trouble in qualifying to vote. With these added duties the position of registrar would be made still more attractive and would likely be sought for by a higher grade of men than if the duties and long hours remain, as at present.

The suggestions made in regard to the concentration of power in the hands of registrars will make not only for efficiency and economy but also for the concentration of responsibility.

The last day of registration in the fall and the January day of registration should be changed so as to coincide with the last day for paying poll tax, in order to accommodate the electors; and the first day of the fall registration should be the same as the last one for the assessment of voters for purposes of taxation.

Bills incorporating these ideas were introduced into the 1907 session, and all except those relating to the abolition of the deputy ward poll-tax collectors and the now practically useless assessors were adopted.

Reference to the fate of these recommendations is made to illustrate the changed attitude of the legislature on the matter of honest elections. There were many who thought that the reform

spasm would soon end and that personal registration would be repealed or crippled. Not only was this not so, but the system was perfected in harmony with the views of those who knew most about it, and who were most friendly to its protection and development.

This somewhat lengthy description of an important law is justified by the fact of its importance and significance. It affords a striking illustration of the effectiveness of persistent effort intelligently directed, and how a great popular uprising may be directed toward permanent results. As has been pointed out in a previous article,¹ the reforms that were taken up and advocated by the aroused populace were those that had for years been unremittingly urged by patient reformers.

Personal registration of voters, however, is not the only permanent result of the Philadelphia upheaval, although it is generally and properly regarded as the most important. Nomination reform in an excellent shape has been achieved. Under the old system primaries were held when and where the party committees determined, and the primary officers were nearly wholly irresponsible. The only laws bearing on the subject were those of 1881, known as the Landis laws, which merely provided that a violation of the party rules should be regarded as a misdemeanor! But not one word was said about what those rules should contain, and it is needless to say that they were made to contain what best suited the politicians in power. Those who are interested in this phase of the subject will find it discussed in a paper, which I presented to the National Conference on Primary Reform, held in New York in 1898, and subsequently published in the *Proceedings* of that conference and in a paper on "Political Organization and Primary Legislation in Pennsylvania 1881-1904," presented to the New York meeting of the National Municipal League by Scott Nearing and Lawrence W. Trowbridge. (See *Proceedings* of the New York Conference.)

The special session of 1906 passed an Act to regulate nominations and provided for a direct primary of a most excellent type. The primaries of all parties are held on the same day (which is

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII (September, 1906), p. 190.

fixed by law) at the regular polling places with the general election officers in charge. The voter is given the ballot of his party and this is arranged on the Australian system; i. e., the names of all the candidates for an office are arranged alphabetically under the caption of that office. The elector votes directly for the candidate of his choice, and the candidate for each office receiving a plurality of the votes forthwith becomes the nominee of his party for that office, and his name appears as such on the regular ballot at the general election, without further action of his own or of his party organization. There is no convention to be juggled with; no delegates to be won over or cajoled. The primary is a preliminary election.

Moreover, the law provides for a simple and effective recount where there is any dispute or where fraud is suspected. Upon the petition of ten qualified electors, the County Commissioners are required to open the ballot box of any district in which fraud is alleged and to recount the vote. This is a mandatory provision, the commissioners having no discretion in the matter when a formal petition has been presented. It is further provided by the law that any person aggrieved by the decision of the County Commissioners relative to the counting of the votes may appeal from that decision to the Court of Common Pleas of the county, and the court must hear the appeal and make such decree as right and justice shall require. The whole purpose of the section of the act thus outlined is clearly to protect the rights of all candidates who are made the victims of fraud of any kind. In this respect the nomination law is a great improvement over the general election law.

Concerning this law the Committee of Seventy declared that it redeemed Pennsylvania "from the vicious system in existence for so many years by which candidates were nominated in secret by the authority of the bosses and without any action whatever on the part of the people." And of the personal registration act, it said it "is more complete and more searching in its identification of the voter than the law of any other state."

The same special session passed a strict civil service act for Philadelphia as drawn by the Civil Service Reform Association

of Pennsylvania. This act is still in force although the present mayor of Philadelphia is frankly hostile to it. Just what the outcome of his opposition will be cannot be forecasted, but if we may judge of the effect of similar tactics elsewhere, it will eventually result in strengthening the new system. It is a matter of sincere congratulation that not only did the session of 1907 not tamper with the law in any manner whatever, but it passed an equally satisfactory bill relating to Pittsburg, Allegheny, and Scranton.

These may likewise be considered as part of the permanent results of the Philadelphia upheaval, as also the passage in 1906 of a law which provided "that no officer, clerk, or employee, under the government of any city of the first class within this Commonwealth, shall, directly or indirectly, demand, solicit, collect or receive, or be in any manner concerned in demanding, soliciting, collecting, or receiving, any assessment, subscription or contribution, whether voluntary or involuntary, intended for any political purpose whatever," as also another law which prohibited officers, clerks, and employees from taking an active part in political movements and elections.

Still another act of importance regulated nomination and election expenses, and required the accounts of all such expenses to be filed in a public office, and when formally objected to, to be audited by a court.

To quote and adopt the language of Thomas Raeburn White, counsel for the Committee of Seventy, and an assistant city solicitor—

To one who is unfamiliar with the conditions of the election laws in Pennsylvania, previously existing, it is not easy to understand what a tremendous advance these laws constitute. It is no exaggeration to say that in the city of Philadelphia there has not been an election in which the majority governed for many years. These laws will restore once more to the people the powers of sovereignty which rightfully belong to them, and it is believed will prevent so-called political leaders from manipulating elections in the future as they have in the past. The work of the special session is the really notable thing which has been accomplished, and even now it is difficult for those of us who live in Philadelphia to realize that these laws have actually been passed and are now standing upon the statute books.

The upheaval has had two other important results which must not be overlooked or underestimated; one was the nomination of Edwin S. Stuart for governor, by the Republicans in 1906; and the other, the nomination of John O. Sheatz for state treasurer in 1907. Neither would have been considered or thought of if it had not been for the events to which I referred at the outset.

Governor Stuart of Pennsylvania, like Governor Hughes of New York, believes that ante-election promises should be kept, and the resemblance does not end there. Both are men of high personal integrity, who believe that they hold office to serve the people and not to build up a machine. Both regard their pledges as something sacred and binding and not as "something to stand on to get in on." Both have used the prerogatives of their high office to force recalcitrant legislators to do their duties. Both have measurably succeeded in placing important legislation on the statute book. In the words of the legislative correspondent of the *Philadelphia Ledger*,

Governor Stuart has been more active in shaping general legislation than many of his predecessors. This was because he felt that he was personally pledged to the people to carry out many promises he made on the stump when he was a candidate last fall. His interest was principally directed to seeing that the Republican platform pledges were carried out, especially those relating to railroads and trolleys, and when he discovered that either branch was hesitating about enacting the bills he thought should be passed, he promptly summoned the house and senate leaders and told them that they must keep their party obligations.

The legislative investigation of the state capitol scandal has been begun and prosecuted in a thoroughgoing manner, not particularly because the politicians or the legislature wanted it, but mainly because the governor insisted upon it. He also saw to it that the two-cents-a-mile and the trolley-freight bills were made laws, and that a really respectable and influential railroad commission was provided for.

The legislature passed through their first stages constitutional amendments providing for annual elections by abolishing the spring (or February) elections, and for the establishment of

separate criminal courts, two measures most earnestly desired by the reform elements.

The governor and the legislature, but especially the former, are entitled to great credit for protecting the reform legislation of 1906. There was great fear lest the Philadelphia Civil Service Act might be repealed. It was not touched. On the other hand a good bill extending the system to cities of the second class (Pittsburg, Allegheny, and Scranton) has passed. A repealer of the state constabulary (which has done such splendid work) was defeated.

The Salus-Grady libel bill, which Governor Pennypacker approved in one of his now famous state papers, was repealed, but its one important feature requiring all papers published in the state to print in a conspicuous place, in every issue, the names of the owners, proprietors, or publishers, and the managing editors of the same, was preserved through the passage of a bill to this effect.

Hon. John O. Sheatz was the only Philadelphia member of the legislature in 1905 who could be depended upon to introduce the personal registration bill. He did so promptly, and without parley. He also voted against the rippers and against the libel bill, and in favor of numerous good measures. He was marked for discipline, and was on the point of retiring from public life because he felt that there was no place for a man with a conscience. Then came the revolution of 1905-06, evidencing the change of temper on the part of the people; and Sheatz was almost unanimously re-elected to the legislature, and then was made chairman of the Appropriations Committee. So strong was his record in that position, and so popular was he, that he was forced on the Republican ticket as its candidate for the highly important office of state treasurer.

Before one jumps to the conclusion that the revolution of 1905 in Philadelphia was a mere spasm, a flash in the pan, of no effect, let him examine the record of things accomplished. The accomplishments herein set down represent a very substantial measure of progress in the direction of protecting the fundamental liberties of the people and advancing the cause of decent

and effective government, and they should afford encouragement, not only to the reformers of Philadelphia, but to those of every other community in the land. There may be a temporary reaction; but this much has been gained by the people of Pennsylvania—they have been given a fair and free opportunity to express their political opinions through the purification and intelligent development of their election machinery. If they do not choose to avail themselves of the opportunity—"that is another story."

REVIEWS

Capitalist and Laborer and Modern Socialism. By JOHN SPARGO. Pp. 122.

Socialism, Positive and Negative. By ROBERT RIVES LA MONTE. Pp. 150.

The Right to Be Lazy, and Other Studies. By PAUL LAFARGUE. "Standard Socialist Series." Chas. H. Kerr & Co., 1907. Pp. 164.

While socialism seems to me hopeless heterogeneity, I make no apology for a certain warming toward socialists, even the most exasperating of them. I like the man who has made himself enough acquainted with the world to know that change is its law, and who is eager to promote inevitable readjustments of life in the interest of developing human interests. Whatever else may be said of him, the socialist who does his own thinking is fairly sure to be of that type. On the other hand, after the best is said that can be said of the doctrine, it cannot escape the condemnation of phenomenally overestimating human power to forecast the reconstructive workings of an idea.

So far as socialism is a movement, as distinguished from a doctrine, my quarrel with it is a contention against the practical incontinence which is a counterpart of its super-sanguineness as a theory.

One of the most intelligent American expositors of socialism recently called upon me to acknowledge myself in error in representing socialism as more an agitation than an investigation. Yet the publishing house which represents my critic's type of socialism now circulates Lafargue's dictum: "Our comrades in Germany were discussing some time since the question whether socialism is a science. *Socialism is not and cannot be a science* for the simple reason that it is a political party and must disappear when its work is accomplished after the abolition of the classes which gave birth to it; but the end which it pursues is scientific." (*The Right to Be Lazy*, p. 139.) After the socialists have settled their own differences I will submit to all the correction that is contained in the results.

I have no defense for the intellectual snobbishness which assumes

that socialism has received its full deserts when it is treated with sarcasm and abuse. Socialism has done more than any other phase of social theory to ferret out factors in the social process which do not get their share of reckoning in our present calculation. Like most other heterodoxies it brings to light phases of truth which must sooner or later be organized into prevailing orthodoxies. At the same time the socialists themselves are very largely to blame for their failure to get a fair hearing. The investigators among them cannot easily be distinguished from the agitators, and the latter indulge in such extravagant tirades that something can be said in palliation of the conventionalism which declines to pry behind such unreasonableness for a possible relation to sanity. The three books before us do not mark the extreme range between scientific and neurotic socialism, but they indicate it in a way. From John Spargo to Paul Lafargue we cover the distance between serious argument and frenzied rhetoric. Each appeals to a constituency of its own. Neither socialism nor any other doctrine can permanently hold both constituencies. It is as the Irishman said of the coffee-room at Hull House: "Yez can have de office gang, or yez can have de shovel gang, but yez can't have both!"

ALBION W. SMALL

The Mountain People of Kentucky. By a Mountain Man—
WILLIAM H. HONEY. Cincinnati: Printed by Roessler
Bros., and for sale by the author, at Williamsburg, Ky.
\$1.50.

It is only a few years since "Appalachian America" was brought to the notice of the outside world. President Frasi, of Berea College, was among the first to call attention to the arrested development of this great section. It was he who used the graphic term, "our contemporary ancestors," in describing the people and their picturesque peculiarities.

Travelers, magazine writers, and novelists have in still more recent years set forth the striking features in the life of the people of this region. In doing so, it is natural that they should seize upon the peculiar and exceptional features—the making of moonshine whisky, the primitive stick-chimney dwelling, the rude one-room log schoolhouse, the bloody feuds—and that the person whose information of the region comes entirely from such sources should think that these features are common and typical.

The present book gives the other side of the picture. It is written by an intelligent and educated mountain man. He shows that the mountain people are not descendants of convicts and indentured persons but of the representative stock of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Pennsylvania. Some of the early emigrants passed from the seaboard states through the mountains and settled in the Blue-Grass regions of Kentucky and Tennessee; others stopped in the mountains and their descendants are the inhabitants of this region today. Shut in by rugged hills and cut off from one another by woods and streams, they have lived on for generation after generation in much the same manner and under the same conditions as their forefathers did a century ago.

In reading Mr. Honey's book one feels that the author has had a double purpose in view—to show the facts as they exist and to exhort his mountain readers to move forward. While speaking, for instance, of the lack of transportation and of how seriously this has handicapped the region, he gives four or five pages to showing the benefits to be derived from good roads, the cost to the community of bad roads, and to urging the people to mend their ways.

Mr. Honey dwells but lightly upon the peculiar social customs of the mountain people. Dancing, he tells us, is not "believed in" by the best people and is passing away. "Apple peeling," "bean stringing," and "carpet tacking" parties, followed by games are popular. Socials, where "the songs are strictly religious" and where even "Flinch" is looked upon by some as being a little too closely allied to cards, are the most refined and approved form of social intercourse.

Moonshining, we are told, was once approved of by the community. This was when there was little opportunity of marketing the corn otherwise, and when the spirit of personal liberty was strong and respect for the law was weak. But moonshining is no longer generally approved of:

Out of the elections in nine counties on the temperance question in 1904, all were carried for prohibition by good majorities. More than 92 per cent. of the mountain counties of Kentucky are under strict prohibition laws.

That the blind tiger is dying hard, though, is evidenced by the fact that one revenue collector between July, 1905, and February, 1906, cut up forty stills and arrested more than fifty moonshiners.

Mr. Honey shows the general causes of the terrible feuds and

also shows how these are dying out with the general advance in civilization, business, and the enforcement of the law. He tells us that the feuds have been greatly exaggerated and that the mass of the people have always looked upon the feudists with horror. One cannot but wonder, if this is true, why there has been so little public sentiment in the community for the enforcing of the law.

Farming is shown to be, of necessity, the chief occupation of the people and some interesting paragraphs are devoted to the recent development of the natural resources and the struggle of the people to secure for themselves some share in this advancing material prosperity, rather than let it all go to outside capitalists. The author makes no mention, however, of weaving, spinning, dyeing, and other characteristic household industries.

The style is not always clear and one at times is not quite sure just how much of a given statement is one of fact and how much is what a young and optimistic teacher hopes to see realized. On the whole, however, the author has shown up the modern, progressive side of the mountain people in a very creditable manner. If there is lacking in the picture he gives us anything that is striking and peculiar—in the dwellings, the clothes, the speech, the customs; if the picture is a rather commonplace one, no better, no worse, in no wise different from others—it may be set down to that passion for uniformity among us which will not tolerate, apparently, anything that is peculiar, no matter how picturesque and striking.

SAMUEL MACCLINTOCK

The Lodging-House Problem in Boston. By A. B. WOLFE.
Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1906.
Pp. 200.

One of the characteristic conditions of urban life is treated with extreme care and intelligence by a scholar who resided during 1902-04 at the South End House. The problems of economic interest, vitality, and morality are discussed upon the basis of ample information derived from reliable sources: the house itself, the change from boarding to lodging, the life-history of the lodger, density of population, birth- and death-rates, crime and prostitution, influence of lodging-houses on marriage. Societies which aim to promote the well-being of young people of this class will find here materials and methods of investigation of highest value.

C. R. HENDERSON

Americans in Process: A Settlement Study by Residents and Associates of the South End House. Edited by ROBERT A. WOODS. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1903.

Even a belated notice of this interesting and illuminating description of the north and west ends of Boston may help to do justice to a study which is creditable to the writers and suggestive of similar faithful observations in other localities. The residents of a settlement report what they found by friendly and prolonged contact with an immigrant population, the physical conditions, the moral influences, the varied interests, the obligations of the city to its adopted citizens. Such a book first inspires and guides social workers in the present, and then becomes an authentic source for future historians.

C. R. HENDERSON

Tuberculosis as a Disease of the Masses. By Š. A. KNOPF, M.D. New York: Fred P. Flori, 1907.

This essay, first published in German in 1901 and translated into twenty-one languages, now appears in a fourth issue with supplementary sections on home and school hygiene and a sketch of the anti-tuberculosis movement in the United States. Approved by the highest medical authorities its clear and direct style fits it for its popular mission, and the pamphlet has already been read by hundreds of thousands of persons. The motto accords with the sociological theory of Ward's *Applied Sociology*: "To combat consumption as a disease of the masses successfully requires the combined action of a wise government, well-trained physicians, and an intelligent people."

C. R. HENDERSON

Das moderne amerikanische Besserungssystem: eine Darstellung des Systems zur Besserung jugendlicher Verbrecher im Strafrecht, Strafprozess und Strafvollzug in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. VON DR. PAUL HERR. Berlin: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1907. Pp. 455.

This volume is the fruit of a personal study of the principal reformatories of the United States and of the American and European literature of the subject. Baiernreither's recent work covers a wider field but is not so exhaustive in this particular subject.

Aschrott, Winter, and Hintrager were limited chiefly to Elmira. Mittenauier's report is systematic but too brief to furnish full material for an independent judgment. No really systematic work in English has been published, although Dr. Barrows' collection of essays has very great merit. Dr. Herr visited eight of the eleven institutions which he regards as typical and collected all available documents for the others.

In the first chapter the author discusses the history and theory of our reformatory system; and here he does justice to the British anticipation of some of its best features, to the pioneers in theory, and to Z. R. Brockway, who first organized the doctrines of the movement into a consistent and practical system. In the second chapter he studies the inmates of the institutions in relation to age, crime, and previous punishments.

In the third chapter is a clear presentation of the theory of the "indeterminate sentence" and its actual administration. Then follow certain technical details in respect to the commitment of prisoners, the organization of the institution, and the training of officers.

The fifth chapter is a fine analysis and description of the treatment of the prisoner during his stay in the reformatory, his reception and examination, the classification, grading and marking system, discipline, order of the day, correspondence, food, work, school instruction, religious influences, library, institution paper, physical improvement, societies, and entertainments. It would be difficult to think of an aspect of the life of the reformatory which is not treated with considerable fulness.

The sixth chapter is devoted to the conditional and final release of the convict, the parole, supervision, requirement of reports, final discharge, and duration of confinement.

The last chapters are given to a critical review of the system as a whole and a consideration of the question, what parts of it may be of value to Germany in its revision of the penal system.

Dr. Herr is by no means blind to the weak points in our system, the defects in statistics, the perils of political appointments, the lack of a corps of trained officers, the insufficiency of supervision in a country where it is so easy to escape.

On the whole he approves the fundamental principles of the law, the methods of organization, and the treatment of the convicts under discipline. If we may take this book as an expression of the judgment of the most intelligent European students who have actually

investigated our methods in person, we may fairly conclude that we have made a conquest of the civilized world, as we are in turn indebted for many of our ideas to the pioneers of the Old World. This is the judgment of Baiernreither and Freudenthal who also have recently visited America and brought trained legal powers to the investigation.

A translation of this work would be extremely useful in this country and in Great Britain and Canada, where its teachings find more and more hospitable welcome.

C. R. HENDERSON

What Is History? Five Lectures on the Modern Science of History. By KARL LAMPRECHT, Ph.D., LL.D. Translated by E. A. ANDREWS. London and New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905. Pp. 227.

Professor Lamprecht, of Leipzig University, is an authority on the economic history of Germany and France in the Middle Ages, and is writing a history of Germany in several volumes. It was not this sort of a historian who used to go into the philosophy of history, and so when we find a psychology of history written by a man of his acquaintance with facts it is worthy of some attention. The lectures were delivered in Freiburg in 1904, and the English translation was published the following year.

Although economists no longer hold so strictly as formerly to the economic interpretation of history, it is unusual for a student of economic history to be able to tell why it is "utterly inadequate" (p. 192). In the same way, however, that the controversy between the associationists and the apperceptionists is settled by the modern theory of knowledge which shows that both are parts of one process, so both the individualistic and the political, the ideologic and the economic, interpretations are absorbed into the larger whole of the socio-psychologic interpretation. Says Professor Lamprecht:

The economic life of any period of culture manifests a decided similarity to the instinctive and impulsive actions of single individuals. . . . As compared with the higher intellectual life, economic activity bears in many respects the stamp of the vegetative, at least after certain general habits have been developed, and so long as these are adhered to (p. 188). . . . An economic revolution not only creates a psychic dissociation, but, corresponding to its special character, and at the same time intensifying the dissociation, produces in every instance numbers of new specific stimuli and germinations

of association. New conditions of will and purpose, and so forth, set in, which tend to modify decidedly the higher forms of intellectual life . . . the psychic values of new periods of culture come into existence, as a rule, along with economic and social changes (p. 190).

This theory is illustrated in German history in such a way as to show that the development of literature, the new possibility of travel and leisure, have had an influence equally with economic improvement.

The first chapter shows the progress of historical writing, from the epic poem down to present-day pragmatism. Chapter 2 sketches German history from a psychological point of view, showing the forms in which the imagination of the people expressed itself, and the stimuli which changed the psychic disposition of the people. Sometimes the dominant feeling was for political liberty, sometimes for religion, sometimes for art. From the whole, the author concludes that all culture periods may pass through similar cycles of psychic development, which he calls "symbolism," "typism," "conventionalism," "individualism," and "subjectivism"—the last including Classicism and Romanticism. He calls the time since 1870 the latter half of the Romantic period, and considers the transition to the present period of German history highly instructive for the study of the psychological mechanics which underlies all periods of culture. From what he says we may conclude that an investigation into the psychology of the classes that compose the government on the one hand, and the body of the people on the other, is the most important step in the interpretation of history. The new economic development stands perhaps first in point of time, it is followed by new class formations, and this by a breaking-up of old habits of thought and association, and the formation of new sciences to investigate the world as it appears to the newly awakened mind.

Professor Lamprecht says a new temperament has been produced by the changed conditions—*Reizbarkeit* or nervousity, with its characteristic literature, poetry, and art, which are realism, naturalism, and impressionism. Each of these forms of expression is an attempt to mirror a chaos of new stimuli upon which apperception must go to work.

The first wholes into which the modern mind has classified the world are symbols; that is, in symbolic art and the drama. Germany started over again on the cycle of a new culture period, and

since 1870 a return to the great unities, society and the state, has been in progress. The parallel is everywhere closely drawn between the individual and the social processes of change—dissociation, autosuggestion (p. 11), and the great danger of abnormal forms of development from epidemic suggestion. The most important condition of healthy growth, both for the individual and for society, is the energy of aim perceptions. Freedom of will exists when these are sound and well grounded. When they are not so, there is vacillation, and abnormal aims set in. At the present time (speaking of Germany of course) science is merely objective, art is becoming barren, egoism rules the day; altruism, self-sacrifice, and moral idealism are all crowded to the wall—these symptoms denote the end of a period, while the growth of individuality and the search for new ideals indicate the coming of a new period with a new culture *dominant*.

In the fourth lecture the author concludes that there is in history a psychic scope which may be traced in the history of the nation (p. 154). History is a kaleidoscope (p. 167), with a certain number of group possibilities in elementary psychic phenomena, and the pictures included in these possibilities are produced, now in this way, now in that, by exterior incitations.

This analysis of the psychic process of social change represents the high-water mark of social psychology at the present time. Most articles on the subject in American journals indicate the field of social psychology and some subjects which may profitably be investigated. Professor Ellwood, of the University of Missouri, has contributed the most psychological analysis of the social process as shown in revolutions. Dr. Veblen has made a most brilliant study of the psychology of one class. Professor Lamprecht makes a valuable suggestion for the study of psychic changes in America when he says that there is some connection between the emergence of individuality and high finance. The stages of the culture epochs in American history have not been indicated by anyone, but there is a concurrence at the present time of individualism and high finance, and a general belief that we are approaching a new stage of our existence. Another suggestion for the theoretical economist is the following: "What are the constantly recurring economic factors of each period which are so uniformly followed by the development of other higher intellectual values?"

CAROLINE M. HILL

Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development: A Study in Social Psychology. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN. Fourth Edition. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906. Pp. xxvi+606.

This fourth edition of Professor Baldwin's well-known work would call for only the briefest notice, were it not that the new matter (which also appeared in the third edition) is almost wholly in the nature of a reply to his critics. As one of the critics replied to, the writer would like to raise a few questions.

In replying to certain criticisms Professor Baldwin says that he accepts them as a sociologist, but not as a social psychologist (pp. 6-8); elsewhere he insists upon a distinction between social psychology and sociology (p. 531). In the book as a whole, however—which he describes as a text in social psychology—he repeatedly refers to his objective point as “a theory of society” (e.g., pp. 90, 193, 294); and Book II on “Society” is simply a psychological theory of social organization and progress. Professor Baldwin, therefore, apparently understands by social psychology a psychological theory of social organization and evolution. But wherein does this differ from sociology? Is not social psychology defined thus simply the psychological aspect of sociology? How can, then, one say that he rejects as a social psychologist what he accepts as a sociologist?

Again, Professor Baldwin says that the “other factors” in the social process than imitation, to which his critics call attention, are “socioeconomic” rather than “social” (pp. 5-8). But if the social is the interindividual—anything that involves the interaction of individuals—as Professor Baldwin himself seems to assume throughout the book, how is it that only one native impulse, imitation, can be regarded as “social,” while all the other native impulses, such as rivalry and sex-attraction, must be regarded as merely “socioeconomic”? No psychological sociologist denies that purely physical conditions are “socioeconomic” rather than “social;” but why mental processes which enter into the interaction of individuals quite as much as the imitative impulse are merely “socioeconomic” is difficult to see.

Finally, the whole argument of Professor Baldwin's book is that society is a product of self-consciousness; that it depends in all phases of its evolution upon the development of the self-thought. Accordingly, he finds the matter of social organization to be thoughts; and he denies that animal associations constitute true societies, since animals do not possess self-consciousness. Does not

this make human society a purely intellectual construction? Is not this an ultra-psychological view which neither the sociologist nor the psychologist who takes biology into account can afford to countenance?

Many other similar questions suggest themselves; but these will suffice to show that some of Professor Baldwin's critics may feel that he has not answered their objections. Elsewhere the reviewer has briefly criticized the imitation theory of mental development,¹ upon which Professor Baldwin's sociological theories rest.

In spite of all criticisms, however, Professor Baldwin's book is an invaluable one to every student of sociology, and it remains, up to the present, the only systematic attempt in the English language to apply modern genetic and functional psychology to the interpretation of social organization and evolution.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Riallaro: The Archipelago of Exiles. By GODFREY SWEVEN.
New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901. Pp.
iv+420. \$1.50.

Limanora: The Islands of Progress. By GODFREY SWEVEN.
New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903. Pp.
ix+711. \$1.50.

It is rare that works of fiction deserve serious notice in a scientific journal; but the above two books, written by Mr. James Collier, one of Spencer's assistants and compiler of the volumes on the French and the English in Spencer's *Descriptive Sociology*, certainly deserve such notice, if any fiction does. They belong to the class of utopian romances, but in breadth and height of imagination, in grasp of scientific and philosophic principles, and in scientific suggestiveness they are far above most works of their class.

The new Utopia which the author describes is one of an archipelago of islands, supposed to lie somewhere in the South Sea and to be surrounded by a ring of mist which shuts it off from the rest of the world. Here, ages ago, a people, already far advanced in the arts and sciences, undertook an experiment in artificial selection, or stirpiculture on their own population, by exiling to the neighboring islands all who varied unfavorably—not only the criminal, the vicious, and the physically degenerate, but liars, hypocrites, sensual-

ists, egotists, and all who were socially undesirable. The social results of this experiment, after ages have passed, both among the original population and among the exiles, are depicted for us by the author.

The first volume, as its subtitle indicates, is devoted to describing the various types of social life found in the islands occupied by the exiles. Each island represents some arrested or degenerate type of human society; thus one island is populated by hypocrites, whose whole social life is one of sham and cant; another by sensualists, among whom animalism reigns supreme; another by militarists, whose sole object in life is military glory. There are even islands specially set apart for journalists and book-reviewers! The picture of the life in each island is, in effect, a striking caricature of some phase of western civilization, while the whole book amounts to a bitter satire upon the weak points in present European and American society. The various great types of human society are passed in review—slavery, militarism, capitalism, and communistic socialism—their weaknesses laid bare, and their social implications subjected to scathing criticism. It is a pity that all this withering satire on existing social conditions and proposed social schemes is hidden in a book which is far from a popular character; for though it abounds in striking passages, it has not that lightness of style and humor which are necessary for popular success in satirical literature.

The second volume describes the wonderful social progress which took place in the central island, "Limanora," after the weeding-out of all the inferior and undesirable elements. The social utopia which results, as depicted for us by Mr. Collier, differs from nearly all preceding utopias constructed by social thinkers, in that continued progress is its dominant feature, and science is the basis of this progress. The most wonderful scientific discoveries are made. Man becomes practically master, not only of physical nature, but of himself, and of his mind as well as of his body. Even earthquakes are largely controlled by artificial perforations of the earth's crust, while the weather is strictly regulated to meet the needs of a scientific agriculture and horticulture. Of course, many things might be criticized in the book as fantastic. But what is the use of criticizing a utopia where architecture is literally "frozen music," where men live to be as old as Methuselah, and where the population is as much at home in the air as are the birds?

The work is evidently primarily one of the imagination; and judged as such it must be ranked high. But it is more than that. There is scarcely a page of the book which is not thought-provoking. There is a wealth of ideas in it about human life and society, physical nature, and even the constitution of the universe itself, which bewilders. On account of their stimulating and suggestive qualities, therefore, these two books by Mr. Collier deserve a wide circle of intelligent readers. They especially deserve reading by all who are pondering the problem of human progress. If we were to venture a general estimate of these books, we would have to say that eventually they must rank high among the masterpieces of utopian literature.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Riches and Poverty. By L. G. CHIOZZA MONEY. London: Methuen Co., 1906. Pp. xx+342.

The author finds that one-half of the entire national income of the United Kingdom is taken by one-ninth of the population, and one-third of it by one-thirtieth of the population. Five millions out of a population of forty-three millions own nearly all the national wealth, while one-seventieth of the people own more than one-half of the national wealth. The population of the United Kingdom is a poor people thinly veneered by the well-to-do. The congestion of capital, the appreciation of securities, watered stocks, the unearned increment of "sleeping partners," increase the already disproportionate share of those who wait; while business depressions, the precariousness of employment, accident, disease, and physical failure cut down the uncertain share of those who work. Parallel with this wasting of the laborer's personal substance goes the wasting of the capitalist's impersonal superfluity of naughtiness. But they are more than parallels. The latter sucks its life from the former, but returns unto it no fertilization. To the error of distribution is charged the undernourishment of the poor, especially of mothers, infant mortality, the employment of women, inferior schooling, and the overcrowding in cities. Incidentally, palliatives must be used while the remedies are working themselves out. Hence charity and old-age pensions must find support. The wastes of production can be turned into savings only by governmental ownership of the means of production. The error of distribution can be overcome in part by a

revised income tax and a new schedule of death duties. But "to deal with causes we must strike at the error of distribution by gradually substituting public ownership for private ownership of the means of production."

The foregoing is the fabric of argument presented by the author. Through it runs the thread of socialistic theory. This does not obtrude itself so much as may possibly seem from the skeleton outline given. The author presents an abundance of statistics in large figures. They leave a slight suspicion that they have been interpreted with a "single-barreled" canon of criticism and one eye squinted shut. On some individual topics, however, they may be found quite satisfactory.

T. J. RILEY

Among Country Schools. By W. J. KERN, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Winnebago Co., Ill. New York: The Macmillan Co.

Among Country Schools is just the kind of source-book the country teacher should have. It is full of suggestions, and invariably tells where material can be found and how to get it. It is explicit and concrete. It is not a theory, but an account of things.

T. J. RILEY

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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Le Mouvement Sociologique International.—In laying out constructive work in sociology, M. Cyr. Van Overbergh in the first number of the transformed organ of the Belgian Sociological Society, *Le Mouvement Sociologique International*, for March, 1907, proposes the following *questionnaire*:

1. Definition of sociology.
2. General history of sociology.
3. Sociology in the classification of the sciences.
4. Method.
5. Classification of social structures.
6. The formation of social structures.
7. The preservation of social structures.
8. The evolution of social structures.
9. The decay and disappearance of social structures.

He regards these as fundamental topics which may be analyzed and subdivided according to the character of the sociological undertaking.

The purpose of *Le Mouvement Sociologique International* is to cover, as broadly and as practically as possible, the field of sociology with the view to obtain a complete and orderly documentation of the science. To that end in this number of the journal there appears the first part of a systematic arrangement of Ward's *Pure Sociology* (*Sociologie pure*). The French translation of this work by Ferdinand Weil, in 1906, is followed, and the analysis is arranged in the order of the *questionnaire* above given. One topic is given upon a page and the pages are perforated so that they may easily be detached and rearranged, reclassified, or made the basis of more extended treatment. There is also made a similar systematic arrangement of the available material bearing on the Congo tribe, the A-Babua. This material can be classified to meet the plans of any person desiring to make use of the data furnished. This may be shown by examples of the pages under the general heading, "Intellectual Life"—(a) Arts: 123, Writing; 124, Language; 125, Painting; 126, Dancing; 127, Singing; 128, Music; 129, Sculpture.

While some of the sections read like the chapter on "The Snakes of Ireland," it is easy to see that the systematic arrangement of similar data in regard to many peoples would be of great value. The journal also contains an article upon the evolution of modern Europe, as well as book reviews. This attempt at orderly presentation of sociological matter is certainly valuable and suggestive in many ways.

G. G. W.

Parties and Classes.—1. Party spirit is an ensemble of tendencies, ideas, and passions. By tacit accord this rise gives to a certain organization: the collective person is substituted for the individual person.

2. Elements of the party: The characteristic traits of the party of opposition are hatred of existing institutions and hope for reform. The causes of discontent lie in the conditions, but they are also due to the internal dispositions of the members of the party. The profession determines the fundamental tendencies of each member of society. The real cause of a hostile or favorable disposition resides invariably in the professional interests. Trouble in the social function, whatever it may be, is the origin of the great currents of ideas, tendencies, and passions which form parties and arouse them against established authority.

3. But in a profession not all the members are in the same class or party, (a) because of internal causes, such as difference in age, civil state, success and fortune; (b) external causes, such as artificial distinctions which the state has established by its commercial and industrial legislation, by gifts and favors, on the basis of birth, territory, fortune, and religion.—Arthur Bauer, in *Revue internationale de Sociologie*, January, 1907.

E. H. S.

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SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL STRUGGLES ¹

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I

It has long been perceived that the "struggle for existence" is common to the human race and to the animal kingdom in general. Biologists are also aware that it extends to the vegetable kingdom and to all life. The sociologists, very few of whom are biologists in any proper sense, but most of whom have read the great leading works in biology, have themselves long been endeavoring to find the bond connecting the social with the biological struggle and the essential characters by which the two forms of struggle are distinguished. It is not too much to say, and is what might be expected, that the greater part of all that the sociologists say on the subject is wide of the mark, and exhibits an almost complete failure on their part to understand the true nature of the biological struggle.

The socialists, for the most part, regard the social struggle as a practical extension of the biological struggle into the human field, and the work of Karl Marx is frequently characterized as having the same relation to society that Darwin's work has to the organic world. For a long time the modern doctrines relating to life were regarded as highly favorable to socialism, and they are

¹ From the *Annales de l'Institut International de Sociologie*, Tome XI, pp. 111-126, Paris, 1907.

still so regarded by many. Nevertheless it is a fact that they are looked upon by most biologists who think at all on the subject, and by biological philosophers in general, as completely opposed to socialism, and as sustaining the old "let-alone" political economy.

The sociologists in the main deem it their duty to deny that there is any necessary connection between social and biological struggles. They are especially severe on all attempts to show that there is any redeeming virtue in social struggles, or that it is through them that social evolution has taken place, in any such sense as it is claimed that organic evolution takes place, viz., through the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Considerable ingenuity has been shown in pointing out that the cases are not parallel, and that social struggles result in the survival of the unfit.

The sociologists generally confound the so-called "struggle for existence" with Darwinism, and very few of them have any adequate idea of what Darwin's phrase "natural selection" means. It is true that Darwin used both phrases, and also that he recognized the influence of direct effort, i. e., use and disuse, in modifying structures, although the discovery of that great law is more properly attributable to Lamarck, and constitutes the essence of Lamarckism as distinguished from Darwinism. But the sociologists are unable to see the distinction, and have only a confused idea of the whole process which they imagine to constitute Darwinism.

With this vague notion in their minds certain of them have invented the phrase "social Darwinism," and have set it up as a sort of "man of straw" in order to show their agility in knocking it down. There is of course much difference in the ability with which different authors have treated the subject, and a few have evinced some conception of the true merits of the question.

II

Darwinism has very generally been confounded with Malthusianism, and the fact that Darwin modestly admitted that he was led to the consideration of such subjects by reading Mal-

thus on *The Principle of Population* has caused most of the sociological writers who graduated out of political economy into sociology, to identify the Malthusian law with Darwinism as a whole, and to imagine that when they have stated the former, which, as economists, they usually understand, they have stated Darwin's great biological principle, which they do not at all understand.

Darwin did not say nor mean to imply that the Malthusian principle embraced the whole of the biologic law. It is contained in the latter with certain qualifications, and naturally suggested the wider applications that Darwin made of it to the organic world; but it falls far short of embodying even the principle of natural selection.

M. Achille Loria, in a very interesting chapter entitled "Social Darwinism,"² confines himself to a statement of the principle that "the quantity of subsistence existing on the earth is not sufficient for the nourishment of all organized beings, so that they are compelled to secure it at the price of an incessant struggle," and he bases his discussion entirely on that principle, saying:

It is natural that the weak should be defeated in this struggle, because, not being able to obtain any nourishment, or at least not a sufficient quantity, they perish, while the strong survive and triumph, so that the species possessing the "fittest" qualities improve little by little and rise to more perfect conditions of existence.

M. Loria then shows that certain sociologists apply this theory to social phenomena:

Men, too, they say, have carried on for centuries a terrible struggle for life, which, in our days, manifests itself in the unbridled competition of which we are witnesses; in this fierce struggle the victory is to the strong, and this constitutes the basis of evolution and progress. It is therefore wrong to deplore the bloody battles between men and the fierce competition which makes them trample upon one another in order to be first, since it is this competition which insures the triumph of the best, the most worthy; it is wrong to try to make laws to mitigate this struggle, since it is a valuable factor in progressive development. . . . Hence the most complete quietism, the happy calm of the philosopher and the *dolce far niente* of the legislator

² *Problèmes sociaux contemporains*, Paris, 1897, Sixième Leçon; *Le Darwinisme social*, pp. 113-35.

constitute the lesson taught by the Darwinian theory, according to these modern theorists.³

Such is the theory which, according to M. Loria, is called social Darwinism, but in his view these social applications of Darwinism are wholly false. He does not say who has defended this doctrine, but it cannot be denied that something near akin to it is held by many biologists who attempt to carry biological principles into human affairs, and that it is practically the attitude of most scientific men and evolutionists in so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject. It is the doctrine that I have characterized as the "gospel of inaction," and to the refutation of which I have devoted much effort.

M. Loria easily shows that there is no such parallel, and his comparison of the industrially successful class in society to parasites is ingenious and not wholly incorrect. He could have made his argument much stronger if he had recognized that all predatory animals are essentially parasites, since they live on the nourishment stored up by animals that take it from the vegetable kingdom, and do not differ in this essential respect from parasites that attach themselves to the bodies of other animals.

But the "struggle," if it can be so designated, between parasites and their hosts, including that between carnivorous and herbivorous animals, is only a very small part of Darwinism. In fact it may be said to form no part of it, since it was well understood long before Darwin was born. And yet, curiously enough, the so-called "social Darwinism" scarcely ever gets farther than this. I have never seen any distinctively Darwinian principle appealed to in the discussions of "social Darwinism." It is therefore wholly inappropriate to characterize as social Darwinism the *laissez-faire* doctrine of political economists, even when it is attempted to support that doctrine by appeals to the laws of organic development. That the *laissez-faire* doctrine is false and not sustained by biological principles I freely admit and have abundantly shown, but the fallacy involved is to be found in an entirely different department of scientific investigation.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 117, 118.

III

There is another school of sociologists who, ignoring the economic struggle, confine themselves to the race struggle. These have still another form of supposed "social Darwinism" which they have conjured up in their own imagination, and against which they are battling as valiantly as Don Quixote battled with the windmills. With them social Darwinism is any attempt to maintain that human or social evolution has been influenced or furthered by the struggle of races, peoples, and nations. Their idea is that the only condition to progress is absolute peace, and that all disturbances of the peace of the world are retrogressive and even "pathological."

It is not my present intention to refute this doctrine. That has been done far more eloquently by history than it can ever be done by words, but I wish to protest in the strongest possible terms against the application of the term Darwinism to the race struggle. I know of no ethnologist, historian, or sociologist among those who see the real effect of the struggle of races, who has accepted this designation for that law. The general character of that struggle has always been known, and therefore it no more belongs to Darwin's teachings than does the law of parasitism. But the great discovery of precisely how the race struggle operates in the process of civilization, though clearly formulated by Gumplowicz in 1875 in a pamphlet⁴ of whose existence Darwin could have known nothing, was not fully worked out until 1883,⁵ one year after Darwin's death. That principle is to be ranked with the principle of natural selection, and may be appropriately called its sociological homologue, because, although an entirely different principle, it agrees with the latter in constituting a strictly scientific explanation of a great natural process, never before understood. I call it the principle of *social synergy*. It certainly is not social Darwinism nor Darwinism in any form. It would be difficult to find even an adumbration of it in any of Darwin's works, or, for that matter,

⁴ Ludwig Gumplowicz, *Race und Staat. Eine Untersuchung über das Gesetz der Staatenbildung*, Wien, 1875.

⁵ Ludwig Gumplowicz, *Der Rassenkampf. Sociologische Untersuchungen*. Innsbruck, 1883.

in the works of any author prior to 1875 or even to 1883. But Ratzenhofer in 1893,⁶ and especially in 1898,⁷ took it up and greatly expanded it. But he acknowledges that it was Gumplowicz who succeeded in first establishing sociology as the science which forms the foundation of all political teachings.⁸

IV

One of the sociologists of the school now under consideration has recently made a general onslaught upon the new doctrine, but instead of going to original sources and analyzing the works which I have enumerated in which it was first promulgated and most elaborately expounded, he has seen fit to attack a work in which it is simply set forth by the author, though with all due credit to the discoverer and chief expounder, and without claiming any originality in the matter at all. He seems to be wholly ignorant of the works named and of their authors, except as he has met with them in the book which forms the object of his polemic. He does, indeed, mention Gumplowicz, and calls him a Pole, although he has been a professor in the University of Graz nearly all his life. He also mentions Ratzenhofer, whom he calls a German, apparently for no other reason than that his works have been mostly published in Leipzig. As a matter of fact this new and vital doctrine, like the new doctrine of value in economics, is essentially Austrian, and the discovery of both these principles is probably due to the prolonged reflection of penetrating minds upon the series of social struggles which that land of many races has had to pass through.

But the author to whom I have referred has seen fit to direct

⁶ Gustav Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik als Theil der Sociologie und Grundlage der Staatswissenschaft*, 3 vols. Leipzig, 1893.

⁷ Gustav Ratzenhofer, *Die sociologische Erkenntnis: Positive Philosophie des sozialen Lebens*, Leipzig, 1898.

⁸ These are his own words, to which almost all his expounders neglect to call attention: "Nach vielen mehr oder weniger erfolgreichen Versuchen, das gesellschaftliche Leben wissenschaftlich zu erfassen, in welcher Hinsicht insbesondere Comte, Spencer, Tylor und Bastian bahnbrechend wirkten, scheint es Gumplowicz gelungen, die Sociologie als Wissenschaft festzustellen, welche die Grundlage der Lehre über die Politik bildet."—*Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, Vol. I, Preface, p. v.

his shafts at an American who is guilty only of having perceived that this principle lies at the foundation of sociology, as Ratzenhofer admits. This author characterizes the doctrine as social Darwinism, although none of the works treating it contain that or any similar expression. He is a peace reformer and any admission that there has ever been any social virtue in war is highly offensive to him.

We are interested now only in pointing out how completely this author misunderstands the teachings of Darwin whose name he so freely invokes. He sees in Darwinism nothing but war—*bellum omnium contra omnes*. Nevertheless, ten years earlier he had said:

Just as the perfect being wins in individual struggles, so the most perfect nation wins in international struggles. Darwin's law acts as inexorably in the case of collectivities as in that of individuals. The resultant of international struggles is also the triumph of the best.

But his mind seems to have undergone a great change since that date, and he now sees no good in social struggles, but only evil.

All his examples from biology refer to the relations subsisting between predatory animals and their prey, which he looks upon as a war of extermination; whereas, as Darwin clearly saw, a predatory animal cannot exterminate its prey without at the same time exterminating itself. In fact, between a predatory animal and its prey there is no struggle at all. A struggle implies some sort of reciprocity between the parties to it. But between a wolf and a sheep there is no mutuality. All the "struggling" the sheep can do is to escape from the jaws of the wolf. Even the most robust ram in such a case would have no instinct except that of flight.

This author makes the same mistake as Professor Loria in saying that the great difference between animal and human struggles is that the former are always between different species while the latter are between individuals of the same species. This is regarded as the final and conclusive argument. It simply shows how completely these authors fail to understand the most rudimentary principles of the biological struggle for existence. Dar-

win himself lays down the law that the struggle is always most intense between organisms that are most similar. The reason is obvious. It is essentially a struggle for subsistence. Any environment contains certain elements which a given organism can appropriate. Similar organisms appropriate similar elements. When too many organisms of the same general kind exist on a given area, all using the same forms of subsistence, it is evident that they will exhaust their resources, and there will be a struggle among them for the supply of their wants. This is a universal law in biology and applies to plants as well as to animals. To all outward appearances there is perfect peace. Any landscape in a state of nature presents an aspect of complete tranquillity, but the biologist knows that this is an illusion, and that there is going on an intense competition among all living things for the means of subsistence. If a given area is watched for a sufficient length of time changes will be perceived. Certain forms will be found to have gained the ascendant and advanced in number and vigor, while certain other forms have lost ground and begun to decline. The former will ultimately come to dominate the field, and the latter will disappear, having succumbed in the struggle for existence. The observing botanist will note the existence of varieties among plants. The leaves of some will be of a deeper or a paler hue, some will develop hairs, down, tomentum, bloom, etc. All these differences in outward appearance are due to corresponding differences in the minute structure and constitution of the plants, and these differences of structure in turn enable the plant to appropriate slightly different elements from the soil, air, sunlight, etc., and thus to escape in so far from the struggle for subsistence. It is thus that varieties arise. The differentiation at length becomes specific, and we have an explanation of the "origin of species." The great principle according to which all this goes on is natural selection, and it requires generations to effect the changes. Our anti-social Darwinists seem to have no conception of this law, and never get beyond the crude idea of bloody battles in which the weak are "devoured" by the strong.

It is true that closely allied species do compete with each

other and one species often drives out another, but this is where both species require nearly the same food. Thus the brown rats in America have practically exterminated the black rats, which were formerly abundant. The latter seem to have been introduced earlier and flourished in our houses and barns until the brown or gray rats came. These required exactly the same kind of food, and being superior in certain qualities, they were able to multiply until they consumed all the food there was for rats, and the black rats, being unable to obtain any food, perished. The same occurs in a pure state of nature and on a large scale, but the great competition is always among individuals of the same species, resulting, as already described, in the gradual production of slightly different varieties and ultimately of distinct species, and thus causing all the variety and multiplicity that nature presents, and accounting for its power to appropriate all the elements of subsistence that the earth affords.

This competition is universal. It occurs among the most innocent and peaceful creatures, and even, as already remarked, among plants. But it also occurs among predatory animals, not as between them and their peaceful prey, but among themselves. If lions and tigers in the same area lived on precisely the same prey they would compete, and when the prey became scarce, the more successful of the two might exterminate the less successful. But it is probable that these animals in their native jungles live on quite different prey, and are thus both able to subsist together. Natural selection would bring about this result. The competition here is therefore the same as elsewhere, viz., between individuals of the same species. It may result in the production of varieties and new species, but its main effect is to keep down the number of individuals of each species, so that there can never exist more than a certain number of lions, tigers, leopards, etc., in a given region.

v

It is obvious how completely different this all is from the bloody picture drawn by the well-meaning persons whose biological vagaries we are considering. But their errors in biology are scarcely less gross than their errors in ethnology. I had not

proposed to consider these here, but there is one that it may be well to point out as typical of them all. This is the much-discussed doctrine of "social pathology." This is one of the most specious and pernicious of all sociological fallacies. It consists in regarding all social phenomena that do not meet with the approval of these writers, as abnormal and as social diseases. The social phenomenon commonly called war is regarded as especially irregular and morbid, and comes in for the principal share of denunciation, which seems to be the form of medical treatment chiefly prescribed. But as the entire history of mankind has been characterized by incessant war, it follows that disease has been the prevailing condition and leading characteristic of human society. One might well wonder that mankind should have even survived, much more that the race should be able to present the robust appearance which it does present. If disease prevailed over health in any such degree among individuals surely we should have a moribund race of weaklings, even if they could exist at all.

It is therefore evident that the entire doctrine of social pathology must be fundamentally false, and that what is called war must be in a certain sense a normal condition. But a very little inspection shows that what is called war is simply the struggle of races for existence and for predominance, and is at least analogous to the biological struggle for existence, which no one would think of calling pathologic. Although, as I have shown, the principle involved in the race struggle is not the same as that involved in the organic struggle, still it has the same effect, and results in the survival of the fittest, which, as all know, are not always the ideally best. But in pure sociology we are not dealing with ideals any more than we are in biology. We are dealing with facts and searching for truth, and the fact is that the course of human development has been characterized and determined by the struggle of races, peoples, and nations, and whatever progress has been attained has grown out of this struggle, which is a perfectly normal and healthy condition, and, properly understood, does not possess the evil and immoral attributes that have been ascribed to it. It is ethically colorless, or, as they say, amoral

or anethical, and is simply the consequence of a universal, even cosmical law of nature.

Nor has this historical study anything to do with the question of the abolition of war in the present advanced stage of civilization, unless, indeed, here as everywhere, an understanding of the past places us in a better condition for stating and solving that question. To accuse, as these writers do, the historical and scientific sociologists who have discovered and expounded the law and process of social development, of being for this reason apologists of war among modern nations, is a cheap rhetorical flourish, unworthy of anyone who aspires to be accounted a philosopher.

SOCIOLOGY: ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS RELATIONS¹

I

DEFINITIONS OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIETY

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Definitions of sociology.—As sociology is a new science and has not yet received a definite form, it is not to be wondered at that there are a number of different conceptions of the science and no universal agreement as to its definition. While this disagreement among sociologists themselves as to the conception and definition of their science is now far less than formerly, still it is necessary to point out to the student at the outset the existing conflict of opinion. Through comparison of definitions more or less faulty, moreover, we may hope to reach an approximately correct definition. Of course no ultimate definition of sociology will be attempted, as that can only be formulated when the final stages of the development of the science have been reached. We are concerned only with the working or tentative definition, such as every scientific worker must have in order to delimit his problems clearly from those of other sciences. There are at least six leading conceptions or definitions of sociology:

1. Perhaps the most common conception of sociology is that it is a science which treats of social evils and their remedies. This is indeed the popular conception of the science, but it has few or no supporters among sociologists themselves. Sociology deals with the normal rather than the abnormal in the social life. It is true that sociology deals to some extent with social evils, but it deals with them as incidents in normal social evolution rather than as its specific problems. Again this definition is open to criticism in that it confounds sociology with

¹ This paper constitutes the first four chapters of a text in sociology which Professor Ellwood has in preparation.—EDITOR.

scientific philanthropy, which is an applied science resting upon sociology and other social sciences. This conception of sociology must, accordingly, be pronounced erroneous.

2. A second definition of sociology which is often heard is that it is the science of society or of social phenomena. This conception of sociology is current among many scientific men, but it must be criticized as too broad and too vague. There are other sciences of society or of social phenomena than sociology. Economics and politics deal not less truly with social phenomena than sociology. If "the scientific treatment of any social phenomenon" is sociology, as an eminent authority has recently declared,² then it is difficult to see how there is any place left for the special social sciences. It would be difficult to see, for example, why the scientific treatment of trade and markets would not fall within the scope of sociology, rather than of economics. Such a definition would make sociology include all the special social sciences; it would make it, in effect, but a name for the totality or encyclopedia of the social sciences. In any case it is too vague to satisfy the requirements of a working-definition of a science. It may be noted in passing, however, that there is no objection to using sociology as an encyclopedic term for all the social sciences in some connections, such as classifications of the sciences, library classifications, philosophic summaries of knowledge, and the like.

3. Another definition of sociology is that it is the science of the phenomena of sociability. This definition has grown out of a narrow interpretation of the word "social" as used in the definition last given. It is evident that if the second definition is much too broad, this latter is much too narrow. The sympathetic or altruistic phenomena of society which are brought together under the term "sociability," though very important, are only one aspect of our social life. A science which treats of the phenomena of sociability could not be a general science of society, but only another special social science, co-ordinate with such sciences as economics and politics. Such a definition of sociology is usually not found explicitly stated in sociological texts, but

² Westermarck, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, p. 684.

it is often implicit in sociological theories, and needs to be noted as a type of definition of sociology.

4. A fourth type of definition of sociology is that which makes it "the science of human institutions." Under this head must be included Professor Ward's conception of sociology as "the science of human achievement,"³ although he uses achievement in a somewhat wider sense than the word "institutions" is generally used. While this definition indicates many of the most important problems which the sociologist investigates, and so in a general way marks off the field of sociology, yet it is open to criticism as being at once too broad and too narrow. It is too broad, because the special social sciences also deal with human institutions, though in a specific rather than in a general way. Thus politics deals with the origin, development, and workings of political institutions. But the chief objection to this definition of sociology is that it is too narrow. It leaves out of account all the ephemeral and transitory phenomena of society, such as mobs, crazes, fads, fashions, and crimes, all of which are important phenomena for the sociologist to understand.⁴ Moreover, it leaves out of consideration also the many instinctive activities connected with nutrition, reproduction, and defense against enemies, which human societies exhibit in common with animal societies, and which constitute no inconsiderable part of the everyday social life of a people.

5. A fifth type of definition of sociology is that which makes it the science of the order or organization of society. Under this class comes Professor Simmel's definition of sociology as "the science of the *forms* or *modes* of association."⁵ To this type also belong such definitions as "sociology is the science of social relations;" for in this case the problem emphasized is that of the organization of society. Now the problems of the organization of society, of the relations of individuals to one another in the social order, are undoubtedly among the most important problems of sociology; and much of the best sociological literature of the present is occupied with the

³ Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 15.

⁴ See Ross, *The Foundations of Sociology*, p. 5.

⁵ See *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 167.

discussion of these problems. This definition is good, then, as far as it goes; but modern science no longer throws the emphasis upon the static aspect of things, but rather upon change, development, evolution. A definition of sociology, accordingly, which makes it the science of social organization, is open to the objection that it neglects the most important problems of sociology, namely, the problems of social evolution.

6. A working definition of sociology may, then, be tentatively formulated as follows: *Sociology is the science of the organization and evolution of society.* This definition has the advantage of indicating at once the problems with which the sociologist deals, namely, problems of the organization, or order, of society, on the one hand, and problems of the evolution, or progress, of society, on the other. It meets, therefore, the requirements of a working definition of our science, in that it clearly delimits the problems of sociology from the problems of related sciences. It is worthy of note that this definition is very nearly that which Auguste Comte, the father of modern sociology, proposed, namely, "the science of the order and progress of society."⁶ The words "organization" and "evolution" are, however, broader terms than "order" and "progress," and are therefore preferable. "Order" connotes a stable, settled, and harmonious condition of the elements of society; while "organization" means any arrangement of the parts of society with reference to each other. Social organization is practically synonymous with social structure. "Progress" means advancement, change for the better; while "evolution" in the broad sense in which it is here used, comprehends change of every sort, whether for the better or the worse.⁷

⁶ *Positive Philosophy*, Book VI, chap. iii.

⁷ Of course, many other correct definitions of sociology might be formulated. The above definition we adopt simply because it serves to delimit clearly the problems of sociology from those of nearly allied sciences. As examples of others equally correct might be cited Professor Giddings' definition (*Principles of Sociology*, p. 5): "Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure, and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psychological causes working together in a process of evolution;" and also Professor Small's definition (*General Sociology*, p. 35): "Sociology is the science of the social process"—provided, of course, that we understand by "the social process" the whole process of social growth, development, and interaction, not one aspect of the process, such as the economic.

Definitions of society.—Our definition of sociology is still very far from clear until we define society. Unfortunately the conceptions of society are as varied as the conceptions of sociology. Indeed, it may be doubted whether the word "society" is capable of exact scientific definition.⁸ In defining it, there is all the difficulty of giving a loose popular term, which is continually shifting in its meaning a definite scientific content. The real fact which the sociologist is trying to get at is better expressed by the word "association." Our use of the word "society" in the definition of sociology is, therefore, merely provisional. But in the historical development of sociology the word has been used, and it seems best to continue its usage on that account, pointing out to the student its varied meanings in sociological literature. We must note the chief of these:

1. A majority of the older sociologists used the word society as practically synonymous with the word nation. A society in their minds was "a body of people politically organized into an independent government," i. e., a nation. These sociologists have been called, not inaptly, "the national sociologists." No sociologist of the present would defend such a confusion of terms as this must be admitted to be. But the nation, as the most imposing social structure, legitimately occupies a central place in the sociologist's thought.

2. Another definition of society, proposed by those who have seen the impossibility of limiting the concept of society to the national group, is that "a society is all that group of people that have a common civilization," or "who are the bearers of a certain type of culture." A society, according to this conception, might be much more extensive than a nation, but could hardly be smaller. But if the confusing of society with the nation must be criticized as unduly limiting the concept of society and the work of the sociologist, much more must the confusing of society with the cultural group be criticized for the same reason. Such an arbitrary limitation upon the meaning of a term could scarcely be justified upon grounds of scientific necessity. It would be far better to take the term society with all the breadth

⁸ See Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 183, 184.

and variety of meaning which popular usage has given it, and try to give it a scientific content by finding a common element in its varying usages. All recent attempts at the definition of society have been directed to this end.

3. As an example of such definition we might cite the definition of society proposed by Professor Fairbanks: "Any group of men who are bound together in relations more or less permanent."⁹ This is substantially a correct definition of the term society as it is used in a concrete sense by most sociologists of today. It is, however, somewhat vague as to what sort of relations constitute a society. It fails to specify that these relations are not those of mere contiguity in time and space, but are those of *psychical interaction*.

4. Any group of interacting individuals, we may say roughly, then, constitutes a society. But this definition must be qualified in at least two respects to give it scientific precision. In the first place we do not usually speak of individuals of different species as constituting a society. We regard a society as made up of individuals of the same species; and this limitation of the concept is convenient, and even necessary from a scientific point of view. To this extent Professor Giddings is undoubtedly right in insisting that similarity, resemblance, both physical and psychical, is the basis of society.¹⁰ Without at least the amount of resemblance which is found among individuals of the same species, society, in the scientific meaning of the word, is impossible. When we speak of individuals as the constituent units of society, therefore, we assume that they are individuals of the same species.

In the second place we do not think of the individuals of a group as constituting a society unless they are *psychically* interdependent. Mere physiological interdependence is not sufficient to constitute a society. When we speak of groups of plants or other low organisms as constituting "societies" it is probable that we are using the term metaphorically, or else attributing to them some degree of psychic life. If we accept these two qualifications

⁹ Fairbanks, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 3.

¹⁰ Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, chaps. i, vi, and vii.

a correct definition of society in the concrete sense would be *any group of psychically interacting individuals of the same species*.

It may be asked if another qualification should not be added to our definition, namely, that the individuals of the group be friendly disposed toward one another. But it is evident that hostility may exist among the members of a group and that it may be but a phase of their social life. Indeed, conflict between individuals usually arises because of their social relations (psychical interactions), not because they are socially unrelated. The concept of society cannot, then, be regarded as implying exclusively friendly relations. However, the prevailing relations between the members of a group are friendly, and conflict may be regarded as a sort of negative and destructive element in the total life of the group. Practically, therefore, the internal conflicts of a group may be disregarded in a constructive view of its life-history. Ultimately all the members of a group work together in the carrying-on of a common life-process. In this sense they may be said to co-operate. If we mean by co-operation nothing more than this living together and working together in a common life, we shall be substantially correct if we define society as *any group of individuals who either unconsciously (instinctively) or consciously (reflectively) co-operate*.¹¹

Thus a society may be constituted as readily by two or three individuals as by a million. The only criterion by which we may decide whether any group constitutes a society or not is its possession or non-possession of the essential mark of a society, namely, *the functional interdependence of its members on the psychical side*. According to this view a family and a nation, a debating club and a civilization, are equally entitled to the appellation of society, and to be objects of the sociologist's investigation. As Stuckenberg has put it,

Society is created whenever men pass from isolation to a relation of co-operation or antagonism, of mutuality and reciprocity; whenever they affect each other as stimuli. . . . Society [is] constituted by the mental interaction of individuals, *that is the essential idea*.¹²

¹¹ Compare Professor Giddings' definition of animal society in his *Inductive Sociology*, p. 5.

¹² The first writer to define society as essentially an interaction of individuals (and so as a process), so far as I can discover, was Professor Simmel, of the

It is evident that society is but a broad term standing for the psychical interactions of individuals. It is practically a verbal noun, that is, it is the name of a process, and but little narrower than the abstract term "association." When used abstractly, indeed, it is synonymous with this latter term, meaning the interaction of individuals. It is frequently convenient to use the word society in an abstract sense and when so used in this book it will mean "the reciprocal interactions of individuals." Substituting this phrase in our definition of sociology we get the following: *Sociology is the science of the organization and evolution of the reciprocal interactions of individuals.*

Even this definition, the reader must be warned, like all formal definitions, falls far short of presenting an adequate conception of sociology. Such a conception we hope, however, can be gained from a perusal of the following pages. We hope to show that what the sociologist is interested in is not so much the organizations and institutions of society as the associational processes which lie back of these, the processes of individual interaction which constitute them;¹³ and that sociology, in seeking such a fundamental view of the social life, necessarily becomes a biology and psychology of these associational processes.

Definition of social.—Much confusion has been introduced into sociological discussions through the lax use of the word "social." The same writer not infrequently uses it in three or four different senses, shifting from one meaning to another without warning to the reader. Of course, when this adjective is properly used, it should correspond in meaning to the word society, signifying, "of, pertaining to, relating to, society." In accordance with our definition of society, therefore, the word social means "that which relates to, pertains to, the interactions of individuals." In other words, *the social is that which involves the interaction of*

University of Berlin (see his *Soziale Differenzierung*, pp. 12-20). In the work of Stuckenberg from which the above quotation was taken (*Sociology: The Science of Human Society*) the idea is expanded through several pages (Vol. I, pp. 80-102). Professor Small (*General Sociology*, chap. i) and Professor Hayes (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 750-765) have so developed and emphasized this idea that it must now be regarded as a postulate for sociology.

¹³ See Professor Hayes's article on "Sociology a Study of Processes," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 750-765.

two or more individuals. *Social phenomena* are, accordingly, as Professor Ross says in effect, "all phenomena which we cannot explain without bringing in the action of one individual upon another."¹⁴

"Social," then, is a comprehensive term including the economic, political, moral, religious, educational, and other phenomena arising from the interactions of individuals. The economic, political, etc., is not to be distinguished from the social, save as one aspect or phase of the social. Economic and political problems, for example, are at the same time social problems; but not all social problems are economic or political problems. Social problems are economic, political, moral, religious, educational, etc., problems or problems which involve several or all of these aspects of the social life—problems, in other words, which are wider and deeper than any single phase of society. It is this latter class of problems which particularly deserve to be spoken of as sociological problems; but these we shall discuss later.

Unfortunately the word social is not used popularly in the strict scientific way in which we have defined it, but is used with a variety of loose meanings attached to it. It is especially used as nearly synonymous with the word "sociable." The scientific student of society, however, has little excuse for using the word in a loose sense. He can always find some other word, or make use of some qualifying phrase, when it is necessary to express a narrower idea than that which logically attaches itself to the word "social" from its connection with the term "society."¹⁵

Animal societies.—It will be noticed that in the definitions of sociology, society, and social, we have avoided the use of the words "man," "human being," "humanity," and the like. This is because there are animal groups from which we cannot well

¹⁴ *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 7.

¹⁵ Because of the narrow meaning often given to the word "social," several writers have proposed other adjectives, such as "societal" and "societary," to mean "of, or pertaining to, society." But there is no good reason why the word "social" should not be given in the social sciences this broad meaning, which, as we have already said, logically attaches to it; and such is rapidly becoming the best scientific usage.

withhold the name of "societies," because they have all the characteristics of societies as we have described them. Such, for example, are the groups formed by the so-called "social insects," the ants, bees, and wasps, and the groups formed by many birds and mammals. Objectively and even subjectively, so far as we can see, these groups conform to the definition of society which we have accepted. While there are vast differences between these animal societies and human societies, these differences are specific, and not generic. The theory of evolution has broken down the wall which so long separated the human from the animal world, and no longer permits us to regard human nature and human inter-relations as something altogether peculiar and isolated. It is, in fact, impossible to define society in such a way as to include all human groups and *only* human groups, without resort to some arbitrary procedure. The fact of society is wider, then, than the fact of humanity.

The question arises, therefore, whether sociology should take account of animal groups as well as of human groups. If we assume the evolution of the human from the sub-human there can be only one answer to this question: Sociology must take animal societies into account. Just as psychology cannot stop with the study of the human mind, but goes on to study the manifestations of mental life even in the lowest animal forms in order to throw light upon the nature of mind; so sociology cannot stop with the study of human interactions, but must go on to study the lowest type of psychical interactions found among animal forms, in order to throw light upon the nature of society.

But it must be admitted that the psychologist's interest in the mental life of animals is prompted by his desire to explain the mental life of man. So, too, the sociologist's interest in animal societies is prompted solely by his desire to explain human societies. In each case the human remains the center of interest. But because we believe that we cannot understand a thing unless we understand it in its genesis, and because we believe, furthermore, that the origin of nearly all important elements in human nature is to be found below the human line, we are forced to study animal mental and social life in order to understand fully

the social life of man. Sociology is, therefore, essentially a human science; and its comparative chapters form but a brief introduction to its treatment of human problems. It would be substantially correct to define sociology in human terms—as *the science of the organization and evolution of human societies*, were it not that some sociologists have denied that sociology has any comparative chapters; that animal association can throw any light upon human association. The elementary considerations on modern scientific method which we have here introduced are sufficient to refute this position; and to establish the proposition that sociology, though distinctively a human science, must take into account at every step the facts of the animal life below man.

II

THE SUBJECT-MATTER AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGY

The subject-matter of sociology.—Considerable controversy has existed over the question as to whether sociology has an independent subject-matter or not. It is evident from our definition of sociology, however, that its subject-matter is the same as that of all the social sciences. The only difference between the subject-matter of sociology and a special social science, like economics, for example, is that sociology takes the whole field of social phenomena for its subject-matter while economics takes only one section or phase of social phenomena, namely, the industrial phase. In the same way biology or physics has no distinctive subject-matter apart from the specialisms which exist under them. Sociology, then, like all general sciences, has no distinctive subject-matter of its own. This is true, however, more or less of all sciences. The distinction between the sciences is not one of subject-matter, but of problems. The same subject-matter may be investigated by several sciences, but always from different points of view, that is, with reference to different problems. Thus a movement of the human body may be investigated with reference to certain problems by the physiologist, and with reference to quite different problems by the psychologist. The truth is that there are no hard and fast lines in nature upon which to base the divisions between the sciences. The present

divisions have grown up as a result of the division of labor between scientific investigators and are largely matters of convenience. That is, they are largely teleological divisions, based upon the different problems before the minds of different investigators.

The subject-matter of sociology is, then, social phenomena, in the broad sense in which that term has been defined; or as Professor Small has somewhat more happily phrased it, "the process of human association."¹⁶ The sociologist considers this process as a whole, in its totality, and especially in its more fundamental aspects; while the students of the special social sciences study special phases of the same process. Thus the same objective social fact, say the French Revolution, may serve as scientific material for the sociologist, the economist, the political scientist, and many other investigators.

The unit of investigation in sociology is a topic which has occasioned considerable discussion among sociologists. It is not apparent, however, that a science must have but one unit of investigation,¹⁷ and the outcome of the discussion has been to indicate a number of units of investigation which may be used. Among the more important of these are: (1) the *socius*, or associated individual, the member of society, the unit out of which all the simpler social groups are composed: (2) the *group* of associated individuals, whether the groups are natural, genetic groups, or artificial, functional groups; (3) the *institution*, which we may here define as a grouping or relation of individuals that is accepted, usually expressly sanctioned, by a society.

It is evident that all of these units, and many more, may be employed by the sociologist in investigating social organization and evolution. The object of the sociologist's attention is always, however, as Professor Hayes has demonstrated, *the associational process*, that is, the psychical interactions of individuals.¹⁸ Some phase of the social process is, then, always the real unit of sociological investigation. It may be communication, sugges-

¹⁶ *General Sociology*, chap. i.

¹⁷ Compare Ross, *The Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 85-99.

¹⁸ See *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 750-765.

tion, imitation, competition, co-operation, or any one of the many minor processes which go to make up the whole process of social organization and evolution. It is these *processes of individual interaction* and their many complications which the sociologist investigates and is bent on explaining. As soon as he shifts his attention from the interactions between individuals to the individual himself, he is no longer a sociologist, but a psychologist or a biologist, for the object of his attention is then either the states of consciousness of the individual or his physical characteristics. The *socius* can, then, be a "unit of investigation" in sociology only in so far as he is considered a functional element in the associational process.

The problems of sociology.—Our definition of sociology has already indicated that the problems of sociology fall into two great classes: (1) problems of the organization¹⁹ of society, and (2) problems of the evolution of society.

The problems of the organization of society are problems of the relations of individuals to one another, and to institutions and of institutions to one another. Ultimately all these problems reduce themselves to the problem of the types of interaction found among the individuals of a given group at any given time. Specifically, such problems are, for example, the nature of the forces which draw and hold men together in certain forms of association; the various forms or modes of association; the influence of various elements in human nature upon the social order; the influence of physical factors upon the constitution of a society; how men act in groups or co-operate; how ideals, standards, public sentiment, and the like dominate the individual and shape social activities; in short, how all forces or influences

¹⁹ It must be admitted that the word "organization" is not exactly a happy one, since, as the problems mentioned indicate, it is meant to cover both the "structural" and "functional" aspects of society. If, however, it be remembered that in sociology we are dealing always with processes, not with fixed structures, it will be seen that an organization or co-ordination of processes is what is essentially involved in both the so-called structural and functional aspects of society. Organization, in this broad sense of social co-ordination, then, may be used to cover all problems of a hypothetically stationary society.

No attempt is made in this section to give a full list of the problems with which sociology deals. It is attempted only to show that all the problems of pure

operate to give a society a certain form or arrangement at any given moment. The problems of social organization, then, are problems of a hypothetically stationary society. They are such problems as arise from studying society in cross-section, as it were, when no question as to changes in society is raised. For this reason Comte called the division of sociology which deals with such problems "social statics;" many recent sociologists would prefer to call it "social structure."

The problems of the evolution of society are problems of the changes in the type of social organization; that is, in the type of individual interactions. Under this head comes the important problem of the origin of society in general—that is, of psychic group-life—and of human society in particular. But aside from the problem of origin, the problems of social evolution are mainly two, namely, the causes of social progress, that is, advancement toward a higher, more complex type of social organization; and the causes of social decline or degeneration, that is, reversion to lower and simpler forms of organization. The former problem is, of course, the more important of the two, the latter being merely its negative aspect. Indeed, the problem of social progress is, perhaps, the central problem of sociology, the one to which all other problems lead up. Hence the chief purpose of sociology may be said to be to develop a scientific theory of social progress. The study of social evolution, then—that is, of the factors which produce social changes of all sorts, from those of fashions to great industrial and political revolutions—is the vital part of sociology. The problems of change, development, in society are evidently problems of movement. Hence Comte proposed that this division of society be called social dynamics, as "dynamics" in his time was the name of that part of physics which dealt with

sociology may be classified under one of two heads: (1) social organization (in the broad sense explained above); (2) social evolution. A careful survey of the problems dealt with by modern sociologists will show that they can all readily be classified under one or the other of these two headings, save, perhaps, problems in social ethics, which, as I shall show later, do not belong in pure sociology. Other classifications of sociological problems are of course possible, and may be easily reconciled with this most fundamental classification; as e.g., the classification into biological problems and psychological problems.

the laws of motion. Recent sociologists usually call this part of sociology genetic sociology, or simply social evolution.

Static and dynamic sociology.—Shall we, then, preserve the old distinction between static and dynamic sociology? It is worthy of note that even Comte, who made this distinction, said that he made it merely for purposes of scientific analysis, and that it must not be considered as involving “any real separation of the science into two parts.”²⁰ The truth is that no problem in social organization can be deeply investigated without running into the problem of social evolution. We cannot study social structure without being led insensibly into questions of origin and development; on the other hand, we cannot study social evolution without considering the structure affected. Complete sociological theory, therefore, does not admit of division into static and dynamic portions. The distinction is merely one of problems, and arises through scientific analysis. It is a useful distinction in sociological investigations and for pedagogical purposes, but it cannot be maintained in a systematic presentation of sociological theory, as all recent sociological writers have discovered.

Moreover, the terms “static” and “dynamic” are borrowed from physics, and are not particularly happy terms when used to describe social processes. As noted above, terms borrowed from the biological sciences are coming to replace these borrowed from physical science in recent sociological discussions. Thus social morphology is used instead of social statics, and genetic sociology instead of social dynamics. But it must be admitted that these new terms are scarcely more happy than those borrowed from physical science; indeed, in some respects they fail to convey the meaning as clearly as the older terms. There is, after all, little in names, provided they are used with clear and definite connotations. The adjectives “static” and “dynamic” are often convenient in the social sciences, and there can be no good objection to their use, since they have been adopted into the vocabulary of nearly all the sciences. We shall continue to speak of the “static” and “dynamic” aspects of soci-

²⁰ *Positive Philosophy*, Book VI, chap. iii.

ology, therefore, without implying, on the one hand, any separation of the science into two parts, and, on the other hand, any close analogy between physical and social conditions and changes.

The relation of sociology to social description.—Some sociologists have created another division of sociology which they term descriptive sociology, made up of descriptions of social activities and institutions. It is true that all science presupposes descriptive material. Thus political science presupposes the description of actual government, economics the description of commerce and industry, biology the descriptive material which we term natural history. But it is true also that mere description is never science. Science, in the strict sense, is always explanatory, it is a higher generalization, revealing laws, causes, and principles. As Professor Small says, "Like all genuine science, sociology is not interested in facts as such. It is interested only in relations, meanings, valuations, in which facts reappear in essentials."²¹

Moreover, another difficulty in creating a descriptive division in sociology, which shall be recognized, is the fact that the field of social description is already covered by three well-recognized departments of knowledge, namely, ethnography, demography, and history; ethnography describing the savage, barbarous, and semi-civilized peoples; demography, describing the contemporaneous societies of civilized peoples; and history describing the past events among the civilized. It has been somewhat of a puzzle which of these three, descriptive sociology should be identified with. Mr. Spencer, in a famous passage,²² identified descriptive sociology with history—as it ought to be written. Most other sociologists have tended to identify it with demography; while some have not hesitated to assume that the only social description worthy of attention by the sociologist was to be found in ethnography. It is evident, however, that the descriptive material which the sociologist must make use of is to be found in all three of the above disciplines.

It would seem that the best way out of the difficulty is to drop the use of the term "descriptive sociology," just as we do

²¹ *General Sociology*, p. 15.

²² *Study of Sociology*, Preface to American edition, p. iv.

not speak of a "descriptive biology." Its use only adds to the confusion already existing as to the relation of sociology to the above three disciplines. There can be no objection, however, to using the term to designate special organizations of descriptive material from the above sources for sociological purposes. This, in effect, is what Mr. Spencer attempted to do in his vast work entitled *Descriptive Sociology*.

III

THE RELATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY TO OTHER SCIENCES

THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE SPECIAL SOCIAL SCIENCES

The relation of sociology to the special social sciences, economics, politics, ethics, and the like, has been often compared to the relation of a trunk of a tree to the branches. Perhaps, as Professor Ross has suggested, the tree in question should be thought of as a banyan tree,²³ as many of these sciences have independent roots in psychology and biology. All of these sciences, however, derive their significance from the fact that they deal with some phase of human interactions; and they are, therefore, properly styled the special social sciences. The economics, the morality, the religion of a perfectly isolated being, if such could be thought of, would be something far different from the things we know under those names in human society. As was said above, the special social sciences deal with special phases or aspects of the social life; and they do this by a process of scientific abstraction, that is, by studying these phases as more or less separate, or abstracted, from the total social life. They are all, therefore, in a certain sense one-sided sciences of society; while sociology, dealing as it does with the total social reality, must be thought of as the all-sided science of society.

The relation of sociology to the other social sciences, however, is a purely logical relation, and can be fully described only in logical terms. It is the relation of the general to the special. The special social sciences, as the name implies, deal with problems which are relatively specific and concrete, concerning only

²³ *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 27.

one section or aspect of the social process. Their generalizations are, therefore, relatively partial and incomplete. Sociology, on the other hand, tries to reach generalizations of a higher order, and to present a general or complete view of the social reality. The social problems which are of a general nature, therefore, that is, those which pertain to the social process as a whole, are left by the special social sciences to sociology. What these problems are has already been pointed out.

Moreover, the special social sciences are not logically competent to deal with these general social problems, as their basis of induction is not sufficiently wide. In the past, this fact has not always been sufficiently appreciated by workers in the special social sciences, and the result has been many one-sided theories of the social life. Thus an economist in constructing a theory of social progress would naturally give undue prominence to economic factors, and perhaps even subordinate other factors altogether. This Karl Marx and other students of economic conditions have actually done. It was, in part, as a protest against such "fractional" views of the social life that sociology came into existence. The special social sciences, when pursued by themselves, necessarily furnish only fractional views of the social life-process; they must find their logical completion, therefore, in a general science of society which shall furnish a complete view of social organization and evolution.

The relation of sociology to the special social sciences may, perhaps, be illustrated by the relation of general philosophy, as a *scientia scientiarum*, to all the sciences. Modern philosophy is not indifferent to the sciences, but is, in one sense, to be regarded as a result of the synthesis of all of them. The several sciences, dealing as they do each with but narrow segments of reality, necessarily present but partial views of the universe; to philosophy is left the task of combining these partial views into a complete and ultimate picture of the universal reality. To philosophy, therefore, are left the ultimate and universal problems, such as the nature of mind and matter, the ultimate relations between these two, the nature of causation, etc. In this sense, the relation of philosophy to the several sciences is similar to the relation of

sociology to the special social sciences. The matter might be further illustrated by considering the relation of any general science to the special sciences under it. Thus biology may be considered a synthesis of all the biological sciences, and to it are turned over the general problems of organic life, such as the origin and evolution of species, the nature of nutrition and reproduction, the causes of variation, the theory of heredity, and the like. While these illustrations are imperfect, it is manifest that the relation of sociology to the special social sciences must be of the same general character as the relation of any general science to the special sciences under it.

There has been some debate as to whether sociology should be regarded as a synthesis of the special social sciences or as a science fundamental to these. The question could have arisen only through confusion of the logical relations between problems. All the general sciences are at the same time synthetic in method and fundamental in character. Their fundamental character is wholly a result of the wideness of their syntheses. Their generalizations are not only much wider than those attempted by the special sciences, but, because they are wider, they are also much deeper. Now, sociology, as we have said, attempts generalizations much wider than the special social sciences; and for that very reason its generalizations are of a fundamental character. But it is only through the synthesis—the seeing together—of all social phenomena that such fundamental generalizations can be effected. Hence, sociology is correctly conceived as a result of the synthesis of the special social sciences. At the same time it is well to remember that we mean by this, not a summing-up of the special social sciences, but rather an all-sided generalization of the social process. Hence, sociology is the fundamental science of the social life, the basis of the social sciences as well as their logical completion.

It must be evident from all that has been said that the practical relations between students of sociology and students of the special social sciences should be those of sympathetic and helpful co-operation. The sociologist needs to know at every point in his work the results of the special social sciences, and, on the

other hand, in order that he may have a proper point of view, a proper perspective, the worker in the special social sciences must be well grounded in sociology.

The dangers of isolation of the special social sciences from sociology and of sociology from these sciences are very grave dangers. Overspecialization in any one social science must be discouraged if one-sided views of social reality are not to prevail. Human life is a unity, and it must be studied in all of its aspects, on all of its sides, if a true conception of it is to be attained. Accordingly we shall emphasize the close interdependence of the several social sciences with sociology and of sociology with these sciences in discussing the relations of sociology with each of them. We shall now note briefly the more important of these sciences and the close interrelations between them and sociology.

1. *Economics*.—First among the special social sciences must be placed economics. This is primary among them because it deals with that phase of the social life which is concerned with the production and distribution of the material means of subsistence. To be more exact, it is "the science of those social phenomena to which the wealth-getting and wealth-using activity of man gives rise;²⁴ or in the language of another authority, it "treats of the commercial and industrial activities of men from the standpoint of values and markets."²⁵ It is evident, whichever of these definitions one adopts, that economics deals with a most fundamental phase of man's activity as a social being—the problems connected with the production and distribution of wealth. Its importance, therefore, in understanding the total social life, to the sociologist, cannot be too highly estimated.

On the other hand, economics, more than any other social science, has been guilty of claiming for itself more of the total field of social science than it is justly entitled to. Some economists have even attempted to make it a general science of the organization and evolution of society as a whole. These unjustifiable extensions of economics have been due, in part, to loose and careless definitions, as when it is defined as "the science of

²⁴ Ely, *Outlines of Economics*, p. 82.

²⁵ Davenport, *Outlines of Economic Theory*, p. 2.

values," or "the science of the mind as utilizing."²⁶ Such terms as "value" and "utilization," it is only necessary to remark, are much broader than the economic sphere, and their use in definition leads to a confusion and haziness as to the problems of the science. More often, however, the unjustifiable extensions of economics have been due to the assumption that the economic activities of man, because of their primary character, determine all his other activities. The fallacy of this assumption lies in assuming that what is primitive, or rather what manifests itself primitively, contains all the factors of future development. The resulting view of social organization and evolution as exclusively determined by economic factors is, of course, exceedingly one-sided and untrue to the reality. All of this argues the importance of sociology, as a science of social first principles, for economics as well as for the other social sciences; in brief, that economics must be grounded upon sociology. The economist, indeed, can less afford to dispense with the guidance which the sociological view-point can give him than the sociologist can afford to dispense with the knowledge of facts and principles which economics can furnish. Sociology is indispensable for economics, and economics is indispensable for sociology, if both are to attain the character of realistic science.

2. *Political science and jurisprudence.*—Among the oldest of the social sciences is the science of politics or government. It was first systematized by Aristotle, and down to the modern era may be said to have been almost the sole recognized representative of the social sciences.²⁷ Its relations with sociology are most intimate. The state is the most visible manifestation of social organization; it is the most imposing, if not the most important, social institution. Hence it is of direct concern to the sociologist. Still there is little excuse for regarding sociology as simply an enlarged political science, or for thinking, on the other hand, that political science will be absorbed by sociology. Political science deals with that aspect or phase of man's social life which

²⁶ Sherwood, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September, 1897.

²⁷ Previous to the nineteenth century ethics was not recognized as a social science.

is manifest in government. While the phenomenon of authority or control is universal in all human groups, political science deals only with the organized authority, manifest in the state, which we call government. Among its chief problems are the origin, nature, forms, and functions of government, the nature and location of sovereignty, and methods of administration.

An important branch of political science is jurisprudence. This is the science of law. Its problems are the nature, genesis, and historical development of law. In its comparative portions it brings together many facts concerning the customs and institutions of different peoples, which makes it closely akin to sociology.

It is evident, then, that political science and jurisprudence are both closely related to sociology. Government and law are two of the most important aspects of human social organization and evolution; and they cannot be understood without understanding the principles which underlie all social organization and evolution. On the other hand, these aspects of the human social process, because of their importance, present problems of their own, and there can be no doubt that they are legitimate fields for independent special sciences. But they will achieve their best development, and sociology will achieve its best development by a recognition of mutual interdependence.

3. *The science of religion.*—By the science of religion is meant, not theology, a metaphysical inquiry into the nature and attributes of God; but a study of the actual phenomena of religious belief and practice among men. An important section is called comparative religion. Its problems are the origin, nature, forms, and functions of both religious beliefs and religious practices. To superficial thought, religion seems to be wholly an individual matter. But close study has shown that nothing is so inextricably interwoven with the social life of man as religion. Not only are the forms of religious belief and practice frequently an outcome of a particular social organization or stage of social evolution; but every type of civilization seems to rest upon a particular form of religious belief. Religious phenomena are, then, social phenomena, and the science of religion is a social

science, though like all the other social sciences it has independent roots in psychology. It is as yet in a comparatively undeveloped and unsystematized condition and its development must come through establishing it definitely upon a sociological basis. On the other hand, sociology needs the enrichment which will come from a scientific study of religious phenomena from the social point of view.

4. *Ethics*.—The relations of ethics to sociology need careful consideration, as those relations are more complex than in the cases of the sciences which we have just considered. Ethics is a science of norms and ideals; it is concerned with the right or wrong of human conduct, and its problem is what ought to be in human life. There can be no doubt that ethics is a social science, since its problems are those of human interaction. On this account some eminent sociologists have considered it to be merely a part of sociology. This was the earlier position of Comte, who at first gave no place to ethics among the sciences. Later in life, however, he recognized the relatively independent position of ethics as a science. On the other hand, there have been many ethical thinkers who have seen in sociology nothing but an extension of ethics. Ethics, they say, has a right to inquire into all phases of human relationships in order to determine the principles of right and wrong, and in their opinion, sociology is simply such an inquiry.

Here we have the old familiar situation. One group of thinkers maintaining that a special social science (in this case ethics) has no right to exist because its field can be covered by sociology; and another group maintaining that sociology has no right to exist because its field can be covered by other sciences (in this case, ethics). As in all of these cases we shall find reasons for pronouncing both of these extreme views radically wrong. Ethics cannot be reduced to a mere chapter in sociology, because its problems are sufficiently distinct and important to constitute it a relatively independent science. Nor can sociology be regarded as a mere extension of ethics, because its problems are not only distinct from, but fundamental to, those of ethics.

Yet it is impossible to separate ethics from sociology or

sociology from ethics in any hard and fast way. It is impossible to study the various types of social organization without indicating the superiority and inferiority of the various types; or to study social evolution without indicating advantageous and disadvantageous adjustments, tendencies toward social survival or social extinction. In general, it is impossible for the human mind to study social conditions without perceiving maladjustments or possible economies not realized; or to formulate a theory of human progress without implications of social obligation. This is not saying that sociology is ethics or ethics sociology; but it is saying that a system of ethics grows spontaneously out of a system of sociology; and that the attempt to exclude all ethical implications and judgments from sociology is not only futile and childish, but undesirable. It is the business of sociology to furnish a foundation for ethics; hence it is desirable to recognize in sociology ethical implications. And such will be frankly the practice of this book.

On the other hand, ethics cannot discuss the ideal for human life, whether individual or social, without taking into account actual social conditions. If it is to be a science of "the good for man," it must build up its conception of the good out of the tendencies and potencies of actual human society. Moreover, there can be no application of ethical principles to actual human life without involving again a consideration of the principles of social organization and evolution. All this is equivalent to saying that scientific ethics must be founded upon sociology. But this is not saying that ethics does not rest, though less immediately, like all the other social sciences, upon psychology; nor is it denying that ethics has metaphysical projections, which are, however, in our opinion, of more interest to the metaphysician than to the ethicist proper.

What, then, is the exact relation of ethics to sociology? Before finally answering this question it will be well to recall that ethics is a normative science, that is, a science of values and ideals. In character, then, it is midway between a pure science and an applied science. All the social sciences, however, may be said to have implicit normative aspects, sociology being the gen-

eral science which furnishes the basis for the synthesis of their implied norms and ideals. Now ethics takes these norms and ideals and develops them and synthesizes them. *Ethics, in its widest sense, is, therefore, the normative aspect of the social sciences.* In its narrowest sense, as the principles of right conduct for the individual, ethics may be regarded as the synthesis of the normative aspects of sociology, psychology, and biology. But inasmuch as the sociological comprehends the psychological and biological, it would be sufficiently accurate to say that individual ethics is the normative aspect of sociology, looked at from the individual point of view, while social ethics would be the normative aspect of sociology, looked at from the collective point of view.²⁸ The various special branches of social ethics, such as political ethics, industrial ethics, and the like, of course rest especially upon the corresponding social sciences.

Scientific ethics, then, presupposes a scientific sociology, as Professor Small and others have clearly shown,²⁹ and in large measure the development of the one must await the development of the other. The independence of ethics from sociology as a science, as in the case of all the other social sciences, is a matter of methodological expediency, of the division of labor, not of difference of subject-matter. The various social sciences cannot explain what is and what has been in human society without showing, at least by implication, what must be if human progress continues, that is, *what ought to be*. On the other hand, these sciences are not complete until their normative implications have been developed and harmonized by a general science of ethics; in other words, they find their completion in ethics. The relations between ethics and the other social sciences are, then, relations of mutual interdependence, and this is especially true of the relations of ethics and sociology. The scientific moralist and

²⁸ It is doubtful whether there should be any division of ethics into individual and social, since every ethical question has both its individual and social aspects. But these terms have come into common usage, and it seems best to indicate that they came from looking at the same body of principles from different points of view (individual and collective).

²⁹ Small, *The Significance of Sociology for Ethics*; also *General Sociology*, pp. 674-96.

the sociologist should, therefore, work hand in hand, for they are both working at the great problem of human welfare, the one directly, the other indirectly.

5. *Education*.—The science of education, or pedagogy, as it used to be called, is an applied science. On the one side it is concerned with the development of the latent powers and capacities of the individual; on the other with the adjustment of the individual to society, the initiation of the individual into the social life. The science of education thus has two sides—one psychological and the other sociological; in other words, it is an application of psychology and sociology. The psychological aspects of educational science have been sufficiently emphasized, but it is only recently that its sociological aspects have begun to receive attention. It must be evident, however, that if education may be regarded from one point of view, as the fitting of the individual for full and complete membership in the social life, it should proceed with full consciousness of what the needs and requirements of the social life are. There can be no such thing as a scientific educational program without an understanding of the first principles of the social life.

Moreover, education should be not simply the development and adjustment of the individual; it should aid in social evolution, regenerate society, by fitting the individual for a higher type of social life than that at present achieved. And to do this requires an insight into the principles of social evolution as well as an understanding of human nature. The science of education rests, therefore, equally upon sociology and psychology. The educator who would use the educational system as a means of social progress should have a profound knowledge of the principles of social organization and evolution; and even the humblest teacher who comes to his task equipped with such knowledge would find a significance and meaning in his work which he could hardly otherwise obtain.

6. *The applied social sciences*. Many sociologists speak of an "applied sociology;" but it is doubtful if there is such a discipline, or division of sociology. Rather, sociology, like most of the general sciences, serves as a basis, not for one, but for

many, applied sciences. Thus biology is the basis for those applied sciences which are grouped together under the term "the medical sciences." It is also largely the basis of the applied sciences of agriculture and horticulture. But we hardly ever speak of "applied biology." There is scarcely more propriety in speaking of applied sociology, though the term might be justified, (1) as a name for such an organization of the principles of sociology as will show their practical bearing upon human life, which is the sense in which Dr. Ward uses it;³⁰ or (2) as a name for an organization of all our knowledge of practical means and methods of improving social conditions, for which Professor Henderson has proposed the name of "social technology."³¹ In our opinion, however, it would be better if the term "applied sociology" were dropped altogether.

Besides education, among the more important applied social sciences are philanthropy, social economy, and social politics. The best organized of these is philanthropy, or charitology, as it is sometimes called. This deals with the abnormal classes in society, that is, the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes, their genesis, social treatment, and prevention. It has numerous subdivisions, one of the most important being penology, which deals with the social treatment of the criminal class. The science of philanthropy is perhaps the best developed of any of the special social sciences, resting as it does immediately upon a practical art; and, in its broadest sense, it has good grounds for claiming to be the applied department of sociology. However this question may be decided, it is evident that the relation of the science of philanthropy to sociology is very similar to the relation of the science of medicine to biology. The tendency to develop a science of philanthropy apart from sociology, is, therefore, to be regretted; and the tendency of some sociologists to ignore the work being done in the field of scientific philanthropy is equally regrettable. Just as many valuable contributions to biology have come through the development of medical science

³⁰ In his *Applied Sociology*.

³¹ Henderson, "The Scope of Social Technology," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, pp. 465-86.

and art; and just as the development of biology has reacted to deepen and broaden medical science; so similar results can be expected from the close co-operation of the sociologist and the scientific social-worker.

Social economy is an ill-defined term which has lately been used to cover the whole field of social betterment, and so as synonymous with philanthropy in the widest sense. Strictly, however, it should be applied only to the betterment of economic conditions, that is, to industrial betterment. In this sense, it may be regarded as an application of sociology and economics to a particular phase of the social life. Social politics is a term loosely used to designate the science and art of bettering social conditions through the agency of the state or government. It may be regarded as an application of sociology and political science.

However the various applied social sciences may be defined, it is evident that they overlap; that they are closely related to sociology and the other social sciences, and that they are of interest to the sociologist.

THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO HISTORY

There remains to be considered the relations of sociology to one other body of knowledge which concerns human society, and that is history. Personally, I prefer not to call history a science, although it uses scientific methods; it is rather descriptive material preliminary to science, which is a higher generalization of facts into laws and principles. As we have already seen, some sociologists, notably Spencer, would make history synonymous with descriptive sociology. We are now speaking, of course, of written history, history in the subjective sense. But to understand the relations of sociology to history in this sense, one must first understand the relation of sociology to objective history.

Objective history is simply that which actually occurs in human societies; it is the procession of events in the entire life of humanity. History, in this sense, is evidently but a convenient name for the whole movement of human societies from the

beginning of human life up to the present. Sociology, on its genetic side, is concerned with the constant factors in that movement, the laws or principles of social evolution. Objective history, if we include in it present social phenomena, is, therefore, the subject-matter of sociology; and in this sense, sociology is the science of history.³² But objective history is not only the subject-matter of sociology; in its various phases it furnishes the subject-matter for all the social sciences. It is also the subject-matter of that preliminary organization of knowledge which we term written history, or historiography.

The relation of sociology to historiography.—Historiography, or history, in the subjective sense (the sense in which the term is ordinarily used) is the description or narration of past events in the life of humanity. It is the mental picture of some portion of the human past which we are enabled to form by means of documents and other remains. The knowledge of past social phenomena which we get from history is particularly dependent upon documentary evidence. It is, therefore, only a partial picture of the past, more or less accurate according to the character and abundance of this documentary evidence. Moreover, because it rests chiefly upon the evidence of written records, history, as a body of knowledge, is limited to what is known as "the historic period" in the life of humanity. Thus it furnishes no knowledge of a most important stage of social evolution, the period before written records began, during which social institutions were slowly forming and the foundations of culture being laid. To reconstruct this period the sociologist has to turn to the descriptions of the life of present savage and barbarous peoples furnished him by ethnography.

Again, because the method of history is the indirect method of investigating, that is, by means of documentary evidence, rather than the direct method of observation, it rarely includes descriptions of present society. For his knowledge of present social phenomena the sociologist has to turn to demography, various collections of descriptive and statistical material concerning present societies, besides, of course, making use of his own

³² Cf. Flint, *Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum*, p. 334.

powers of personal observation. But this knowledge of present social phenomena is of primary importance in a scientific interpretation of society, in accordance with the general principle that the scientific value of a fact decreases in proportion to its remoteness from the observer.

Thus history, as a body of knowledge, falls far short of furnishing a complete presentation of the subject-matter of sociology. It fails to furnish knowledge of the facts of the earlier stages of social evolution; and it also fails to furnish knowledge of the facts of present social life. In studying social evolution, or the evolution of any particular institution, therefore, the sociologist must turn to ethnography and demography as well as to history. For example, the sociology of the family cannot be constructed from the knowledge which written history affords. All the earlier stages of the evolution of the family as an institution can only be made out by recourse to ethnography, while the latest stages, the present tendencies of the family, can be discovered only by recourse to demographical and statistical material relating to present society.

Moreover, history, as it is usually written, has certain shortcomings from the scientific standpoint which still further limit its utility to the sociologist. Perhaps the worst of these is the predominance of the literary over the scientific spirit in the presentation of its subject-matter. This leads to the story-telling type of historical narrative, and to overemphasis of the dramatic elements in the life of societies. Now, the essence of the dramatic lies in the personal and individual; hence the literary historian crowds his narrative with striking personalities and personal incidents, neglecting not only the less obvious psychical and physical influences at work in the social process, but also the commonplace, recurrent events of the social life. Undoubtedly the personal and the particular have a legitimate place in historical narrative; for without their proper emphasis history could not give a true picture of the social reality; but their overemphasis serves to obscure the real and deep undercurrents in the social life which chiefly determine its course. The literary method of presenting historical facts is, therefore, subversive of scientific

ends; the story-telling interest is opposed to the scientific interest. Consequently, the sociologist can look to the literary historian for but little help.

In a similar way the exclusive attention of the historian to one or only a few aspects of the social life serves to distort the picture of the social reality. Thus much of the history written down to the present has been political history, the history of the state or government. This has been, perhaps, helpful to the political scientist, but it has been insufficient to reveal for the sociologist the forces at work in social organization and evolution. Political history, and in general, one-sided history of all kinds, falls far short of making that exhibit of all phases of a people's life which alone is a sufficiently wide basis for induction for the sociologist.

Although written history furnishes but a part of the facts with which the sociologist deals, nevertheless the co-operation between the sociologist and the scientific historian—the historian who employs scientific methods and who aims at the faithful representation of the social reality—should be of the closest sort. They are both working in the same field and to a large extent have the same aim. The sociologist needs scientific history. He cannot complete his inventory of the social world without its aid. Moreover, sociology cannot content itself, as one author has well remarked, with being merely illustrated psychology; it must also be, at least in its final development, analyzed and compared history.³³ Finally, the historical method of study is of supreme importance to the sociologist, and this fact alone makes a scientific history of all ages and peoples perhaps the greatest desideratum of the sociologist. On the other hand, the scientific historian has need of sociology. Without some knowledge of the principles of social organization and social evolution he can scarcely obtain a proper perspective of his facts; nor can he rightly interpret his facts or explain the causes of social changes without reference to such principles. The scientific historian could do his work more scientifically if he had a critical knowledge of sociological laws and principles. We conclude, then, both that

³³ Bouglé, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, March, 1904.

scientific history is necessary to the sociologist, and that sociology is equally necessary to the scientific historian.

The relation of sociology to the philosophy of history.—In the eighteenth century there grew up a body of speculative thought about human progress known as the philosophy of history. Among the founders of this discipline were Vico, Herder, and Condorcet. The attempt of these men and their successors was to find certain laws or principles which underlie historical phenomena and which would explain human progress. It is evident that the problem which the philosophers of history undertook to solve is the same as one of the main problems of sociology, namely, the problem of social evolution, or of progress. The method of the philosophers of history was, however, entirely different from that of the modern sociologist. In the first place, their method was speculative rather than scientific. For the most part they deduced their theories of progress from metaphysical assumptions rather than built them up out of the facts of history. In the second place, the philosophers of history usually sought some one all-pervading principle, which would be “a key to history,” and which would explain everything in the historical movement; while the modern sociologist seeks not some abstract universal principle which will explain everything, but the psychological factors at work in producing social changes. It is not too much to say that sociology is the modern scientific successor of the philosophy of history.

Dr. Paul Barth, of the University of Leipzig, has claimed that sociology is identical with a scientific philosophy of history.³⁴ But sociology includes the structural as well as the genetic study of societies. A scientific philosophy of history would be at most a genetic explanation of the historical movement—that is, a theory of social evolution. It is only by stretching the term philosophy of history beyond what it logically connotes, that it could be made to include all of sociology. As Comte clearly indicated, a scientific philosophy of history would coincide merely with genetic or dynamic sociology. It would, however, be better to drop the name philosophy of history altogether, both on

³⁴ Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, pp. 4–13.

account of its past unfortunate associations, and because the two aspects of sociological theory—the theory of social organization and the theory of social evolution—are now seen to be inseparable.

A word should be said in conclusion about the relation of the philosophical historian to the sociologist. The philosophical historian is one who is not content with the mere faithful description or narration of past events, but seeks to interpret them, and in some degree to unify them, through the light of general principles. In this interpretation, the older philosophical historians made use chiefly of metaphysical assumptions, such as fate, providence, and the like; but the modern philosophical historian makes use chiefly of psychological principles. He offers a psychological interpretation of social movements. He is, therefore, very close to the sociologist. Indeed he may be said to be a sociologist rather than a historian, to the extent that he makes use of general principles in order to interpret history. If his work is rightly done, it becomes a sort of illustrated sociology, and is of great value to the sociologist in the narrow sense. This type of historian, the sociological historian, we might call him, is becoming increasingly common, and from the sociological standpoint should be welcomed as a valuable auxiliary worker in the field of the social sciences.

THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO BIOLOGY

It is now necessary to examine the relation of sociology to other general sciences. The other general sciences, usually recognized as antecedent to sociology, are mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology. Upon all of these sociology is more or less dependent, but particularly upon biology and psychology, as these sciences deal with the phenomena of life.

We must first consider the relation of sociology to biology. Biology is the general science of life. In its broad sense it is inclusive of all the special biological sciences, such as zoölogy, botany, physiology, anatomy, embryology, and the like. In its narrow sense, it is a science fundamental to these dealing with certain general problems of life, such as cell structure, heredity,

variation, natural selection, and organic evolution. In both of these senses it is evident that biology bears a close relation to sociology. The phenomena of association are phenomena of life; the general laws of biology, therefore, must hold in sociology. More specifically, the laws which govern the bodily activity of the individual (i. e., physiology) must be understood in order to interpret scientifically the interaction of individuals.

Of course, certain sections of biological science are much more closely related to sociology than others. Thus physical anthropology, which has been happily defined as "the zoölogy of man," has many important bearings upon sociology while general biology, furnishing us with the laws of organic evolution, must be regarded as one of the foundation sciences of sociology.

Biology, however, usually limits itself to a consideration of the physical aspects of life, passing on to psychology, in the scientific division of labor, the consideration of the mental aspects. For this reason some have claimed that biology is not directly related to sociology, but only indirectly through psychology. In other words, they claim that all the phenomena of society are psychical, and that all the problems of the social life are psychological. This view is incorrect only because it is extreme. As we have already seen, society is constituted by the psychical interaction of individuals; but this does not preclude the existence of interactions between individuals which are predominantly physical, as, e. g., in reproduction. Thus it comes about that there are some social problems which are largely biological. Among these problems are the laws of the growth of population (birth and death rate), the social influence of heredity (degeneration and eugenesis), and the influence of natural selection upon social evolution. Not only are these problems included in sociology, but their solution is an indispensable step in framing any theory of social organization and evolution. We must conclude, therefore, that sociology rests in part directly upon biology. Indeed, whether such problems as those just mentioned are treated in sociology or biology, is simply a matter of the scientific division of labor. They have always

been considered social problems, however, and will doubtless continue to occupy the attention of social investigators.

But inasmuch as the vast majority of social problems are in the main psychological, the relation of sociology to biology is chiefly indirect. Biology furnishes the background for both psychology and sociology in giving them the laws of organic life. Human society, we may well repeat, is but a phase of organic life; and the laws of all life must apply to the social life of man. The biological sciences, then, dealing with the physical aspects of the life-process, are the preliminary foundation of all the social sciences, even though the latter rest more immediately upon psychology.

THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO PSYCHOLOGY

As we have just said, psychology is the immediate basis of all the social sciences, since the interactions between the individuals of a group are mainly psychical; that is, they are processes which involve consciousness; or, as the psychologists would say, they are *mediated* by consciousness. In plainer language, nearly all of the interactions between individuals are interactions of thought, feeling, and will. Now, psychology is the science of consciousness, or of the mental life.³⁵ A somewhat more elaborate definition would be that psychology is the science of the forms and methods of experience. Now, consciousness, experience, is an individual matter; hence psychology is, in effect, a science of individual human nature. It investigates the consciousness of the individual to discover the forms and methods of his experience. And as the individual is alone a center of experience, it would seem that psychology, if defined as the science of *immediate* experience,³⁶ or consciousness, must be limited to the individual.

Still, it must be admitted, there is nothing in the nature of things to prevent the psychologist from going on to investigate the laws of individual interaction, the forms or modes of association, and the evolution of social organization. Some psycholo-

³⁵ James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 1; also Angell, *Psychology*, p. 1.

³⁶ See Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 3.

gists have done so; but there are practical reasons which prevent the majority from doing so, similar to the practical reasons which prevent the physicist from taking up the problems of chemistry. The psychologists' own problems of the forms and methods of the mental life in the individual are so vast that practically they have no time left to investigate the interrelations of individuals. Hence, sociology is a practical necessity as a matter of the scientific division of labor. The psychologist, therefore, turns over to the sociologist the principles of individual human nature which he has discovered; and these the sociologist uses to interpret the interactions, combinations, and progressive organization of individuals.

The distinction, then, between sociology and psychology is the same as that between all other sciences—it is fundamentally a distinction of problems. The problems of the psychologist are those of consciousness, of the individual mind, as we commonly say; while the problems of the sociologist are those of the interaction of individuals and the evolution of social organization. To put it in other language, the distinction between sociology and psychology is one of point of view. The psychological point of view is the individual and his experiences; the sociological point of view is the social group and its organization. *Whatever, then, aims at explaining the psychical nature of the individual is psychological; while whatever aims at explaining the nature of society is sociological.*

From the point of view which we have given, sociology presents itself as mainly an application of psychology to the interpretation of social phenomena. Indeed, from this standpoint, all the social sciences become psychological disciplines. This is not saying, however, that the psychology worked out in the laboratory or found in the textbook may be readily and easily applied to explain all social phenomena. The method of the social sciences is not so simple as that. History and the daily life around us afford psychological principles of interpretation quite as important as any offered us by the texts. Statistics reveal great tendencies of human nature which laboratory methods would never suffice to discover. Nevertheless, a mastery of psychology, no

matter whether the knowledge is gained from daily life, from textbooks, or from the laboratory, is essential to the sociologist. Though all sciences contribute of their principles for the interpretation of human life, which the sociologist attempts, yet because of the psychological nature of his subject-matter (social phenomena) psychology contributes more than all of the rest. Equipment in psychology is, therefore, absolutely indispensable for the sociologist. If it is true, as has been recently declared, that "no one is a psychologist unless he is a biologist,"³⁷ it is even more true that "no one is a sociologist unless he is a psychologist."

THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

In recent years there has grown up a discipline known as social or collective psychology. What, then, is the relation of this science to sociology? If what has been said is correct, it is evident that sociology is mainly a psychology of the associational process. Now, this is usually exactly what is meant by social psychology. Social psychology is, therefore, the major part of sociology. This has been recognized by many sociologists, as, for example, Ward, who speaks of "that collective psychology which constitutes so nearly the whole of sociology."³⁸ But social psychology is not the whole of sociology, as some have claimed; for sociology has, as has been already pointed out, also important biological aspects.

It must be noted, however, that the term "social psychology" is often loosely used to designate, not only the psychology of the associational process, but the genesis of the so-called social states of mind of the individual. In this latter case social psychology is evidently a section of the genetic psychology of the individual. Though very important for the sociologist, it would be better to recognize, for the sake of clearness, that this sort of social psychology is a part of individual psychology. With social psychology in this sense we have at present nothing to do.

In the former sense, social psychology is simply an applica-

³⁷ Hall, *Adolescence*, Vol. II, p. 55.

³⁸ *Pure Sociology*, p. 59.

tion of the principles of psychology to the interpretation of social phenomena. But this is what we said sociology mainly is. Concerning the identity of social psychology with the larger part of sociology, then, there can be no doubt. They have the same problems and the same point of view; and the distinction between sciences is, as we have repeatedly said, a distinction of problems. The aim of social psychology is to give a psychological theory of social organization and evolution. It may be, therefore, best defined as the *psychological aspect of sociology*. A more accurate name for social psychology would be, then, "psychological sociology."

PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY AND BIOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY

The content of sociology is, then, the biology and the psychology of the associational process (i. e., of human interactions). Every social problem, every problem of human interrelations, is resolvable into psychological and biological elements, and may be approached from either side. Just as sociology has its static and dynamic aspects, so it has its biological and psychological aspects; and just as it has been found that the static and dynamic aspects cannot be kept separate in complete sociological theory, so it will be found that in a complete theory of social organization and evolution the biological and psychological factors must be harmonized. Social biology and social psychology, so-called, are simply different ways of attacking the same problem. They have the same problems, and they constitute one unified science—sociology.³⁹

Biological sociology, dealing mainly with the influence of natural selection upon social evolution, with the social effects of heredity, and with the principles of population, may, however, be regarded as a foundation for the more important part of sociological theory—the psychological part. Though far from being

³⁹ This does not, of course, reduce sociology to mere biology and psychology, any more than physiology is reduced to mere physics and chemistry by saying that it is essentially a physics and chemistry of organic processes. Every science derives its principles of interpretation from the sciences immediately beneath it. Besides, since every social problem has both biological and psychological aspects the science of sociology remains a unity, not portions of two sciences.

completely systematized, it is so much better worked out that it may well be taken for granted in developing a psychological theory of social organization and evolution. Accordingly this book will deal directly only with the psychological aspects of sociology.

IV

THE RELATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY

SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

Sociology was the last, historically, of the great sciences to be differentiated from philosophy. For a long time prior to the definite organization of sociology as a science there existed a body of speculative thought about human society which was known as social philosophy. This older social philosophy is related to sociology much as the older natural philosophy is related to modern physics and chemistry. It had the same problems as sociology—the origin, nature, and processes of development of human society. It differed from scientific sociology mainly in its methods, which were almost wholly speculative, or *a priori*. Of course, sociology in its more general aspects still remains a philosophy of society.

Philosophy is no longer to be sharply separated from science. On the contrary, all modern philosophy is scientific in its spirit and methods, in that it has its beginnings in the established results of the special sciences, and in that it bases speculation upon the empirical study of reality. In a generic sense, philosophy is a term often used to designate the more general and speculative aspects of all the sciences. It is entirely right, therefore, to speak of sociology as both a science and a philosophy.

In the stricter sense, however, the word philosophy has now two generally accepted meanings. First, it is used as a general term for all the so-called philosophical disciplines, such as psychology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics. Secondly, it is used in a narrower sense as synonymous with metaphysics, including in that term epistemology as well as cosmology and ontology. We have already discussed the relations of sociology to ethics and psychology. It remains only to consider the rela-

tion of sociology to philosophy in the narrow sense, that is, to metaphysics. Before doing this, however, we should like to point out that sociology as a general science has much in common with the so-called philosophical disciplines. Like them, it deals mainly with mental phenomena. Like them, also, it employs the method of generalization—of speculative inference from facts—to a greater degree than the sciences of physical nature. Two general conclusions may be drawn from what has been said. The first is that sociology itself may be regarded as a philosophical discipline, quite as much as psychology, though this is not inconsistent with maintaining at the same time that it is a natural science. The second is that the study of other philosophical disciplines, and especially training in philosophical methods of reasoning, will be found of great help to the student of sociology.

SOCIOLOGY AND NATURAL SCIENCE

Sociology is a natural science in the sense that it studies definite processes in real space and time. Like physics and biology, sociology does not question the reality of its subject-matter. It may be that there is no such thing as the interaction of individuals, as one mind acting upon another mind; but this is a postulate which sociology refuses to question. Its attitude toward its subject-matter—the social process—is the naïve uncritical attitude which all the natural sciences assume toward their subject-matter. It starts with the common-sense view of the world, assuming the existence of real individuals, who are both physical and psychical beings, and who are in mutual interaction with one another.

Again, like all natural sciences, sociology aims only at answering the question, "how?" "in what way?" It traces the coexistences and sequences among social phenomena, showing the method, or technique, of the processes involved. Beyond this it does not go. It does not attempt to give the what or the why of the social life. The what, or objective content, belongs to the descriptive sciences, history and demography. The why, or the subjective meaning of the social life, belongs to philosophy and religion. Though sociology may throw light upon such problems,

as a natural science it makes no attempt to penetrate into the ultimate nature and meaning of things.

The term "natural science" is, we must note, however, sometimes used as synonymous with physical science. In this sense, of course, sociology is not a natural science. Despite the fact that it has certain biological aspects, it is properly placed among the psychical sciences. It is, then, a natural science only in the same sense in which psychology is a natural science.

THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO METAPHYSICS

The natural science point of view saves the sociologist from settling beforehand many troublesome metaphysical problems. It excludes metaphysical problems from sociology, though it does not, of course, exclude metaphysical implications; for these are found in all sciences and in every view of the world. Metaphysics, as Professor James has said, means only an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently about the universal reality.⁴⁰ It deals with the ultimate problems of reality and of knowledge. It takes the established results of the special sciences, criticizes and harmonizes them, so as to present an ultimate view of reality. In this modern sense metaphysics is not non-scientific in character; it is rather a science of the sciences, a clearing-house of the sciences. It is as presumptuous, however, and unscientific for the sociologist as such to attempt to settle metaphysical problems as it would be for a physicist to deal with sociological problems; and it is a reversal of scientific method to attempt to build a system of sociology upon some shadowy hypothesis as to the ultimate nature of reality.

While sociology must keep to the natural-science point of view, it is better to recognize frankly, however, the metaphysical elements in many of its problems. These words are necessary; for most sociologists have kicked metaphysics out of the front door, but have ended by lugging it in again through some back door. They have rejected as unscientific the idealistic view of the world, but have accepted as scientific the materialistic view. Now, materialism is just as much a metaphysical theory as ideal-

⁴⁰ *Psychology, Briefer Course*, p. 461

ism, and the sociologist as such has no more right to assume the one theory than the other at the outset of his investigations. He is not called upon to assume anything as to the ultimate nature of reality; but like all scientific investigators, he should start with the naïve view of the world. It is true that this naïve view has a great deal of metaphysics implied in it; but it does not pretend to be a definite theory of the nature of reality, and is, therefore, merely provisional, subject to correction and revision in the court of last resort—metaphysics itself. Thus the sociologist has no right to assume that mind can be derived from matter and motion, nor that matter and motion can be derived from mind; but he must accept as a fact the existence of physical and psychical phenomena alongside of each other with no discoverable way of deriving either one from the other. Again the sociologist must not assume that all is necessity in the universe; but he must accept the existence of that relative freedom of individual action which consciousness seems, at least, directly to testify to, until investigation proves the contrary.

The sociologist is, perhaps, more excusable for getting entangled in metaphysical problems than any other scientist; for he deals with both the bodies and the minds of men, with physical necessity and free choice; in a word, with human beings in all their complexity and with their interactions. Certain metaphysical problems inevitably obtrude themselves in his investigations. The more important of these are, (1) the relations of mind and matter; (2) the freedom of the individual will; (3) the existence of immutable laws in social phenomena. In each of these problems it is so important that the sociologist should preserve a neutral attitude that we shall consider briefly some of the conditions of each problem.

1. *The relations of mind and matter.*—The naïve view of the world sees in mind and matter two interacting elements, each relatively independent of the other, but each a factor in a complex, unified whole. According to this view, mind may act upon and modify matter; while physical facts act upon and condition mental facts. As opposed to this view materialism asserts that physical facts (matter and motion) are, in the last analysis,

alone determinative of all processes; that mind is a derivative of these; and that we are, from an *a-posteriori* view, automata. Again, idealism asserts that the physical universe is a mental construct, and has no existence independent of some perceiving subject. Without going farther into metaphysical theories of the relations of mind and matter, it is evident that for the sociologist to assume either of the above theories in his investigation and reasoning is for him to shut his eyes to half of his facts. The sociologist has nothing to gain, and much to lose, through his assuming either that the mind cannot modify and control physical forces, or that physical forces do not modify and condition mind. Through assuming either hypothesis he surrenders the uncritical point of view of natural science and becomes a metaphysician. And he reverses the true method of all science when he attempts to build a science upon a metaphysical theory. It is preposterous, therefore, for a man to offer to the world a view of human society embedded in his metaphysical philosophy as scientific sociology. It may be a valuable contribution to sociological thought, but it is not scientific sociology, because it has abandoned the method of science.

2. *The freedom of the individual will.*—Has the individual a limited freedom in his deliberate actions (that is, is any one of several courses of action open to him), or is this freedom an illusion? This is a metaphysical problem which has puzzled the wisest minds. The general impression is that science pronounces in favor of the latter view—that freedom is an illusion, that we are really automata—but this is an erroneous impression. Necessitarianism, or determinism, as it is usually called, is purely a metaphysical theory. It is the view that everything in the world is mechanically predetermined by forces acting from behind (by a *vis a tergo*). Freedomism, on the other hand, is the doctrine that human actions may be determined teleologically, that is, by purposes or foresight of ends. It is almost unnecessary to point out that necessitarianism is based upon a mechanical view of the world, and that historically this theory has been prevalent in proportion as the mechanical view of the world, which is more or less based upon the physical sciences, has been dominant.

Determination of activities by purposes or foresight of ends has been called teleological or inner necessity; but this is exactly what is meant by freedom; and it is hard to see how this is identical with physical or mechanical necessity. The fact is that mechanical necessity is the only necessity known to science; and this conception has been built up exclusively within the physical sciences, and purely for practical reasons. To carry over such a conception from the physical sciences and apply it dogmatically to all phases of human life is, therefore, an unwarrantable piece of metaphysical assumption.

It is not necessary, then, for the sociologist to take sides on this metaphysical question; and it is especially not necessary for him to view human society as a theater of physical necessity. It is the business of the sociologist to trace uniformities in social phenomena without reference to any metaphysical theory of human action, explaining them as determined, now by forces acting from behind, and now (when it is more reasonable to do so) by intelligible motives and foresight of ends.

3. *The existence of laws in social phenomena.*—Are there “eternal iron laws” in social phenomena as in the physical world? This question would be at once answered in the negative if we assumed that the human individual has a relative freedom; or if strict metaphysical neutrality be maintained no position regarding it need be taken. The question is, however, methodologically even more important than the other two which we have just discussed. It is said that if there are no laws in social phenomena, there can be no social science; that science is a causal explanation of phenomena through reference to laws; that a sociology without laws is not a science.

That there is some truth in these assertions we have already practically admitted by frequently using the word “laws” in discussing the problems of sociology. The real methodological problem is, however, In what sense shall the word “law” be used in the social sciences? Shall it be used to imply the metaphysical theory of necessitarianism, that is, that the concept of mechanical necessity can be made to cover all phases of human life? Or,

shall "law" be used in a broader sense, without implying any support to any metaphysical theory?

In deciding in what sense the word "law" shall be used in sociology, it is first necessary to call the attention of the student to nearly synonymous words. The words "truth," "truism," "rule," "generalization," "uniformity," "regularity," and "principle," are all often loosely used as more or less nearly synonymous with the word "law." But it is important that they be discriminated from one another, for the word "law" has become peculiarly specialized. Without stopping to define all of the above terms it must be said at once that most, if not all, of the so-called laws in the social sciences belong to one of the above categories—that is, they are generalizations, uniformities, or principles, rather than laws in the sense in which the physical sciences would use that word. Thus Comte's famous Law of the Three States is only a generalization; while the so-called law of least effort (that the greatest gain is always sought for the least effort) is really a psychological principle. Now exactness in the use of terms is desirable in science; hence it is important that we inquire the exact meaning which the word "law" has acquired in the older sciences—the physical sciences. At first in the physical sciences law meant the manifestation of an outer force, controlling the action of things. But as the passive view of nature came to be given up, it came to mean merely the uniform way in which things occur. Later, under the influence of the growth of the mechanical view of nature, law came to mean a fixed, unchanging, and so necessary relation between forces. The concept of a law of nature thus became deeply tinged with the idea of physical necessity. Indeed, in the physical sciences, it became synonymous with physical necessity. Hence the expression "eternal iron laws," embodying the idea that nature is a theater of mechanical necessities.

Now it is the carrying over of this idea which has grown up in the physical sciences to the social sciences which we have called metaphysical. This can only be done by assuming that the subject-matter of the social sciences is homogeneous with the subject-

matter of the physical sciences, as Comte assumed; but this, at present, is an entirely gratuitous metaphysical assumption.

In order to prove that "eternal iron laws" exist in social phenomena as in physical phenomena we should have to prove, (1) that physical necessity rules in human affairs; (2) that stimulus and response are equal to cause and effect. As regards the first proposition, we have already said that it is a mere gratuitous assumption, and is not capable of proof. As regards the second proposition, it must be said that psychology teaches that stimulus and response are something quite different from cause and effect,⁴¹ though the popular mind and even sociologists often assume the contrary. And as psychology is fundamental to sociology, its verdict must be accepted as final by the sociologist.

In scientific language a "cause" has come to mean the invariable, necessary, and equivalent antecedent of a consequent which we call "the effect." Now, the "stimulus" in psychology is not the equivalent of the "cause," but rather the opportunity for the discharge of energy; and the "response" is not the mechanical effect of the stimulus, but is always teleological, that is, directed to some end. Hence it is incorrect in the strict language of science, to speak of a stimulus as the *cause* of a response, or of a bodily state as the cause of a mental state. But the connections between individuals in society are almost entirely those of stimulus and response. Men influence each other, act upon each other, though acting as stimuli to each other. *Hence there are no direct causal connections between individuals in society*; or, to be more exact, there are no direct causal connections between the minds of individuals.

The interaction between individuals which constitutes society, then, is upon the plane of stimulus and response rather than upon the plane of cause and effect. This is one of the first truths which the beginner in sociology needs to learn. One of the *igncs fatui* of sociologists has been to trace causal connections among social phenomena. But it is well to remember that the causal connections between individuals are mainly indirect, through their relation to a common physical environment, and

⁴¹ See, e. g., Titchener, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 343.

only direct in the case of heredity. Just as psychology has been obliged for the most part to interpret the mental processes of the individual in terms of stimulus and response, so sociology will for a long time to come have to content itself with an interpretation of social processes in terms of stimulus and response.⁴² Now, what we have said answers the question whether there are laws in sociology in the same sense in which there are laws in the physical sciences. The laws of physical science are laws of cause and effect in the strict sense of those terms. No such laws are possible in social phenomena.

But are there no laws at all in sociology? There is no objection to using the word "law" in the social sciences, provided we do not carry with it all the implications which it has come to have in the physical sciences. By a "law" in the social sciences we can only mean a regular or uniform way in which things occur. In other words, we go back to the older and more general meaning of the word "law," meaning by it simply a uniformity or regularity among phenomena. Even though we grant that human freedom is not an illusion, and that the mental processes of individuals and the processes of society do not illustrate cause and effect in the strict sense of those terms, still it does not follow that human nature is haphazard and that society is without regularities. On the contrary, human nature is remarkably uniform, and the interactions of individuals exhibit surprising regularities. But the uniformities of human nature and society

⁴² Of course, there is no objection to using the words "cause" and "effect" in the social sciences in the broad sense of stimulus and response, provided that this is recognized. Under such circumstances, we could speak of the "cause" of a social occurrence, meaning its psychical motivation, not its mechanical cause. Several sociologists have recognized that the word "cause" cannot be used in the social sciences in the same sense in which it is used in the physical sciences. Thus Ross says (*Foundations of Sociology*, p. 55), "the causes, i. e., the motivation of [social] occurrences;" and again (p. 80), "*the ultimate cause of a social manifestation must be motive or something that can affect motive.*" That is, the ultimate "cause" of a social phenomenon is something psychical—something that influences will. But as we have already pointed out, this is not cause and effect in the strict sense. These terms if used, therefore, in sociology, like the term "law," will have to be used in a wider sense than that given them in the physical sciences. For the sake of clearness it would be often better to use the terms stimulus and response.

are due to habits, that is, teleological adaptations rather than mechanical necessities. The habits of action of individuals—using that phrase in its broadest sense, to cover the inborn tendencies and characteristics of human nature as well as acquired habits—give rise, then, to regularities in social phenomena (the interactions of individuals) almost as invariable as those which characterize physical nature. This is what makes the social sciences possible. Law in the social sciences, then, rests upon the fact of habit. We arrive, therefore, at this definition of a social or sociological law: *A social law is a statement of the habitual way in which individuals, or groups of individuals, interact.*

But it may be said that these habitual ways of interacting among individuals are not invariable, and that therefore there can be no sciences of social phenomena. It may be granted that the social sciences can never become exact sciences like the physical sciences. But it does not follow from this that they are not trustworthy bodies of scientific knowledge, capable of affording guidance in all the practical affairs of life. A slight degree of inexactness does not invalidate scientific knowledge because science deals with large masses of facts and general situations. Thus if certain exceptions are found to some social law—like Professor Giddings' law of sympathy, that the degree of sympathy decreases as the generality of resemblance increases⁴³—it does not invalidate that law for the purposes of the sociologist, because ninety-nine times out of a hundred he can count on its working.

Again, it is not true that science consists chiefly of laws, unless that word is used in a very broad sense. A science consists equally, at least, of principles. Principles are fundamental truths, which generally explain the ways of working of certain forces or agencies; while laws are more superficial formulations of the observed uniformities of the resulting phenomena. In physical science principles explain by referring phenomena to mechanical cause and effect, action and reaction. But in the social sciences, the agent, man, acts teleologically; hence social phenomena must be explained in teleological terms. Thus it is quite as scientific

⁴³ *Elements of Sociology*, p. 67; also *Inductive Sociology*, p. 108.

to explain human actions in terms of habit, adaptation, purpose, stimulus, and response as it is to explain physical phenomena in terms of cause and effect. This is only saying, in effect, that sociology is a psychological science; but it is not of course, saying that sociology is a metaphysical science.

To sum up: It is not the business of the sociologist to settle metaphysical problems, nor has he any right to assume, at the present time, that they are settled. It is rather his business upon the basis of a common-sense view of the world, to trace uniformities among social phenomena so far as he can, and to explain social processes in terms of mental activity, that is, in terms of stimulus and response. Only thus can sociology escape from the barren wastes of fruitless, metaphysical discussion; and only thus can it make its own proper contribution to that ultimate world-view to which general philosophy seeks to attain.

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE

VI

PRIVATE INSURANCE COMPANIES

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I. INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE

The purpose of these companies, from the standpoint of directors and stockholders, is profit; their social end is to secure for the policy-holders a certain sum to provide for the expenses of mortal illness and for burial without appeal to charity. Some of these same corporations carry on an ordinary life-insurance business which does not in any important factor differ from other life-insurance agencies, and does not require special attention in this article.¹

The vast importance and extent of the business of these burial insurance companies may be indicated by their statistics. In a previous part of this discussion the principal facts have been cited. The face promise of all policies of industrial companies in the year 1902 was \$1,806,890,864. The number of policies was 13,448,124, and the average value of the policies was \$135. Mr. Dryden estimated that the companies distributed annually to their beneficiaries more than \$20,000,000 in burial benefits.

The burden of this enormous business is heavy and is borne

¹ References: Frederick L. Hoffman, *History of the Prudential Insurance Company of America, 1875-1900*; Handbook and Reference Guide to the Exhibits of the Prudential Insurance Company of America, prepared for the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, St. Louis, 1904; John F. Dryden, *The Inception and Early Problems of Industrial Insurance*, 1905; Description of Ordinary Policies of the various companies; article on "Industrial Insurance," *Encyclopedia Americana*, by Haley Fiske, vice-president of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Haley Fiske, Testimony before the Legislative Investigating Committee of New York, 1905; H. Fiske, "Profits of Industrial Insurance," *United States Review*, thirtieth anniversary number; H. Fiske, "Industrial Insurance," *Charities Review*, March, 1898; *Memorandum* submitted on behalf of the Metropolitan Insurance Company, respecting the proposed insurance bills, New York, 1906.

exclusively by members of the wage-earning groups, and especially by those whose wages are lowest or next to the lowest. This expense has come to be regarded in this country as a necessary part of the weekly budget. There prevails among the people of our cities, among immigrants as well as among native born, a strong feeling against "pauper burials," and this sentiment is quickened and stimulated by the persuasions and representations of the numerous agents of the industrial insurance companies; it is their stock in trade. According to Hoffman (*History of the Prudential Insurance Co.*, p. 289) the average policy in that company in 1899 was for \$114.22. The entire payments of premiums into the treasury of this company in 1899 amounted to the sum of \$19,028,792, and the payments of benefits to \$5,426,545. The entire receipts from the beginning to the year 1899 were \$120,505,542, and the payments of burial benefits \$39,901,006. The ratio of cost of administration to income was 39.17 per cent., as compared with 17.34 per cent. in the ordinary life-insurance companies. At first sight this contrast is so startling, and the difference of cost so great as to raise a suspicion of foul play. But further analysis mitigates the severity of judgment, although it may lead us to dislike the system even more than before. (The figures may be found in the *Standard* of September 17, 1898, pp. 314 ff., as given by Mr. J. R. Hegemann, president of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.) In *Statistics, Fraternal Societies*, 1905, p. 213, the editor asserts that in twenty-five of the ordinary life-insurance companies the ratio of administrative expenses to premiums was 18.3 per cent. (varying from 10.4 to 31.7 per cent.); while in twenty-five fraternal societies the cost was on the average only 8.4 per cent.

The explanation of the difference and of the enormous burden which falls upon the poor insurers is given by the administrators of the industrial companies themselves, at least in part. Of the cost for salaries and the amounts absorbed by profits of directors and stockholders we must learn elsewhere, but of the chief facts they make clear disclosure. One of the factors in explanation is the small size of the poor man's policy, as compared with that of the rich man. The average policy in ordinary companies is

\$2,468, while that in industrial companies is only \$142, and that of the weekly payment plan is much lower still. The industrial company must write at least eighteen policies to make the sum of one policy in ordinary insurance. In connection with each of these little policies visits must be made to solicit and write the policies; each policy must be carefully examined by experts, immense correspondence must be carried on from the central office with agents all over the land, the payments of premiums demand time and expense, the accounts must be kept with each policy holder and each agent, and the medical examinations also call for heavy payments. It is estimated that the agents of these companies must make in the United States annually more than 416,000,000 visits in homes, or about 1,328,000 each week day. To these causes of expense we must in fairness add the fact that the rate of mortality among working people is much higher than among the members of the well-fed, comfortable classes, and this makes the cost of insurance higher. The habits of life of many working-people, their unsanitary homes, inadequate or improper food, hard and monotonous labor often at depressing tasks, close confinement, and occasionally inherited defects, all have a bearing on death rates and hence on premiums which must be charged to cover risks. The table shows the relative rates of mortality according to Farr's English Life Table, based on the general population of Great Britain; the Actuaries' Table, based on the combined experience of seventeen English companies; and the table based on the experience of 12,000,000 insured lives with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

Age	Deaths per 1,000 (Farr)	Actuaries	Metropolitan
20.....	7.74	7.25	10.52
21.....	8.46	7.33	11.56
25.....	9.24	7.72	14.14
35.....	11.24	9.19	17.15
45.....	14.50	11.95	22.56
55.....	21.75	20.99	35.22
65.....	41.20	42.45	64.51
70.....	60.80	62.51	90.99

The actual premiums paid in the industrial companies are set forth in their tables, and typical tables are here reproduced.

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE OF THE INSURANCE COMPANIES
(Industrial Life Insurance, Its History, Statistics, and Plans [1905], pp. 59 ff.)
 BALTIMORE LIFE, BALTIMORE, MD.

YEAR	NEW POLICIES IN THIS YEAR	POLICIES IN FORCE		PREMIUMS RECEIVED	PAYMENTS
		Number	Amount		
1904	\$4,548,840	103,965	\$7,977,954	\$592,777	\$108,545
1903	4,969,152	105,587	7,770,477	596,472	96,731
1902	5,723,118	100,292	7,133,760	565,871	71,345
1901	5,774,038	100,714	6,529,913	544,309	68,429
1900	5,354,140	92,310	5,642,853	523,785	54,921
1899	4,486,212	86,061	5,038,963	467,880	47,599
1898	4,451,355	76,974	4,251,905	421,496	39,879

COLONIAL, JERSEY CITY, N. J.

1904	\$8,784,984	83,690	\$9,781,317	\$454,807	\$115,554
1903	7,122,800	70,076	8,028,103	364,588	86,855
1902	6,454,644	55,597	6,149,410	282,093	69,871
1901	5,211,301	43,520	4,668,763	203,454	50,676
1900	4,209,047	34,674	3,650,629	152,501	39,501
1899	4,042,526	27,697	2,854,075	85,252	15,900
1898	2,719,798	10,623	1,423,482	23,626	4,221

COLUMBIAN NATIONAL, BOSTON

1904	\$9,468,216	40,397	\$5,532,978	—	—
1903	4,813,941	18,756	2,630,959	—	—
1902	759,640	4,275	615,316	—	—

CONTENTNEA LIFE, WILSON, N. C.

1903	\$43,980	798	\$22,360	\$1,283	\$5
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EQUITABLE INDUSTRIAL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1904	\$1,690,736	25,522	\$2,960,212	\$107,358	\$34,599
1903	1,665,414	23,304	2,692,699	95,425	24,401
1902	1,334,923	20,401	2,325,483	58,252	16,458

HOME, WILMINGTON, DEL.

1903	\$ 284,400	12,948	\$1,691,809	\$49,043	\$14,954
1902	1,104,223	12,842	1,448,963	48,487	15,867
1901	1,417,440	12,132	1,450,393	27,770	8,633
1900	1,551,079	5,146	920,980	18,523	6,063

IMMEDIATE BENEFIT, BALTIMORE, MD.

1904	\$1,233,420	15,002	\$1,210,675	\$71,432	\$18,086
1903	391,268	10,703	705,128	58,857	16,245
1902	421,318	7,587	509,131	54,996	14,253
1901	441,309	7,201	406,849	44,760	14,314

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE OF THE INSURANCE COMPANIES—*Continued*IMMEDIATE BENEFIT, BALTIMORE, MD.—*Continued*

YEAR	NEW POLICIES IN THIS YEAR	POLICIES IN FORCE		PREMIUMS RECEIVED	PAYMENTS
		Number	Amount		
1900	\$ 139,535	5,131	\$ 228,512	\$43,763	\$14,004
1899	1,102,618	4,481	195,802	43,693	11,241
1898	1,488,774	13,651	1,006,704	62,483	19,991
1897	1,520,337	11,843	845,954	38,282	11,073

JOHN HANCOCK, BOSTON, MASS.

1904	\$61,840,600	1,474,399	\$233,069,767	\$13,622,350	\$3,971,330
1903	57,444,640	1,395,779	216,375,960	12,389,529	3,642,681
1902	68,137,409	1,312,630	200,294,696	10,914,984	2,964,953
1901	57,928,751	1,223,500	177,597,439	9,595,301	2,819,024
1900	52,060,760	1,152,444	159,893,856	8,253,341	2,554,905
1899	44,358,033	1,069,197	141,609,904	7,209,290	2,193,573
1898	37,936,626	956,382	124,923,200	6,512,804	1,874,015
1897	35,959,176	899,418	115,750,709	5,773,144	1,684,027
1896	36,871,080	835,351	105,640,047	5,217,207	1,643,708
1895	41,905,652	771,972	95,640,574	4,638,040	1,428,921
1894	33,146,067	681,802	82,876,338	3,862,056	1,213,007
1893	34,571,979	607,150	73,043,678	3,444,313	1,110,124
1892	29,326,680	556,435	65,428,121	2,914,498	1,005,507
1891	25,374,745	476,612	54,516,514	2,387,701	932,488
1890	23,083,151	402,147	45,772,709	2,002,644	811,688
1889	18,239,650	320,264	36,365,419	1,616,585	596,510
1888	15,953,123	256,574	29,943,052	1,317,374	473,843
1887	13,334,392	203,467	23,802,502	1,031,845	357,002
1886	10,748,152	148,850	17,805,910	815,750	306,938
1885	7,055,933	107,872	12,600,935	647,143	221,266
1884	4,752,613	80,629	8,940,275	547,958	200,460
1883	4,085,480	63,625	6,730,902	472,242	175,438
1882	3,718,902	48,568	5,096,488	415,537	194,053
1881	2,931,860	36,012	3,787,230	346,887	161,006
1880	5,483,431	30,702	3,139,018	336,198	172,570
1879	1,275,918	9,327	951,000	294,943	162,141

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF VIRGINIA, RICHMOND, VA.

1904	\$11,788,596	358,541	\$37,710,901	\$1,680,411	\$512,105
1903	11,906,867	331,452	34,503,483	1,509,493	434,204
1902	12,437,338	302,839	30,303,815	1,338,518	392,997
1901	10,785,937	266,685	26,906,073	1,151,213	373,419
1900	9,102,616	237,283	23,239,844	1,087,272	370,429
1899	8,968,321	219,679	20,246,656	937,901	308,259
1898	12,318,555	194,951	18,373,119	852,028	252,025
1897	9,212,201	165,660	15,264,250	752,215	214,273
1896	10,613,052	149,672	13,778,199	712,932	222,987
1895	9,250,579	116,814	11,053,039	591,381	162,663
1894	8,140,705	99,618	9,647,707	551,794	160,003
1893	6,998,569	75,130	6,643,061	546,151	154,529
1892	6,272,217	69,527	6,230,224	475,520	120,496
1891	4,940,820	51,491	4,520,424	395,191	102,742

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE OF THE INSURANCE COMPANIES—*Continued*LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF VIRGINIA, RICHMOND, VA.—*Continued*

YEAR	NEW POLICIES IN THIS YEAR	POLICIES IN FORCE		PREMIUMS RECEIVED	PAYMENTS
		Number	Amount		
1890	\$3,000,115	32,927	\$3,589,720	\$234,547	\$88,795
1889	3,314,876	21,271	2,536,280	151,571	61,697
1888	2,619,276	15,193	1,076,377	127,049	39,291
1887	1,250,000	10,500	850,000	99,556	60,589

METROPOLITAN, NEW YORK, N. Y.

1904	\$305,258,155	7,614,729	\$1,127,889,229	\$50,808,924	\$14,826,976
1903	297,968,863	7,187,345	1,059,875,827	45,656,961	12,907,617
1902	312,990,338	6,698,291	981,676,306	39,653,725	11,320,967
1901	296,606,312	6,008,662	881,491,451	34,705,186	10,704,747
1900	264,737,682	5,327,067	768,977,676	31,210,356	9,785,624
1899	253,396,620	4,855,756	688,629,175	26,591,651	8,575,134
1898	210,508,694	4,317,274	591,427,272	23,372,770	7,691,943
1897	232,264,188	4,028,722	534,343,756	21,402,066	6,990,866
1896	169,820,543	3,643,569	454,068,004	19,306,196	6,963,256
1895	175,995,407	3,458,846	416,062,194	18,336,918	6,580,390
1894	294,270,451	3,559,165	423,514,171	16,827,016	5,747,823
1893	150,057,703	2,932,064	343,917,746	14,361,214	5,535,120
1892	127,222,470	2,715,414	305,451,576	12,511,078	4,898,382
1891	94,927,488	2,278,487	254,939,881	10,830,373	4,408,379
1890	100,852,802	2,096,595	231,115,440	9,399,927	3,746,647
1889	92,726,883	1,849,113	200,829,929	8,342,945	3,042,818
1888	91,242,946	1,632,642	176,533,142	6,810,110	2,550,105
1887	84,059,118	1,345,125	147,758,287	5,618,767	2,098,936
1886	72,783,721	1,066,875	119,560,339	4,438,096	1,566,514
1885	57,819,912	829,833	91,234,252	3,414,524	1,279,645
1884	59,505,421	670,999	71,965,635	2,811,816	970,590
1883	52,505,697	526,042	56,536,325	1,975,703	631,639
1882	36,822,169	335,789	34,679,307	1,246,515	369,314
1881	24,469,300	190,348	17,894,620	859,057	268,811
1880	20,728,700	110,193	9,103,870	568,204	200,805
1879	523,539	5,143	516,618	432,560	144,421

MUTUAL OF BALTIMORE, BALTIMORE, MD.

1904	\$2,016,918	35,730	\$3,559,495	\$207,443	\$84,075
1903	1,815,548	32,162	3,095,453	188,158	74,508
1902	1,684,671	28,093	2,641,356	165,322	57,119
1901	1,322,112	23,981	2,206,081	147,363	59,097
1900	1,217,455	20,855	1,872,030	128,201	43,822
1899	300,572	17,574	1,526,787	124,502	52,243
1898	1,454,344	19,015	1,479,364	119,286	44,355
1897	1,148,486	14,746	1,049,638	101,676	43,410
1896	550,013	8,155	621,108	93,471	32,192
1895	495,226	5,999	541,308	85,493	34,423
1894	387,993	4,340	446,501	73,225	31,792
1893	602,196	2,028	243,010	68,565	25,643
1892	440,989	2,856	391,856	62,691	21,493

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE OF THE INSURANCE COMPANIES—*Continued*

PROVIDENCE LIFE, PROVIDENCE, R. I.

YEAR	NEW POLICIES IN THIS YEAR	POLICIES IN FORCE		PREMIUMS RECEIVED	PAYMENTS
		Number	Amount		
1904	\$108,450	2,012	\$301,600	\$ 5,173	\$3,225
1903	586,320	5,509	761,185	11,610	2,163
1902	548,840	4,818	654,378	8,107	1,824
1901	514,319	3,683	517,168	6,864	2,164
1900	301,270	1,913	310,711	3,604	1,215
1899	524,886	663	224,886	1,406	308

PRUDENTIAL, NEWARK, N. J.

1904	\$202,524,911	5,642,335	\$675,992,239	\$41,155,697	\$11,258,506
1903	190,386,294	5,176,456	613,935,910	36,028,402	9,812,458
1902	184,327,303	4,692,182	550,404,265	31,138,718	8,096,719
1901	191,712,877	4,290,539	498,127,133	26,681,757	7,411,428
1900	182,270,423	5,908,622	448,596,996	22,559,354	6,207,418
1899	165,760,248	3,406,189	389,039,257	19,028,792	5,420,758
1898	121,080,784	2,924,526	333,992,200	16,139,452	4,749,885
1897	112,371,379	2,658,700	303,770,952	14,551,868	4,342,562
1896	108,223,712	2,437,251	279,030,638	13,329,644	4,158,831
1895	124,374,407	2,330,741	268,414,100	11,892,766	3,846,754
1894	205,128,243	2,256,014	259,840,927	10,890,302	3,191,175
1893	128,208,941	1,941,533	218,199,566	9,084,844	2,893,708
1892	92,677,524	1,653,465	184,306,206	7,525,844	2,518,567
1891	72,966,176	1,360,383	150,758,907	6,413,283	2,079,669
1890	95,674,484	1,228,332	135,084,498	5,636,876	1,749,714
1889	73,576,853	1,099,312	117,357,415	4,442,833	1,327,856
1888	58,214,981	850,064	92,418,854	3,659,495	1,096,234
1887	60,202,194	736,909	81,694,088	2,942,257	853,819
1886	49,142,316	548,433	59,328,627	2,114,296	593,273
1885	28,860,882	422,671	40,266,445	1,468,955	418,622
1884	24,892,268	324,794	28,545,189	1,127,738	322,382
1883	20,426,140	273,917	23,053,935	828,911	222,083
1882	11,541,210	190,007	15,738,973	571,595	157,705
1881	9,688,362	133,582	10,959,948	402,947	111,508
1880	8,555,994	87,462	7,347,892	250,958	57,256
1879	3,157,352	43,715	3,866,913	121,560	23,013
1878	1,785,696	22,808	2,027,888	59,817	11,338
1877	967,932	11,226	1,030,655	28,517	5,296
1876	727,168	4,816	443,072	14,495	1,958

WESTERN AND SOUTHERN, CINCINNATI, O.

1904	\$14,830,110	227,624	\$24,600,187	\$1,249,945	\$354,666
1903	14,161,533	209,623	22,223,035	1,113,699	295,369
1902	12,948,340	184,686	19,643,480	917,337	221,284
1901	10,878,524	155,096	16,426,534	722,605	203,896
1900	10,070,944	131,132	13,618,878	614,301	150,642
1899	8,370,729	117,545	10,881,961	508,900	122,494
1898	7,256,666	91,589	8,392,902	397,687	96,448
1897	4,980,043	71,301	6,619,653	320,996	79,169
1896	4,290,332	62,747	5,724,728	298,686	79,060

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE OF THE INSURANCE COMPANIES—Continued

WESTERN AND SOUTHERN, CINCINNATI, O.—Continued

YEAR	NEW POLICIES IN THIS YEAR	POLICIES IN FORCE		PREMIUMS RECEIVED	PAYMENTS
		Number	Amount		
1895	\$4,573,492	56,960	\$5,294,381	\$246,807	\$69,087
1894	6,178,914	46,362	4,374,675	227,392	52,456
1893	3,830,862	41,296	3,691,843	183,415	44,336
1892	2,522,842	30,472	2,707,366	140,564	39,539
1891	2,661,930	24,638	2,329,936	101,397	26,944
1890	2,620,328	16,926	2,000,973	70,327	19,233
1889	2,505,945	11,348	1,537,430	43,518	10,837
1888	1,698,748	6,237	889,073	14,359	1,107

GENERAL SUMMARY

YEAR	NO. OF COM- PANIES	NEW POLICIES IN THIS YEAR	POLICIES IN FORCE		PREMIUMS RECEIVED	PAYMENTS
			Number	Amount		
1904...	14	\$624,422,316	15,637,692	\$2,132,300,723	\$110,006,643	\$31,302,626
1903...	15	596,510,505	14,600,502	1,977,185,534	98,063,490	27,408,191
1902...	15	610,968,819	13,444,753	1,806,454,742	85,146,410	23,243,657
1901...	15	598,593,825	12,333,459	1,640,398,546	74,660,060	22,003,402
1900...	18	566,037,936	11,215,531	1,468,474,534	65,962,426	19,607,808
1899...	17	519,796,085	10,048,808	1,292,812,402	56,159,889	17,023,485
1898...	14	422,164,810	8,794,178	1,109,526,870	48,776,246	14,971,238
1897...	12	415,338,614	8,000,636	995,545,736	43,619,310	13,526,315
1896...	11	360,852,458	7,375,688	880,484,869	40,058,701	13,420,336
1895...	11	380,832,362	6,943,769	819,521,573	37,008,536	12,398,782
1894...	12	573,279,943	6,847,892	802,016,133	32,253,881	10,635,602
1893...	11	344,361,223	5,748,195	661,568,502	28,311,386	9,955,865
1892...	10	276,893,923	5,118,897	582,710,309	24,352,900	8,841,322
1891...	9	218,138,800	4,302,427	481,060,716	20,654,980	7,725,328
1890...	9	242,250,959	3,875,102	428,037,245	17,647,036	6,423,341
1889...	8	201,787,017	3,352,708	364,483,382	14,760,691	5,086,233
1888...	7	161,260,335	2,788,000	302,033,066	11,939,540	4,162,745
1887...	4	158,845,704	2,296,001	254,104,877	9,692,425	3,379,340
1886...	3	132,674,189	1,764,158	196,694,876	7,368,142	2,466,725
1885...	3	93,736,727	1,360,376	144,101,632	5,530,622	1,919,533
1884...	3	89,150,302	1,076,422	108,451,099	4,486,612	1,499,432
1883...	3	77,017,326	863,584	86,321,162	3,276,856	1,029,160
1882...	3	52,082,281	580,304	55,514,768	2,233,647	721,072
1881...	3	37,089,522	359,942	32,641,798	1,608,891	541,925
1880...	3	34,768,035	228,357	19,590,780	1,155,360	430,631
1879...	3	4,956,809	58,185	5,334,531	548,163	329,575
1878...	1	1,785,696	22,808	2,027,888	59,817	11,338
1877...	1	967,932	11,226	1,030,655	28,517	5,296
1876...	1	727,168	4,816	443,072	14,495	1,958
Total ..		\$7,797,291,727			\$845,385,672	\$260,069,267

PREMIUMS AND PAYMENTS OF THE "PRUDENTIAL COMPANY OF AMERICA"—Continued

Age	5 Cts.	10 Cts.	15 Cts.	20 Cts.	25 Cts.	30 Cts.	35 Cts.	40 Cts.	45 Cts.	50 Cts.	55 Cts.	60 Cts.	65 Cts.	70 Cts.		
20	\$87	\$174	\$261	\$348	\$435	\$522	\$609	Burial Benefit	
21	84	168	252	336	420	504	588	\$672		
22	82	164	246	328	410	492	574	656	720		
23	80	160	240	320	400	480	560	640	\$720		
24	78	156	234	312	390	468	546	624	702		
25	76	152	228	304	380	456	532	608	684	\$760		
26	74	148	222	296	370	444	518	592	666	740	\$814		
27	72	144	216	288	360	432	504	576	648	720	792		
28	71	142	213	284	355	426	497	568	639	710	781	\$852		
29	69	138	207	276	345	414	483	552	621	690	759	828		
30	67	134	201	268	335	402	469	536	603	670	737	804		
31	66	132	198	264	330	396	462	528	594	660	726	792		
32	64	128	192	256	320	384	448	512	576	640	704	768		
33	62	124	186	248	310	372	434	496	558	620	682	744		
34	60	120	180	240	300	360	420	480	540	600	660	720		
35	59	118	177	236	295	354	413	472	531	590	649	708		
36	57	114	171	228	285	342	399	456	513	570	627	684		
37	55	110	165	220	275	330	385	440	495	550	605	660		
38	54	108	162	216	270	324	378	432	486	540	594	648		
39	52	104	156	208	260	312	364	416	468	520	572	624		
40	50	100	150	200	250	300	350	400	450	500	550	600		
41	49	98	147	196	245	294	343	392	441	490	539	588		
42	47	94	141	188	235	282	329	376	423	470	517	564	\$611	..		
43	45	90	135	180	225	270	315	360	405	450	495	540	585	..		
44	44	88	132	176	220	264	308	352	396	440	484	528	572	..		
45	42	84	126	168	210	252	294	336	378	420	462	504	546	\$588		
46	41	82	123	164	205	246	287	328	369	410	451	492	533	574		
47	39	78	117	156	195	234	273	312	351	390	429	468	507	546		
48	38	76	114	152	190	228	266	304	342	380	418	456	494	532		
49	37	74	111	148	185	222	259	296	333	370	407	444	481	510		
50	35	70	105	140	175	210	245	280	315	350	385	420	455	490		
51	34	68	102	136	170	204	238	272	306	340	374	408	442	..		
52	32	64	96	128	160	192	224	256	288	320	352	384	416	..		
53	31	62	93	124	155	186	217	248	279	310	341	372	403	..		
54	30	60	90	120	150	180	210	240	270	300	330	360	390	..		
55	28	56	84	112	140	168	196	224	252	280	308	336	364	..		
56	27	54	81	108	135	162	189	216	243	270	297		
57	26	52	78	104	130	156	182	208	234	260	286		
58	25	50	75	100	125	150	175	200	225	250	275		
59	23	46	69	92	115	138	161	184	207	230	253		
60	22	44	66	88	110	132	154	176	198	220	242		
61	21	42	63	84	105	126	147	168	189		
62	20	40	60	80	100	120	140	160	180		
63	19	38	57	76	95	114	133	152	171		
64	18	36	54	72	90	108	126	144	162		
65	17	34	51	68	85	102	119	See footnote 1								
66	16	32	48	64	80	96	112									
67	16	32	48	64	80	96	112									
68	15	30	45	60	75	90	105									
69	14	28	42	56	70	84	98									
70	13	26	39	52	65	78	91									

¹ One-fourth of the death benefit in the first six months; one-half of death benefit in the second six months; full benefit after one year of insurance.

INFANTILE TABLE ENTAILING A WEEKLY PREMIUM OF 5 CENTS¹

PAYMENTS AFTER FOLLOWING PERIOD	AGE AT TAKING OUT POLICY							
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Under 3 Months.....	\$ 8	\$ 9	\$ 10	\$ 11	\$ 12	\$ 14	\$ 16	\$ 20
3-6 Months.....	10	11	13	14	16	19	22	28
6-9 Months.....	12	14	16	18	22	26	35	50
9-12 Months.....	15	17	20	24	29	35	50	75
1 Year.....	17	20	24	29	39	55	80	120
2 Years.....	20	24	29	43	60	85	120	...
3 Years.....	24	29	47	65	90	120
4 Years.....	29	51	70	95	120
5 Years.....	55	75	100	120
6 Years.....	80	100	120
7 Years.....	100	120
8 Years.....	120

¹ A weekly premium over 10 cents is not collected.

PREMIUM FOR ADULTS ON A POLICY CARRYING A \$500 DEATH BENEFIT²

Age	Weekly Premium	Age	Weekly Premium	Age	Weekly Premium
	Cents		Cents		Cents
15 Years	24	27 Years	35	39 Years	48
16 "	25	28 "	35	40 "	50
17 "	27	29 "	36	41 "	51
18 "	27	30 "	37	42 "	53
19 "	28	31 "	38	43 "	56
20 "	29	32 "	39	44 "	57
21 "	30	33 "	40	45 "	60
22 "	30	34 "	42	46 "	61
23 "	31	35 "	42	47 "	64
24 "	32	36 "	44	48 "	66
25 "	33	37 "	45	49 "	68
26 "	34	38 "	46	50 "	71

² During the first six months \$125; \$250 during the second six months, and full benefit (\$500) after one year of insurance.

Value of industrial insurance.—We may freely admit that the claim of the companies that they offer real benefits to low-paid workmen has considerable foundation in fact, and they are entitled to consideration. It is incredible that such a vast business should rest upon unmitigated falsehood and injustice. The companies are right in their claim that no considerable number of workmen of this level will voluntarily insure, even if rates are low, and that solicitation by agents is costly and must be charged in the premiums. They are right in claiming that the benefits have often spared the poor family the shame of a pauper

funeral; that family feeling and affection are fostered; that a spirit of independence and self-respect is maintained; and these are not insignificant advantages, although we may think they cost too dear and may be better gained in other ways.

Pauper burials, although not an accurate measure of the distress of the period, reached an average rate of 20 per 10,000 of population. During 1881 to 1885 the rate for 18 cities was 18.5 against an average of 12.9 during the five years 1897 to 1901.²

Hoffman (*History of the Prudential Insurance Co.*, p. 308) presents a study of pauper burials in ten cities (New York, Boston, Newark, Cincinnati, Baltimore, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Cambridge, Worcester, and Charlotte), and finds that the rate of pauper burials in 100,000 population was, in 1880 to 1884, 210, and fell in 1895 to 1899 to 156, after the industrial companies had had time to establish the custom of burial insurance on a general scale. It is impossible to discover all the causes of this decrease, but we may admit a large influence from burial insurance. They have unintentionally rendered another service to the cause of a rational system of insurance which the future will develop; they have shown that voluntary systems are costly and inadequate and that in all probability obligatory measures alone will bring such benefits within the power of low-paid workmen. But while we may try to be just to the companies, and may admit that they have responded to a universal demand of wage-earners, we have still to inquire whether the good has not been purchased at too great a price, and whether a more economical system is not possible. The premiums are relatively high and the benefits extremely low. The poorer wage-earners must content themselves with extremely small returns for their enormous sacrifices. Numerous workers in charitable societies complain that after the burial fees are paid there is nothing left for savings; that while thrift may be cultivated in one direction the benefits paid at death in a lump sum lead almost universally and inevitably to extravagant funerals and display, so that the insurance company, their agents, and the undertakers profit by

² J. F. Dryden, *A Quarter Century of Industrial Insurance in the United States*, p. 8.

the losses of those who can least afford such expenditures. President Hegemann has stated that in 86 per cent. of cases investigated the expenses of sickness and burial exceeded the benefits paid, and that the average sum paid on infantile policies in the year 1897 was only \$25.83.

A very material consideration in this connection is that while the burial-benefit companies absorb the greater part of the available resources for insurance purposes in families of small income, they by no means cover all the insurance needs of such families and, perhaps, not the most pressing. The attempt was made in the earlier history of these companies to provide sickness insurance, but the effort failed and had to be abandoned. President Dryden, in his account of this movement, says that a company which has its business scattered over a wide territory, and must act through salaried agents, cannot undertake sickness insurance, and that this form of insurance is possible only in brotherhoods or small groups where the members know each other and can detect and discipline malingerers.³ In the same way it can be shown that this form of organization cannot conduct accident insurance, without radical changes of method; and, indeed, it would be grossly unjust, as we have elsewhere shown, to lay this burden on the poorly paid employees. We must conclude, therefore, that these companies are restricted to a very limited field of industrial insurance, that they render a necessary service at enormous and burdensome cost, and that this cost is so heavy as to hinder both savings and insurance of a desirable kind.

A recent and valuable study of the operation of certain companies not named has been published in *Bulletin 67* of the Bureau of Labor, November, 1906, by Mr. S. E. Forman. In this intensive study of a particular city we see the working and effect of the system at large, although here some of the worst features appear in aggravated form. Washington, as the capital city, has few manufactures and relatively a large number of personal servants and persons employed in ministering to personal convenience of visitors and residents. The ratio of poorly paid negroes living on fluctuating income, with high rate of sickness

³ *Inception and Early Problems of Industrial Insurance*, pp. 16, 23.

and mortality, is very high, and their housing conditions are generally bad. Among these the industrial insurance companies which raise funds by levying assessments are popular. The assessment companies are not akin to the fraternal societies elsewhere discussed, but are companies for profit of the directors and stockholders. They are distinguished also from the industrial-insurance companies considered already in the fact that they carry on sickness and accident insurance with burial benefits added. They are not legally required to carry a reserve fund; they collect the premiums by the costly method of weekly visits, or sometimes by monthly visits; and the contract permits them to levy assessments to meet deficits, although in fact competition with other companies prevents them from exercising this right under ordinary circumstances; if the weekly premium is five cents then the yearly premium will be about \$2.60. The policy promises sickness, accident, and death benefits, although the forms of contracts are varied. Twelve of these companies, on December 31, 1903, had in force 28,921 policies of this type. Forman has shown that those insured in these companies must pay very dearly for their insurance—at least 75 per cent. more than those insured in the regular companies, and also more than those insured in the ordinary industrial insurance companies which offer accident and sickness benefits. If we compare the insured in the assessment companies with those insured in the regular companies we find that they must lose, that is in excessive premiums pay more. We may cite the conclusions:

The price of regular industrial insurance in all its forms has been seen to be very much higher than that of ordinary insurance. An analysis of the insurance business of the District of Columbia for 1903 furnishes some measure of the losses to the policy-holders resulting from the purchase of life insurance on the weekly payment or industrial plan when compared with the cost of ordinary insurance. The rate of premiums charged differs according to the form of the policy, but an examination of the several tables which have been given would seem to justify the statement that on the average the charge for regular industrial insurance is at least 75 per cent. higher than that for ordinary insurance. If the amounts collected for premiums from the regular industrial policy-holders (\$864,059.61) could have been paid in annual payments and could have purchased insurance at the rates charged by the ordinary companies, \$40,250,227 would have been secured by

the industrial policy-holders instead of \$23,000,130, the amount actually secured under the industrial plan. This represents an apparent loss in insurance protection to the industrial policy-holders of \$17,250,000, or, if it be measured in premium payments, an apparent loss of over \$370,000 upon premium payments of the year.

If now we turn to the combination schemes offered by the assessment companies we find that similar policies of ordinary companies furnish 300 per cent. more insurance for the same money. Placing the ascertained facts together for the poorest people of Washington, we may accept this estimate of loss:

Losses measured by amount of insurance carried—

a) Regular industrial insurance	\$17,250,000
b) Assessment industrial insurance	3,375,000

Total\$20,625,000

Or, if the losses be measured in premium payments made during the year in excess of what would have been required to purchase the same amount of insurance if the premiums could have been paid in yearly payments in ordinary companies, they may be expressed as follows:

Losses measured by excessive premiums—

a) Regular industrial insurance	\$370,000
b) Assessment industrial insurance	120,000

Total\$490,000

Of course the facts set forth above tell nothing about the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the cost of either ordinary insurance or of industrial insurance. They simply show what the cost of industrial insurance is and how much greater that cost is than the cost of ordinary insurance, and illustrate, as did the study of conditions of living among the poor, that the smaller the earning power of a wage-earner, the smaller also is the purchasing power of each of his dollars.

The facts already recited have long been familiar to students and to visitors among the poor of our cities, and many schemes for mitigating the evils have been debated, thus far without result. The older counsel was to encourage saving deposits and to assist the people to utilize very small savings for this end. But to this plan there are very grave objections, since it is an attempt to lay the burden of industrial risk altogether on the poor and compel them to carry the accident insurance burden which all admit should be borne by the business which causes the risk.

Furthermore the sum which can by any possibility be saved by unskilled workpeople is utterly inadequate at any time and especially during the first years of married life when the expense of rearing children increases and consumes all earnings.

The chief causes of the extravagant insurance premiums to the poor are: (a) the unfair part of the receipts from premiums and interest which is kept by the chief officers of the companies from the dividends of the insured; (b) the excessively high salaries of the officers of administration; (c) above all the fees to agents for soliciting insurance under the weekly collection plan. The first and second causes of waste may be to some extent reduced by the legislative and administrative action of the states, by publicity of accounts, and by inspections and rules of management. But not in any such direct way can political means reduce the third and most important cause of waste of the contributions of low-paid workingmen. If we are ever to place the business of industrial insurance on a fair and economic basis the agent must be dismissed; all other means of relief are relatively insignificant. Assuming that every director is honorable, that expenses of administration are reduced to a minimum, that the agents themselves are paid a mere pittance, yet the system itself must necessarily absorb a very great sum from the hard-won earnings of the working-people. This argument has been urged by the advocates of the savings-bank method of industrial insurance in Massachusetts. A society⁴ has been formed in Boston for the purpose of securing legislation permitting the savings banks to go into the life-insurance business; and the necessary law has been passed. Among the founders of this association are numbered men of education, philanthropy, and business standing; some of them would be glad to help introduce compulsory insurance in some form, but are discouraged from making efforts in that direction by the apathy of the public, the failure of the bill offered in 1904, and by the constitutional and economic obstacles which confront all such attempts in this country. Some of the savings banks have declared their readiness, in case they are empowered by law, to try the proposed experiment. Under the

⁴ The Savings Bank Insurance League.

plan proposed there would be no expense of solicitation by agents; the commodity would be offered, and then the banks would depend on the education of the people to induce them to take advantage of the opportunity of insuring themselves at bare cost. It is argued by the friends of this movement that the savings banks not only in Massachusetts but elsewhere have won the confidence of the country by their honest and careful management of the deposits, and in some instances the administrators, with the exception of a few salaried officers, perform their duties without charge and for the public good. Thus the savings banks, especially in Massachusetts, seem to be the most promising agencies for cheap insurance.

On the other hand the representatives and managers of the regular, orthodox life-insurance companies think they have discovered the Achilles-heel of this scheme. They assert that comparatively few persons, least of all the very poor who most need relief, can be induced to apply voluntarily for insurance without the persistent labor of agents. The employment and payment of agents is a necessary and legitimate expense, since without it working-people must go without the needed benefits. It is asserted by these advocates of present methods that the founders of the new association, however estimable and amiable, must lack knowledge of the business and the history of life insurance, that they are mere theorists and impractical. In support of this contention they cite the experience of the British companies who have tried a similar scheme, the old Equitable, the London Life, and the Metropolitan of London. Still more striking is the example of the industrial insurance societies whose purpose is to guarantee burial money for working-people. The British Post-office Department has offered small policies for forty years at low cost. These policies are written at local post-offices and the premiums may be paid in weekly instalments. At the end of the year 1904, after forty years' trial, the government insurance office had in force only 12,875 policies of this kind; while the Pearl Life Assurance Company of London, which began operations only a year earlier than the post-office, had in force 2,320,463 policies, and the Refuge Assurance Company of the

same age as the Pearl, had 2,628,650 industrial policies in force. The Prudential Assurance Company of London, only a little older than the post-office department of insurance, had in force at the end of the year 1904 between fifteen and sixteen million policies: During the year 1904 the post-office, with its 23,068 branch offices wrote only 517 new policies. The Prudential of London in the same year wrote 71,700 industrial policies. The conclusion of these experts and representatives of the insurance companies therefore virtually is that there is no relief for the working-people; the only outlook is that they must continue to bear this heavy burden.

Of course the philanthropists of Massachusetts may be able to set in motion educational agencies to reverse this condition and win customers to their savings-bank insurance companies. Already the powerful associated charities are considering methods of co-operation with the insurance associations; and with their fine organization of friendly visitors they might accomplish much; how much, only trial can reveal. But in any case these associations must still leave the great problems of accident and sickness insurance at one side; they cannot solve these problems, for only compulsory insurance can ever, at one stroke, make insurance even general.

II. CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANIES

In the absence of social organization by the states, certain accident insurance companies have entered into competition with trade unions and mutual benefit societies to furnish the desired accident and sickness insurance for wage-earners. We have not yet at hand satisfactory statistics of the operations of these companies, and we are told by some of them that they dare not let rival companies even see their reports on account of the exigencies of competition. The reports which have been published do not always distinguish the economic classes of their clients, and so do not inform us what number of wage-earners are included. Skilled artisans and well-paid mechanics may be able to pay for a fair amount of accident and sickness insurance, but the rates are prohibitive for those on bare living-wages, and these are in

the great majority. Even when insurance is taken there is common and growing complaint that the contracts are narrow and narrowly interpreted in settlements. Thus it is claimed that many diseases are included which rarely occur and many omitted which are very common; so that in reality more is promised than is paid. It is asserted that there are so many technical clauses modifying the agreements that no man can know in advance what his claim actually is. But the need of insurance is so widely and keenly felt, and the misery of being without protection is so intolerable, that the business of these companies is growing and is already considerable. Not seldom the employers are disposed to assist the introduction of this form of insurance in their establishments, since they know its value to the men and realize that men who are insured are somewhat less inclined to sue for damages in case of injury if they have some benefits coming in during disability. The companies began with accident insurance, but the demand for sickness insurance led some companies to offer this and competition is driving other companies to follow their example.

The workmen's collective policy.—The essential feature of this plan is to include all the employees of a firm or corporation in a single contract which insures them against loss by reason of accident or accident and sickness. The employer pays a premium which is based on the number of employees, the hazard of the occupation, and the amount of wages. The insurance company agrees to pay indemnities according to a graduated scale. Then the employer makes a contract with his employees according to which he is authorized by them to retain a weekly sum from their wages to reimburse him for payment of premiums. Rarely, the employer pays a part or even all the premiums himself without taking anything from wages. The premium advanced is based provisionally on the estimated number of workmen and the amount of wages for the coming year; if at the end of the year it appears that the force has been increased a supplementary sum must be paid the company insuring; and if the payroll shows that the premium advanced was too large the insuring company returns the excess. The employer acts as trustee of the men and

is paid for his trouble usually 5 per cent. for cost of collecting premiums. If, as sometimes happens, the employer insures himself against damage suits, another 5 per cent. is deducted from the premium. Both forms of insurance may be covered in one policy. This form has suggested some of the features of the bill proposed by the Illinois Industrial Insurance Commission.

A few examples are given of various forms of insurance of large numbers of employees. The General Accident Insurance Company of Philadelphia deposits \$100,000 with the Pennsylvania Insurance Department to give a guarantee of all contracts. In its industrial department it writes policies for workingmen's indemnity, which it describes as a collective policy issued to the employer as trustee for his employees, furnishing health and accident insurance for monthly premiums, paying monthly benefits to employees for loss of time caused by accident, not to exceed fifty-two consecutive weeks, no matter when or how the accident happens, whether in factory, going to or from work, or on recreation. Substantial benefit is paid if the insured is killed by accident, or for the loss of one or more limbs or eyes. Sick benefits are paid for every disease to which flesh is heir, while the insured is confined to the house, after the policy has been in force thirty days for a limit of six months, with the exception of rheumatism, paralysis, tuberculosis, Bright's disease, for which full indemnity is paid for a limit of two months in any one year. In addition, full medical or surgical attention is given, whether disabled or not. Inducements are offered to the employers to encourage the introduction of their plan in shops and mills. The language of the advertisement is quoted:

This form of insurance is 50 per cent. cheaper than any other form of workmen's collective insurance that has ever been offered. We save from 25 to 50 per cent. on the cost of your employers' liability insurance by introducing this form of insurance in your plant.

In the policy occurs a clause which shows how cost of employers' liability is reduced:

The acceptance by an employee, or any other person who may be entitled thereto, of a benefit under this policy for injury or death of the employee, shall operate as a release of all claims for damages against the assured arising from such injury or death which could be made by or through the

employee, or any other person, and the person so accepting the benefit shall execute such further instruments as may be necessary formally to evidence such acquittance.

This form of policy is increasingly objectionable to workingmen, particularly where the employer contributes little or nothing to the premium, and it is becoming every day more unpopular. The workmen declare that it is unjust to ask them to make heavy sacrifices in loss of a portion of wages to build up a fund for insurance and then deprive them of enjoying it in case of injury unless they sign away their common-law rights to sue the employer for damages due to his negligence. This objection would lose its point if the employer contributed a sum substantially equal to that he must pay to protect himself from loss under the liability law.

The New Amsterdam Casualty Co. has had some experience with industrial insurance of the kind under consideration. The agreement with the insured is to indemnify against loss from bodily injuries sustained by an employee or employees of the insuring employer through external, violent, and accidental means, while actually engaged in the occupations and at the places mentioned in the schedule, and resulting from the operation of the trade or business described in the schedule. The president of this company says of this form of policy:

Workmen's collective insurance is wholesale accident insurance, the policy running to the employer, and the protection thereunder being for the workmen whether the employer be legally liable for the injuries or not. In some cases the employer assesses the premium back on the men by deducting all or part of it from the wages, a certain percentage being deducted on each pay day. The insurance company, however, assumes the full burden of reimbursing the men for injuries such as are covered by the policy.⁵

The net premiums of this company by years have been as follows:

Year	Premiums
1899	\$ 2,322.97
1900	13,618.10
1901	4,757.13
1902	4,355.18
1903	3,156.46
1904	2,381.75
1905	3,269.15
	<hr/> \$33,860.74

⁵ Letter of Mr. W. F. Moore, April 27, 1906.

Insurance of individual workmen.—Some of the casualty companies do not attempt to do business among working-men but confine themselves to selected risks with persons of larger income who pay yearly and thus receive the benefit of lower cost for administration and for being in a less hazardous class. Companies which insure working-men must, as a rule, collect the premiums monthly in small amounts. This increases cost of solicitation and collection which must be charged in the premiums. And since the policy must be renewed each year the cost of solicitation is still more increased. Under the plan of insuring individual workmen the company deals with the insured more or less directly, although arrangements are sometimes made with employers to collect the premiums, in which case the collective form is closely approached. Sickness insurance is usually connected with accident policies and cannot otherwise be obtained.

The Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company, of Detroit, Mich., may be used for illustration. (*Vide* Instructions of March, 1906.) This company employs agents to solicit business, and it has local agents in towns and cities, not for the purpose of calling upon the policy-holders but for furnishing convenient means of collecting premiums. A drug store is preferred for a local agency because it is open in the evening. A commission of 5 per cent. is allowed the collector for receipting and remitting the premiums of policy-holders. Women between the ages of eighteen and forty-five engaged in occupations from which they derive a regular income, and on which they depend for support, will be granted insurance in the sum of \$25 per month accident and illness indemnity with \$200 accidental death insurance for a premium of \$1 per month. Those desiring larger indemnities must be classified according to occupation and pay a premium 50 per cent. higher than that specified in the rate table. In no event will they be written for more than \$50 per month accident and \$40 per month illness benefit, nor to exceed three-fourths of their average income. Over-insurance is avoided in all cases. The indemnity should not exceed three-fourths of the average actual money value of the insured's time, or of the amount of his monthly salary or wages. The insurance is not

forfeited by change of occupation, but in the event of receiving an injury when engaged in a more hazardous occupation, the sum insured and the monthly indemnity will be for such amounts as the premium paid shall be sufficient to purchase at the rates fixed by the company tables for such increased hazard of occupation. Insurance is not written on any person who is under seventeen years or over sixty. Applicants between fifty and sixty pay 50 per cent. additional premium. There is no graduation of premiums between seventeen and fifty years. The beneficiary must have an insurable interest in the life of the insured, as wife, child, parent, or other heir-at-law, or must be a dependent relative, fiancée, or a charitable institution. In case of accidental injury to, or sickness of, any person insured in this company, for which a claim is likely to be made, immediate notice must be given. Payments of claims are made by check to the insured or agent after investigation and adjustment. Surgeons are appointed in localities where the business is large enough to warrant such an appointment, and their duty is to protect the interests of the company. Premiums are payable monthly in advance at the home or branch office. The detailed definition of accident indemnity is significant. Full accident indemnity is paid for accidental death, loss of one or more limbs, or both eyes, and for loss of time, resulting from bodily injuries caused solely by external, violent, and accidental means such as dislocation, fractures, broken bones, bruises, cuts, shot wounds, crushing or mangling, burns or scalds, bites of dogs and serpents, stroke of lightning, drowning, or injuries produced by falls, or any other purely accidental injury happening to the insured in any of the lawful vocations of life, whether such accident happen at home, or in the office, going to or from work, in the store, factory, shop, mill, yard, or on the street or farm, traveling on passenger trains, street cars, steamboats, walking, riding, driving, boating, etc., but will not be paid except at one-fifth the indemnity otherwise stated, in case of disappearance, or suicide, sane or insane; nor for any injury, fatal or non-fatal, resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from intoxication or the use of narcotics from, or while violating law, war risks, inhalation of gas, vapor, or

anaesthetic, voluntary over-exertion, wilful or gross negligence, unnecessary exposure to apparent danger, surgical operations not necessitated solely by injury and made within ninety days after the accident. Sick indemnity is paid for the time, after the first week, that the insured is necessarily confined to the house by reason of any disease or illness, except rheumatism, paralysis, lumbago or lame back, hernia, orchitis, sciatica, insanity, dementia, and venereal diseases, which would be covered by one-fifth the regular indemnity. Some risks are prohibited; the following will not be accepted for insurance on any terms: Persons who are blind, deaf, dumb, feeble-minded, cripples, intemperate, disreputable, or persons without visible means of support, those engaged in gambling, in handling highly inflammable or highly explosive material in factory or warehouse, aeronauting, driving, submarine working, rubber grinding or mixing; electricians handling live wires or working about machines where it is possible to receive a direct current of 500 volts, or an alternating current of 250 volts; professional baseball players, laborers or machinists employed in constructing tunnels or caissons; soldiers or sailors engaged in active warfare; blasters, insane persons, persons compelled to use a crutch, subject to fits or vertigo, who have suffered from paralysis, or are paralyzed, or have any deformity that will in any way hinder the regular duties of life; powder-makers, circus performers, fishermen on the sea, fireworks' employees and employers, cartridge makers, football players.

There are ten classes of risks; select, preferred, extra-preferred, ordinary, extra-ordinary, medium, extra-medium, hazardous, special hazardous, and there is a table of indemnity and cost for each class. Thus the table of indemnity and cost for the select class is:

	Monthly Accident Indemnity	Monthly Illness Indemnity	Accidental Death or Loss of Two Limbs or Both Eyes	Loss of One Limb	Cost per Month, Regu- lar Policy	Cost per Month, Special Policy
1.....	\$ 50	\$50	\$ 500	\$250	\$1.00	\$1.50
2.....	60	40	600	300	1.00	1.50
3.....	60	60	600	300	1.25	1.75
4.....	70	60	700	350	1.40	1.90
5.....	80	50	800	400	1.50	2.00
6.....	80	60	800	400	1.60	2.10
7.....	100	60	1000	500	1.75	2.25

Additional accidental death insurance will be written in this class at 25 cents per month for each \$500. Applicants over fifty years of age must pay 50 per cent. more.

The table of the special hazardous class is:

Monthly Accident Indemnity	Monthly Illness Indemnity	Accidental Death or Loss of Two Limbs or Both Eyes	Loss of One Limb	Cost per Month, Regu- lar Policy	Cost per Month, Special Policy
\$15	\$15	\$100	\$50	\$1.00	\$1.25
20	20	100	50	1.40	1.65
25	25	100	50	1.75	2.00
30	30	100	50	2.25	2.50
35	35	100	50	2.60	3.10
40	40	100	50	3.00	3.50

Additional accidental death insurance will be written in this class at \$1.00 per month for each \$500, with a limit of \$1,000. Male applicants over fifty years of age must add 50 per cent. to the above premiums.

This company has a special arrangement for "railroad installment insurance." No person may be insured under the accident policy under eighteen or over sixty-five years of age, nor in the sickness policy over sixty years of age. The rates are the same for all ages. The rates for locomotive engineers are:

For \$1,000 death benefit and \$5 weekly indemnity, annual premium, \$18.00
 For \$1,000 death benefit and \$20 weekly indemnity, annual premium, \$50.40
 For \$2,000 death benefit and \$20 weekly indemnity, annual premium, \$36.00
 For \$2,000 death benefit and \$20 weekly indemnity, annual premium, \$57.60

The maximum limit for engineers is \$2,000 death benefit and \$20 weekly indemnity; for firemen, \$1,500 death benefit and \$15 weekly indemnity. The annual premium for weekly indemnity alone is \$10.80 for \$5 or \$43.20 for \$20 weekly indemnity. The insured gives an order on the paymaster of the railroad company, according to previous contract, and the premium is taken out of the monthly pay. The figures of business in the year 1905 were: accident premiums received, \$818,973, and losses paid, 384,733; health premiums, \$102,757, losses, \$40,971. The statement does not show how many were wage-earners.

The Continental Casualty Company of Chicago does a large business in accident insurance. In the year 1905 it collected from wage-earners in premiums \$1,675,000; of this sum about

\$500,000 was collected upon the industrial or "one-dollar-per-month plan." This company has already paid out to wage-earners for death benefits, sickness, and accident indemnities over \$5,615,000.

Experiments are tried with various forms of sickness insurance and provision for invalidism. In discussing the burial benefit companies ("industrial insurance") we have seen that after an effort to unite sickness insurance with their business they abandoned the attempt, although the assessment companies studied by Forman in Washington still offer sick benefits in some policies. The chief difficulty in the experience of the most important companies was that there was no check on malingering and the cost was too high. Their officers thought that only in moderately small groups of fraternal societies would sickness insurance be practicable. The Health Insurance Company of Philadelphia and several companies in Massachusetts attempted to furnish sickness insurance about 1847. The Philadelphia company started with a capital of \$100,000 in 1848, used the tables of the English Friendly Societies as a basis of calculation, and charged from \$5.25 to \$6.25 for a weekly indemnity to cover loss from any kind of disease. Although commissions of agents were then very much lower than they could be now all these experiments ended in failure. Similar experiments and attempts in various parts of the country came to the same inglorious end; but so great is the need of such insurance, so disastrous the effects of being without protection, it was inevitable that the experiment should be revived in some form. About 1896 some company introduced as a "rider" to an accident insurance policy an agreement, for a consideration, to pay indemnity in case of six zymotic diseases. This bait for accident insurance proved so attractive to customers that about 1899 several companies extended the list of diseases to ten or twelve, at a premium rate of \$2 for each \$5 of weekly indemnity, and under stress of competition among accident insurance companies the list was still further enlarged until about thirty or more were covered. Experience taught the companies, for a rather high tuition fee, that some of them had not charged enough for certain diseases to cover their risk

and that the attempt to distinguish the nature of the sickness added to the confusion and cost attending adjustment of claims. To meet this situation a so-called General Disability Policy was introduced.

There can be no doubt that a policy covering any sickness originating in an individual after the beginning of his policy will afford less cause for misunderstanding and disagreement between the company and its policyholders, and that physicians will be less frequently called upon to stretch their consciences in diagnoses for the purpose of assisting their patients, than has been the case with the restricted sickness policy, and since many of the companies have taken up sickness insurance as an adjunct to accident insurance, merely as a means of holding their accident insurance against the aggressions of competing companies, any plan likely to secure this result with a minimum of friction and misunderstanding between the company and the assured would seem to commend itself to the underwriter if the cost does not prove to be too much of a tax upon the business which it is intended to protect.⁶

Another suggestion has been made to diminish the cost of sickness insurance by connecting it with other kinds of insurance. It is evident that if one fee for soliciting and adjusting claims could be made to cover all forms of insurance desired, the sum of cost would be reduced, especially if the fee for solicitation did not have to be paid over each year. At present the company retains the right to stop protection at the end of any year or to increase the rate with age until it becomes prohibitive. Furthermore the benefit is limited to a relatively brief period, usually twenty-six weeks, while the need is for indemnity as long as sickness lasts. Mr. Dawson recommends that sickness insurance be joined with life insurance, for thus

it is possible to furnish at a much lower cost, because of lower expense in the payment of commissions, indemnity for the whole course of the disability, renewable without increase of premiums and at the option of the insured. Abundant statistics upon which to base these rates are now obtainable.⁷

Information from the mining region of the western states is difficult to secure, and therefore the statement of the superintendent-

⁶ R. S. Keelor, M.D., *American Experience with Invalidity*, 1904.

⁷ *The Business of Life Insurance*, p. 244.

ent of social welfare of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, Pueblo, Colorado, is welcome.

This company provides medical attendance and hospital care for its employees and their families as long as they are sick, for which the men pay \$1 per month. Privileges of the hospital, however, are extended only to the employees and not to their families, but a special rate is given to members of employees' families. All medical attendance outside of the hospital, including medicines, is furnished both to the men and to their families. Some years ago this company attempted to insure its miners against accidents, but the plan was not successful and so the plan at present followed by this and all other mining corporations in Colorado is to permit the agents of reliable insurance companies to go into the mines and solicit, the company guaranteeing the agents the amount of premium which is then deducted from the men's payroll. The foreign miners also have a number of sick benefit societies, but they do not play a very prominent part in the matter of insurance, as they are usually small organizations.⁸

One point deserves special mention in connection with the assertion that compulsory insurance would be impossible unless all states introduced it at the same time, since the manufacturers of the state having compulsory insurance would have to carry heavier premiums than the managers in states which have not such laws. A part answer to this argument is found in the fact that already the cost of accidents must be borne in gifts, taxes for poor relief, and various schemes to which employers contribute for the relief of disabled men; and further, it may be claimed that insurance so greatly increases the contentment, steadiness, and efficiency of the insured workmen that premiums are largely returned in an equivalent of some kind. It may be added that if compulsory insurance were introduced in one state its advantages would soon be seen to be so great that public sentiment, reinforced by trade unions, would speedily make the law general in all industrial states. Still further it is precisely those states, as Massachusetts and New York, which lead in social legislation which retain the first rank as industrial states. To all this we may add certain facts furnished by casualty companies which tend to diminish the fears of timid capitalists that compulsory insurance would place them at a disadvantage as compared with the employers of other states; the fact being that

⁸ Letter of Dr. R. W. Corwin.

already, in consequence of the differences of court interpretations and legislation, the cost of employers' protection varies greatly in different states, without any of the dreadful things happening which are feared. Thus if we take the cost of liability insurance for the whole country as one, on the average, the cost for several states would be relatively as follows:

The figures are stated on a basis of a loss cost of 1 for the United States as a whole. If then the relative loss cost of a state is given as 1.2, the meaning is that the loss cost in that state is twenty per cent. (20 per cent.) greater than for the United States as a whole. A relative loss of 2 designates a loss cost twice as great as that for the United States as a whole. A relative loss cost of .80 designates a loss cost eighty per cent. (80 per cent.) of that for the United States as a whole.

The loss cost of one state relatively to another may be ascertained by taking the ratio of their relative loss costs. Thus, the loss cost in Tennessee is four times as great as the loss cost in

TABLE OF RELATIVE LOSS COSTS TO EMPLOYERS IN THE SEVERAL STATES BY REASON OF THE LIABILITY IMPOSED BY LAW UPON THEM FOR DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF BODILY INJURIES OR DEATH ACCIDENTALLY SUFFERED BY THEIR EMPLOYEES¹

TABLE OF STATES LISTED ALPHABETICALLY

Alabama	1.20	Louisiana70	Ohio80
Arizona Territory ...	2.00	Maine	1.00	Oklahoma Territory ..	2.00
Arkansas	1.33	Maryland70	Oregon80
California	1.00	Massachusetts	1.00	Pennsylvania	1.00
Colorado	2.00	Michigan60	Rhode Island	1.33
Connecticut60	Minnesota	1.33	South Carolina	1.20
Delaware	1.33	Mississippi80	South Dakota	2.00
District of Columbia ..	.90	Missouri	1.33	Tennessee	2.00
Florida60	Montana	2.00	Texas	2.00
Georgia	1.20	Nebraska	1.33	Utah	2.00
Idaho	2.00	New Hampshire	1.00	Vermont	1.00
Illinois	1.33	New Jersey70	Virginia70
Indiana	1.20	New Mexico Ty. ...	2.00	Washington	2.00
Indian Territory ...	2.00	Nevada	2.00	West Virginia70
Iowa	1.33	New York	1.00	Wisconsin	1.33
Kansas	2.00	North Carolina	1.20	Wyoming	2.00
Kentucky	1.33	North Dakota	2.00		

¹ From the *Monthly Bulletin* of the Fidelity and Casualty Company.

Pennsylvania, the relative loss cost of Tennessee being 2, that of Pennsylvania being 0.50, and the ratio $2 \div 4 = 0.50$.

The differences between the states are due to differences in the law and in the judicial decisions interpreting the law.

The above table is founded in the main on combined experience of the companies composing the Liability Conference, an association of companies engaged in the business of liability insurance. Where changes in the law have occurred subsequent to the period embraced by the experience, comparative studies of the laws have been made and corrections made in the table accordingly. It is believed that the table represents accurately the relative costs today.

It is worth while to consider the probable part which the casualty companies will play in the immediate future in relation to the development of accident and sickness insurance, especially if permissive or compulsory laws should be passed in any of the states. This matter has already been seriously considered. It is well known that in England under the Compensation Act and recently in France under a compulsory-insurance law, the private accident companies have done a thriving business in assuming the legal obligations of the employers. In France the mutual insurance associations or syndicates, and even the government itself, through a central fund, are competitors of the private companies, and yet the latter hold their own and contribute very substantially to the promotion of the purposes of the law. Nor are we entirely without experience in the United States, for the workmen's collective policies contain suggestions of a method which may be greatly extended if legal pressure or even encouragement were to make it to the interest of large bodies of employers and wage-earners to unite in securing protection. Already under the collective policies the expenses of solicitation have been reduced to a minimum, since the entire body of employees is included at a stroke under a contract which also lowers the cost of payments of premiums by the simple process of deducting them from the wages. Uncertainty in regard to the indemnity would be reduced by legal definition of obligation and by simpler judicial organization for the adjustment of disputed claims. If

the employers could be released from liability under existing laws they could then have at their disposal a large fund which they are now compelled to expend on casualty companies and lawyers to protect themselves against suits for negligence; and the insurance companies would then become insurers of the working-men rather than their sworn antagonists.

THE TEMPER OF THE AMERICAN

JOSEPH B. ROSS

Lafayette, Ind.

One of the most perplexing problems in the growth of every national state is the adjustment of its own organism to the changing conditions of its existence. While the conflicts with exterior foes and forces are always met by the united strength of the people of the state, the conflicts of peace are attended by the most trying antagonisms. The concentration of political power and authority is vigorously opposed, and the lesser units of government strive almost to the death to maintain their historic prestige. The civil wars of the world have for the most part found their causes in the antipathies which the lesser and local political units have nurtured toward the greater and dominant political life. And the increasing complexity of the larger problems of government finds but little sympathy in the minds of the people at large. This meeting-point of local and national administration promises to be a zone of perpetual conflict. The local political life tends to become an organism of simple structure which finds its chief expression in a more or less democratic assemblage. If we except the great municipalities, the lesser political organisms quickly attain their growth, and then are subject to but slight modifications. The circumstances which environ local life are of a persistent type, and demand only the enforcement of the customary administration. The immediate boundaries of each local political unit are political units of a like character which are striving for kindred ends. The entire life of every people is thus organized into political communities which subserve neighborhood needs, and which only occasionally touch the larger problems of administration. And as members of the same state, their mutual animosities are lessened in poignancy, while their kindred ends serve to ally them in their insistence on local privileges.

The national state, however, is far differently conditioned.

It is a complex structure which by every new experience is rendered more complex and intricate. It is subject to a continuous growth, and to rapid, sometimes radical, changes. Its environment is not constant, and varies from peaceful international intrigue to the forceful outbursts of intermittent wars. The national political organism is in the midst of a twofold conflict: the conflict which it maintains with contemporary states for international prestige, and the internecine conflict which is perpetually modifying its organism from within. The contemporary states which form the immediate environment of the national political organism are inherently antagonistic, and it is only occasionally that they form peaceful alliances for their mutual welfare. The problems of national administration are rendered even more difficult of solution by the fact that the officials of the national state are drawn from the local political units, and they are deeply imbued with local prejudices. They approach the problems of national and international politics with the training of the town-meeting or of the rural city or county. The ease with which they have achieved local prominence and the facility with which they have disposed of the requirements of local government give them an overweening confidence in their power to dispose of every contested question in national political life with like success. There is but slight appreciation of the fact that local administration has little resemblance to the administration of the national state. And the self-confidence of the official only bespeaks the attitude of the public mind. The locality has ever denied that its innate capacities and limited political experience were too circumscribed to comprehend the problems of the nation. And the popular ear is deaf to the cries of national peril.

This persistence of provincialism is worthy of the keenest study, and its relation to the national welfare makes a comprehensive knowledge of its essential character of the greatest importance to the citizen. To the American most of all is the problem important because here the national state is in its beginnings, and the impress of the locality is still the most significant phase of the national political experience. The self-confidence of

the community has transformed itself into a national trait, and is recognized immediately as one of the distinguishing marks of the American spirit. Everyone who has intelligently observed American life has been impressed with its optimism. However dangerous and threatening present conditons may be, the American is not distressed, for he believes that finally everything will be adjusted. The prevalent municipal corruption, the horde of immigrants who segregate in various parts of the United States and fail to assimilate American ideals, the increasing economic complexity with its strikes and lockouts and its recurring periods of financial stress, these may be acknowledged as threatening, and yet the optimistic thought of the people is not appalled. If we should inquire the reason for this boundless faith in the future welfare of the national life, it would be referred to the temper of the American people. The people are believed to be right at heart, and when they realize the dangers which beset them, they will rise to the emergency and overwhelm the untoward forces. When a mistake has been made, or when political or economic conditions lead to dire hardships and seemingly insoluble problems, the people are believed to have been deluded. And all that is thought to be necessary in order to insure a recurrence of national prosperity is the enlightenment of the popular mind.

This universal optimistic temper of the American is broadly recognized. It may be well to inquire into the thought and life of the American himself that we may know what are his characteristics which are sufficient for such boundless faith. It is not a little remarkable that while we have had many studies during the past few years of different types of aliens who have domiciled in America, and while several classes of society have been analyzed, the indigenous American has been overlooked. Perhaps it has been thought that it is not necessary to analyze one who is universally prevalent, and with whose most intimate experiences everyone is familiar. But amid the rapid changes in the industrial conditions of this nation, and the promise of quite as radical modifications of the political phases of our national life, the quality of the indigenous American can no

longer be overlooked. For it is this primal life which is depended upon to solve all the problems which affect our national welfare. The dangers arising from an indiscriminate immigration are admitted, but it is averred that the children of immigrants become thorough Americans. The multiplication of industrial enterprises may modify the familiar conditions of national life, but it is claimed that the American spirit will prove an efficient ballast to prevent national shipwreck. Municipal corruption may be universally pervasive, but the people are undisturbed through a consciousness of their own integrity.

Upon an examination of the American temper at first hand it is found to be predominantly rural. The indigenous American is a resident of an agricultural community. He pursues agriculture directly for a livelihood, or he engages in some occupation which ministers to the rural classes and which is affected by the conditions of rural life. The rural town, which acts as the chief market for the agricultural produce and as the county seat for the administration of local government, seldom exceeds in size five thousand inhabitants. There may be minor manufactures in these municipalities, but they have no foreign market and find their chief end in providing for the necessities of the surrounding countryside. The American is attached to the soil and believes in a rural economy. Success and labor are convertible terms. He is no believer in a privileged class. He points with pride to the self-made man, the one who began his life-career penniless, and has amassed a fortune. He reads the stories of men who have risen to high station, and in each narrative he finds that success has resulted from constant struggle with untoward circumstances. He has no faith in prerogatives of birth. In his own community he can refer to numerous instances in which a moderate inherited estate has ruined a promising youth, and he believes a heritage of toil is the most valuable legacy which can be bequeathed to a son or daughter. He is fond of the axioms of Poor Richard, and discovers their truth anew in his own experience and in the experiences of his friends. A failure to accumulate a competence is ascribed to shiftlessness. He has no sympathy with the claim that economic conditions have

changed and that the youth of high aspirations has not the same opportunities to amass a fortune that his father enjoyed. If the youth of the family has failed to obtain employment at home, and has gone elsewhere upon the same quest, but without success, the failure is explained by the adage that "the rolling stone gathers no moss." If the newly married pair begin life with a modicum of comforts and then are unable to maintain the standard with which they began their marital career, their extravagance is denominated the chief cause of their failure and is believed to be merited. The indigenous American is a thorough believer in the Canonist doctrine that there is sufficient labor in every community to support every inhabitant, and that a failure to be employed is a personal fault. A tramp is a reprehensible being, who deserves to be punished for remaining idle and for becoming a burden upon the community.

The American recognizes few distinctions of caste. Labor is the common heritage, and the well-to-do toil as manfully as do the poor. The children of the prosperous, particularly their sons, seek employment among the neighboring families. The children of a man of wealth labor with the hired wage-earners and share with them the family meals and the several sleeping-apartments. American philosophy is opposed to the recognition of caste and rank. There is a universal willingness to bow to the possessor of wealth, but every rich man is the embodiment of successful toil, and hence the rule of American life is not disturbed. The rich and learned, and perchance the one who may visit the community in whose veins flows the more gentle blood, may be gazed upon with awe and served with obsequiousness, but American canons still attach to the manual toiler the greatest significance, and refuse to acknowledge that any prerogative other than that of personal worth can be admitted in the community.

These economic conceptions temper the entire life of the American. The success of the toiler is deserved, and the failure of the slothful is likewise merited. But a third term is added. Not only are success and toil synonymous, but each is deemed the equivalent of the ethically right. The one who labors is not

only rewarded by success in accumulation, but his life is meritorious for its goodness. The one who refuses to toil, who is an idler, naturally becomes occupied with evil. The proverbial philosophy again perpetuates this belief in the adage, "Satan finds some evil still for idle hands to do." The indigenous American measures ethics by an economic standard. Since the man who toils is successful in accumulation and success is worthy, goodness is identified with success. And since the improvident persons in the local community tend to become vicious and dissolute, evil is identified with failure. The American is puzzled when evil befalls a good man: the matter is incomprehensible to him. And it is anomalous when one who is notoriously evil achieves a fortune, for this too contradicts the philosophy of American life. For he believes that evil should be its own reward, and that the wrongdoer should fail in his undertakings and should be apprehended and punished. His chosen literature convinces him that his current beliefs are true. The narrative of the struggles of successful men show that their evil opponents finally were reduced to want. The literature which is circulated through the Sunday-school library teaches also the unwavering execution of this law. And when the American occasionally attends the theater, the plays which he prefers are those in which the villain is discovered and punished, and in which virtue and right are finally triumphant.

The American is a firm believer in himself and in the solidarity of his community. The successful man was always born on a farm, and was acquainted with the hardships of rural life. And it was the straits of his early life which developed the sterling qualities of his character that afterward led to signal successes. He believes that the qualities of life which have achieved success in the neighborhood are universally potent. In his exceptional visits to the theater, he sees the honest agricultural toiler as the chief agency for the thwarting of evil and the rescuing of innocence. The skilful machinations of the confidence-man have no efficacy against the swain whose intentions are unalloyedly good. But the value of the community depends to a great degree upon the preservation of its pristine character

intact. For the American is usually of progenitors who also were born in America, and who perchance occupied the land upon which the American himself still resides. The staid members of the community are those who have been reared within its borders and who are interrelated with many of the older and more substantial families by marriage. The dependence of the community is upon its substantial citizens; hence they must be upheld and sustained. The strange face is not welcomed. The transient is bidden to leave the neighborhood with all speed, and the individual or family who come as strangers to the community and desire to establish permanent residence within its borders are not welcomed until they have proved their worth by time and by achieving a considerable fortune.

The American temper is also dominantly political. The chief citizens of the community are chosen to the local offices, and there is keen interest in the outcome of every election. Every man is a partisan. However good friends men may be in their neighborhood life, they are bitter enemies in their political preferences. The American will oppose his best friend who seeks political office but who is affiliated with a party organization different from his own, and he will give his support to an unworthy member of his own party. He accepts the platform of his party as an *ex cathedra* utterance and believes its every statement is a verified fact. But the platform of the opposing party is full of deceit and its policies will be destructive to the political life. Its candidates, if they are elected to public office, will exploit the public for their private advantage. But the American is not deeply affected by charges of corruption in public office. If the official whose integrity is questioned is of an opposing political affiliation, he ascribes the dereliction to that fact. If a member of his own party is accused of malfeasance in office, he may acknowledge the truth of the accusation, but he is not inclined to condemn the offender. For the American mind is not keenly alive to the sacredness of public office. The incumbent is expected to exploit the public if it can be done without detection, and the American admires the astuteness of the one who can thus improve his private fortune with the greatest skill.

The indigenous American is a firm believer in favoritism and privilege. His every conception is tempered by the rule of the partisan. In his purchase of domestic necessities he feels that the price of commodities should be lessened in his case, and he suggests this course to the merchant in an undertone. If he is involved in litigation, he ascribes an adverse verdict of a jury to the personal dislike of certain jurors for him, and it is inexplicable to him that one who is his sworn friend should permit any judgment to be entered injurious to his interests. In the course of a legal proceeding, he insists that his attorney shall consult the judge privately, and frequently he beseeches his intimates to seek interviews with the court in order to influence the tribunal in his favor. Upon the occasions when he is drawn for jury service, he practices these precepts faithfully. He pays little attention to the issues involved or to the weighing of the evidence which is presented in the trial of the cause, but favors his friend even at the expense of justice.

In his religious affiliations, the American is passively orthodox. He is rarely a zealot. His interest in the church is often inane, but he firmly defends it against any attack. His own life may not be in conformity with its tenets, and he is very willing to acknowledge his personal shortcomings. He insists that had he conformed to the teaching of the church he would have lived a life of higher spiritual tone. He is not specific in this self-depreciation, but asserts the fact as indisputable. He believes in religion as an essential safeguard of the community, and shuns the critic of the neighborhood ecclesiasticism. Anyone who is an avowed independent in matters of religion may be assured of popular execration. If such a religious free lance becomes a candidate for political office, the chief opposition which he will incur will be criticism and condemnation of his religious forwardness.

The American is not predisposed to pleasure. A few books may be observed in his home, of which the most noticeable are the Bible and sectarian literature. With these are frequently associated the Acts of the recent state assembly. The assured recreation is the weekly visit to the county seat or market town

where he meets with neighbors and gossips about local political conditions or the prospects for an abundant harvest. The chief evils are attendance at the theater or the dance and participation in games of cards or of chance. These indulgences are periodically denounced by the ministers of the churches, and when the youths have united with the church, they are presumed to give up such reprehensible amusements. The reading of novels is classed as trifling, and sometimes as even dangerous to the moral tone. In the weekly visits to the nearest town, there is more or less imbibing of intoxicants. The meeting of friends is made more cordial by their mutually partaking of stimulating beverages, and frequently before the day has closed, the American has succumbed to his bibulous propensities.

The American firmly believes in versatility of gifts. He has no faith in specialized powers. He admires the man who is equally fortunate in all his undertakings. His ideal is one who has achieved startling prosperity in many different lines. As boy and man, in business and professional life, the ideal of the American attains a like success. In the common thought the potential of man is convertible into any form, and anyone who has ability cannot but win a prominent place in the public regard. The college professor is one who can teach any branch of learning with equal aptitude; the lawyer or physician can also direct agricultural or commercial ventures successfully. The public speaker in particular is vested with the attributes of seer and sage. Verbosity is apotheosized. Anyone who is fertile of felicitous expression is believed to speak verities; if he becomes a writer, his publications meet with ready and popular sale; his name is used and accepted as a guarantee of worth. There is little investigation into the sources of facts, and little regard for original authority. A statement of platitudes by an acceptable public speaker is universally commended.

The range of thought of the indigenous American is generally limited by personalities. He is not capable of abstraction, or if in any case he can thus exercise his mental powers, he does not to do so. It is the concrete instance that is cited, the person who has done a particular thing whose acts and doings are discus-

sed. The political doctrines of a favorite local orator, the pulpit utterances of some cherished divine, the maladventures of some person in the neighborhood—these are the sole topics of conversation. Beliefs and practices, likes and dislikes are embodied in persons. The larger world is likewise observed. The neighboring youth who has gone forth into the region beyond the narrow hamlet is an object of thoughtful regard. His letters are of uncommon interest, and his achievements are the pride of all his friends. In the larger circles of political interests, the words of favored statesmen are read and pondered, and are quoted as conclusive in any argument. Perhaps the only departure from this rule of personality in conversation is the devotion which the American has for doctrinal religious discussion. In an earlier day the Arminian sects of the Central West were keen to denounce the “five points of Calvinism.” This attitude still persists in the older and Calvinistic communities. But in the communities which are rather predisposed to spectacular manifestations of religious zeal, the doctrine of baptism is of overweening importance. Friends and relatives are estranged because of difference of belief upon this speculative dogma. The chief object of pulpit ministrations is the establishment of this doctrine so that it cannot be questioned further. The limit which personality has placed round the whole of the American’s thought is here broken down, and every mind ranges wide in its search for destructive arguments.

The character of the American which we have attempted to analyze was formed in an earlier age. It still bears the impress of the frontier. Its simplicity, its limited range, its neighborhood character, all are vestiges of an earlier time when the neighborhood existed in practical isolation, and when the concerns of one were known to all. For two hundred and fifty years American life was nurtured of the neighborhood, and the occupations of the people were those which called only for the expenditure of superabundant physical energy. That entire period was one in which the successful man in any undertaking might have achieved quite as great success in any other occupation which he might have pursued. It was an era which pre-

ceded specialization. The absence of newspapers and railroads made communication well nigh impossible, and local concerns were magnified. The church alone impregnated the hamlet with intellectual stimulus other than that of personal gossip, and this single vent for intellectual energy was surcharged with the questionings of the people. Favoritism was a rule of life because on the frontier favors were asked and granted with sheer generosity, and the abundant hospitality offered every passer-by his food and lodging. With the growth of associative relations and the great increase of commercial facilities for intercommunication, the conditions which gave rise to the American as we have described him passed away, and the interests of the larger world succeeded the vista of the hamlet. But while the environment of the earlier American life has been outgrown, the American type has persisted. The political and social ideal is still dominantly rural. Our cities have not existed long enough to create an urban American who shall be as clearly carved as the American of the rural neighborhoods. Our rapid economic growth and the development of corporate forms of industrial organization have set awry the economic maxims of Poor Richard, but have not as yet given rise to an economic philosophy distinctively American. And the American in whom is believed to be resident a dynamic which will conserve the national life and which will thwart the untoward forces that may at any time imperil our national existence is the rural American as we have pictured him.

The chief antithesis of American life lies in this popular and general conception of the American temper, and in the actual tendency of American development. For while the temper of the people is agricultural and rural, their bent is decidedly commercial and urban. The rise of cities in this nation is too recent to have affected national traits predominantly, but their increasing growth makes the era of the city undoubted. Within a generation the goal of American youth has changed from the West to the city, and the latter has become the mart for surplus population and for the expenditure of youthful exuberance. Henry Ward Beecher's advice to the Yale students for the ministry that they could best fit themselves for their lifework by a

period of service on the frontier, and Greeley's famous epigram are alike untrue to the present, as they were true to a generation since. But the conflict of urban tendencies with rural thought, of the universal with the provincial, is one that cannot but affect the entire life of the American people. So long as the thought of the people remains provincial the larger national life cannot be lived. The provincial philosophy was true to the past but its mold is too small for present needs. And while an appeal might have been made a quarter of a century ago to the ameliorating qualities of the American temper, they are quite inadequate to safeguard the life of today. The creation of an enlarged view is one of the needs of the immediate future. Whether it is possible at all depends upon the form it may assume. The time has passed when the single type can represent the entire nation. The broad diversity of present-day interests makes it questionable whether any single type can ever be universally American as it once was.

But whether there can be an adequate substitute for the present conception of the American temper makes little difference in our consideration of its essential character. For the present conception is clearly inadequate and has caused not only the people at large, but even some acute thinkers to underestimate the problems of our national life, and to rest confidently in the power of the national spirit to retrieve every misfortune. The recent awakening of civic communities in behalf of public righteousness meets its most fatal foe in the failure of the community at large in respond to stimuli. One of the indispensable conditions to our further public growth is a realization of the limitations of American life, and among the most needed lessons for every American is a correct measurement of the temper of the people. Only thus can the persistent equanimity of every phase of our community life be overcome.

THE RELATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

A SYMPOSIUM

The following letter, with appended list of questions, was sent to twenty-seven prominent scholars, instead of the twenty originally selected. Historians, economists, political scientists, and sociologists were included. Nineteen replies were received. Of these thirteen were courteous acknowledgments of the request, with reasons for not answering the questions. Six writers replied to the questions submitted, and the answers are printed in the alphabetical order of their authors' names.

THE LETTER OF TRANSMISSION

DEAR SIR: I am sending under another cover reprints of four papers which have led to the following request:

Will you contribute 400 to 500 words to a symposium in the *American Journal of Sociology* on the series of questions submitted herewith? The one group of questions was drawn up by Dr. Hoxie, the other by myself. If it is impracticable to answer the whole series, will you reply to one or more of the questions which may seem to you most pertinent? Our desire is not to elicit expressions of opinion about the merits of the printed discussion, but about the main questions concerned. I may add that we have no intention of inflicting upon you the burden of reading the four papers, but they are sent rather as evidence that the questions proposed have taken shape in the course of serious debate.

This request will be sent to twenty representatives of the social sciences.

As the subject is important to every student of the social sciences, it is hoped that you will be able to join in the discussion.

With thanks in advance for your favor,

Sincerely,

THE EDITOR,

The American Journal of Sociology.

THE QUESTIONS

I

1. Do you believe that reality is fixed in its ultimate nature and constitution? If not, (a) can you assign any absolute or ultimate or inviolable constitution to it? (b) Is any science or any group of correlated sciences capable of giving any "normal" or exclusively valid or ultimate or completed view and explanation of reality?

2. Is the following a valid definition of a social science? A social science is an examination and interpretation of human experience as such from some distinctive human standpoint, aspect, or interest; or it is an attempt to describe and explain or interpret human experience as it is ranged about and related to some one special interest which is for the time being regarded as the end of human experience. If such a definition be accepted, (a) Is any particular social science standing by itself merely or predominantly analytical in its treatment of human experience. (b) Does not a science thus constituted make constant use of the results and conclusions of other similarly constituted sciences? (c) Can sciences thus constituted then rightly be called fragmentary? (d) Can they rightly be called independent? (e) How can such sciences be "correlated" so as to give a complete view of human relations?

II

3. What is your opinion of the proposition: The indicated function of the social sciences at their present stage is to co-operate in finding a detailed content for some comprehensive conception of human relations?

4. What is your opinion of the following as a formula of such guiding conception?—For our intelligence the most central process within the range of experience is the evolution of human personality; for our intelligence, therefore, every separable phase of human experience must get its meaning and valuation from the connections which we discover between it and the central process of the evolution of persons (4th reprint, p. 219).

THE ANSWERS

PROFESSOR T. N. CARVER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

I have had so many other things pressing that I have not been able to give the necessary study to the list of questions which you did me the honor to send me until I am afraid that it is too late to answer your purpose. However, inasmuch as I find myself in such complete disagreement with the whole trend of the discussion perhaps it is just as well if I am too late. What I have to say cannot throw much light upon the exact question under controversy. My answers and comments follow:

1. I believe that it is, but I do not know.

2. I do not think that I can understand the definition, therefore I can neither assent nor dissent.

3. I am not certain that I know what is meant by a "detailed content for some comprehensive conception of human relations," and therefore I cannot say whether it is "the indicated function of the social sciences" or not.

4. I have a very poor opinion of the formula because it seems a labored one—so labored as to lose its meaning.

I have tried to make something out of the questions, but as you see, I have not succeeded. It seems to me that sociology, instead of being a master-

science, comes nearer being a science of "left overs." If ethics had continued to cover the ground which Aristotle laid out for it there would never have been such separate sciences as politics and economics. But as ethics has *actually* developed it covers a much narrower field. Again, politics as developed by such writers as Hobbes and Locke, left little room for economics or sociology either. But politics was narrowed down to the study of government, and economics occupied the remainder of the field. But economics has also been narrowed down, and sociology is inflicted upon the world for the sins of the economists. If economists had occupied the whole field laid out for them by Adam Smith there would have been very little excuse for sociologists. Therefore I am inclined to define sociology as economics broadened out. It is the study of the factors and conditions of human well-being, and thus includes a number of factors, such as selection, heredity, etc., which economists usually neglect.

PROFESSOR JOHN B. CLARK, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

I pass over the first question as not in my province of thought and study.

The definition of a social science suggested in the second question appears to me to err in not bringing into the foreground the relations of men to each other rather than the nature of the individuals. Society is an organism and the distinctive fact about it is the interactions of its atomic parts, the men who compose it. Of course the ultimate forces are, as it were, atomic, residing in the individuals, and the facts concerning individuals are among the data of the social science. The collecting of such facts is rather the work of other sciences. The word, *human*, which is repeatedly used in the questions would suggest a distinction between facts concerning man and those concerning dumb animals, inanimate objects, or disembodied spirits; but it does not suggest the distinction between the social atom and the interactivities of the atoms. It could lead a reader to infer that social science aimed to become encyclopedic in attaining and presenting facts about man, who of course is the subject of a number of other sciences. Section *b* of the question suggests, in this connection, the essential fact, namely, that social science uses the results of other sciences. They are among its data, and the use it makes of them is what it can claim as its own. Those other sciences are not parts of the social one. Political economy uses as data the results of the study of physics; but physics is not a part of political economy.

As to sections *c* and *d* of the question, the social science and others are in no true sense fragmentary, though each presents a part of what makes the total of knowledge. As to data, they are to a large extent interdependent, but as to their processes and conclusions they are, in a natural sense of the term, largely independent.

My objection to the definition suggested in question number two applies to that in question number three, and even to the one in question number four.

Human personality is an ultimate fact—one of the supremely important data. Sociology has to do with a higher organism and the relations and interactions of the men who are its members. A science may be social in a very different sense, and may study men as they are controlled and individually modified by society; but in that case it is not a truly social science. Sociology proper succeeds best when it gives attention altogether to the higher organism of which men are members and, in studying men, investigates only their relations and interactivities. Such facts as it needs about men themselves are either matters of common knowledge or are furnished by other sciences. Working in this plane sociology has an enormous field and there is no need of going beyond it.

PROFESSOR DAVID KINLEY, THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1. I should accept the definition of social science as given in lines four to eight of paragraph two, with slight modifications, as follows:

A social science is an examination, description, and interpretation of human experience from the point of view of one predominating special interest or of related special interests, which, for the time being, are regarded as the aim of human activity.

From this point of view I do not regard any particular social science as merely analytical in its treatment of its materials. Indeed, I am inclined to believe that the logical method of treatment depends more largely on the temperament of the writer than on the nature of the subject-matter. Sociology, political science, and economics can all be treated in a purely analytical way with some valuable results and can also be treated in large measure in a synthetic manner.

2. However, any science whose method of treatment is predominantly analytical certainly must make constant use of conclusions of other sciences. I should hesitate to call such sciences fragmentary, unless the word is carefully defined. I should prefer to call them partial. That is, I should regard them as explanations of part of the field of human experience. They are incomplete from the point of view of a general social philosophy, but complete in covering the whole field of human activity, though from a special point of view.

I do not think there is any science that can be called logically or substantially "independent." Each draws on the others for its materials, and its premises. They are interdependent. The general problem of social philosophy, I take it, is to determine the resultant social life produced by the interaction of the social life phases which are the conclusions of the separate social sciences. Since I do not admit that the separate social sciences are fragmentary, or that they properly can be described as investigating segments of human experience, but rather that each one presents a complete study of all human experience from a special point of view, each one must

present in its conclusions complete social life. The phases of the complete social life yielded by the different social sciences react on one another to produce the resultant actual life of society. I think that the study of the interaction of these phases may properly be regarded as a separate field of knowledge. It is the study of social adjustments.

3. I should modify this a little. The difference is perhaps in emphasis merely. I should put it: From the point of view of a complete social philosophy: the function of each social science is to supply a detailed content of human experience from the point of view of that particular social science, with the ultimate object of correlating their conclusions in order to establish a comprehensive and general conception of human relations. I believe that the thought intended in your paragraph is sound.

4. I think the formula given in this paragraph is scientifically sound as a principle of guidance in social investigation.

To my mind no phase of human experience is either of meaning or of value as an isolated phenomenon.

PROFESSOR E. A. ROSS, THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1. The properties of the elements and the manner of operation of the natural forces are so fixed that sciences like physics and chemistry attain stability. Copper sulphate is today just what it was in Thales' time. Species of plants and animals change a little in the centuries, but zoölogy and botany, still more biology, are stable enough. On the other hand, the social sciences deal with human beings; and these evolve, owing to changes in the culture-content of their minds and owing to changed relations to their environment. The progress of ideas and inventions so alters the reaction modes of men that the behavior of people today in a given situation, or with a given institution or law, is not the same as in the days of Thales. This transformation of the subject-matter of sociology is so determining that the sociology a master mind, like Aristotle, might produce today would have little more than antiquarian interest in the year 2407; whereas if he gave himself to human physiology he might hope to remain a high authority at that remote date.

2. I cannot accept the definition. I think of a social science as explaining the manifestations in the social field (i. e., in human relations, conflicts, co-operations, conventions, institutions, etc.) of some distinguishable order of human desires ("interests" Dr. Small would say). The social sciences are in some respects distinct, in others interdependent. Correlated they must be in a measure, for whatever alters average personality (e. g., culture advance or a let-up in the struggle for existence) may bring about disturbance in all the orders of human desire and therefore in the subject-matter of all the social sciences.

3. Accepted.

4. I accept the formula in general, but find it too sweeping. I would prefer to say that the behavior in the social field of men actuated by any one order of desire can never be completely explained without reference to the central process—the evolution of persons—and ultimately to the crisis in this or that department of human experience that brings about a given evolution of persons. The social scientist may work long and profitably in his special field, but sooner or later he must connect up with the other social scientists through this central process of evolving personality.

PROFESSOR LESTER F. WARD, BROWN UNIVERSITY

I will try to answer the points *seriatim*, but I do not think anything I can say will be worth anything, certainly not worth publishing. I read all the articles as they appeared.

I

1. I do not understand “reality” to be anything in and of itself, or to have any “nature” or “constitution.” That would belong to the old ontological metaphysics. Anything that is real, i. e., that exists, is a reality, and there are as many realities as there are things that exist. When you say “reality” I understand you to mean real things, nearly in the sense of what is true, but regarded objectively—nature, matter, and its relations, “things as they are.”

2. Both the definitions of a “social science” seem correct, but a dozen others might also be given and be correct. I have always confined it to “human” phenomena, and given my reasons. Some extend it to animals.

(a) Some treatises on, or treatments of, social science are predominantly analytical and others are predominantly synthetic; e. g., my *Applied Sociology*, Part II, is an analytical treatment, and my *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. II, is a synthetic treatment of the same subject. (b) It seems to me that both analytical and synthetic treatments of almost any science, and especially of social science, must “make constant use of the results and conclusions of other similarly constituted sciences,” and of others that are not “similarly constituted.” (c) The term “fragmentary” does not seem to be a happy one by which to characterize any of the established and recognized sciences, not even the so-called special social sciences. (d) They may properly be called “independent” in the sense that they are complete disciplines, but no science is in reality independent. The interdependence of the sciences is admitted by all. (e) There are two ways in which the sciences may be “correlated.” The great primary ones can be arranged in serial order as determined by their relative generality and speciality, and their relative simplicity and complexity (these always going hand in hand), as well as by the natural filiation, or the affiliation of the higher upon the lower. The lesser secondary sciences should be arranged in synoptical form under the primary ones, as geology

under astronomy, zoölogy under biology, etc. All the "special social sciences" thus fall under sociology.

II

3. The proposition seems to me a little obscure. Perhaps this is due to redundant words. If it means that the special social sciences co-operate in the creation of a general social science, there can be no objection to it. It follows from the synoptical arrangement referred to under I, 2, (*e*).

4. The use of the words "personality" and "persons" obscures the meaning, and I am not sure what that is. The evolution of individual men seems to be involved in the evolution of the human race. This belongs rather to anthropology than to sociology, but is a condition to the evolution of society. "The most central process" for the sociologist is the formation of groups, or associated "persons." (I may entirely misunderstand this number.)

PROFESSOR HUTTON WEBSTER, THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

1. Questions as to the "ultimate nature and constitution" of reality being metaphysical, not sociological, in character, I can only answer as metaphysician, not as sociologist, that there is an "absolute," "ultimate," and "inviolable" constitution of reality and that it is the high function of philosophy to interpret that reality to us. Building upon the foundations of the several sciences and correlating their results into an intelligible whole, philosophy may by successive approximations at length attain a "normal," "exclusively valid," "ultimate," and "completed" view of reality.

2. Accepting the definition of a social science here given as valid and explanatory, I answer: (*a*) that the science of "sociology" seems to me to be "predominantly analytical" in its treatment of human experiences; (*b*) that it does make constant use, by the very nature of its being, of the results and conclusions of other social sciences; (*c*) that the other social sciences are "fragmentary" in the sense that botany and zoölogy are fragmentary unless subsumed under the more general science of biology; that (*d*) the special social sciences as academic disciplines may properly be treated as "independent" while, nevertheless, yielding allegiance at every step of their progress to the general science of social relations usually denominated sociology; and that (*e*) the problem of "correlation" will, in a measure, solve itself as we gradually push backward and inward our investigations in each of the social sciences. The way to develop the "social science" of the future is to make as fruitful and useful as possible the "social sciences" of the present.

3. The "biological analogy" above noted may again prove helpful here. One does not say that the "indicated function" of botany and zoölogy is simply to find a "detailed content" for some comprehensive conception of organic relations. That is, indeed, one of their functions, and a function important enough. But the biological sciences are also important subjects of study for

themselves—to the analyst as well as to the synthesist of organic life. Hence I conceive that we shall always find a place for an ever-growing group of social sciences whose devotees will be usefully employed in cultivating, by the most intensive methods, their own particular plats in the sociological garden.

4. As a general formula, the statements in this paragraph seem to me unimpeachable from the point of view of the *synthesist* of human relations and human experience. But the *analyst* may well urge, as indicated above, that for practical purposes, it is sufficient to take one thing at a time; that there is danger in generalizing about the “evolution of human personality” before we have made the most exhaustive studies possible of every phase of human experience.

RÉSUMÉ

ALBION W. SMALL

As a referendum, the six statements, however important in themselves, have of course no inductive value. The total result of the inquiry serves principally to point the moral suggested by the old definition of an egotist—“a man who is always talking about himself when you want to be talking about yourself.” If doubt anywhere existed, this inquiry may fairly be taken as creating a rather plausible presumption that there is comparatively little interest today among American specialists in the social sciences about questions of general methodology. These men are busy with subjects that interest them more, and I am not disposed to think hard even of those who were too much preoccupied to send a postal card saying that they were otherwise engaged.

At the same time, it would be unfortunate to close the incident without making it an occasion for one more reiteration of what ought to be a truism, but which at present has only the force of a vagary, viz., that this prevalent contempt for live-questions of the bearings of different parts of social science upon one another does credit to nobody. Irrespective of the right or wrong of positions in debate between Dr. Hoxie and myself, the degree of aloofness from reality which passes among us for scholarship is a serious misfortune. There is one question, and one only, which in the last analysis gives social science under any name first-rate dignity. However we may phrase the question, it amounts to

this: What is potentially in human beings, and how may human beings who have begun to be conscious of themselves make the most headway in realizing these possibilities? So far as I am able to see, this question is closer on the track of the last meaning we can discover for life than any other. I can see nothing but hysterics in any human activity whatsoever which is not in some way contributing its quota toward answering this question. Sciences all seem to me so many triflings with capricious conceits about life, unless each in its way is co-operating with all other investigations of human experience in working out the completest report possible upon the main question. In the last resort, the place of any science in the gamut between triviality and importance must be fixed by the degree of its participation in this co-operative inquiry.

Back of the chaos of opinions about the relations of social sciences to one another, and back of the still worse pedantry that pursues faddishly isolated social curiosity-hunting without caring whether it is related to anything else than individual whim, is indifferentism or agnosticism about any main meaning which gives the incidents of life a scale of values. These questions of methodology have their chief value in their bearing upon this fundamental unfaith. We either do or do not believe that there is an underlying moral economy which it is the interest of all mankind to know. We either believe or we do not believe that every specialization of knowledge about society is on trial until it connects up with all that can be ascertained about the entire system of moral economy which human evolution demonstrates. The attitude of the social scientists in the United States points to a considerable preponderance of opinion that the idea of an underlying moral economy in the affairs of men is a myth. If this is so, then we may take our pick of the interests which we shall think and act about, and our choice makes no difference. If it is not so, if men's actions tend to promote or to retard some central process, then it makes a mighty difference if in thought or deed we assume the contrary.

I have urged that, from a spectator's point of view, the chain of human experience, so far as it is open to observation, amounts

to an unconsciously co-operative process of finding out what is latent in the capacities of men, and how those possibilities may be realized. I have urged that this fact points to the proper temper of co-operation among social sciences. If there is a trunk line of evolution of this sort, the only rational inference is that special social sciences are standing in their own light unless they try to carry on their work so that it will both give meaning to and get meaning from this central process.

Whether few or many assent to this statement of the situation, it is the clearest view I can get of the truth, and I shall do my best to recommend this interpretation of life and science until some other view can establish superior claims.

HEREDITARY CRIME.

GERTRUDE C. DAVENPORT
Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island

Magnificent are the scope and effectiveness of our organizations of charity, church, and state, for the repression of crime. They can cope, however, only with crimes that are the product of unfit environment by diminishing temptations or by strengthening the individual's inhibitions. But even if they should succeed in eradicating all such crimes there would still remain those committed by habitual criminals—criminals who are bred as race horses are bred, namely, by the process of assortive mating. Such are outside the pale of beneficent environment. They can no more help committing crime than race horses can help going. Precise information about these criminal breeds is hard to get; so much the more valuable, therefore, are the remarkable results obtained by Dr. Jörger, director of the Insane Asylum of Waldhaus-Chur in Switzerland.¹ Dr. Jörger noticed that the inmates of his institution very frequently bore the same family name. He marveled at this fact, the more so because it was the name of one of the most sturdy, sane, and respected families in the neighborhood. He was therefore led to make inquiry concerning the coincidence. His investigation showed indeed a blood relationship between the inmates of his institution and the respected family; but the respected family never furnished a single patient to his asylum. He found that the respected family descended in two lines, each of which maintained its integrity. Unfortunately there was a third line, the one that furnished not only all the inmates of that name to his institution but inmates to other kinds of state institutions. His full investigation disclosed such depths of degradation in the bad branch of the family that he has been constrained, out of consideration and respect for the good branches, to assume in his account of his researches a fictitious

¹ Jörger, "Die Familie Zero," *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie*, July-August, 1905.

name for the family and for their dwelling-place. He has assumed these names, however, according to a code in order that the true names may be made known at some future time. The family, including both the good and the bad branches, he has called the Zero family and their dwelling-place Zand.

Zand is an isolated village in a Swiss valley. It consists of 700-800 inhabitants only. The ancestry of each and every family he has been able to trace back to the seventeenth century. The isolation of this village has preserved in its inhabitants racial peculiarities in all their purity. The people of Zand are a branch of the German Walser colony. They are an industrious, economical, earnest, cautious, moral, and temperate people. Into many of their houses alcohol does not find its way year in and year out. They are either of medium height or tall of stature, and walk with the long stride of the mountaineer. Lack of pasture in season or the failure of other resources sometimes forces them out of the valley, but when affairs prosper with them their strong love of home brings them back again. They almost invariably marry women of their own valley and end an industrious life there—all of them except the Zeros. The Zeros drank, wandered aimlessly from home, persisted in no occupation, and almost always married foreign women. They usually returned home only when accompanied by police escort.

Dr. Jörger finds in the archives of the town that a Peter Zero was the chief magistrate in 1551, and later that a Eugene Zero held the same office. In 1727 a Carl Eugene Zero was baptized with rich and noble people as god-parents; hence he concludes that the family is one long native to Zand and one formerly held in high esteem there. Also he has been able to establish the fact that all the Zeros now living in Zand are descended from an Andreas Zero, a miller, born in 1639. Andreas married Ida Olga Lauter. This woman not only was a blood relative of her husband but her blood was tainted with insanity. She bore two sons, Peter and Ernst. Peter married Sina Frohman, a woman from a healthy, moral, and sturdy family, and from them descended one of the two good branches of the Zeros, a branch so upright that it no longer enters into

this story. The second son, Ernst, married twice. His first wife was a blood relative, a Lauter from the same family as his mother. Their son, Paul Alexius, was the founder of the vagabond and criminal branch. Ernst's second wife, Christina Scholler, bore a son Paul. Paul was an officeholder in Zand and married Ida Froham, a relative of the Sina Froham from whom the first good branch descended. This marriage gave origin to the second good branch of the family, a branch that has no further connection with this narrative.

Paul A., the son of the first wife, was not only the product of two generations of blood relatives but of marriage for two generations with blood contaminated by insanity. Paul's character was one not without suspicion before his own marriage. But his physique was good, for he lived to be 106 years old. It seems probable that he was an itinerant kettle-mender. At any rate his wanderings led him to the Valle Fontana in Italy—a place long noted for its kettle-menders and venders, a people so notoriously disliked that an old decree of Zand forbade them to enter its boundaries. Paul married a woman of this place. No record of his wife's name can be found, and he himself died away from home. This marriage with a woman of wandering and vicious disposition is, according to the opinion of Dr. Jörger, the cause of the permanent downfall of this branch of the Zeros. The Lauter blood, despite its kinship with the Zeros and its insanity, he believes, cannot alone be responsible for the complete and lasting degredation of this branch, for the two good branches descended from the first union with it. These good branches numbered only one degenerate in all their lines of descent. This one will soon enter into our story. However much or little the Lauter blood may have contributed to the decline, the marriage of Paul Alexius with the Italian kettle-mender and of their son Paul Jos with a German vagabond settled the fate of this line. Paul Jos, born in 1722, was the only child of the Italian marriage. He led a vagabond life very similar to that of his father. His vagabond wife was from the Marcus family, a German family that has remained in vagabondage until today. This Olga Marcus gave birth to seven children, but so persistently did the parents

wander that each child was born in a different place. The oldest was a girl; the remaining six were boys. These seven children were the parents of seven lines of degenerate Zeros. The rest of this story is an account of their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and of a few great-great-grandchildren. Dr. Jörger has named them in succession Prima Zero to Sesto Zero.

Prima Zero, the daughter, married one of her Zero relatives of the first good strain. The man was well educated for his time and place, and during his early life was a teacher. He had degenerated, however, even before his marriage, into a confirmed drunkard and a consequent idler. He soon deserted his wife, who died early. Fortunately she had given birth to only two children, a son and a daughter. The daughter, with better instincts, voluntarily ran away from her father after the mother's death and was brought up in Swabia. She was a respectable woman, never married, and spent her entire life as a servant. Her only brother had different instincts. He grew up in the care of some of his vagabond relatives and could scarcely write his own name. He followed various occupations such as kettle-mending and basket-weaving. He was displeasing in appearance, weak minded, and with very rudimentary moral conceptions. His wife was illiterate, vagabond, bold, and disreputable. Of their 8 children, 6 were vagabonds, 4 criminals (1 a murderer), 2 were drunkards, and 6 unlawful parents. These 8 children had borne 28 offspring up to 1903. Of these 10 were illegitimate, 6 vagabonds, 10 either weak-minded or idiotic, and 2 drunkards. Seven died in infancy or early childhood, and so were spared a worse fate. The 2 known great-grandchildren are illegitimate. One died the year of its birth. So much for the descendants of the daughter Prima Zero.

Secondo Zero, her oldest brother, married three times. His third wife was an Italian from the Valle Fontana. She bore him no children. On the whole, however, he chose better wives than was the custom of his kindred. His first wife bore one son; his second two, idiotic sons. All three were vagabonds. The eldest and youngest bore children, 8 each. Of these 16 children 4 were vagabonds, 1 was a drunkard, 2 were unlawful parents, 2

criminals, and 7 were mentally abnormal. The 17 great grandchildren number 2 unlawful parents, 1 criminal, 2 illegitimate, and 2 mentally abnormal. One of the five great-great-grandchildren is illegitimate.

Terzo Zero, the second brother, was the father of 7 children; 6 of them were vagabonds, 2 drunkards, 1 an unlawful parent, and 1 weak-minded. There were 12 grandchildren, 5 of whom were weak-minded, 2 drunkards, and 1 an unlawful parent. There are several dead great-grandchildren, 4 only are living, 2 of these are half-witted.

Quarto Zero, the third brother, married an Italian from Valle Fontana, who bore him 4 sons. Three of them were vagabonds and 1 was a drunkard. Of the 12 grandchildren, 4 were criminals, 5 unlawful parents, 2 drunkards, and 1 was weak-minded. There are 17 known great-grandchildren of whom 7 are illegitimate, 3 criminals, and 1 is an unlawful parent. All the known great-great-grandchildren, 4 in number, are illegitimate.

Quinto Zero, the fourth brother, was the parent of 2 vagabond sons who gave him 6 legitimate and 1 illegitimate grandchildren. Of these 4 were vagabonds, 1 was a drunkard and 1 an unlawful parent. Two of his 3 great-grandchildren are vagabonds.

Sesto Zero, the fifth brother, married twice and had 4 children, of whom 2 were idiotic and 2 vagabonds, 2 criminals, and 2 unlawful parents. The record of his grandchildren is no better for 2 of them were illegitimate, 4 unlawful parents, 4 idiots, 6 vagabonds, and 2 criminals. There are 42 known great-grandchildren, 9 of whom are illegitimate and 7 idiotic. Twelve died in very early infancy. Of 13 neither the date of birth nor the fate are known to the investigator.

Settimo Zero, the sixth and youngest brother was a drunkard. He is the father of 5 children, of whom 4 are vagabonds, 2 idiots, 2 unlawful parents, 1 is a murderer, and 1 a drunkard. These bore in all 16 offsprings; of these grandchildren 2 are illegitimate, 8 vagabonds, 5 weak-minded, 5 unlawful parents, and 3 criminals. There are 22 great-grandchildren, 13 of whom are

illegitimate, 6 weak-minded, 2 others not ordinarily bright, and 11 of them have already died.

In the foregoing categories it will be seen that the individual frequently appears in two or more classes. In all Dr. Jörger has investigated the characteristics of 310 persons, of whom 190 are still living. On account of the high percentage of illegitimacy many relationships have doubtless escaped his inquiry. Notwithstanding all difficulties he has been able to trace the geneology of the family for nine generations. Many individuals of the last three generations are personally known to him.

External signs of degeneracy were early observable in the Zeros. They had a halting gait in contrast to the long stride of the other people of Zand. Their stature diminished until now very many of them are conspicuously dwarfed. For a very long time the people of Zand have recognized that these Zeros are different from themselves and that they are an element to be avoided. Strabismus and pustules on the face are a family characteristic of the Zeros. Indeed the frequency of cross-eyes was only rivaled by that of rickets. The Zeros, both from lack of desire and parental encouragement, attended neither school nor church unless compelled by village authority. Nor were they mentally capable of much accomplishment. Many of them, however, had considerable mechanical skill, a gift which permitted them to lead their itinerant life.

In the days when police interference was light they wandered over the country singly or in bands, like gipsies. Not infrequently, indeed, they associated with gipsies. Their language, however, is of German origin and shows that they are not of gipsy descent. They have in addition many words peculiar to themselves. They were wont to drive about in old wagons followed by numerous dogs. Indeed their advent in a neighborhood was a warning to the inhabitants to shut up in safe inclosures as quickly as possible all valued dogs. For want of sufficient draught animals the women and children were often forced to carry heavy burdens. The men ostensibly practiced such professions as crockery- and kettle-mending, rag- and bone-picking, basket-weaving, house-cleaning, etc. In reality they worked

little and smoked much, while the women sold wares and begged. Indeed vending was, for the most part, only an excuse for begging, and clever beggars they were. They knew the inclinations and whereabouts of all the industrious inhabitants as well as the location of all their possessions. Thieving was just as common with them as begging. Parental responsibility was light with the Zeros and consequently infant mortality was high. Thus of 300, 74 died in early childhood. Illegitimacy was great. Parental irresponsibility, idiocy, and poverty have made this family for one hundred years a burden to the almshouse of Zand.

The real extent of drunkenness and crime in this family history cannot be accurately told. In the earlier days, especially when police control was lighter, much thieving went unrecorded and unpunished. The categories of their thefts are so numerous that many kinds must needs escape observation under any circumstances. They stole milk from the cows in the fields, vegetables from the gardens, poultry and dogs from the barnyards. On their vending expeditions they found opportunity to steal all kinds of wearing-apparel and articles of personal adornment as well as of the household. They were a highly superstitious people with a large supply of signs and omens, but, strange to say, they had little awe of the church. Robbing of alms-boxes, which in earlier days were placed outside of churches or on posts by the wayside, was a most common practice with them. The bolder of them robbed tailor shops, markets, monasteries, and even the altars of churches. A few of the more clever have been counterfeiters. Murder, the most desperate of their crimes, seems to be incited either by jealousy over women or by illegitimacy.

In discussing the various environmental causes that have contributed their share to the maintenance of such a state of vagabondage, immorality and criminality as exists among the Zeros, Dr. Jörger states that he considers alcoholism the most important. It plays so great a rôle in the fate of the Zeros that, he says, his whole account of them sounds like one vile tale of rum.

One great effort was made to break up the life habits of the Zeros and if possible save Zand from this burden. In 1861 an energetic Capuchin priest came to Zand. Under his influence

most of the children of all the poor families in Zand were taken from their own parents and divided among the respectable and industrious inhabitants to be reared and educated. The experiment brought good results with most of the children that were not Zeros. All the Zero children either ran away or were enticed away by their worthless kinsmen. It is clear, therefore, that the Zeros cannot be reclaimed by favorable environment. It is a matter of selective breeding, or better still of preventative breeding. Nature is already at work by the latter and more effective method. Physical weakness is becoming more pronounced with each generation and infant mortality is great.

REVIEWS

The History of North America. Vol. XVII: *The Rise of the New South.* By PHILIP ALEXANDER BRUCE. Philadelphia. [N. D.]: Printed for subscribers only by George Barrie and Sons. Pp. xxi+491.

This volume, which covers a period of twenty-five years, contains hardly a word of political history. Mr. Bruce has undertaken to describe the economic and social conditions of the South at the close of "reconstruction" and to follow their development down to 1901. The author is no novice at this kind of writing and he has performed the present task *con amore*. The greater part of the book is devoted to agriculture, manufacturing, and education, in all of which the South has made great strides. It is an interesting story, well told for the most part, but the progress made since 1901 has been so remarkable that much of it now reads like ancient history.

The chief fault of the book—it is hardly worth while to comment on such slips as the statement of the opening sentence that the last soldier stationed in the South to overawe the inhabitants was withdrawn in 1876—lies in its narrow range of vision. Though one of a series which purports to give a history of North America, it gives the impression of a very remarkable growth in one section without so much as a hint at what was taking place elsewhere. By comparing ourselves with ourselves it is very easy to congratulate ourselves on our wonderful advancement. The mistake of the author in following this plan, or of the editor or publisher in requiring him to follow it, is one common to most historians of this period. They have assumed that "reconstruction" was a thing peculiar to the South, practically ignoring the transformation which the war and its aftermath wrought in the North at the same time. The fault of the volume under review may be remedied in part by adding another to the series describing in a similar way the development of the rest of the country and making the necessary comparisons, but it does not appear that there is to be any such addition.

Only a few comparisons are necessary to show the unsatisfactory character of Mr. Bruce's book as a part of the history of our

common country, however excellent an account it may give of a particular section. The South has had a wonderful development, but so has the rest of the country. From 1850 to 1900 New York increased the value of her manufactures 810 per cent., while Virginia increased hers only 350 per cent. North Carolina, however, outstripped Massachusetts in the rate of increase by 940 to 570. Even in the value of farms New York outclassed Virginia, the increase being 90 and 45 per cent. respectively. Taking the South as a whole, it appears that her increase in agricultural products was only 257 per cent., while that of the North was 309. In railroad building alone was her percentage of increase greater than that of the North. Yet her superficial area is greater by 238,851 square miles. It may be added here that by "North" and "South" is meant the two sections as they were in 1850.

Since 1900, however, the South has excelled in several industries and it may be that we are now on the eve of an era in which she shall really distance her rival. The agricultural laborer in the South produces less per capita than his competitor in the North, but he gets a return of 27 per cent. on a capital of \$870, while his competitor gets only 18 per cent. on \$3,527. Even in manufactures the southern laborer has a slight advantage in his returns, but nothing like so great as in agriculture. Now everybody knows that the least intelligent part of the population in the South is engaged in farming. Given an equal amount of intelligence, and capital equal to that of his northern brother, what will not the southern farmer accomplish?

Such comparisons are wanting in Mr. Bruce's book. The chapter on "Political Conditions" is very good, but it hardly goes far enough in the "economic interpretation" of southern history.

DAVID Y. THOMAS

UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS

Women's Work and Wages. By EDWARD CADBURY, M. CECILE MATHESON, GEORGE SHANN. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1907. Pp. 368.

The University of Chicago Press has done well to issue an American edition of this study into a "phase of life in an industrial city," the city of Birmingham, England. In the absence of accurate information so painfully felt as to the employment of women in our own communities, a well-planned and well-executed study as to their employment in another great commercial and industrial center

brings with it the possibility of great value, both in the aid it will give in formulating the problem that presents itself on this side the water, and in the body of accurately ascertained facts which will furnish a basis for intelligent comparison. The plan of the present study has been well worked out. For the general outline of any intelligent inquiry into women's work and wages, the student is really indebted to two or three of the English women who began their career at the time of Mr. Charles Booth's colossal investigation into "the life and labor of the people of London." In the work of Miss Clara E. Collet of the British Board of Trade, and Mrs. Sidney Webb, then Miss Beatrice Potter, are found the beginnings of all the inquiries since set forth. It is by no means to the discredit of the authors of the present study that traces of the influence of these women upon their work are very obvious.

The plan includes a study of the work from the objective side as introductory to a study of the workers themselves. This preliminary study of the nature of the employments into which women go has peculiar value for American students because our own sources of information are particularly barren on this subject. The fact that our federal *Census of Occupations* and the recent *Bulletin on Statistics of Women at Work* give facts as to the number, nationality, age, and marital status of our women employees, but because of the faulty classification of occupations tell absolutely nothing of the nature of their employment, is indicative of our need of such careful observations as are presented here. .

The most interesting chapters are those on legislation (chap. i) showing the extent to which English common-sense approves public control over the conditions under which the future mothers of the country shall be employed; and on wages (chaps. iii and v) which bring out clearly by well-planned tables the economic necessity, already recognized by recent legislation in the State of New York as a social necessity, of distinguishing between workers under eighteen and older women. The facts as to wages confirm the conclusions drawn from the facts of the social life of girls under eighteen who have not the protection of family life and from the known lack of educational opportunity which is due to the prospective cessation of work on marriage, as to the existence of a special problem of the girl worker which should be carefully distinguished from the problem of the woman worker, with its complicated relationship to the problem of the family institution, the

problems of child life and child mortality, and the sanitary problem of proper housing in congested centers. Since there are these two distinguishable problems there will be two sets of evils noted, and two kinds of remedies proposed; but both problems are characterized by the evil of a wage reduced to the point of bare subsistence which is less than a living wage according to any reasonable standard of continued industrial efficiency (pp. 126, 127). This subsistence wage cannot be accounted for according to these writers by the usual explanation of the lower standard of life prevailing upon women, nor by the fact that the girls' and the women's wage is often an auxiliary wage; neither of these explanations seem to accord with the facts. The explanation is rather to be found in the well-nigh universal separation of employment in accordance with which women and girls together do the unskilled and poorly paid jobs, in the lower bargaining power of women as compared with men, and in the slight degree to which both employers and women employees recognize the wage contract as a proper subject for competitive influence. It may be added that in the case of both women and girls there is a greater immobility than probably characterizes the labor of men and boys. As to a remedy for these low wages, the authors look to nothing less extreme than the creation of wages boards, and the fixing of minima standards of payment in different trades. A bill providing for the creation of such boards was introduced by Sir Charles Dilke a number of years ago, and reintroduced during the last session of Parliament. A discussion of the probable success of this device would have little value in this place as there is no American community where such a proposal has been seriously entertained; but it might be noted that so far as girls under eighteen are concerned that they are recognized even among us as wards of the state and calling for a large degree of control and of extended protection. The creation of some device by which the wage contract between employers and girls under this age could be made public might in itself be most effective in curing some of the evils of low wages. Undoubtedly in those establishments which depend largely on public favor and on a certain reputation for fair dealing and honest practices, such as the large department stores in our great cities, the mere publication of their wage scales would be most effective in bringing to bear upon them the pressure of public opinion.

As agencies for lessening the other evils mentioned the authors

look to girls' clubs and classes as possibly the best device yet discovered for bringing them to a consciousness of their economic weakness, and developing in them a desire for better industrial training. It is interesting and at the same time distressing to notice that they find little reason for confidence in the trade-union among women as an effective means of bettering conditions. However, in this they differ altogether from the conclusions of M. Gonnard, who, in a recent discussion of the "La femme dans l'industrie," finds the main reliance to be placed upon the trade combination among women.

L'ouvrière doit faire l'apprentissage de l'association. C'est par là surtout qu'elle parviendra, comme son frère de labeur, à l'amélioration de son sort. L'action syndicale, quand elle est pacifique et sérieuse, est le moyen le plus digne et le plus efficace à la fois, pour le salarié, de faire admettre par le salariant ses droits et ses prétentions. Actuellement, les syndicats féminins sont rares et faibles. . . . Et cependant, l'avenir est là. L'ouvrière finira par ouvrir les yeux sur les avantages de l'association de résistance. Elle se syndiquera, et syndiquée, étayée sur la force commune, elle n'acceptera plus pour elle un salaire de famine, ni n'obligera par là les autres à l'accepter.¹

Upon different forms of public control then, upon such social devices as girls' clubs, to a slight degree upon organization among women, the authors rely for some amelioration of the lot of the working women of Birmingham of whom might be said, to quote again from the words of M. Gonnard who is writing of the working women of France: "In certain respects the life of the modern working woman is at times well-nigh a hell itself; but over the door of this hell she still refuses to inscribe the words 'abandon hope all ye who enter here'."

S. P. BRECKINRIDGE

Folkways: a Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Mores and Morals. By WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, professor of political and social science in Yale University. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1907. Pp. vi+692.

"Mores" seems likely from now on to symbolize Sumner, as "imitation" suggests Tarde and Baldwin, or as "consciousness of kind" epitomizes Giddings. For Professor Sumner's philosophy centers in the idea of the mores which he first expounds and after-

¹ R. Gonnard, Professor à la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Lyon, *La Femme dans l'Industrie*, p. 198.

ward uses to interpret the life of social groups. "Folkways" contains a general theory of society which is illustrated by copious use of materials from anthropology, ethnology, history, and everyday life. It is worth noting that among nearly seven hundred authors cited in the book, there is hardly one known as a philosophical or a methodological sociologist. With thinkers of this type, Professor Sumner has little in common. In this field "the most elaborate discussion only consists in revolving on one's own axis" (p. 98). Philosophers like to play with words, and as for "methodology" it is "eternal" (p. 193). Naturally Professor Sumner has given little heed to the work of men like De Greef, Tarde, Baldwin, Novicow, Ross, Sighele, and Le Bon,¹ so that when in the preparation of his systematic sociology he wanted to refer to the theory of the mores, he could point to nothing in print. Hence, he turned aside to formulate this theory. It must be counted a great gain to sociology that Professor Sumner did not try to find, as he might have done in the authors named, many if not all of the leading ideas in his doctrine of the mores. In his own way he has set forth more vividly and effectively than any or all of them the part which habit and custom play in the lives of men and groups.

In brief outline the doctrine of the "mores" is as follows:

Men in carrying on the business of life unconsciously hit upon ways of solving their daily problems; these "folkways" selected by pleasure and pain repeat themselves in personal habit and solidify into a structure which is societal. After a time with many of these "folkways" a judgment of value to the group is connected; they gain coercive force, and become *mores*. The mores are unconscious products. Reflection is their worst enemy. "There is logic in the folkways, but never rationality" (p. 473). They are formed out of the needs of the group, and are changed, not by conscious purpose, but in adaptation to new conditions. "Intentional investigation, original reflection, projects of voluntary associations, authoritative prohibitions are not in the mores" (p. 57). But the standards of right and wrong are in the mores. Adaptation to the social situation is the test of the mores. "Whatever is defined and provided for in the mores as a way of solving the problems of life interests is never wrong." "Immoral" never means anything but contrary to the mores of the time and place" (p. 418). Legislators and

¹ The only citation from Le Bon is a review article and not his *L'Evolution des peuples*, Paris, 1895, which has so direct a bearing on the "mores."

reformers succeed in proportion as their proposals run with the mores. Laws after all always ordain and regulate what the mores have long before made facts. Products of the mores are often mistaken for causes which have changed them. Thus humanitarian sympathy has not abolished slavery, but changed conditions having made slavery impossible have widened sympathy. Democracy and free institutions are a result of cheap land and a demand for men. With dense overcrowding, aristocracy may be expected to reassert itself. Education is chiefly a transfer of the mores to the young. Ritual offers an effective discipline for preserving the mores. Catchwords and question-begging epithets and phrases deepen and appeal to the mores. The group uses the mores for societal selection and the enforcing of types by suggestion, cozening, and coercion. Taboos imbedded in the mores define social standards. Pathos "in the original Greek sense"—envelops the ideas of the mores with a glamor of sentiment and protects them from criticism and even discussion. Readjustments in the mores demand the solution of new problems and insight into the changes which are going on. "The masses are not an oracle, and if any answers can be obtained on problems of life, such answers will come rather from the classes. . . . It is the classes who produce variation. It is the masses who carry forward the traditional mores. . . . Thinking and understanding are too hard work" (p. 49). The mores fixed in habit are persistent under surface changes. No social group is fundamentally transformed by contagion or coercion from without. The mores contain many false inferences and superstitions and hence the supposed value of these to the group is a delusion. Again, the mores may suffer disintegration. "A revolution is a time when there are no mores. The old are broken up, the new not formed. The social ritual is interrupted. The old taboos are suspended" (p. 86). But the mores are not wholly beyond the influence of reason for "a really great and intelligent group purpose . . . can infuse into the mores a vigor and a consistent character which will reach every individual with educative effect."

No mere epitome can do justice to the clearness, vigor, and frequently convincing force with which Professor Sumner through six hundred generous pages, drives home his theory of the origin, changes, and determining influence of the mores. So vivid and dominant does this idea of a blind, remorseless power become that the futility and folly of attempting to modify or direct it are borne

in upon the reader with chilling effect. Certainly the first impression is that of an almost fatalistic determinism. Philosophy, religion, and ethics are declared to be products of the folkways and "not creative or determining forces" (p. 40). All these things are in the mores not outside of or acting upon them in any independent way. The idea of progress as a "function of time" is utterly misleading. There is no social development, for "development means the unfolding and growth of a germ according to the elements which it contains" (p. 475). Again "we can find all kinds of forces in history except ethical forces. Those are entirely wanting" (p. 475). The effect of all this is to picture social life as a vast, unconscious, resistless, onswEEPing process determining its course from time to time by the demands of the immediate situation, but without plan, purpose, or destination, and with no standards of value save the shifting notions of current utility. And along with this stream the individual is swept powerless to direct its course. It is not to be denied that many a fervent soul who feels society plastic in his hands and would reshape it to his millennial model would profit by the cold douche of Professor Sumner's philosophy.

But this first impression needs correction. While a large group is unified by common mores, there are sub-groups with slightly varying standards. There are the superior few, the *élite*, "the classes," who think, solve problems, and foresee situations. Within the limits imposed by the nature of the mores, the capable few may influence in some measure the changes in customs and standards. It is through them, to a considerable extent, that the mores get themselves adjusted to new conditions. The possibility of some conscious control of social life is admitted by Professor Sumner but always in a significantly restrained and almost grudging way. What could be more cautious than the assertion that "knowledge of the mores helps to understand and *perhaps regulate to some extent* the education" (p. 638). It is with something like surprise that the reader in the last sentence of the book finds both a personification of the mores and apparently an ethical aim: "The mores aim always to arrive at correct notions of virtue, and in so far as they reach correct notions of virtue, the virtue policy proves to be the only success policy" (p. 653). On the other hand, ideals are characterized as "entirely unscientific" (p. 201), useful chiefly for sermons, as stimuli to self-education and as aids to vanity. Professor Sumner in this low estimate of ideals must have in mind not rational pro-

jections of present facts into pictures of possible attainment, but "fanaticism which has little or no connection with fact" (p. 201). Probably Professor Sumner would deny that he has ideals, but he betrays frequently the possession of positive standards as to a protective tariff, the pension system, government intervention, and "imperialism." It is hard to see how he can avoid setting up some end or aim of society by which to value these policies; in short, how he can come off quite guiltless of some sort of teleology. If good mores are *adjusted* or *adapted* mores "aiming to arrive at *correct* notions of virtue," who is to judge of this "adaptation" or "correctness"? How could anyone decide without appeal to some criterion which would seem at least to be detached from the mores themselves? If Professor Sumner does not close the door to conscious guidance toward a social ideal, it must be owned that he leaves the portal only barely ajar. Moreover one suspects the author of falling victim to a fallacy against which he gives frequent warning, viz., the danger of being deceived by words and phrases to which an almost magic power is attributed. With the progress of the argument, the word "mores" gradually takes on a kind of force and agency. The "mores" seem to be almost objective and independent things, determining right and wrong, creating status, and having "aims." To be sure they are hardly so dangerous as "progress," "democracy," "the people," but nevertheless the word "mores" becomes a term to conjure with.

Professor Sumner's allusions to democracy deserve notice. Democracy is a contemporary fetish, the subject of "dithyrambic oratory." The product not of "great principles"—which are simply made to order to meet emergencies—but of physical and economic conditions, democracy is protected by pathos from rational criticism, and is glorified for popularity. With changing conditions, however, the doctrine that all men are equal is not being emphasized, and "we may at any time find it expedient to drop the jingle about a government 'of the people, by the people and for the people'" (p. 167). However, the author holds no brief for aristocracy for he insists that no class can be trusted to rule society with disinterested justice. Nevertheless the bourgeoisie are to be credited with the "institutions of civil liberty which secure to all safety of person and property" (p. 169). It is hard to resist the conclusion that Professor Sumner's intense aversion to dithyrambic rhetoric and cant phrases has blinded him to the reinterpretation of democracy in terms of an

intelligent leadership appealing to and modifying the deep currents of national life which flow in the mores, and preserve a great tradition.

The use of illustrative material throughout the volume discloses a vast amount of reading and establishes Professor Sumner as a folk psychologist, however modestly—or indignantly—he may disclaim the title. The doctrine of the mores is used to give setting and significance to such phenomena as slavery, infanticide, cannibalism, sex relations, marriage, incest, kinship, and asceticism. The treatment is illustrative rather than controversial. In some cases the author takes issue with another scholar, as for example, in questioning Westermarck's "house-mates" hypothesis and advancing the theory that primitive people reach a vague induction as to the evils of close in-breeding. The data from anthropology and ethnology seem at times to outweigh the book by their sheer bulk and multiplicity,² but for the most part they deepen the impression of the main thesis. Now and then there is repetition not always defensible on the ground of utility to the underlying philosophy. Occasionally, too, proportion is lost sight of, notably in the detailed description of the Inquisition.

The literary style is forceful and idiomatic. The sentences are brief, incisive, and emphatic. Probably no social theorizing of recent times is so free from technical language. "Folkways," "father-family," "mother-family," "pair-marriage" (proposed as more accurately descriptive of the present advanced type, than the term monogamy), are some of the self-defining terms of the book. Syncretism (the fusion of the mores of two combining groups), ethnocentrism, biolog, etc., are evidence that Professor Sumner, if temperate, is not a total abstainer from Greek terminology. The adjective societal appears consistently in accordance with the author's usage. The general reader can follow Professor Sumner's argument and description without difficulty and get a vivid picture of the unconscious, underlying forces of human society.

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² The bibliography of over seven hundred titles fills fifteen closely printed pages; and the index, twenty-one.

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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Social Improvement in the Light of Modern Biology.—What light does biological science in its present stage of development throw upon the problem of social improvement? Biologists say, "Permanent progress is a question of breeding rather than of pedagogics; a matter of gametes, not of training." Nevertheless the problem is one primarily for sociologists rather than for biologists. It involves two questions: (1) What kind of society is good, either absolutely or relatively to some other kind? (2) By what means is the desired kind of society most likely to be brought about? The former question is wholly ethical and not to be dealt with here. Biology is concerned only with the second which subdivides into three problems: (a) Can the qualities of subsequent generations be improved by changes in the environment of the present generation, unaccompanied by any other change? (b) Can they be improved by changes in respect of parentage, unaccompanied by any other change? (c) In actual practice, when these two classes of change cannot be really separated, what course ought a statesman to pursue? These three problems are considered in order.

(a) The answer here turns partly on the problem of inheritance of acquired characteristics. The conclusion is that the original properties of a child are not likely to be affected to any important extent by the circumstances in which the parents' lives have been passed. "Education is to man what manure is to a pea." Granting this, the sociologist replies, "The entity which biology declares to be unaffected by ancestral environment is a different entity from that to which the conception of [social] progress applies. The goodness to which the social reformer looks is that of concrete men and women, and not of original properties, which play a secondary part. Among other elements of great importance, ancestral environment is included. It acts in two ways—directly, as in the environment of the mother during pregnancy; indirectly, in its reaction upon the current environment through the world of ideas, the economic, aesthetic, etc., conditions socially transmitted. Here is a means of progress entirely independent of breeding and gametes.

(b) Those characteristics of parents which have not been acquired tend to be inherited. Our problem here is one of practice: is our knowledge sufficient to enable this fact to be successfully utilized for purposes of social improvement? It may be said that, while the general results are known, there is not sufficient quantitative knowledge "to justify legislative action except in extreme cases." These extreme cases are represented by various recommendations to authoritatively restrain propagation among the obviously unfit by means of segregation or sterilization.

(c) The so-called lower classes are reproducing as compared with the higher classes to an extent much more than proportionate to their numbers, and increasingly so. In so far as these children of the poor are molded into finished persons by a relatively bad environment, this growing proportion is bad for the community. This injury might conceivably be removed by state amelioration of con-

ditions. But, secondly, does this relatively high rate of reproduction among the lower classes necessarily imply such a rate among bad original properties? Perhaps, yes. For example, a relatively high reproductive rate among those who have remained poor implies a form of selection that discriminates against the original properties that promote economic success. The statesman may seek a remedy by attacking directly either environment or parentage. As to the latter our knowledge is indefinite. To give exclusive attention to the former threatens in the long run the breeding out of intelligence and other desirable qualities. But some things may be done. Negatively, the state may discourage unlimited child-bearing among the poor by requiring from the parents a reasonable sum for maintenance of the children. Positively, persons of civic worth might upon some objective test have their salaries increased at marriage and at the birth of each child. A more radical recommendation, diminishing the number of economic checks to child-bearing in general, so as to encourage it among the better grades of working-people, is open to three serious objections: First, it would still increase the proportion of children born to prudent workers relatively to that of professional and upper classes; secondly, it would encourage hard and mercenary marriages; thirdly, the evidence of poor-law history is against the idea. It would be better to restrict the families of the submerged tenth.—A. C. Pigou, *Economic Journal*, September, 1907.

L. L. B.

Unemployment. — [Notes on the present English situation.] Unemployment is not caused [primarily] by bad weather, personal defect, etc., but there is a constant margin of people without work as a result of the present competitive commercial system. The present palliatives are insufficient to cure the evil. The crying need is for a national department of public works, which should have absolute control of all main roads of the country, of the reclamation and protection of foreshores, of crown lands, with power of purchase and improvement (compulsorily if necessary) of all waste land, power to establish labor colonies—for vagrants, for able work-house inmates, for the ordinary unemployed—with the hope of ultimate independence for the men so employed. This last should be for those unable or unwilling to go to public works direct, and might ultimately lead to small holdings in the nature of co-operative communities operated under expert advice. This system would obviate the present expensive methods of providing employment by borough and town councils.

Beyond this, and even more fundamental requirements obviously are reduced hours, raised age limit, mental and moral protection for young laborers, expansion of the area of municipal employment, and abolition of national and municipal and private (corporate) casual labor. These results however cannot be expected at once.

Agriculture is the only English industry not overdone. To make it profitable only better methods and nationally organized system of transit are necessary. Under such conditions market gardening, fruit-culture, and dairy farming pay well, as has been shown by a number of communities organized on this plan. With proper encouragement the home market may be supplied with home products, instead of drawing from the poorer soil and climate of Denmark, the present chief source of supply. The prime requirements for the solution of the

problem of the unemployed is a reorganization of agriculture and a changed governmental attitude towards the question of land tenure.—G. Lansbury, *Economic Review*, July, 1907.
L. L. B.

Notes on the Takelma Indians of Southwestern Oregon.—A brief systematic study of a higher savage tribe, illustrating most of the general phases of primitive life and culture. Describes habitat and linguistic position; neighboring tribes and descriptive place names; language (briefly); food, vegetable and animal, and the connection with fishing and hunting methods; implements and utensils, also games; habitations; clothing and adornment, especially of shells and tattooing customs; numeral system; social organization with scheme of relationships, naming, injury and vengeance and blood money; war and war implements; puberty and marriage ceremonies, courtship, parental choice, wife purchase, menstrual dances and sex taboos, child purchase from the wife's father; mortuary customs, corpse decoration, mourning, burial of valuables with the dead. Religion and mythology are not treated.—Edward Sapir, *American Anthropologist*, April-June, 1907.
L. L. B.

Der Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilosophie. Ein philosophisches Programm.—The recent tendency among socialist writers to adopt the Marxian point of view as a rather dogmatic and peculiar standpoint, is decried by Stanislaus Brzozowski in *Die neue Zeit*, of May 4, 1907. To him the Marxian way of looking at reality is not one out of many points of view which can be chosen arbitrarily for the interpretation of reality, but it is the scientific and critical interpretation of all social phenomena. The Marxian or materialistic philosophical standpoint is nothing else but a method of investigation into the works of mankind—moral, legal, scientific, and aesthetic. The value of this method has been proven in that it has solved and is solving consciously those very problems which mankind has been solving blindly and in a haphazard manner. The work of this materialistic interpretation of history will have been completed when behind each element of social production we will be shown the figure of the living man who has produced it, and the values of life will be shown in their significance. Particular emphasis is laid upon the fact that this is a conscious method of interpretation as opposed to any other blind and unforeseeing. It is also this interpretation of history and reality which has disclosed to us the real foundation of all values, namely labor. Even the philosophical problem of thinking and being is solved by showing that thinking influences the being of mankind in so far as it acts upon the productivity of labor. Labor is this element which is dependent both upon thinking and being in the same time. It is the world which has become man, the problem of the philosophers. It is the act of projection of the absolute—not-I through the I of which Fichte is speaking. Here is the moment of objectivation of the subject, here is born the idea of Hegel. Labor is Hegel's idea in plain language. It is mental-subjective—this is clear. It is in the same time extra-mental. Labor is what man can make persistent outside of himself. It is the only human language to which being does give an answer.
M. S. H.

Optimistic Economics and Scientific Economics.—By distribution of wealth, the economists mean determination of the price of services. They seek to find out how the prices of the services rendered by man, by capital and by

land are established in the market under a régime of free competition. This free competition constantly tends to enable each unit of capital, of labor, and of land to secure a part of the common product equal to the value created by each one of them. The economists have often seemed to believe that this theory of the price of services contained the whole question of the distribution of wealth. By considering the situation in relation to things, and not to persons, they have for a long time obscured the whole theory of the real distribution of wealth. We will treat only incidentally the problem of the proportional division of revenues, but primarily will consider the relation of the two problems: the determination of the price of services, and the distribution of revenues among individuals.

A "just" distribution can be considered only from the point of view of the persons whom it affects. The fact that the services of capital, of labor, and of land tend to receive a sum corresponding exactly to the value which they create, does not at all prove that each individual in society, who is productive, receives the portion which agrees with our idea of distributive justice. To find the revenue of the individual, even in a state of equilibrium, it is necessary to introduce a new element: the amount of services possessed by each person. This consists of two factors: first, the division of property between individuals; second, the division of force, ability, intelligence, etc., between individuals. To be able to declare that the distribution of wealth is just or unjust, it is necessary to be able to state that the division of property and the other economic abilities is equally just. Up to the present time the search has been to find the justice or injustice of the distribution of wealth in the manner of determining the price of services.

The assumption of equilibrium gives only a one-sided theory of price. The prices of services at any moment are fixed by a twofold tendency: the tendency to equality, resulting from the removal of the factors of production toward the markets where their services receive the greatest rewards, and the tendency to inequality, resulting from the constant changes which social progress makes in the conditions of equilibrium; and it is difficult to tell which of these tendencies is the stronger. The economic world is constantly rearranging the prices of the different productive services. But the principal function of these prices of services is to promote production; they have a very significant effect on the part of the entire revenue which each individual will receive.

If this theory is correct, every attempt to affect directly—by law, for example—the rate of wages, interest, or rent ought to have an inevitable reaction on the production of wealth. On the contrary, every attempt to affect social conditions of the decision of wealth, the distribution of property, or of the conditions of the struggle for existence can be beneficial. An increased equalization of the conditions of the struggle for existence, in particular, would assure a more favorable distribution of wealth.—Charles Rist, in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, September, 1907. E. H. S.

The Problem of the Progress of Law.—The progress of civilization, on the one hand, consists in the perfection of the intellect, feeling, and will of the individual; on the other hand, in a more complete co-ordination and harmony in social life. These elements are the criterion of civilization by which to judge of progress.

The application of this standard to legal institutions shows that there is the same progress in law as in other social phenomena.

From the point of view of form, progress has consisted in an increasing differentiation, individualization, and integration of laws. Public and private laws were gradually separated from the customs, ceremonies, and moral and religious rules.

From the point of view of content, progress consists in the following:

- a) They adapt themselves to a superior form of social organization.
- b) They sanction and protect the independence of the individuals, and the solidarity of the social organism.
- c) They assure to every individual approximate equality in the initial conditions of the social conflict.
- d) They abandon mechanical solidarity to morality; they strengthen the bonds of organic solidarity, and extend their action to new conditions, in controlling retribution and the reciprocal assistance of individuals, and in subordinating them to the state and the society.—Alessandro Gropalli, in *Revue internationale de sociologie*, July, 1907.

E. H. S.

The Rules of the Game.—The rules governing the distribution of wealth and of welfare are man-made rather than natural. Society establishes the rules of the game. As the good or ill fortune of the player depends not only on his skill and means, but also upon the rules of the game and how they are respected, it is worth while to consider the bearing on the social welfare of the various policies that society may pursue.

The non-enforcement of the rules of the game ruptures at last social peace. If saloon and dive bribe themselves free of laws, they not only continue their work of ruin but incidentally the police is corrupted. The real type of law-impotence is failure to enforce the laws governing the conduct of groups or classes in their economic struggle. Into law is injected now the greed of this big concern, now the vengefulness of that. This path leads to class war.

Tampering with the rules of the game finally brings the game itself into discredit. Tariff-protected businesses, railroads, public-utility corporations, have captured and operated the machinery of government, have legislated for themselves as a class, have pulled the economic game askew so that one savors a fine irony in calling ours a régime of individualism. The present abysmal inequalities of wealth are an outgrowth of privilege playing into the hands of monopoly and plutocracy.

The conspicuously successful violator of the rules of the game robs us of that which is more precious than gold. He has done worse than extort money from us; he has robbed college young men of ideals. As they saw the power of his money many have left college for the battle of life with the conviction that the ideals of success held up by their instructors were unpractical. The founder of the oil trust may give us back our money, but not if he send among us a hundred Wesleys can he give us back our lost ideals.

Unless rules be enforced, the moral plan will not be lifted simply by adding to the number of righteous men. The plane of competition must be raised by righteous pure-food laws, child-labor restrictions, a stricter ethical code for the legal profession, so that able attorneys will not handle the corporation work,

clean or dirty, just as it comes. Political methods must be raised to a higher plane.

The resistance to the enforcement of righteous rule constantly increases. We declare pipe lines common carriers with the duty to file tariffs, and we get refusals, subterfuges, freak tariffs, etc. Structural improvement of the government causing society to devote an increasing share of its thought and conscience should purify and uphold the rules of the game.—E. A. Ross, *Atlantic*, September, 1907. L. W.

Sinning by Syndicate.—Those who contend that men are growing better, and those who insist that matters are growing worse, may both be right. The key to the paradox is that while men are improving in their personal relations, the control of industry and business is becoming impersonal. The mandate, "Get results," comes from the stockholders and is passed on to the officers and finally to the heads of departments, who must obey or lose their positions. Corporations are often overcapitalized and the misconduct of this giant race of artificial persons deserves consideration by itself. More than other sinning corporate sinning alienates social classes. The syndicate has become a relentless machine and mammon is its master. The directors are economically free. The obscure employees in terror of losing their livelihood may be pushed apparently into deeds of wrong. But, "Blame not the tool, but the hand that moves the tool." The anonymity of the corporation can be met only by fixing on directors the responsibility for corporate sinning. Nothing but the curb of organized society can confine them to their own grist and keep them from grinding into dividends the stamina of children, the health of women, the lives of men, the purity of the ballot, the honor of public servants, and the supremacy of law.—E. A. Ross, in *Atlantic*, October, 1907. L. W.

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RATZENHOFER'S SOCIOLOGY¹

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The untimely death of Gustav Ratzenhofer has had the effect of giving his name a certain precedence among the sociologists to which it would not have been entitled by the date of his writings. There was also a distinct note of independence, a courage of unpopular convictions, a willingness to accept the rôle of a voice crying in the wilderness, in Ratzenhofer's personality, which is gradually winning him a hearing.

This *Journal* will presently publish a review of Ratzenhofer's posthumous work. Meanwhile some of the most striking traits of this important sociologist, both as a man and as a contributor to our science, are in and between the lines of the introduction to the book, so that a translation of it will certainly be welcomed by our readers. It is in full as follows:

By the side of that science which deals with individuals, stands on equal footing the science of the reciprocal relationships of human beings. Such is their connection that neither individual nor social life, each treated by itself, can be understood. That biology and psychology, as sciences of the sensible and intel-

¹ *Sociologie: Positive Lehre von den menschlichen Wechselbeziehungen.* Von Gustav Ratzenhofer. Aus seinem Nachlasse herausgegeben von seinem Sohne. Mit dem Bildnis des Verfassers. Pp. xv+231. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1907.

lectual occurrences in the life of individual men, have had the start of sociology, as science of the reciprocal relationships of human beings, and that the latter is only now coming to have a secure foundation, although from the beginning social relationships have been inseparable from individual life, is explained by the fact that it is human nature to take itself as the center of the All, and that it is difficult to reach scientific comprehension of social interrelations. Today it has become a certainty that psychology and sociology can thrive only in the most intimate correlation, corresponding with the causal correlation between individual and social life. Both sciences derive their thought-element, however, from philosophy, which should be the synthesis of all human insight.

Because the reciprocal relationships of human beings are an utterly distinct scientific territory, although they are in correlation with all other scientific territories, they constitute a distinct philosophical problem, namely the sociological, which remains unsolved, even if we presume that the cosmological, the psychological, the mathematical, and the logical problems are closed. The social relationships of men, or properly of all organisms, are in a word subject to a regularity which is immediately contained in no other order of regularity, but pertains to this order of relationships as an added factor. It is the task of epistemology (*Erkenntnistheorie*) to make out the causality of all problems, and to determine the relationships of the different orders of regularity in the realms of the cosmic, the physical, the organic, and the social.

Philosophical insight into the origin of the reciprocal relationships of human beings, into the essence of the social forces, and into the regularity of their operation, constitutes, as a portion of positive philosophy, "sociological epistemology" (*sociologische Erkenntnis*). This remains within the boundaries of philosophy.

When, however, research crosses the boundaries of philosophical epistemology, by investigating the biological and psychological elements of social life in the light of their practical facts, the realm of sociology begins. The latter, as science of the

reciprocal relationships of human beings, determines the fundamental characteristics of social development, in order to derive from this basis theorems of the ways in which social phenomena may be controlled in the interest of civilization.

Upon its philosophical basis, therefore, sociology will classify the phenomena of the reciprocal relationships of human beings, it will search out the factors of social development, and within this process it will try to determine the workings of natural law in general and of sociological law in particular. Sociology is not called to investigate the numberless incidents of social life, but its province is to work over the results of minute investigation of particular types of occurrences, for the purpose of arriving at a unified survey and comprehension of the coherent regularity of all social phenomena.

Sociology must regard the aggregate of human knowledge as the source of its insight, from which to derive those facts and theorems which correspond with the above purpose. Sociology can consequently not make its way into the microcosm of phenomena. It must devote itself to the total of the same, on pain of never performing its task.

Because it is the genius of modern science everywhere to press after the particulars, and because, thanks to Hegel's premature fantasies, it has been regarded as beneath the dignity of science to search for the great correlations, the few attempts that have been made to compose sociology in its full circumference have not obtained high repute. On that account some investigators who were in search of a sociology betook themselves to special provinces of social development, and thus became uninvited competitors in every possible branch of knowledge, particularly in national economy, criminal psychology, race psychology, demography, etc. Because there has been as yet no official psychology, while the demand for a science of social relationships was not to be disregarded, many, especially German scholars, presently developed, on the other hand, out of their special fields, sociological researches. Thus history was sociologically pursued (e. g., Lindner, Lamprecht); also economics (Wagner, Schmoller, Sombart); geography (Ratzel); psy-

chology (Wundt); and other sciences. Of course the result of these researches was not raised to the full value of a sociology. In a word, sociology was not able to differentiate itself from its auxiliary sciences.

It is evident that history, the branch of knowledge which assumes the task of making out social phenomena, their genesis, and their consequences, is a principal source of sociological theorems. Indeed in the case of history we have to do with that division of knowledge which up to the present time has regarded itself as called and competent to comprehend instructively the reciprocal relations of human beings as philosophy of history. This vocation has, to be sure, proved to be in vain, because the history lacks the essence of science.² Yet history furnishes the bulk of the material for making out the social process. The finest fruit of competent historiography is the support which sociology finds in it for the erection of its system. At bottom the true goal of historiography is sociology. Whatever falls outside of this purpose belongs in the realm of art and of ideals. In spite of the high significance of historical knowledge for sociology, the natural sciences are its foundation, especially those which aim at knowledge of human beings. In this connection biology is the proper source of scientific intelligence, and with it anthropology and ethnology, as next in importance; then history of civilization and statistics as auxiliary sciences at once associate themselves. Geology, paleontology, and geography must always be looked to as advisers. Over this wide realm of the scientific founding of sociological thinking, philosophy (*sociologische Erkenntnis*) must as it were keep watch, in order that the vast unity of all natural evolution may never be lost from sight. Sociology therefore has no limited field of research, like the social sciences, whose theoretical structure gains in certainty in the degree in which the investigator sticks to his

² Here follows a long note referring to the author's *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, Vol. III, p. 445; *Die Kritik des Intellekts*, p. 137, and to Bernheim's *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, 3d and 4th eds., pp. 626 ff., 685, etc. Of the latter author Ratzenhofer remarks that loyalty to his old colors made it impossible for him to come fully over into the promised land of sociology which he had approached so near.

specialty. It rather demands categorically the most comprehensive thinking and knowledge. Everything in the sociological field which is capable of specialization into a technology belongs no longer in sociology in the narrower sense, but to the application of its theorems, and this principally affects the theory of politics.

Sociology is not, like most branches of knowledge, a distinct portion of our insight, but in correspondence with its object it extends over our whole knowledge. In the social relationships all the efforts of our intellect flow together, to permit man and his groupings to gain a share in the achievements and purposes of all thinking. The social relationships are not a species of phenomenon in the realm of nature, like the plants or electricity, or in the life-process, like law or religion, but they are *human life in itself*. Whatever produces, qualifies, impels, and destroys us human beings—all this makes up the social relationships, and in social life the deeds of human beings have their last echoes. Hence the science cannot be a specialism (*Fachstudium*) but merely a synthesis of all knowing, like philosophy.

If therefore, on the one hand, from most branches of knowledge something extends over influentially into sociology, on the other hand sociology furnishes the most fundamental impulses for the sciences of law, of the state, and of economics, by means of which these may at last become true sciences, and have thoroughly purposeful effects.

The need of a comprehensive insight into the reciprocal relationships of human beings becomes more imperative as social complexity increases. Although it remains a duty of specializing science, indefatigably to work for intelligence about the depths of being and becoming, it is not less the duty of synthesizing science to make these results profitable. It is constantly becoming more evident that science cannot possibly accomplish its utmost, if it merely strives for the minute, and dissolves itself in subdivisions. We are coming to see rather that this tendency can be only an auxiliary phenomenon in intellectual development, because all creative work has its conclusion not in unraveling but in combining.

The division of labor is, and always will be, merely a technical trick. All completeness in art and science has its roots in unification.

No one thinks more pessimistically about the final value of all research than the specialist who is always seeing new gaps in his object. He is consequently not qualified to appraise the synthetic purposes of sociology. The sociologist, supported by philosophy, must know when the possibility of a fruit-bearing synthesis is present. This turning-point of an adequate mass of scientific preliminary knowledge appears to have arrived since the complete opening-up of the surface of the earth, and the beginning of world-commerce. Through these facts the highest and last object of sociology, so to speak, the social universe, has presented itself to view. To investigate its laws is the order of the day.

Attainment of the proposed end seems to me to be assured through positive monism as *Weltanschauung*, and through monistic positivism as heuristic method. Monism presents all being to us as the work of a unitary principle of all phenomena, and incidentally society as subject to the inclusive regularity of nature. In this method resides the guarantee, however, that sociology will never lose itself in unproved assertions; that in directions in which special research has reached only negative results, sociology will abstain from dogmatic conclusion, so that, without surrendering the universal purpose of a sociology, the necessary increments and interpretations will have to be reserved for the future.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF POLITICAL PARTIES¹

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I

No one will deny that the action of political parties constitutes a social struggle. It is not, however, generally supposed that it admits of scientific treatment, and the prevailing idea is that it is simply politics. But surely anything so universal must grow out of some fundamental principle, and it must be possible to search out and ascertain the true nature of that principle.

Philosophers have, indeed, discussed political action and political parties, but they do not at all agree upon an explanation of them. Some, like M. Tarde, regard all political and even national struggles as so much clear loss to human progress, and conceive that the only road to progress lies through absolute peace. This is the position of most of the peace advocates. This view arises out of a complete failure to understand the law of development, or evolution in nature at large.

Others maintain that in political strife the gain is simply the algebraic sum of the results obtained, the triumph of one party over the other being looked upon as undoing all that the other had done, and so on with each stage of the endless rhythm which characterizes party struggle. This view is scarcely less false than the one last considered, and also ignores the fundamental law of social development.

Still another school, with John Stuart Mill at the head, holds that the truth lies somewhere between the two extreme views which form the chief planks in political platforms. This is an approach toward a correct interpretation of political antagonism, but it comes far short of the whole truth.

A modification of this last view consists in admitting that there is some truth in the demands of both parties, and that the

¹ From the *Annales de l'Institut International de Sociologie*, Tome XI, pp. 393-417. Paris, 1907.

result preserves the modicum of truth and rejects the mass of error in both. There is a sense in which this statement is correct, but it is, to say the least, a wholly inadequate and more or less erroneous way of stating the case.

Finally, a few have dimly seen that the result of political strife is a sort of synthesis of the two antinomies represented by the two parties. The chief objection to this is that it is obscure, and does not clearly indicate what is meant by synthesis.

Without enumerating other views, it may be as well to state at the outset what the fundamental principle is that underlies political action, and without a clear comprehension of which it is impossible to understand it in any scientific sense. It is the same principle that underlies all forms of development and evolution in general. Political antagonism is a form of *social synergy*. The parties that think they are opposing each other are simply *working together* for the accomplishment of an end of which they are unconscious. They are acting in exactly the same way that hostile races act in the process of social assimilation; in the same way that organic beings act in the process of organic development; in the same way that cosmical forces act in the formation of solar and planetary systems. It is all struggle, and the result is the same in all—evolution.

We talk of progress, but the fact is that there can be no progress without resistance. It is customary to picture a party of progress and a party of reaction, or a party of progress and a party of order. The former represents innovation and the latter misoneism. But what is this innovation or pure progress that we try to picture to ourselves? It is a mere figment of the imagination. Unopposed progress is simply motion of translation and accomplishes nothing. It is centrifugal, and either ineffectual or positively destructive. Any unobstructed force has this character; to be effectual and constructive it must meet with resistance and encounter opposition. The conservative party, party of reaction or of order, represents this wholesome opposition, and the vigorous interaction of the two forces, which looks so much like antagonism, strife, and struggle, transforms force into energy and energy into power, and

builds political and social structures. And after they are constructed the same influences transform them, and it is this that constitutes social progress. Political institutions—the laws of every country—are the product of this political synergy, the crystallized action of legislative bodies created by political parties. As Machiavelli said: “Le buone leggi nascono da quelli tumulti, che molti inconsileramente dannano.”²

The passage in full is as follows: “Li buoni esempi nascons dalla buona educazione, la buona educazione dalle buone leggi, e le buone leggi da quelli tumulti che molti inconsideramente dannano.”

II

If now we look at political parties from a less abstract point of view, we may first of all inquire on what kind of questions parties divide. The most prominent fact in this connection is that the questions dividing political parties are always questions of principle, never questions of interest. But here we are met by the important truth that all questions of principle are reducible to questions of interest. This truth is what may be called the moral or sociological aspect of the physical truth formulated by Descartes, that all questions of quality are reducible to questions of quantity. For what is a principle? In politics, and in every other department of social science, a principle is the statement of some form of action which is believed to be advantageous to the public, i. e., to mankind in general. But whatever is advantageous consists in interest, for there is no difference between advantage and interest. A principle is therefore a sort of generalized interest. It must relate to the general interest, to the interest of all and not to the interest of a few.

What the framers of political platforms seek, therefore, is to find some form of national action which is regarded as generally beneficial and in the interest of all citizens. There is no difficulty in doing this. The difficulty is in finding some form of action which is considered to be thus advantageous by some while it is believed by others to be disadvantageous. There are always many such, but most of them are still unfit for political uses

² *Discorsi di Niccolò Machiavelli sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, Lib. I, cap. iv, Opere, Vol. III, p. 243. Firenze, 1820.*

because the belief in their advantageousness or else in their disadvantageousness is too general. A proposition which nearly everyone either accepts or rejects cannot be made a rallying cry for a political party. There is therefore the further requisite that the action recommended be of such a kind that something like an equal number shall be found defending and opposing it. We see therefore how very delicate a matter it becomes to select an issue that is adapted to political purposes.

There is even a still further condition, viz., that the question be important. One would suppose that if an almost equal number favored and opposed a measure it must be rather a matter of indifference whether it be adopted or not. But the case requires that those who favor it shall do so passionately and vehemently, while those who oppose it shall do so with the most intense hostility. Usually there are two measures, the opposite of each other, one of which is defended by one party and the other by the other, so that instead of a positive and a negative party, we have two positive parties contending for opposite and contradictory measures.

When we thus take account of the difficulties in the way of devising issues adapted to the use of political parties, the wonder grows that there should exist, in all countries and at all times, permanent political parties, always kept so evenly balanced as to render the result of nearly every election uncertain, and the reversal of party control a constant feature of political history. Such, however, is the case, and the still more curious part of it is that the process is automatic. It is not the work of a few persons purposely convening and shrewdly deciding what shall be the party issues at any time and place. Persons do, of course, convene, and the "convention" has become in most countries a regular feature of party management, but such persons are "delegates" sent from different sections to represent the public sentiment on these questions. The feeling may be characterized as *instinctive*. In enlightened countries the whole intelligent population is thinking about certain things, and the things that are most thought about are the ones on which there are differences of opinion. They may be classed as subsidiary questions. There are

certain great vital questions which have been long settled. They have passed out of the range of discussion and could not be used as party questions. These differ in different ages and countries. Questions which are settled one way in one country are settled the other way in another. For example, the great religious issue of Catholicism and Protestantism in Europe did not come into the political field until in certain countries a sufficient number of Protestants had developed to render the parties nearly equal. Prior to that the church had a short way with dissenters. They were heretics and were exterminated. But the world has nearly passed through the stage of religious parties. In most countries the preponderance of one or the other faith is so great that it is felt that there is no use in making religion a party issue. In religion there is very little changing of belief. Both the majority and the minority are practically fixed quantities and the fate of an election would depend entirely on the actual number of adherents of each faith. If made a party issue the country would certainly be controlled by the numerically larger faith, and it is instinctively felt that this is not desirable.

This shows better than any other example that there is another quality which must inhere in a political issue. This quality is a susceptibility to change. The question must not be so vital that there can be no alteration in anyone's attitude toward it. In other words, it must not be a question of faith or belief, but rather a question of opinion. On most questions of opinion change is possible. Opinions rest on evidence, and political campaigns have for their chief purpose the production of evidence in favor of the one side or the other. It is true that in the heat of party strife all manner of sophistry and fallacious reasoning, besides much actual falsehood, is resorted to, but the enlightened public is supposed to sift this and be guided by the sound argument and real evidence. The ignorant voter will be deceived. He will follow the demagogues and vote against his own interests, so that the ballot is of very doubtful value in his hands. But intelligent people will discriminate, and are liable to change their minds with the new evidence, even on the main issue. This results in the production of a large uncertain contingent, popu-

larly called "floaters." They cannot be depended upon, and are usually so numerous as to "hold the balance of power," as it is said. Fourier discovered that in any body of men there would always exist two nearly equal parties opposing each other, and a third party, as he called it, ready to throw itself on the one side or the other, and large enough to decide the issue.

There are certain purely political questions that are not adapted to political parties. Such are questions relating to forms of government. In very few countries can these be made political issues. Most countries have decided them for themselves, although in different ways, and any party that should attempt to bring them into the political arena would either meet with no material opposition or else with certain defeat. In England, for example, which really possesses a democratic government, a republican party, should one be organized, would stand no chance of success, while in the United States, which is in many respects less democratic than England, the president having more power than the king, a monarchical party would have practically no supporters at all. These questions are settled, and any person advocating a form of government different from the existing one is simply a political heretic. He would not be punished in our day, but he would be an object of public scorn or ridicule.

III

The questions best of all adapted to form political issues are those classed as moral questions. They constitute more nearly than any others questions of principle as distinguished from questions of interest. The more completely disinterested they can be made to appear the better do they suit the case. Thus the slavery or antislavery question in the United States was peculiarly well adapted to form a political issue. The antislavery agitators could not be accused of having any personal interest in the result. They stood as the defenders of an oppressed race, and as actuated by lofty humanitarian motives. Anyone who understands human nature must see that all this was attended with a large amount of hypocrisy, as the motives of politicians are not higher than those of other men, but they perceive that

such disinterested principles are calculated to attract followers and win political victories. The men professing them often entertained race prejudices quite as strong as those of the defenders of slavery. I have heard Mr. Frederick Douglass describe his experiences with them. On one occasion, when invited to go to a New England town and speak for his race, the influential men of the place who had invited him refused to receive him in their houses, and he was obliged to wander about the streets alone for several hours. At last a leading Democrat, a man who was opposed to the abolition of slavery and defended that institution, but who possessed generous impulses, took him in and entertained him, and even listened to his address.

Now that this question is settled in the United States, the two great parties split on a variety of other questions. It is somewhat difficult to define the exact difference between Republican and Democrat. The words mean nearly the same thing and are no guide to understanding the real distinction. In fact, at the very outset the name Republican was applied to the Democratic party, later qualified as Republican-Democratic party, and finally, for the sake of brevity, the first of these appellations was dropped, to be taken up much later as the name of the opposite party. The Democratic party originally stood for what is called State Sovereignty, i. e., the practical independence of the several states of the Union as against the encroachments of the federal government, except in such matters as are stipulated in the Constitution. Its great exponent was Thomas Jefferson. The party opposed to it was called the Federal party. Its leading representative was Alexander Hamilton, who believed in a strong central government. Later on the Federal party took the name of Whig, borrowed from English usage, and when the slavery question arose this became the antislavery or free-soil party, and changed its name to Republican a short time before the Civil War.

But besides these main issues there has always been another essential difference between these two parties. In general it may be said that the Whig or Republican party has constituted the party of innovation, while the Democratic party has been the party of conservation. The fact that most Republicans favored

either the restriction or the abolition of slavery showed their willingness to bring about changes in existing institutions. As this was a moral question that party attracted to itself those whose moral sentiments were quickened by the real or supposed evils of slavery. This class was also naturally the one that read most and was best informed on all abstract questions. In fact, while there were many enlightened Democrats who defended slavery on general principles as a matter of deliberate conviction, the rank and file of the Democratic party consisted of the less informed elements of the population, who read little and had no lively disinterested sympathies. In a word, the Republican party was the progressive party and the Democratic party the conservative party.

These characteristics are less marked now, and in a certain sense they may be said to have been somewhat reversed. This is because the leading question today has become that of the relations between capital and labor. After the Civil War enormous industrial operations were undertaken and colossal fortunes were acquired. Capital was accumulated to an unprecedented degree in the hands of great corporations, and for the first time there appeared in America a true proletariat. The Republican party had carried through the war and held the reins of government for many years. The capitalist class generally ranged itself with that party, and the Democratic party to a certain extent espoused the cause of the working and debtor class. But here that party itself divided, and the only two occasions on which it has been successful were those in which it was led by a friend of the capitalist class and was supported by a large number of Republicans who had become disaffected with their party. It was the Republican or capitalist policy that was continued, and the real Democratic principles were not at all in evidence.

Political sympathy, in so far as it exists now, is for the working classes as against the capitalists, and while this is largely shared by the mass of both parties, the Democratic party is the one that most openly professes it. A large wing of that party is now advocating extensive changes in the laws and institutions of the country, but the other wing, combined with the bulk of the

Republican party, has thus far been able to prevent these innovations. This is probably well, because the Democratic party still represents the less intelligent class, and the capitalistic wing embraces the better informed portion of that party. The measures advocated by the other wing have been ill-considered and of doubtful propriety, and it is far better that they remain in abeyance until wiser measures can be framed looking to the same class of reforms. So much for the political parties in America.

IV

Of the political parties of European states I cannot of course speak from any personal knowledge, and must depend mainly upon history and general information. Indeed, except for those of England, I shall not attempt to speak, but there are features of English partisanship that possess a special interest for the sociologist. In England as in the United States the names of the leading political parties have changed while their character has remained practically the same. The old Whig and Tory parties have become the Liberal and Conservative parties. Exactly what the names Whig and Tory originally stood for has probably never been better expressed than by Bolingbroke in 1735, when he said:

The power and majesty of the people, an original contract, the authority and independency of Parliament, liberty, resistance, exclusion, abdication, deposition; these were ideas associated at that time [he is writing of the end of the seventeenth century], to the idea of a Whig, and supposed by every Whig to be incommunicable and inconsistent with the idea of a Tory.

Divine, hereditary, indefeasible right, lineal succession, passive obedience, non-resistance, slavery, nay, and sometimes popery too, were associated in many minds to the idea of a Tory; and deemed incommunicable and inconsistent, in the same manner, with the idea of a Whig.³

Mr. Herbert Spencer, who cites this passage from Bolingbroke, adds: "In essence Toryism stands for the power of the state *versus* freedom of the individual; and in essence Liberalism stands for the freedom of the individual *versus* the power of the state."⁴

³ *Bolingbroke: A Dissertation on Parties*. The work of the Late Right Honourable Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke, etc. Eight volumes. Vol. III, p. 38. London, 1809.

⁴ *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 606 (§ 266). New York, 1877.

If we compare this last with American parties we shall find that, quite the opposite of the popular assumption, the English Whig or Liberal party is not represented by the American Federal, Whig, or Republican party, but more nearly by the Democratic party. The Federal party of the United States, as all know, demanded a strong federal or central government, with restriction of the powers of the states. The modern Republican party certainly has this for one of its fundamental principles. On the other hand, the Democratic party not only insists on the sovereignty of the states, but it opposes nearly all attempts of the government to enlarge its functions or undertake operations of its own in any direction. It is pre-eminently the party of *laissez faire*. It also demands the maximum individual liberty for the citizen, and thus represents the greatest freedom of contract.

The most curious part of the comparison is that, notwithstanding the resemblances between the Liberal and Democratic parties just pointed out, it still remains true that the Whigs of both England and America, and the English Liberals and American Republicans, constitute the party of progress, while the Conservative and the Democratic parties agree in constituting the party of inaction, at least, if not of reaction.

This is explained by the entirely different political conditions of the two countries, even today, and still more so in the past. The fact is that in a monarchical government the state really does represent *status*, i. e., it represents the statical condition, and no initiative in the direction of reform or improvement is taken by the state. This makes the party that defends the state the party of inertia or of order, if anyone prefers, while the party that resists the state stands for progress in the sense of preventing governmental restraint of free individual initiative. This is exactly reversed in a republican form of government, like that of the United States. Here it is the state that is constantly striving to do something, to change the existing status, to introduce reforms and improvements. It is this spontaneous initiative of the state which calls for a conservative party to hold it in check. That party in the United States is the Democratic party, while the Republican party constantly seeks reform.

This distinction is coming to exist in England also. A government may call itself a monarchy when in fact it really is a democracy. Whenever it becomes thoroughly representative, whenever its lawmakers are chosen by the votes of the people, and are in danger of being defeated unless they advocate in Parliament the measures that the people demand, the government takes on the character of a democracy, and the reforms desired by the people will be brought before Parliament to be either adopted or rejected. This inaugurates a complete revolution, and the government no longer represents pure status, but takes the initiative in all progressive activities. When this occurs the party of resistance to state action is transformed from a party of liberation to a party of reaction.

V

The inability to see that different political conditions in different countries or at different periods in the history of the same country alter the complexion of political parties and produce such apparent anomalies as have been pointed out, has led writers on the subject to some very unphilosophical conclusions. I will revert to only one case, and that is the position taken by Mr. Herbert Spencer. He undertook to show that the modern Liberals of England are in reality Tories, and are defending the principles that specially characterize the Tory party. Bemoaning what he calls the "reversion to the compulsory social system," and immediately following his definition of the parties, he adds:

But whereas, during the previous peaceful period, individual liberty was extending by abolishing religious disabilities, establishing free-trade, removing impediments from the press, etc.; since the reversion began, the party which effected these changes has vied with the opposite party in multiplying state-administrations which diminish individual liberty.⁵

This is what he afterward called "The New Toryism," which is the title of an article contributed by him to the *Contemporary Review* for February, 1884, republished in 1892, as the first of the series entitled: "The Man *versus* the State," following his *Social Statics*, abridged and revised. He opens this article with the remark that "most of those who now pass as Liberals, are

⁵ Spencer, *loc. cit.*

Tories of a new type. This is a paradox which I propose to justify." Farther on in the same article, speaking of "Toryism as rightly conceived," he says:

Standing as it does for coercion by the State *versus* the freedom of the individual, Toryism remains Toryism, whether it extends this coercion for selfish or unselfish reasons. As certainly as the despot is still a despot, whether his motives for arbitrary rule are good or bad; so certainly is the Tory still a Tory, whether he has egoistic or altruistic motives for using state-power to restrict the liberty of the citizen, beyond the degree required for maintaining the liberties of other citizens. The altruistic Tory as well as the egoistic Tory belongs to the genus Tory; though he forms a new species of the genus. And both stand in distinct contrast with the Liberal as defined in the days when Liberals were rightly so called, and when the definition was—"one who advocates greater freedom from restraint, especially in political institutions."

Thus, then, is justified the paradox I set out with. As we have seen, Toryism and Liberalism originally emerged, the one from militancy and the other from industrialism. The one stood for the *régime* of status and the other for the *régime* of contract—the one for that system of compulsory co-operation which accompanies the legal inequality of classes, and the other for that voluntary co-operation which accompanies their legal equality; and beyond all question the early acts of the two parties were respectively for the maintenance of agencies which effect this compulsory co-operation, and for the weakening or curbing of them. Manifestly the implication is that, in so far as it has been extending the system of compulsion, what is now called Liberalism is a new form of Toryism.⁶

What the form of restriction of individual liberty is of which he complains as being brought about by the combined sanction of both the Conservative and Liberal parties of England, may be gathered from the three other articles of this series, entitled respectively: "The Coming Slavery," "The Sins of Legislators," and "The Great Political Superstition." In none of these is it charged that the government had seized and imprisoned citizens for political reasons, or had oppressed them in the manner which was so common in the earlier history of the country. We hear nothing of dungeons, of *lettres de cachet*, or of political executions. There had always been religious liberty, free trade, and a free press. What then was the supreme offense? It con-

⁶ *The Man versus the State*, pp. 299, 300; *Contemporary Review*, Vol. XLV, pp. 166, 167. February, 1884.

sisted almost exclusively in a series of steps taken by the state in the direction of assuming new duties, enlarging its functions, and undertaking industrial operations which had previously been left wholly to private enterprise. In the second article he sums up the greater part of these as follows:

Then, again, comes state-ownership of railways. Already this exists to a large extent on the Continent. Already we have had here a few years ago loud advocacy of it. And now the cry, which was raised by sundry politicians and publicists, is taken up afresh by the Democratic Federation, which proposes "state ownership of railways, with or without compensation." Evidently pressure from above, joined by pressure from below, is likely to effect this change dictated by the policy everywhere spreading; and with it must come many attendant changes. For railway-proprietors, at first owners and workers of railways only, have become masters of numerous businesses directly or indirectly connected with railways; and these will have to be purchased by the government when the railways are purchased. Already exclusive letter carrier, exclusive transmitter of telegrams, and on the way to become exclusive carrier of parcels, the state will not only be the exclusive carrier of passengers, goods, and minerals, but will add to its present various trades many other trades. Even now, besides erecting its naval and military establishments and building harbors, docks, breakwaters, etc., it does the work of ship-builder, cannon-founder, small-arms maker, manufacturer of ammunition, army-clothier and boot-maker; and when the railways have been appropriated "with or without compensation," as the Democratic Federationists say, it will have become locomotive-engine-builder, carriage-maker, tarpaulin and grease manufacturer, passenger-vessel owner, coal-miner, stone-quarrier, omnibus-proprietor, etc. Meanwhile its local lieutenants, the municipal governments, already in many places suppliers of water, gas-makers, owners and workers of tramways, proprietors of baths, will doubtless have undertaken various other businesses. And when the state, directly or by proxy, has thus come into possession of, or has established numerous concerns for, wholesale production and for wholesale distribution: following such a example, say, as is offered by the French government, which has long been a retail tobacconist.⁷

Such, according to Mr. Spencer, is the New Toryism, and he imagined that it closely resembled the Old Toryism. His mistake was precisely that which has already been pointed out. In the last two centuries the English government has become a virtual democracy; the people have taken the initiative, and have

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 326, 327; *Contemporary Review*, Vol. XLV, p. 478. April, 1884.

demand action by the government along various industrial lines. The legislators, to whatever party they belonged, have been compelled to respond under pain of being left at home. If they did not respond they were left at home and others chosen who were willing to respond. The only sense in which such action can be called oppression is that the state has entered into competition with the individual in these industries and may have rendered their operation by private initiative unprofitable. But no one will contend now that the state has not conducted the postal business better than it was conducted by individuals. The same is now generally conceded for public telegraphy in England. It is more or less true of other industries, and would probably prove true of public railways after a fair trial.

In such matters there is no doubt that the Liberal party in England, like the Republican party in America, has chiefly stood for state action, while the Conservative party of England and the Democratic party of America have offered the chief resistance to such action. In this respect, as has already been pointed out, the attitude of the parties of the present day seems to be the reverse of that of the old Whig and Tory parties of England, when the Tories were found defending state action and the Whigs resisting it. But there is all the difference in the world in the character of the action of the state at the two epochs. Whereas the state was then actually restraining the freedom of the individual, seizing him and thrusting him into prison, or cutting off his head, today it is leaving him perfectly free to act, to carry on any business he chooses, and its only action is to enter, under certain circumstances, into the industrial work of society and conduct certain kinds of business which it can do more advantageously for the people than can private individuals. To call this Toryism, or to see in it any restriction of individual liberty, is completely to misunderstand it and to confound utterly dissimilar things.

VI

This brings me to the part of the subject most vital to the sociologist. In a certain sense the state represents, and has always represented, the active power of society. But under truly

monarchical governments state activity is directed to securing the advantage of a ruling class. For all other purposes its attitude is essentially passive. Such action as it takes in other directions is mainly in the form of resistance to individual activity within the state. Individual liberty in states thus constituted is regarded as hostile to the state, and therefore such states have always assumed the rôle of limiting or suppressing individual liberty. The essential quality of Toryism was, then, support of the state in its efforts to suppress individual liberty. The opposite party, originally called the Whig party, stood for individual freedom against this action of the state, and this party, in England and France, had for its powerful ally the whole body of political economists. Thus reinforced it ultimately triumphed and brought about the constitutional government which now exists in England. The revolution went on until the government at last became a virtual democracy. I have already described the further effect of this change in converting the government into an active agent of social amelioration. The present Liberal party is the natural successor of the old Whig party, but instead of resisting the action of government, which no longer strives to restrict individual liberty, it now finds itself mainly on the side of the government in seeking to bring about these reforms. The opposing party, now no longer called the Tory party, takes the name of the Conservative party, and finds itself resisting instead of supporting state action.

The question has arisen which of these parties is to be regarded as on the side of individual liberty. The political economists of the old school, who formerly aided the Whig party, are now for the most part allied with the Conservative party in opposition to what they regard as the excessive initiative of the state. This was practically Mr. Spencer's position. But there is a new school of economists who perceive the significance of these fundamental changes, and who see no danger in the action of the state in response to the demands of enlightened constituencies for political reforms.

The state still represents the collective action of society, and in a much more complete sense than it did under a truly mo-

narchical government. No doubt the old Whigs and political economists were right in regarding such collective action as was then taken by the state as hostile to individual liberty. The only question is whether the present collective action is to be so regarded. An analysis of the situation shows that this is not the case, and that the action of democratic, or virtually democratic states is simply the carrying-out of the expressed wishes of the people.

Under the strict economic régime that was originally demanded and ultimately achieved, which forbids the state to interfere in any way with the so-called individual freedom of the citizen—the *laissez-faire* policy—it was found that individuals could and did inaugurate a system which restricted the personal liberty of man more completely and more oppressively than the state had ever done, and the great modern political question has become how to prevent this new form of oppression. Nearly all clear-sighted statesmen, economists, and thinkers see that the only way is through collective action. This collective action, which Mr. Spencer characterized as “the coming slavery,” is therefore neither more nor less than a policy of individual liberty. The real “slavery” has already come, and the problem now is that of emancipation. The progressive party in all countries is now, as it always has been, on the side of individual liberty, the only difference being that whereas formerly it was the state that restricted it, now it is powerful individuals and great corporations. The true Liberal cares not who the oppressor may be; it is oppression that he resists, from whatever source. And thus we have the somewhat remarkable paradox, a true paradox, and not a false one, such as that with which Mr. Spencer set out, viz., that collectivism, instead of being opposed to individualism, is the only means of securing it.

A REVIEW OF MUNICIPAL EVENTS, 1906-7

CLINTON ROGERS WOODRUFF

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The militant character of the modern municipal movement has long been conspicuous; but never more so than during the last eighteen months. The fight against graft has grown in extent and intensity. The battle against inefficiency, ignorance, and indifference has been waged on every side. The regular army of city clubs, municipal leagues, citizens' associations, and civic federations has been reinforced by the volunteer corps of city parties and committees of various types. The public official to a far greater extent than ever before has enlisted for effective service in the cause of decency and higher standards. In short, the battle for betterment is on in every community and is being waged with varying fortunes at times; but the army, ever increasing, is pressing steadily forward against the intrenchments of the enemy of public order and the common weal, and toward the goal of a higher public life and cleaner politics.

During the present year the attack on official graft has on the whole been the most vigorous. The San Francisco prosecutions have, quite naturally, occupied the largest share of public attention. They have been so far reaching, they have been directed against offenders of such high standing, and have been so uniformly successful that the whole country has been aroused to their importance.

The one overshadowing fact in San Francisco's affairs has been the proof that the public-service corporations had debauched its government by bribing the supervisors and other municipal officers, through the instrumentality of former "Boss" Abe Ruef and former Mayor Schmitz. The indictment of the officials of the principal public-service corporations in San Francisco for bribery has followed the advent of Francis J. Heney and William J. Burns, and the trial and conviction of Mayor Schmitz,

Abraham Ruef, and Louis J. Glass, president of the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company, have been the tangible result of the prosecution so far. Patrick Calhoun, one of the most prominent financiers in railroad construction in the United States, has been indicted and is to be placed on trial shortly.

The business men of San Francisco as a class are said to be in favor of calling off the prosecutions, on the ground that a man is justified in committing bribery to help his business, and they condemn Mr. Spreckles, who is financing the prosecution, and Mr. Heney, who is conducting it. The carnival of corruption which has held sway in San Francisco in the last six years resulted in the lowering of the city's morals almost to the zero point. Many business men justified the bribery because they committed it; and the laboring population was satisfied with the situation so long as its demands were acceded to; the police were leagued with crime and criminals because their superiors had been committing felonies, and the children in the schools made graft and grafters the subject of childish jests, and justified grafting on the ground that everybody did it.

The majority of the people of San Francisco are unquestionably honest and desire to have honesty in their municipal affairs; but at times, they have been woefully indifferent to the demands upon them. They met the test, however, on November 5, when they re-elected Mayor Taylor (chosen to succeed the notorious and malodorous Schnitz) who has been nominated by the Independents and had refused the indorsement of the two national party organizations, and likewise re-elected as district attorney, William H. Langdon, who had inaugurated the prosecutions, who indicted his own colleagues, and could not be pulled off; the man, in other words, who has been primarily responsible, in co-operation with Spreckles, Heney, and Burns, for the purging of San Francisco.

In Pittsburgh a broker has been convicted along with the president of the company (who refused to defend the charge against him) for conspiracy to bribe the councils to pass the Pittsburgh and Tube City franchise ordinance. A councilman was convicted of soliciting a bribe of \$7,000 from the broker

and the president to secure the passage of the ordinance. Thus the three interests involved, the corporation, the councilman, and the go-between, are receiving their just deserts. The disclosures came about through the convicted men failing to keep their agreements with each other.

In Peoria, Ill., two former members of the board of highway commissioners have pleaded guilty to an indictment charging them with the misappropriation of the public funds. In Milwaukee, a number of convicted grafters will have to go to jail, the supreme court of the state having declared their technical appeals unfounded. Recently another official pleaded guilty to a shortage in his accounts, and an alderman has just been convicted of soliciting a bribe. In Columbus, Ohio, a lumber merchant has been found guilty of defrauding the city by presenting vouchers for electric-light poles which were never delivered. New Jersey has a legislative commission at work to discover if there has been any graft in the conduct of state affairs, as well as to make suggestions in regard to the more efficient and faithful conduct of business.

The disclosures of the Pennsylvania legislative committee in the state capitol scandals have surprised and shocked the whole country. As a result eighteen defendants have been indicted and will be tried by the attorney-general in January, 1908, for their complicity in the gross frauds practiced on the state.

St. Louis, which a few years ago was the center of a vigorous campaign against official graft, seems to have forgotten its lessons and recent dispatches disclose a serious state of affairs. Late in October developments came thick and fast in the investigation being conducted by the grand jury soon after City Councilman Linde had been indicted for malfeasance in office. When the charge was made against him he made a clean breast of his connection with contracts that have been let by the city, implicating several members of the city's legislative bodies, and wholesale indictments are expected. He also announced that he would resign his office and would tell the truth before the jury.

The present prosecutor in commenting on the St. Louis cases

has said with truth and effect that during the term of his predecessor (Joseph W. Folk)—

the gang then in control of the legislative power of the city, grown bold after a quarter of a century of uninterrupted carnival in official dereliction, crime, and corruption, were brought to halt and blistered by the law and public opinion.

The crusade then instituted left in its relentless trail misery and suffering beyond compare—death, insanity, imprisonment and degradation marked its course. This lesson was drastic, and by all marks and signs of human action and understanding it promised St. Louis a better day. It so impressed him who was charged with the conduct of the war then waged that he, as the chief executive of the state, has since extended its mercy (pardons) to those whom he convicted and who had been given long sentences. He did it in response to a demand growing out of sympathy engendered by the conviction that a permanent reformation had been brought about and that the ends of justice in the fullest sense had been achieved. But in less than four years thereafter we find the same practices indulged in and this progressive, ambitious, and promising city is again enthralled—held in the vise of official corruption.

The work of purging will have to be done again, but the significant features are that the space of time elapsing between the two experiences was so short and that the city has public officials who can be depended upon to probe the inquiry and force the remedy and punishment.

From San Francisco comes word that a plan has been nearly perfected for a permanent safeguard against the grafters. It is expected that it will be put in operation by the first of the year. The plan contemplates the formation of a civic auditing agency, which is to follow every movement of the city government and every officer from the mayor down. Rudolph Spreckels is reported as saying that the scheme could be put into practice at an expense of \$100,000 a year, and that it would effect a saving to the taxpayers of \$3,000,000 to \$3,500,000.

Persistent and minute espionage of public officials may at first blush seem to be an unwarranted interference with their personal rights; but it is in the interest of the public whom they are elected to serve and of their own character that unwarranted extravagance or expenditures be exposed and discounted. The Wisconsin legislature passed a law providing that no city, town,

village, or county official should have a pecuniary interest as a stockholder or otherwise in any corporation which is interested in a bid, contract, or proposal for public work or supplies of any kind whatever. When such connection with a private business becomes known, the office is to be forfeited forthwith. State officers, boards, and commissions in New York State can investigate their employees, under a law recently approved by Governor Hughes, and it is expected that many of the newly elected officers will take advantage of the act and do a little investigating on their own hook. It has been hinted that the principal reason for the bill was to give some of the governor's new appointees power to find out just what side-grafts the attachés of the departments are interested in. The new law also gives the head of the department power to issue subpoenas, administer oaths, and require the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers.

The Chester County Court in Pennsylvania recently granted an injunction which has far more than local significance at this particular time. Not long since the town council of Coatsville passed an ordinance annexing thirty-six acres known as Valley View to the borough. This land belonged to an improvement company in which several councilmen were interested. Proceedings were at once commenced by a bill in equity, filed by certain citizens and taxpayers, to restrain the burgess and town council from enforcing the ordinance in question, alleging that the pecuniary interest of the councilmen made the ordinance an illegal one. The defendants tried to relieve themselves by the sale of their interest after the filing of the bill. A second ordinance was then passed so as to avoid, if possible, the objections to the first, but the court held that the sale was not entirely in good faith, and entered a decree restraining further annexation proceedings, thus establishing a precedent which should be followed by insurance and public-utilities companies generally.

Men who hold representative positions should not be on both sides of a deal. If they have something to sell to the city, or if they are to be benefited by their official action they should resign as representatives and trustees or be forced to do so. Several years ago the courts of Philadelphia (and the Supreme

Court sustained them) at the instance of the Municipal League ousted a councilman who was at the same time the general manager of an electric lighting company which was supplying the city with electric lighting. The same rule should hold in private and quasi-private corporations. Such a proceeding as the Brady-Whitney-Dolan-Ryan deal involving the Wall and Cortland Streets franchises should not only be set aside by the courts, but those responsible for them should be disqualified from holding a similar position for a term of years, just as at the present time in many states a defendant found guilty of an election fraud is disfranchised.

The various (and it is a pleasure to record the increasing) efforts that are being made by party organizations to put a stop to electoral fraud and corruption through mutual agreement are indicative of the new spirit which is abroad. The following is a copy of the now famous "Elmira Compact" which has set the standard for other communities and has been instrumental in eliminating the corrupt use of money to influence votes in Elmira. It has been lived up to for the past three successive years and has marked a new epoch in municipal politics. The compact was entered into by political managers of Elmira and Chemung County in 1905 and has since been observed. It provides:

First.—That the amount of money to be placed by each of the said organizations or their candidates, in each of the election districts, shall not exceed the sum of forty dollars to a district.

Second.—That no expenditure of money or promise of money shall be made on election day or prior to or after election day or by either party or its representatives for the purpose of purchasing or influencing votes, nor for any other purpose than the legitimate expenditure for the legitimate organization and educational work of the campaign.

Third.—It was further agreed to unite to bring about the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of any person or persons who engaged in the violation of the law and its provisions in reference to bribery at the polls.

Fourth.—It was further agreed that a reward of \$100 be paid in each case for information resulting in the arrest and conviction of any person or persons guilty of any violation of the provisions of the election laws; and the agreement concluded with these words: "And we hereby jointly and severally pledge ourselves to do all in our power to secure the renewal and continuation of this agreement in the future."

The Republican and Democratic state committees of New Jersey at the instance of Governor Stokes and of the Society for Preventing Corruption at Elections signed an agreement for the conduct of the gubernatorial election just closed, which provided that the two committees would to the utmost of their ability endeavor to enforce existing laws against bribery at elections, and discountenance any infraction of the law thereupon by the committee or the subordinate committee of the respective parties; and that they would discountenance in every way possible the contribution and distribution of funds by candidates, committees, or others for use in corrupting the ballot; and that they would urge the chairmen of the respective parties in the several counties and cities to agree as to the amount (if any) to be paid for poll workers at elections, provided that no one be employed by either party as a poll worker who was not eligible to vote at the primary of that party immediately preceding such election. The parties to the agreement recommended the appointment of a permanent committee of conference, to the end that the agreement might be made permanent and that the respective parties might by united effort perfect existing law that it may be made stronger, more readily enforced, and more certain in execution, and that the committee be authorized to recommend to the next legislature such further legislation as they shall deem advisable for the safeguarding of the ballot.

Similar agreements have also proved effective in parts of Maryland. May their execution and enforcement be multiplied until they cover all city, state, and national campaigns!

While the year just closing has been less productive of sensational campaigns than have some of its immediate predecessors, it has, taking it by and large, been an eventful, suggestive, and

encouraging one. While there have been setbacks and reactions in some places, the general trend has been toward betterment. The forces of decency and uplift are scoring steady advances, even in those communities sometimes mistakenly spoken of as hopelessly inert, indifferent, and enslaved by an arrogant enemy.

Boston has not been so conspicuous a factor along political lines as its progressiveness in other fields of activity, notably those of civic improvement, would justify one in reasonably expecting. The great event of the year has been the disclosures incident to the investigations of the Finance Commission, composed of leading business men, whose expenses, through the force of public opinion, have been paid out of the public treasury. There has been nothing strikingly new thus far revealed. It is the old story of the prostitution of the public for party and personal advantage, resulting in inefficiency, corruption, and the degradation of the public service. The voters of Boston at the municipal election in December declared by their votes they were unwilling to condone this sort of thing. Like the citizens of Cleveland, Toledo, and San Francisco, they placed public welfare above party success and turned out those who had been responsible for the degradation of the city and the besmirching of its good name.

The neighboring city of Cambridge, at the 1906 municipal election, elected a non-partisan mayor and an almost complete non-partisan council and board of aldermen, and re-elected him in 1907.

Providence, R. I., however, has for a number of years past displayed commendable independence, usually electing a mayor from the minority party and with commendable frequency re-electing tried officials irrespective of party designation. Unfortunately the custom, for such it has almost become, of choosing a mayor from the opposition party is fraught with very little practical administrative advantage, for the city is mainly governed through councils and through state commissions.

The present incumbent of the mayoralty, Hon. P. J. McCarthy, has adopted a policy designed to offset the disadvantages of the anomalous position in which he is placed, in that he

can make no appointments except by "the advice and consent of the city council," which, if unable to agree to the mayor's nominations, is empowered to elect independently of such nomination! Mayor McCarthy has chosen an advisory board or "cabinet" chosen from among the most capable and prominent men of the city and without regard to their party politics. They represent all classes and are able to give expert testimony on all of the different subjects concerning which the mayor is called upon to make a decision. They are men of such standing that their recommendations, especially if unanimous, cannot lightly be turned down for partisan reasons.

Governor Hughes has been the great overshadowing issue in New York. His strong character and personality; his determined stand for the rights of the people as against the privileges of the politicians; his election as the only Republican who was successful; his defeat of the sordid men who have abused public power for personal and political ends; his forcing of the legislature to heed the demands of the people, constitute the great achievements in New York State and City since he came prominently before the public eye by reason of his skilful revelations in the insurance inquiry.

Not only has every sound, progressive municipal movement in New York been helped by his action, but those in all parts of the land. He has enheartened the municipal worker everywhere. He has infused new life and energy into every local aspiration for municipal righteousness. He has pointed the way and many have been those who have indicated their intention to follow therein. He pre-eminently represents the new political spirit which is abroad.

As always, there have been many events occurring in New York of great interest to municipal students elsewhere. Notably the successful effort to have the president of the Borough of Manhattan removed on the ground of inefficiency.

The establishment of the Bureau of Municipal Research is an occurrence of more than ordinary concern. It represents a careful, intelligent effort to improve and reorganize municipal affairs through the medium of uniform and effective bookkeep-

ing and accounting. It is exceedingly difficult to discover irregularities in the method of handling the funds of a city, unless there be some uniform method of accounting that will enable an investigator to ascertain easily just what certain funds have been spent for and to compare such expenditures with the appropriation and with former appropriations and expenditures for like work and service in the same city and elsewhere.

Such work is of distinct service in helping to raise the standard of efficiency of municipal government, but care must be taken lest some of the advocates of the necessity for such work conclude that they have become possessed of a panacea that will cure most if not all of the ills of municipal misrule. No system of bookkeeping will either make public officials honest or make a dishonest official fear to make such entries as will cover up his petty or large graft. Such bookkeeping is a method and a highly useful one that will aid in discovering such irregularities. The largest factor in minimizing such misconduct, however, is the pressure of public sentiment, and public sentiment is not aroused or moved by methods of bookkeeping. For this purpose the public-spirited newspapers and organizations that are constantly attacking maladministration are still the largest factors in educating and molding public opinion. Uniform municipal accounting will certainly be a great aid to the work of such newspapers and civic organizations, but, standing alone, would find itself unable to accomplish any very marked reform.

In so far as the bureau continues on the wise lines it has thus far followed it will constitute a great and growing factor in increasing the efficiency of municipal administration in New York. Its founders and managers, however, must not allow a large endowment and a large measure of preliminary success to mislead them as to the complexity and difficulty of the municipal problem and the long road that yet remains to be traveled, even after uniform accounting is an established fact.

The present city government in Greater New York continues to be a strange mixture of honesty and dishonesty, progressiveness and bourbonism, efficiency and inefficiency, without any very well-defined civic ideals, and with a constant tendency to sub-

ordinate public interests to petty personal, political considerations. Notwithstanding all its shortcomings, the McClellan administration may justly be considered to be the best, and on the whole the most satisfactory Tammany has so far given the city, and this is no small praise when we bear in mind that the government of Greater New York involves the lives and welfare of four and one-half millions of people and the annual expenditure of \$141,000,000.

The work of the New York legislature, thanks to Governor Hughes, was far more satisfactory to the people of the state. Not in many years has there been a session so free from suspicion of corrupt influences; not in many years has a session passed so many good and defeated so many bad measures. Moreover, the personal record and character of the individual members have been much higher than usual as an examination of the legislative report of the Citizens' Union will promptly disclose. But first and foremost, the chief claim of the New York legislature of 1907 to distinction and gratitude lies in the fact that it enacted into law the recommendations of Governor Hughes.

The administration of Mayor Adam in Buffalo has been clear and most efficient. The mayor is as independent of his party (which happens to be the minority one locally) as a public official can well be and not lose all touch with it, and having been a successful business man for many years, he has applied business methods to the city's business. There have been no municipal scandals and the government is honest and economical.

Philadelphia having experienced an upheaval which attracted widespread attention, and having accomplished a very considerable measure of reform in certain directions, is now resting from its labors, although its present mayor has adopted as his slogan the motto "Get Busy." He has also applied this principle to circumventing the civil-service law of 1906 and providing places for "the martyrs of 1905."

The reform in the state's electoral machinery, as has been pointed out in another connection, has been little short of enor-

mous.¹ Three elections have been held under the personal registration law and two under the direct primary law, and there has been substantially no fraud, in striking contrast to former elections when the cry of fraud was regularly made and usually believed and admitted to be true.

Before one jumps to the conclusion that the revolution of 1905 in Philadelphia was a mere spasm, a flash in the pan, of no effect, let him examine the record of things accomplished. The accomplishments represent a very substantial measure of progress in the direction of protecting the fundamental liberties of the people and advancing the cause of decent and effective government, and they should afford encouragement, not only to the reformers of Philadelphia, but to those of every other community in the land. There may be a temporary reaction; but this much has been gained by the people of Pennsylvania—they have been given a fair and free opportunity to express their political opinions through the purification and intelligent development of their election machinery. If they do not choose to avail themselves of the opportunity—"that is another story."

The success of the Republican candidate at the mayoralty election in 1907 has been variously explained and interpreted; but one fact stands out prominently, and that is the tremendous influence of an effective organization. The machinery of the Republican party has been maintained intact and has been kept at a high point of efficiency, and its effectiveness has been demonstrated, first, in securing a large registration of its voters, and, secondly, in having its voters marshaled at the primaries, when 98,000 votes were polled for the various Republican candidates, and again on the day of election when 130,000 men recorded their preference for the Republican nominee. While the City Party maintained an admirable organization, it had to depend in most instances upon the voluntary efforts of men who had other business than politics. The consequence was that it suffered from its inability to reach the voters and bring them out. Another factor which seems to have contributed to the success of the Republican candidate lay in the defection and inaction of

¹ See article in *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1907.

the Democrats. While they nominated the City Party candidate on their ticket, no effort was made by them to bring out their voters, and this inactivity had its natural effect in diminishing the support accorded to the City Party candidates. The election, like that of last fall, was generally conceded to be honestly conducted, owing to the effectiveness with which the Personal Registration Law had been enforced. The mayoralty primary on January 26 was the first held under the new Uniform Primaries Act passed a year ago by the special session of the Pennsylvania legislature. The result was the largest vote ever polled at a primary election, but the candidates nominated were those favored by the leaders of the respective party organizations. The City Party made a considerable gain in both branches of council, electing a number of first-class men. Among those elected to the Common Council was George Burnham, Jr., of the Baldwin Locomotive Works, and for many years treasurer of the National Municipal League. A number of other men of good character were chosen at the same time, thus insuring a more careful consideration of municipal questions in the municipal legislature.

Pittsburgh under the distinguished leadership of Mayor George W. Guthrie has continued to make a good record. Here is how one thoughtful observer views the situation:

While we have forced councils to be good, elected the best mayor in the country, put in county offices men of ability and honesty, forced the politicians to give us a good civil measure, I am convinced that our most important victory has been to convince the political leaders and bosses that there is a new era in politics and that for the future none but the best men can be elected to public office. I feel certain unless there is a great change in conditions during the next year that Flinn will again dominate affairs here in the Republican party. I believe also that he will stand for whatever is best. I think he together with other political leaders here have had their lesson and are really sincere in their promises. They now look at things in a different light. They know also if they are ever again to control the city administration it will be only by putting in office men of the highest ability and honesty. What greater work can be done than to convert the politician? The prospects for continued good government in Pittsburgh are good.

Scranton, which has also the benefit of the ministrations of a sincere and intelligent mayor in the person of J. Benjamin Dim-

mick, continues its progressive course, quietly but none the less steadily.

The defeat of Mayor Fagan in Jersey City is regrettable, but it was the result of party treachery rather than a popular repudiation. For several years the Colby wing of the Republican party has kept up a vigorous agitation for the adoption of certain specific reforms, primarily equal taxation. In the face of great odds Senator Colby succeeded in securing the passage of measures providing for a limitation of franchises to public-service corporations, and more equitable methods of assessment and taxation. So far the attacks upon these laws in the courts have failed, and the state has already reaped the benefits of the remedies afforded by them. The "new idea" men, as the Colby adherents are known, added in their recent campaign a number of new planks including a demand for a public-utilities commission, a civil-service law, a direct-nominations law, and a public expression at the polls touching the election of U. S. senators. They were successful in having their planks adopted by the state convention and in the choice of a number of their assemblymen candidates, but they failed to secure the nomination of their state candidates.

The legislature of Delaware at its last session passed an act authorizing the submission to the qualified voters of Wilmington of questions of public policy in connection with the affairs of the city, and providing that should any questions submitted receive a majority of the votes cast thereon, and the subject be within the corporate power of the mayor and council or any department or branch thereof, that it shall be the duty of the council or commission or official as the case may be, to adopt without unnecessary delay such ordinances, rules, or regulations as may be necessary "for putting into effect the popular will thus expressed." Since the passage of the law three questions have been submitted under it.

The last mayoralty campaign in Baltimore offered a choice between two excellent men, one who had served with credit as mayor, the other with equal credit as councilman. The nomination of Mayor Timanus by the Republicans was declared by so

independent a paper as the *Baltimore News* to be creditable to the good sense and right feeling of the voters of the Republican party. The fact that he had given but scant recognition to the workers of his party was an obstacle to his success that perhaps in any other city than Baltimore would have been insuperable. The fact that a Republican could make such a record and get the indorsement of his party in a primary is a gratifying evidence of the acceptance by the voters of higher standards in city government.

The good feeling toward the present mayor is not confined to the members of his own party. There is a widespread and generous recognition of the debt that Baltimore owes him for services rendered under peculiar and trying circumstances. If, when he had succeeded to Mayor McLane's place, he had, in the perilous conditions following the fire, yielded to the baser considerations of spoilsmongering, and had republicanized the City Hall, he would have inflicted upon Baltimore, as well as upon his own party, irreparable damage. He did the opposite thing, with the result that not only his party has sustained him, but that he has commended himself to the right-thinking of all shades of political opinion.

Notwithstanding this high opinion of Mayor Timanus, the *News* did not support him nor did the plurality of the voters. They chose rather Mr. Mahool whose record in the transaction of public affairs had commended him still more strongly to the intelligent and discriminating voter.

He was not a "business man," put up to fool the people, but was a tried and true public servant who had actually gone through the trials of experience in the City Hall and proved himself efficient and faithful. He was not a new man going into office with immature theories or with the easy confidence that comes from lack of knowledge of the difficulties. He was a "seasoned" public man, who understood the trials and the temptations through which any official must go, and to which he must prove superior if he would gain a success worth having.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky last summer handed down a decision of far-reaching importance and significance. By virtue of it, sixty-two officials of Louisville from the mayor down, including judges, city clerks, auditor, treasurer, tax receiver, as well as a long list of county officials, were ousted from office. The opinion, which was a tremendous indictment of the Louisville machine, and one of the most scathing arraignments

ever recorded in the judicial decisions of the country, reversed the decision of the lower court in the contested election cases growing out of the November, 1905, election, by virtue of which Mayor Paul C. Barth and the other county and city officials in Louisville held office. It declared that the election was null and void, because of the proved fraud, crime, conspiracy, and force, in which the Democratic Campaign Committee in Louisville, the police force, the various city and county officials, hired thugs, and thieves were held to be participants.

The election frauds in Louisville have for years been notorious. Following the November election of 1903, charges were freely made and quite generally believed by independent citizens that wholesale frauds had been committed in many of the election precincts of the city; that in some places the ballots were stolen and no election held; that in others the polling-places had been secretly and illegally removed and the voters of these precincts deprived of the right to vote, while in still others such acts of violence had been committed that the voters were driven from the polls and were prevented from taking part in the election. Following this election many criminal prosecutions were set on foot, but none of them resulted in the punishment of those charged with violating the law. To correct these evils the City Club, a non-partisan organization, was formed, which early in the fall of 1905 notified the people of Louisville as to the debauchery of the ballot in 1903 and called upon all good citizens, regardless of politics, to join in a movement to secure a fair election. The campaign which followed was remarkable for the bitterness and intensity of feeling, which was aroused by the charges and counter-charges of fraud and corruption.

The trouble began at the registration, the fusion or independent candidates charging that a great number of repeaters had been brought into the city for the purpose of being registered. The election which followed was, according to the opinion of the Supreme Court, corruptly and illegally held. The charges which followed the election of 1903 were renewed and proved to be true, notwithstanding that the local judges had held otherwise. In three districts the ballots were delivered to the Demo-

cratic clerk for the precinct, who failed to produce them on the morning of election. As a consequence seven hundred and forty-four voters were disfranchised. In four other divisions the ballots were lost or stolen. In certain other districts where the polling-places had been surreptitiously charged, the stub books disclosed the startling fact that the registered voters voted alphabetically, beginning with those whose names commenced with the letter A and voting in regular order to Z, or vice versa, all of the A's being voted before any B's were permitted to vote, all of the B's before any C's, etc. This sort of voting took place in nine precincts, the election therein being conducted by the Democrats and such assistants as they selected, the regular Republican officers being denied the right to participate.

Although the court ousted sixty-two officials, curiously enough it did not, strange as it may seem, seat the contestants. The judgments of the ouster did not go into force for thirty days from the date of the decision and the governor of the state, a Democrat, was authorized to make appointments to fill the vacancies. There was a difference of opinion among Louisville lawyers as to the right of the Supreme Court to take such a step, the feeling being that the candidates who were defeated by such outrageous methods should be given the places, but the friends of honest elections were so happy over the great victory that they did not contest this point. The governor in pursuance of the power given him appointed a mayor, the judges, a sheriff, boards of council, and aldermen. These appointees were all Democrats, as were the ousted officials, but they gave to the city an acceptable municipal government. The police and firemen were taken out of politics and the chief of police and several officers were discharged on account of their connection with the contested election.

The sheriff and the judges administered the affairs committed to them most admirably, and it was hoped that the Democratic party would see its way clear to renominate these gentlemen for re-election at the last election. Instead of doing so, however, the primary was so arranged that the present officials could not go into the primary with any show of fair treatment, and

they declined to do so. The result was that the Democratic ticket represented the same element that was formerly in control, against which the City Club and independent Democrats and Republicans have been working, to bring about better conditions municipally.

The Republican party nominated a good ticket with Mr. Grinstead at the head and it prevailed by a decisive majority. It is pledged to continue the policy mapped out by the appointees of the governor. The City Club at a mass meeting indorsed the Republican ticket, and used its influence to have it elected.

The government of the city of Memphis, Tenn., was likewise vitally affected by a supreme court decision. The recent legislature of the state had "ripped" out of office the mayor and existing government and had given the governor a chance to place his own set of men in power. The city had a dual set of officials but the supreme court decided in favor of Mayor Malone, declaring that it was evident from the record that the introduction of the law was for political purposes solely and without any special consideration for the welfare or needs of the municipality. Its passage, as well as the evident cause for its introduction, was plainly a piece of "jobbery." The Tennessee law taking the appointments of election commissioners from the governor and placing them in the hands of a commission appointed by him has generally been regarded as a mere makeshift and a sort of political trick. The governor prior to the present law appointed the registration commission in each county of the state. In making his canvass he stated that this was wrong in principle because it enabled the governor to build up a machine. A great many people agreed with him in this, and those who were sincere in their views insisted that the men to be appointed for the purpose of appointing election officers in the various counties ought not to be appointed by the governor but ought either to be appointed by the legislature or elected by the people. The governor, however, put through a law giving him the authority to appoint three commissioners, which he did; and on the very day of their appointment it is alleged that they appointed election commissioners at the dictation of the governor. The

general impression is that the election officers over the state generally are as much under the control of the governor as they were under the old law when he appointed them directly.

Tom Johnson's fourth consecutive election as mayor of Cleveland is without doubt not only one of the chief events of the year, but of many years, as it clearly indicates how completely emancipated the voters of that city are from the trammels and allurements of national party names and claims in city elections. His opponent was one of the most distinguished and useful men, not only of that city, but of the United States. Theodore E. Burton is a high type of the thoughtful, able, conscientious public servant. He was defeated, however, in a community composed largely of men sharing his national principles, because it was believed by the majority that Johnson's views and experience as a municipal administrator gave larger promise for the welfare of the city. They appreciated the fact that under the circumstances of his nomination and his previous absorption in national affairs, Mr. Burton would be handicapped in the fulfillment of his ideals, high and public spirited though they were.

It was no small tribute to the political independence of the city that it laid aside personal and political preferences, and chose a man on his tried and proved merits. Another encouraging feature of the campaign was the disregarding of the national phases of Mr. Burton's candidacy, naturally and of necessity injected into the contest. Mr. Johnson's platform declared that—

no injection of national personalities or issues and no appeal to mere partisan politics should be permitted to obscure the vast improvement in every department of the city's life in these seven years; . . . the 150 miles of pavement, 170 miles of sewers, the extension and popularization of public parks, the improvement of navigation facilities in the river, the establishment of the grouping plan for public buildings and the progress made toward its realization, the establishment of public playgrounds and public baths, the acquisition of the municipally owned and operated garbage disposal, refuse collection, electric light, vapor lighting, and street-cleaning systems, the elimination of dangerous grade crossings, the establishment of milk and meat inspection, the building of the farm colony, and the establishment of the Cleveland boys' farm, have been carried out with efficiency and without regard to partisan consideration and with such economy that hostile critics, equipped with the reports of the state bureau of accounting, and

after repeated investigations by privately employed expert accountants, have been unable to point to an extravagant item, or even an injudicious expenditure.

Pledging the candidates to continue this programme, the platform took up general municipal issues in which other cities have a common interest with Cleveland. On this line it reads: "For seven years this city has been the battle-ground of the greatest and most successful war against privilege in the history of American municipalities."

These, although partisan claims, seem to be borne out in the main by the impartial, non-partisan report of the Municipal Association, which is intended to offer to voters "such information as it has been able to gather about candidates, their character, and efficiency, if they have a public record; their supposed ability and training if they have no public record." The association's report on Johnson was:

Tom L. Johnson—for six years mayor of the city—in every undertaking with which he has been connected has shown himself to be a man of unusual executive ability. Since his first election he has furthered plans, many of them either entered upon by his predecessors or suggested by the men whom he has gathered about him to meet the needs of a growing and progressive city.

The streets have become cleaner, better lighted, more rapidly paved and sewered, than ever before; the abolition of grade crossings has been substantially advanced; the health and building departments have been made more efficient; improvements have also been made which better the conditions of life among the poor by the opening of public playgrounds, the popularization of the parks and the establishment of public baths.

He has applied the merit system in the police and fire departments honestly, and has caused the water works department to be placed on a substantial, though voluntary merit system basis.

Mr. Johnson should be criticized because of his indifference to an impartial enforcement of the laws, which order that the saloons shall remain closed on Sunday.

He should also be severely criticized for not using his influence to eradicate the Sunday dance hall evil, which has been a menace to the moral welfare of hundreds of the youth of both sexes in the community. This failure to act effectively has been in the face of the appeals of sundry organizations, like that of the Catholic Federation of Cleveland and the chief probation officer of the Juvenile Court.

The current expenses of the city have increased with disquieting rapidity.

The result has been a widespread feeling that the city's finances have not been soundly and conservatively managed. This feeling partly accounts for the failure of the voters to consent to further bond issues. The actual rate of increase in current outlay has been greater than the rate of the increase of population and the rate of increase of the city's area combined.

Mr. Johnson has pushed the organization of his party control to questionable limits, of which one ominous result is, that the city council intended by law to be a council, has become simply a means for registering his decisions.

Toledo again demonstrated its independence on November 5 when it re-elected Mayor Brand Whitlock on an independent ticket and gave him a sympathetic council. The fact that what ten years ago would have attracted well-nigh national notice is now related in a few lines of a press dispatch, clearly indicates not only the progress that Toledo has made, but what has been accomplished in the country at large.

Cincinnati has had a not unusual experience. Two years ago its electors revolted and chose men who failed to read the signs of the times and to take a sound view of the situation. They utilized the opportunity to build up their own machine. The result was what might have been forecasted. The new machine was unable to weather the storm. The old one came back. That is the whole story except that the spark of independence has been kept alive by a devoted band, through whose work eventually the city will be redeemed and regenerated.

In Indiana, the last legislature attempted to repeal the Metropolitan Police Law, which for many years has vested in the governor of the state the appointment of police boards in all cities except three or four of the largest, but was defeated by the governor's veto. A law to restore certain smaller cities to the older form of government by a city council, after two years' experiment with the federal plan, was also defeated. There was a violent difference of opinion between the cities affected by this measure. Progressive communities, particularly if they had good officials, opposed the repealing measure as a retrograde step. Backward cities, particularly with bad officials, denounced the federal plan without stint. On the whole, the year has not been remarkable in Indiana, although in the larger cities there has

been an increase of civic consciousness and greater interest in the election of good men, the exposure of fraud and the impeachment or punishment of wrong-doing officials.

The situation in Chicago continues to be mixed. Progressive and public-spirited men have been hopelessly divided over nearly every issue that has been presented for decision. The street railway settlement, the new charter, and the mayoralty presented complicated phases, which made it difficult for the student abroad and the voter at home to reach a positive conclusion one way or another. Here is how one thoughtful observer described his own position and analyzed the situation:

In the recent mayoralty election I myself voted for Busse and the ordinances. The mayoralty situation was not an attractive one to independent voters, as neither Busse or Dunne was satisfactory. Before election there was a strong demand for an independent candidate and a great many persons wanted Walter Fisher. He did not think it wise for him to step into the breach at this time. The indication since the election is that Mr. Busse intends to try at least to give the city a pretty good administration.

The feature of the election was a referendum on the traction ordinances. The outcome of the referendum on the traction ordinances is a great victory for Mr. Fisher who was chiefly instrumental in formulating that plan of settlement. Had Mayor Dunne stood by Fisher and the ordinances, instead of repudiating the ordinances when the Hearst papers turned against them, he undoubtedly would have been mayor for another term. The outcome as interpreted by the extremists in both camps is a signal defeat for municipal ownership. I do not so regard it myself. I think that the municipal-ownership movement has received something of a setback in Chicago from the weakness, vacillation, and general administrative inefficiency of Mayor Dunne. But so far as the ordinances are concerned it seems to me that they leave the way open for municipal ownership whenever the people seem ready to embark upon that policy. A great many believers in municipal ownership voted for the ordinances on that theory.

Here, however, is the way another Chicagoan, equally public spirited, observant, and thoughtful puts the case:

In Chicago we have been experiencing a distinct reaction at the polls and in the public mind respecting the general subject of municipal reform and the movement toward the extension of municipal trading. After having had repeated referendum votes, participated in by a very considerable portion of the electorate, demanding by pronounced majorities that the street-car companies should be dislodged and the lines taken over by the city, new

franchises were nevertheless adopted by the council and finally approved by the electorate by a considerable majority.

This was undoubtedly due not to a real shift of public sentiment as to the desirability of municipalization, but to the fact that our constitution and laws had been framed with a view of making municipalization difficult or impossible, to the fact that the people had therefore no alternative except to make some arrangement with the private companies, and to the fact that the latter were in a position to insist that such an arrangement should even have novel elements of permanency about it. The effect of this method of "settling" the traction question has had, I think, a distinctly depressing influence upon the public mind respecting civic progress in general. On the other hand it will undoubtedly serve to teach the radical element that the movement for municipal ownership must have better associations, more intelligence, and abler leaders than it has enjoyed here.

On of the facts borne in upon many thoughtful minds during the last year is the invariable partisanship of the press in respect to any big controversial question. The papers here which have been cited and quoted in the past for their independent attitude have been scarcely less open to criticism for garbling or deliberately suppressing the news respecting important public questions than have been the so-called yellow sheets. The situation thus presented is undoubtedly one of real seriousness.

As has been usual for a number of years past, the Voters' League recommendations were quite generally followed. There were 36 aldermen to be elected. Of those that were successful 18 were indorsed by the league, 13 were opposed, in some cases bitterly and in some mildly, and in 5 cases no preference was expressed by the league. Speaking generally the league just about broke even this year, as has been the usual experience in a bitterly contested mayoralty election. Two years ago, when Mayor Dunne was elected by a landslide, the league had fewer victories to its credit than in former years. Last year, however, when there was no mayoralty election, was one of the most successful in the history of the league. This year it had some serious losses, at least one conspicuous and unexpected victory, and some other gains of distinct importance which were not sensational in their nature.

The league struck a new note in an address it issued early in the year, in which it declared:

For the past ten years the people of Chicago have been vigorously fighting graft and grafters, big and little, with the result that conditions are

tremendously improved. The grafters are no longer the chief menace to the public welfare. Today it is the paralyzing hand of inefficiency that most hinders municipal progress. There are in the public service too few men of first-rate ability; mediocrity, or worse, is the rule rather than the exception.

Our municipal progress is not in keeping with our industrial advancement. The board of directors of that great corporation, the city of Chicago, should contain more men of the caliber of those who give this city pre-eminence in commerce and industry. The time is ripe for a movement that shall put Chicago in the forefront in all respects.

The tendency of the party organizations, when it is no longer safe for them to nominate objectionable candidates, is to name colorless ones of little force or ability. Thus the league in making its recommendations to voters is confined in too many instances to a choice among weak candidates. The situation in the coming campaign promises to be rather worse than usual. The present indications are that the primaries of both parties will be held late. The interest is expected to center largely in the contest over the nominations for mayor. This means—in the absence of very active work by public-spirited citizens—that the aldermanic nominating conventions will be subject to manipulation in the interest of unfit candidates and that little opportunity will be afforded after the party selections have been made for putting independent nominees in the field.

If the present efficiency of the city council is to be maintained, to say nothing of improvement, public-spirited citizens must have more to say about nominations. Progress requires organized movements in the various wards to insure the naming of a better grade of candidates, either by the party organizations or by independent petition, as may seem best in each particular case.

There can be no gainsaying the force of this logic and it is to be hoped that the league will persist in calling public attention to the situation until there will be a general popular response and a higher grade of administrative and legislative talent presented for the suffrages of the people.

The results of the election in Detroit in November, 1906, were generally satisfactory. The great issue was the D. U. R. (Detroit United Railway) franchise which was defeated by a vote of 13,000 for and 28,000 against. Mayor Codd who proposed the franchise and defended it during his campaign was carried down to defeat with it. The new mayor, William B. Thompson, is a Democrat with a good record in public office. The Republican candidate for prosecuting attorney was also

defeated, a normal majority of 10,000 or 12,000 being overcome in his case as in that of the mayoralty contest.

In Grand Rapids at the same time the charter amendment providing for non-partisan municipal elections was approved by a vote of 8,865 to 3,350. The proposition carried in every precinct. The people also voted on an ordinance supplementing the state law prohibiting Sunday amusements and providing adequate penalties for enforcing the law against Sunday theaters. After a very hot campaign the ordinance was lost, the vote being 6,281 to 6,895. The theater ordinance was submitted under the optional referendum and the non-partisan amendment was submitted under the advisory initiative and will have to be ratified by the state legislature before going into effect.

Although from time to time manifesting a wholesome independence, Minneapolis is not yet thoroughly awakened to the problems of municipal government. The average citizen seems unable to get away from the old, narrow, hide-bound, and selfish ward point of view. So long as this is the condition, its municipal administration is likely to continue to be cursed by graft, maladministration, and inefficiency.

Some beginning was made toward better regulation of the public-service companies this year when a franchise ordinance was passed, putting the General Electric Company under more stringent regulations and reducing materially its charges to the city and the public. The company was ready to accept the general conditions of the new ordinance, but balked at the reduction in rates. The city council also passed an ordinance calling for cheaper street-car fare. The Street Railway Company promptly appealed the case into the federal court and there had all its claims allowed. The case has been appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

The gas company will be asking for a renewal of its franchise, probably next year. An active civic worker writes concerning this, that—

there is a keen disposition among some in the council to put in a "lick" for the public here by requiring a fairer contract, lower charges for service and better regulation of the service. All in all, I think our community is

getting a little more insight into these matters all the time, and is ready to insist upon better terms for the public. The chief lack is that of intelligent leadership.

Sentiment against the saloon, both as a drinking institution and as a moral, social, and political evil, has been developing fast in Minneapolis, as in many another community. In line with this sentiment in Minneapolis ordinances have recently been adopted restricting the number of saloons in the city to four hundred and thirty-five, and urged on by the council, the mayor has just issued an order requiring the posting of licenses in the saloons. Hitherto, the brewers, who are owners of nine-tenths of the saloons in Minneapolis, have insisted upon the privilege of keeping these licenses in their office safes.

The notable work done by former Mayor D. P. Jones (who was defeated a year ago because of his attitude on this question) in the Sunday closing of the saloon and the rigorous enforcement of the saloon regulations has become a settled policy of the city. Backed by public sentiment, the Jones policy remains in effect substantially unchanged, even under a wide-open chief executive, personally hostile to the principle. This ground appears to be permanently won, and sentiment is growing stronger constantly for further advances against the saloon; and quite recently, much against his will, the mayor issued an order closing saloons at midnight. In other respects the moral tone of the city has been materially lower under the present executive.

In the recent municipal elections in Iowa party lines were very lightly drawn. In fact local issues were the deciding factors in almost every case, if not all. While in many of the towns of the state the tickets are labeled Republican or Democrat, almost without exception local issues control, and a great many Democrats were elected in Republican cities and Republicans in Democratic cities. Interest in municipal affairs has certainly increased in this state, and there is a general improvement in municipal conditions. The uniform municipal-accounting law that went into effect July of last year has now been in force for over a year and has already shown that it will result in great good to the cities and towns of the state.

Reference has already been made to the recrudescence of graft in St. Louis, and this would seem to justify the comment of a long-time, if somewhat dubious, observer of municipal affairs in that city that there

has never been in the city of St. Louis any profound interest in municipal affairs. Not more than two-thirds of the registered vote is actually cast, even in times of what we regard as great excitement. What public sentiment there is seems to be made to order by enterprising agitators calling themselves West End or North End or East End Business Men's Associations. The grasshopper on the tree still makes more noise than the herd of oxen grazing, and the papers will yield more room to the clamor of an innovator than to a sound discussion of political problems. The city recently voted by an overwhelming majority to give \$3,500,000 for the erection of a free railroad bridge across the Mississippi River, although the constitution of the state declares that a municipality shall not give anything of value to any railroad company; and the Supreme Court sustained the grant because it was made not to *any* railroad but to all. Today the mayor is universally derided because in a moment of just exasperation he declared that he thought the railroads were quite competent to provide bridges of their own. We have had an active civic league which has done valuable work in projecting a system of parks, boulevards, civic centers, etc.; also a terminal commission, admirably well conducted, which has laid out a scheme for the adaptation of physical conditions to the future needs of transportation. I can perceive no signs of enthusiastic support of recommendations which ought to appeal to every thinking citizen, but on the contrary I perceive a great deal of carping criticism. Our local government is still admirably well conducted. We have nothing to complain of and much to admire. Our mayor deserves the highest praise for the fidelity with which he has discharged his trust.

There will be voted upon at the next election a constitutional amendment which will allow the cities of the state to discriminate in the assessment of taxes, that is, to exempt some property and tax other property at a less rate than the generality. Precisely what is involved in this radical change it is now difficult to ascertain.

It has remained for the Kansas City politicians and the legislature of Missouri, with the formal executive approval of Governor Folk, to establish a precedent of the most doubtful character through the enactment of a law requiring civic leagues and similar organizations in addition to filing full statements of their

campaign contributions and disbursements (to which no one could take any reasonable exception) to publish the entire information upon which their recommendations to vote either for or against candidates may be based. The act was primarily aimed at the Kansas City Civic League, which for years past has exercised a wide and wholesome influence through its criticism of the records of public officials and through its investigation of the character and antecedents of candidates for public office.

If this effort is successful in putting such organizations out of business, or of seriously curtailing their usefulness, we may look for a general effort throughout the country in the same direction, because civic and voters' leagues are increasing in number and efficiency and are becoming more and more dangerous to the plans of designing politicians. Not that such a movement would in the long run be detrimental to the cause of higher public standards, for experience teaches that efforts to suppress publicity and public-spirited efforts, even when unwisely directed, fail of their end. The St. Joseph (Mo.) *Press* very aptly described the situation as it exists in that state when it declared that Missouri "now exacts more of the independent voters and of those who insist on decency in politics than it does of the parties who alternate in running things."

Why Governor Folk, who has generally so excellent a record, should sign a bill of this character is at present inexplicable, although his apologists maintain that he decided to sacrifice the Kansas City Civic League in order to secure the passage of some special measures that he advocated in the extra session of the Missouri legislature, the advocates of the Anti-Civic League Bill having threatened all the bills of members who might oppose their bill, and it is understood that they carried their threats to the governor. His making a law of a measure intended to curtail the usefulness of an organization the principal members of which, regardless of party, are Folk men, is perhaps the price he has had to pay to insure the success of other and excellent legislative measures. At least this is the charitable view to take of it. The law has not injured the league. During the first sixty days after the bill was signed the business men of Kansas City con-

tributed more money to its support than during any similar period.

In Butte, Mont., and in the other municipalities of that commonwealth there has been a decided awakening of the public conscience and of the sense of righteousness among the people, as well as a desire for betterment in municipal affairs. This has been manifested in the suppression of gambling in the State of Montana, which a year and a half ago, or more, was practically wide open. In the matter of legislation, the system of initiative and referendum has been extended to municipal corporations. Although no use has yet been made of the powers granted, their mere existence is deemed very beneficial.

A new police system has been inaugurated throughout the state. Under it, the mayor has full charge and control of the police, the members of which are appointed during good behavior. In the larger cities, an examining and trial board is provided for, which examines and tries charges against members of the police force. The imposition of the penalty, however, is left to the mayor, the board merely determining the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

From Denver comes a note of dejection because, to use the language of Judge Lindsay:

The combined municipal corporations that control our politics and are masked first behind one political party and then the other, as it suits their purposes to buy up the machines of either, have more firmly intrenched themselves in control of the powers of government, so that without serious difficulties they have been able to get valuable franchises and make contracts as valuable to themselves as they are seriously detrimental to the people. A series of specious articles published in two of the leading daily newspapers, undoubtedly controlled by these interests, have done much to blind the people to the outrageous robberies to which they have been subjected. These four utility corporations consist of the Denver Tramway Company, controlling all the city railways; the Denver Gas and Electric Company, furnishing all the gas and electric light to the city; the Denver Water Company, a private monopoly, charging rates four or five times higher than they should be; and the Telephone Company. This combination of business interests control the banks and through them many large business houses in the city, furnishing a machine that is all powerful in accomplishing highway robberies of millions that the people are compelled to submit to.

The general trend in the city, according to the same authority, has been toward a reaction of public interest in municipal affairs—a sort of “what’s-the-use” feeling. The general prosperity of the people is said in a large measure to be responsible for this, for so long as they are fairly prosperous, they appear to be too busy to take notice of the appropriation of community rights, privileges, and franchises.

A decision of the state Supreme Court concerning a former contract between the Denver Union Water Company and the city has resulted in taking from the city millions of dollars in excessive charges and rates and also in giving the city the right, of very doubtful value, under certain conditions, to appoint members of the city council, who shall meet with representatives of the water company to fix new rates. Through the political control of the four utility corporations these representatives are practically the appointees of the powers that represent the utility corporations, and the rates will no doubt be fixed according to the wishes of the company, and without any particular regard for the wishes of the people, or justice and a fair charge. The very brazenness of this effort, however, may have the effect of arousing the people from their lethargy.

Seattle, Wash., like many another community of its size and character, is not suffering from any very serious municipal ills. The troubles of such cities largely consist of public indifference and petty larceny and grafting which is apt to permeate public offices where public indifference exists. For example, it has just been discovered that the city’s comptroller, who was defeated as a nominee for mayor, proves to be an embezzler of from five to ten thousand dollars.

The recent municipal election in Portland, Ore., last spring gave to the initiative and the referendum a pretty thorough, and on the whole a very satisfactory trial. The result was locally regarded as gratifying in that the voters took a deep interest in the matter and canvassed the subject most thoroughly. Twenty-one separate questions were submitted. Loans for \$3,000,000 and \$1,000,000, for water pipes and parks respectively, were approved, but the proposed moderate increases in the compensa-

tion of the city engineer, attorney, treasurer, and judge, although now very small for so important a city, were defeated, as was the proposition to pay the councilmen at the rate of \$100 a month. The vote on these was almost unanimously "No." A gas franchise for twenty-five years to a new company was approved, although strongly opposed on the ground that it was "a wilful misuse of the initiative to compass selfish ends and if adopted will go far to discredit the initiative in the eyes of all lovers of good government." It was considered an ill-advised movement by municipal students and the Citizens' Committee, but the voters in this respect seemed to proceed upon the theory that "if one old rat had a rat hole into a man's cellar, a good way to combat it was to authorize another rat to dig a rat hole." The liquor licenses both retail and wholesale were substantially increased. Of the twenty-one propositions submitted, the electors voted "Yes" on thirteen and "No" on eight. A Citizen's Committee representing the business bodies, labor organizations, and taxpayers' league (of which body U. S. Senator-elect Mulkey was a representative) carefully studied the questions and issued a pamphlet giving advice as to the merits of the several measures. Their suggestions were followed on thirteen out of the twenty-one questions submitted. At the same election a determined effort to restore the Republican machine was defeated. Mr. Thomas C. Devlin, a very capable man, was nominated by the Republicans and strenuous efforts were made to whip Republican voters back into line (as Portland is normally a Republican town) but Dr. Lane, the present mayor, who ran as a Democrat and Independent, was chosen by a plurality of 700 votes, although all the rest of the Republican ticket was elected, and so Portland maintained her reputation for independence. Mayor Lane has been vigilant in the public interests touching the grant of public franchises, and has led a growing sentiment in favor of restriction and of terms equitable to the city; he has also been active in compelling corporations and others who have been occupying city streets or property dedicated to the city for street purposes to vacate the same or to purchase their title by money or equitable exchange

of lands. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Southern Pacific Railroad, which runs trains through one of the busiest streets under a perpetual franchise granted more than thirty years ago, is arranging to enter the city by another route. While this would eventually have come about in any event, it has certainly been hastened by strong public pressure.

There has been systematic attempt to eliminate blackmail from the police department. Vigorous and successful effort has been put forth in defense of minors. There has been no prize fighting. Open gambling has been stopped. The slot machines have been closed, and over 3,000 removed from the city. The public exhibition of indecent postal cards has been stopped. Severe restrictions have been maintained in the "restricted district." Saloons have been successfully closed after 1 A. M. and on Sundays. The law against the admission of minors to saloons is well enforced, as well as the law against selling cigarettes to minors.

It is an important gain that the Civil Service Board has won general acceptance on the part of the public and of the city officials. The board consists of two Republicans and one Democrat. The recent reappointment of one Republican by the present mayor, a Democrat, contributed to this. The greatest difficulty is found in obtaining men at the salaries now offered by the city. Until the present financial crisis, the city has been paying very much less than other employers for the same class of work.

San Francisco has been so conspicuously, even if most of the time unfortunately, in the public eye for the past four or five years that she needs little more than a passing reference in this part of the review. There has been a steady trend toward improved conditions all along the line. Her heroism in purging herself of graft and grafters has set a splendid example for the rest of the corruption-ridden cities to follow. Her public spirit in electing Mayor Taylor for a full term is still another splendid achievement. The platform of the Good Government League which was organized principally as a non-partisan association to secure Mayor Taylor's election voiced the demands of

the thoughtful and public-spirited people of the city. It declared among other things that:

The demand of the people of San Francisco is that the government of the city be placed in the hands of honest and efficient men who do not stand for party politics, corrupt motives, personal ambitions or selfish interests, but who do stand for all the people. The moral demand of the people of San Francisco is that the work of cleansing the city of its stain of corruption proceed.

The demand of the people of San Francisco is that business confidence shall be restored to their great city by the election of men who stand before the city and the world acknowledged to be free from self-seeking and whose motives are not open to doubt.

Los Angeles continues to add to its already long list of significant achievements. *Municipal Affairs* which is the title of the effective little monthly published by the Municipal League of Los Angeles recently (June, 1907) congratulated the people of that city on the highly favorable prospect.

Considering that the administration is only five months old—less than one-sixth of its term—it is too early to ask for material results. It is enough that the various officers should show by their conduct and utterances that they are the right stuff and should develop their plan of procedure. To expect more in so short a time would be unreasonable, and if much more than that had been undertaken, it would argue unseemly haste.

While the auditor, the attorney, Board of Public Works and other administrative offices have shown to the satisfaction of good citizens that they are of the right mettle and may be depended upon, the progress achieved by the city council—which is after all the mainspring of the entire municipal machinery—is perhaps the most striking and agreeable. Nowhere else does the contrast between the present efficient administration and the last mediocre aggregation show more conspicuously. While the present body contains one man who is almost invariably wrong, and two others who are frequently wrong, it contains, on the other hand, several men of undoubted courage and ability, and progressiveness, whereby the net result of its action has been right at least nine times out of ten. Its mistakes have been few and far between, and those of a sort that were readily corrected. And on practically all the big substantial issues, it has finally brought up on the right side.

The league achieved a signal victory last January that has very considerably strengthened it locally. The then expiring council, which was an impossible body made up of mediocre and questionable men, in its last week surrendered completely to the

saloon element, and passed a bunch of ordinances which were for the encouragement of "blind pigs" and intended to facilitate the scattering of saloons about the city. This was leading up to a programme for increasing the existing limit on saloons from 200 to 300 and the widening of the boundaries of the saloon zone. On account of the existence of the referendum they had either to pass these ordinances under the thirty-day extension, or suspend the rules, which they could do by a two-thirds vote, incorporating in the ordinances a statement to the effect that they were needed for the "immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety," which preposterous statements they actually incorporated in the ordinances to insure their instantly going into effect. The league immediately brought an injunction suit against the city clerk and the mayor to prevent them from signing the ordinances and allowing them to go into effect. The courts held, in a very strong and emphatic decision, that the league's contention was correct, that the emergency clause could not be applied at will by a council without any showing of a real necessity, and that its application was a legitimate subject for judicial inquiry, the people being a recognized element in the city's legislative department, and one which cannot be shelved by the utterance of a false statement on the part of the council.

This completes the roll call of the cities and it must be conceded that the showing is a fine one and justifies the conclusion that on the whole the trend in municipal affairs is toward improvement.

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE
VII
FIRMS AND CORPORATIONS

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In this article railroad relief departments are excluded from consideration as they are treated in the next chapter of this series. The relation between the two movements is very intimate. Before the railroads undertook their relief departments experiments had been made on a small scale by private firms, and when the railroads had developed their plans with manifest advantage the employers of smaller numbers of men in turn enlarged their schemes and multiplied their number. Meantime the size of manufacturing plants has rapidly increased, until now many of them rival railroad corporations in the magnitude of their enterprises and the number of employees. Some of the corporations also resemble the railroads in their prospects of permanence without regard to the persons who own their stocks and temporarily control their policies. This condition of affairs is favorable to the introduction of plans of old-age pensions, and especially of sickness and accident insurance. During the years 1905-7 there has been a marked increase in the amount of attention given to the development of such schemes. This has been due to various causes; and, first of all, to the examples of success in the railroad relief departments. Another cause has contributed powerfully to this tendency and will continue to operate with increasing momentum until compulsory insurance makes it unnecessary. That cause is the tightening of the employers' liability laws and the strictness and even rigor with which they are interpreted by many courts and applied in individual instances. It has been said by certain judges in high places that with a little more stringency the courts will practically make the law of negligence a compulsory insurance law, for the fact of accident seems

to carry with it in such courts a presumption of negligence. The juries very generally act on this presumption, and elective judges, being human, are inclined to lean to the side of the workmen, whose votes are necessary to elect them. This tendency has received further momentum from the exposures of the frightful waste of life due to industrial accidents and diseases revealed by factory inspectors, reports of trade-unions, and by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Public opinion has been thoroughly aroused and will not bear much more; it will soon demand all the protection that law can give to prevent injury or to compel each industry to bear its own costs. The exhibits of dangerous machinery, sweatshop evils, and tenement-house life in various cities have deepened these convictions and directed public attention to remedies. The expositions of the German government at Chicago in 1893 and at St. Louis in 1904 have had their share in educating the public conscience and revealing a practicable plan for mitigating the sufferings incident to modern industry.

It is almost impossible to tabulate the schemes of insurance here to be noticed; we shall describe certain examples and then endeavor to discover the tendency revealed in them all. Until the government report has been given to the world we shall not have anything like a complete catalogue of all these plans, but we have enough typical illustrations to furnish insight into the forces at work.

The Westinghouse Air Brake Company Relief Department, Wilmerding, Pa., was established in 1903. The company has charge of the relief department, is responsible for the funds, pays 4 per cent. interest on deposits, supplies facilities for office work, and pays operating expenses. The medical examiner is appointed by the general manager. The advisory committee is chosen, one-half by the company and one-half by the members, the general manager being chairman. The relief fund is made up from voluntary contributions of members, income from investments, and contributions by the company when necessary to make up deficiencies. The members are divided into five wage classes: first, those receiving less than \$35 per month; second, those receiving \$35 to \$55; third, those receiving \$55 to \$75;

fourth, those receiving \$75 to \$95; fifth, those receiving \$95 and more. No employee is required to become a member of the relief fund, and any member may withdraw after giving due notice. Usually a person loses membership when he for any reason ceases to be an employee. The monthly contributions are 50, 75, 100, 125, 150 cents according to wage class. The occasion for indemnity is disability due to either sickness or accident, and the medical examiner decides the question of disability. Benefits are not paid longer than thirty-nine weeks, although the right to death benefit continues during disability. Settlement may be paid in a lump sum. No benefits are paid where disability is due to intemperance, vice, or quarrel. The benefits each week for thirty-nine weeks are, according to class: \$5, \$7.50, \$10, \$12.50, \$15, and surgical treatment is also given free. Injuries sustained while off the premises of the company come under the rules of sickness benefits. The usual release clause in the contract reads:

The acceptance by the member of benefits for injury shall operate as a release and satisfaction of all claims against the company for damages arising from or growing out of such injury; unless, within ten days from date of injury, notice is given to the superintendent of intention to seek indemnity from the company; and further, in the event of the death of a member, no part of the death benefit or unpaid disability benefit shall be due or payable unless and until good and sufficient releases shall be delivered to the superintendent, of all claims against the relief department as well as against the company, arising from or growing out of the death of a member.

The death benefit is \$150, not much more than a sum necessary for expenses of illness and burial. Evidently this plan is accepted by the employees only because it is better than nothing or because they do not yet know what European laws secure to wage-earners.

The Pittsburgh Coal Company Employees' Association (*Fifteenth Quarterly Report*, October, 1904). This company has a capital of more than \$100,000,000 and an annual tonnage of 25,000,000. The theory of the managers relating to the necessity for industrial insurance is distinctly set forth in their circular, in which the dependence of workingmen upon wages is made the ground of a scheme of protection by co-operation:

In the new order of things the percentage of managers and operatives, whose capital, as well as their brains and hands, is employed in a given business, is largely reduced, and there is a corresponding increase in the percentage of those whose only interest in the business is their daily, weekly or monthly wage allowance.

This company attempts to give its employees a share in the capital by selling them stock on contracts to pay for the shares \$1.00 each month. In the report used 1,000 contracts for 8,400 shares are mentioned. This scheme is called "profit sharing." There is an elaborate plan of insurance and old-age pensions. At each mine a "lodge" is organized, but membership is voluntary. The dues are 40 cents per month. The benefits are: (1) in case of fatal accident while at work, \$150, of which the company pays one-half; (2) in case of death from natural causes, \$100, paid altogether by the employees; (3) in case of death of wife, or parent, if dependent on employee, a funeral benefit of \$75, all paid by employees; (4) in case of death of children of employees, if over two and under twelve years, funeral benefit of \$25, paid by employees; (5) in case of a non-fatal accident of a serious nature, \$10 per week, one-half paid by the company; (6) in case of a non-fatal accident of a less serious nature, \$7.50 per week, one-third paid by the company; (7) in case of a minor accident, \$5 per week paid by employees. The company has a pension fund, to which it made an original contribution of \$10,000. Its growth and maintenance is provided for by monthly dues of employees, two cents of the forty being set aside for the pension fund, the company adding one cent. The fund is invested in preferred stock of the company and must remain intact for ten years. At the end of that period principal and interest in excess of \$100,000 may be used in the payment of pensions to men who have contributed to the fund ten years, and who, through age, accident, or disease are not able to earn their livelihood. All expenses of the association are paid by the company. About 20,000 members are in the lodges and about 60,000 persons are protected. Up to April 30, 1905, the total benefits paid had been \$202,770.62; the number of men paying premiums into the fund, 21,909. The pension fund on April 30, 1905, was \$35,410.44, of which the company had contributed \$14,945.95.

Metropolitan Street Railway Association, New York. Membership is limited to employees of the company and entrance is voluntary for employees between twenty-one and forty-five years of age. The monthly dues, 50 cents, are deducted from the payroll; the assessments of 50 cents in a month, but not more than \$3 in one year, may be levied to replenish the treasury. There is an initiation fee of \$1 and a fee for the medical examination. New members sign a contract authorizing the deduction of premiums from the payroll. The benefit paid in case of disability due to accident or sickness is \$1 per day, after seven days, but not longer than ninety days and not over \$90 in all. If the disability is due to vice, nothing is paid. The death benefit is \$300. The company has a pension department whose scheme went into effect July 1, 1902. This department is administered entirely by representatives of the company. Pensions are paid to all employees who have reached the age of seventy years, and to employees on attaining sixty-five years who, after twenty-five years of service with this company, have been disabled. Only employees receiving less than \$1,200 yearly wages are admitted. Pensioners must belong to the association. The pension rates are as follows: after thirty-five years of continuous service, 40 per cent. of the average wages of the ten years preceding retirement; service thirty to thirty-five years, 30 per cent. of average wages; twenty-five to thirty years of service, twenty-five per cent.; the same rates are paid to those retiring disabled at sixty-five to sixty-nine years of age. If payments at these rates require more than \$50,000 annually they will be scaled down pro rata. Pensions are payable monthly. No assignment of pensions is permitted, and the pension is regarded as a gratuity, there being no legal claim for it.

The employees of the Crane Company, Chicago, were organized into a voluntary relief association in 1893. The regulations of that association show a classification of dues and benefits based on wages. Members whose wages are \$4 per week pay 10 cents a month and receive in case of disability \$2 per week, and in case of death a burial benefit of \$25 is paid; wages \$6 per week, dues 25 cents a month, benefits \$4 per week and burial benefit \$50;

wages \$9 per week, dues 30 cents, benefits \$8 per week, death benefit \$75; wages \$12, dues 40 cents, benefits \$8, death benefit \$100; wages \$15, dues 50 cents, benefits \$10, death benefit \$125; wages \$18, dues 60 cents, benefits \$12, death benefit \$150. Assessments are levied at each death. Where the disability is due to vice, benefits are refused. This company established, April 1, 1904, a plan for pension and relief, which is a combination of accident, invalidism, and old-age insurance, without legal claim, without payments from the employees, a pure gratuity of the company, though demanding faithful service as a condition of enjoying benefits.

The Macy Mutual Aid Association of employees of R. H. Macy & Co., New York, was organized in 1885. The directors are appointed by the company. Membership in the association is a condition of employment, and membership ceases with employment. The monthly dues are taken out of the payroll. After five days of illness the employee is entitled to receive benefits not more than eight weeks in one year. Members cannot claim benefits until the expiration of twelve months from the last payment of the eighth benefit paid.

Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co., wholesale hardware merchants, Chicago. The employees of this firm have enjoyed the advantages of a benevolent association since March 5, 1888, and quite a number of trusted men have been permitted to buy stock of the corporation. The dues of the association are ten cents a month, although some members pay \$3 a year. The association had one hundred members at the beginning and has grown to have six hundred members. Membership is voluntary. The firm does not agree to help the association, but in fact it has made contributions when needed. During the first seventeen years of its existence the association collected about \$12,000 and paid out about \$11,400, chiefly in sick benefits, one-half of this for the families of members. There are no expenses of administration, the officers caring for the fund without salaries. On January 1, 1905, this firm established an old-age pension fund for the employees. The plan was first proposed to the employees before adoption and was approved by 95 per cent. of them. The control

of the fund is in the hands of the firm. Membership is required of all employees over eighteen years of age, with the exception of stockholders and traveling salesmen. The contributions are 2 per cent. of the salary of each employee, deducted quarterly from the salary. The corporation pays into the fund an amount equal to that contributed by the employees. The ordinary pension is equal to one-half the average salary of the pensioner during the five years preceding his retirement or disability. If an employee is discharged or leaves the firm, the amount of his contributions, together with interest at 3 per cent., is returned to him. If an employee remains and becomes a pensioner and does not remain long enough on the pension roll to draw a sum equal to the aggregate of his contributions together with 3 per cent. interest, the excess is paid to his heirs. The report for the first year, rendered January 25, 1906, showed receipts from employees, \$10,306.79, and the same amount from the firm; with interest, \$190.07. The disbursements were: withdrawn by retiring employees, \$841.90; pensions, \$302; balance, January 1, 1906, \$19,659.75.

The Western Electric Company employs many thousands of workmen. In March, 1906, it created a pension system. The sum of \$400,000 is set aside as a fund. Any unused part of this fund draws interest from the company at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum. The president is authorized to add \$150,000 annually to the fund. If the allowances exceed the income a new rate will be established which will proportionately reduce all allowances. The fund is managed by representatives of the company. All employees of the company who have reached the age of sixty years and have been twenty years continuously in the service of the company may be retired on pension. Any employee who has been ten years in the service and has become totally incapacitated by injury or sickness may receive a pension. The annual pension allowance for each employee retired for age shall be: for each year of active service 1 per cent. of the average annual pay during the ten years next preceding retirement. Pensions are paid monthly till death, and may be granted to widows and orphans one year longer. The amount of pension for age will depend on

two conditions: the number of years the person has been in active service, and the amount of his average wages per year for the ten years next preceding retirement. For example: If the average pay per year for the last ten years of an employee's active service should equal \$900, and if the service has been continuous for twenty-four years, then the pension would be twenty-four per cent. of \$900, or \$216 per year, or \$18 per month. The amount and duration of pension for disability is determined by the pension board for each case.

The Gorham Manufacturing Company, of Providence, Rhode Island, on May 1, 1903, adopted a pension plan, "believing that it is the duty of every corporation which has been in existence for 50 years to provide for those whose terms of service have covered the greater portion of their active life." According to a circular of the company employees whose records are satisfactory to the company will, if disqualified for work on account of age or permanent ill health, be eligible to pensions under the following age limits and terms of service: at seventy years, after twenty-five years of continuous service; at sixty-five years of age, after thirty-five years of service; at sixty years of age, after forty years of continuous service. When the company is satisfied that an employee is entitled to a pension he is to receive a monthly sum equal to 1 per cent. for each year's active service, computed at the wage paid at the time of enrolment, although no pension can exceed \$1,000 per year. The fund is maintained by setting aside a sum equal to 1 per cent. of the amount paid for labor during the preceding year, and out of this fund pensions are to be paid. When the amount paid out for pensions during three consecutive years shall exceed by 5 per cent. the appropriations under the foregoing provision, all outstanding pensions shall be scaled down to come within the average of the three years' appropriation and a new schedule adopted for future pensions. If such reduction of pensions becomes necessary, the original rates on outstanding pensions and the original schedule will be resumed whenever the appropriation for three consecutive years shall exceed by 5 per cent. the amount paid for pensions.

The firm of G. B. Carpenter & Co., merchants of Chicago,

Name of Firm and Place	No. Employees		Contributions	Indemnities (Accident and Sickness)	Death Benefits	Remarks
Bressler Bros., Bayonne	Male 65	Female 20		\$5, 15 weeks		Dues and control by employees Firm pays wages during disability Firm pays administration expenses
Camden & Philadelphia Soap Co., Camden	20	—			\$50 and \$100	
Celluloid Co., Newark	945	360	(300 members) 2 c. per dollar ins. 2-4 c. per dollar of death benefit (233 male members) 10 c. weekly	\$3-\$10 weekly, 13 wks.		
Julius Brandes Mfg. Co., Patterson	310	172	(325 members) 3 wage classes: \$10, \$6.50, under \$6.50 weekly, dues 7½, 5, 2½ c. weekly 10 c. weekly	\$6 weekly, 13 wks.	\$75, \$50, \$25	Firm pays \$2 yearly for each member
Clifton Silk Mills	297	345		\$7, \$4.75, \$2.35 weekly		
Crescent Ship-Yard, Elizabethport	780	—		Free hospital care		Firm supports two beds in hospital
Crooker-Wheeler Co., Ampere	617	62	\$1 yearly	Free hospital care		Firm supports a bed in hospital
Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co., Bridgton	1,762	42				
Edward Lumber and Coal Co., Long Branch	120	—	Assessments	\$4 weekly, 6 weeks		Firm pays administration expenses
Far and Bailey Mfg. Co., Camden	270	—	50 c. entrance fee 50 c. monthly (26 members) 25c. weekly	\$5 weekly, 12 wks.; and firm pays 12 wks. \$4 weekly, 12 wks. after 14 days	\$150 \$50	Firm gives \$100 in need
W. D. Forbes, Hoboken	60	—			\$1,000-\$2,000 policy in life ins. co. Cost of funeral	Firm pays premiums after 5 years' service Firm contributes
Gibson Iron Works, Jersey City	50	—		\$5 weekly		
L. Goldsmith and Co., Newark	50 (all members)	5	10 c. weekly			
Gould and Eberhardt, Newark	350	—	(Mutual benefit association) of employees 25 c. monthly	\$5 weekly, 4 mos. \$500, loss hand or foot \$200, loss 1 eye \$1,000 total blindness or total disability	\$100 funeral	Firm pays same as employees
Ingersoll-Sergant Drill Co., Phillipsburg	775	—				

TABLE I.—Continued

Name of Firm and Place ¹	No. Employees	Contributions	Indemnities (Accident and Sickness)	Death Benefits	Remarks
Johnston and Murphy Shoe Co., Newark	Male 300 Female 115 (60 members)	10 c. weekly	\$5 weekly	\$25	
Keuffel and Esser, Hoboken	425 48	40 c. monthly (\$2 entrance fee)	\$3, 40-\$6.00 weekly up to \$107	\$75 from fund	
Keystone Leather Co., Camden	501 — (82 members)	50 c. monthly	\$5 for 6 wks.; \$3 after	\$25 \$50 (\$50 when wife dies)	Firm contributes from firm
S. Klaber and Co., Carlstadt	70 —				Firm carries accident policies for employees
L. O. Koven & Co., Jersey City	95 —				Firm contributes to hospitals
J. Lucas & Co., Gibbstown	237 39	10 c. weekly (entrance fee \$1-\$6, according to age)	\$5 weekly, 10 wks.; \$3 after	\$75 (\$50 when wife dies)	
Ludlam Steel & Spring Co., Trenton	120 —		Free medical care in hospital		Firm subscribes to hospital
Maddock Pottery Co., Trenton	160 70 (125 members)	50 c. monthly	\$5 weekly, 13 wks.	\$50	
J. Maddock & Son	125 20 (only male members)	10 c. weekly, assessments for burial 50 c.	\$2 first week; and \$5 for 13 weeks		
Marine Engine & Machine Co., Harrison	243 —	5 c. weekly	\$5 weekly for 13 wks.; then \$2.50 for 13 wks.		
S. L. More & Sons, Elizabeth	295 —	10 c. monthly	Hospital care		
National Saw Co., Newark	100 —	50 c. monthly	\$10 weekly, 10 wks.	\$50	Firm gives about \$50 a year
N. Y. Switch & Track Co., Hoboken	92 —				Firm contributes to a hospital
Perth Amboy Dry Dock Co.	190 —	10 c. weekly (50 c. entrance fee)	\$5 weekly, for accidents at work, medical care \$25		
H. S. Peters, Dover	10 50				Employers assist disabled employees

TABLE I.—Continued

Name of Firm and Place	No. Employees	Contributions	Indemnities (Accident and Sickness)	Death Benefits	Remarks
Potter Printing Press Co., Plainfield	Male 300 — Female —	10 c. weekly	\$5 weekly, 25 weeks	\$50	Firm contributes to fund
J. L. Prescott & Co., Passaic	95 90	10 c. weekly	Aid as needed		Firm pays same as employees, and $\frac{1}{4}$ of expenses
Randwitz & Pollitz, Hoboken	148 200	10 c. weekly	\$5 weekly, 26 wks. (sometimes longer)		Firm contributes to fund
Roesler & Haalscher, Perth Amboy	120 —	25 c. monthly. At a death \$1 assessment	\$6 weekly, 26 wks.; and \$4 for 26 weeks.	\$120	Firm helps
Sherwin-Williams Co., Newark (14 plants in U. S.)	262 —		Free medical care and one-half wages during disability		See chap. ii, this series
Staten Island Clay Co., Woodbridge	850 —		\$5 weekly, after 2 wks., for 6 months; then \$2.50		Firm aids the sick
Tide-Water Oil Co., Bayonne	67 —	50 c. monthly (entrance fee \$1)	\$5 weekly, 13 weeks	\$75 (\$50 at death of wife)	Costs paid by firm
Nestor Iron Works, Dover	500 100 (185 members)	35 c. monthly	Full wages, during dis- ability, to employees of 5 years; one-half wages for others. Mar- ried men must carry \$1,000 life insurance; firm pays premium one year		
Victor Talking Machine, Camden	15 —				
Volger Mfg. Co., Pas- saic	270 70	10 c. weekly, assess- ments at death of member	\$2.50 first week, then \$5 for five weeks	\$50	Many social features; no insurance scheme
Weston Electrical In- strument Co., Waver- ly Park	70 — (41 members)				
Woodhouse Chain Works, Trenton					

employing about 200 persons, pays about \$4,000 a year in sickness and accident benefits and old-age pensions. It has no regular system or association, and prefers to keep entire control.

The Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. Staff Savings Fund, New York City, was organized in 1904. The company has complete control of the administration of this fund, which is maintained from contributions of employer and employees and from interest on deposited sums. The company contributes 50 per cent. of the amounts paid by the employees. In case an employee on account of age or infirmity retires from the employment he may receive his share with 3 per cent. interest. In case of death the heirs receive his share with 3 per cent. interest. If an employee leaves the service for other reasons he can receive only what he has himself paid in with 3 per cent. interest, without having any claim on the amounts contributed by the company.

The schemes of Mr. Alfred Dolge have often been described and must continue to attract attention as experiments, the very errors being instructive for future experiment. The firm of Alfred Dolge & Son, at Dolgeville, N. Y., a town of 2,000 inhabitants, employed about six hundred persons in the manufacture of pianos, organs, and various materials used in such manufactures. The firm carried about \$200,000 life insurance for its employees at a very moderate rate, for employees who had remained with them five years. The firm paid the premiums. If the employee left the firm he might retain his policy by paying the premiums. An employee might acquire an insurance at the age of twenty-six years for \$1,000 and for each term of five years of service \$1,000 until he had \$10,000 insurance. Those who entered the service of the firm between twenty-two and twenty-six years of age could acquire only \$2,000. Those who began between twenty-seven and forty could have only \$1,000. For those above these ages and for all who could not be insured the firm set aside \$35 per year until \$1,000 stood to their credit; or if they died before this sum was credited, the heirs received the amount placed to their credit on the books. The firm also agreed to pay pensions for the aged and disabled, varying in amount from one-half to all the wages during the preceding year

before the disability began. The amount of the pension was partly determined by the period of service, from ten to twenty-five years, but it might not in any case exceed \$1,000. Very few remained long enough in the service to gain right to a pension.¹

Since the scheme was advertised far and wide Mr. Dolge severed his connection with the firm and started in business in California. From thence he wrote to the present writer December 12, 1906, to the effect that his scheme of insurance which he had conducted for twenty-five years had been abandoned by his successors. He also called attention to the fact that already in 1895 he had shown the inherent weakness of all such individual enterprises unsupported by law, and had recommended a national system of industrial insurance so that workmen in moving from one state to another according to the changing demands for labor might not be deprived of the advantages of insurance. He declares that his own experience had deepened this conviction and he was glad to learn that the state of Illinois was considering a law for the promotion of this object.

The benefit association of the Buffalo Smelting Works was established in 1893. The dues of the married members are \$1 and of the unmarried 50 cents monthly. These dues are subtracted from the wage payments and used only for relief in case of disability. The contributions of the firm are expended solely on death benefits. The sickness benefits are \$25 monthly, after five days, and accident indemnity is the same. There are 250 employees and membership in the association is voluntary. The same firm has a similar organization in their mines. The funds are invested in the stocks of the company and the interest is used to pay premiums.²

The New York Edison Company pays the wages of injured workmen during disability, about \$10,000 annually.³

Steinway & Sons, New York, have had in their establishment

¹ Article of E. W. Bemis in *Handwoerterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 1898, Bd. I, p. 714; article of Paul Monroe, *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1897; A. Dolge, *Economic Theories as Practically Applied in the Factories*, 1896.

² Report, New York Department of Labor, 1903, p. 231.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

a benefit association since 1864, and in 1883 a new association was formed, which has a membership of eight hundred and fifty. The firm contributes annually to the fund \$1,000, pays \$1,200 for three beds in a hospital, and pays for medical treatment. Every employee who is over eighteen years of age must become a member of the association within three months after being employed; later he cannot become a member. The entrance fee is \$1.00 and the monthly dues 15 cents.⁴

The Oneida Community has an association and all employees must be members. The weekly dues are 5 cents, in some cases 10 cents; the community contributes to the fund 50 per cent. of the dues. The sickness benefits are 50 cents or \$1 daily, during thirteen weeks, and afterward half this amount for thirteen weeks.⁵

Rochester Railway Co. has seven hundred employees, of whom four hundred and fifty are members of the benefit society. Employees between twenty-one and fifty years of age can become members of the association after a medical examination. The entrance fee is \$1.00; monthly dues, 50 cents; disability benefit, \$1.00 per day, for 100 days in one year; death benefit, \$150.⁶

Bausch & Lomb Optical Company, Rochester, N. Y. The firm gave \$3,000 as a foundation for the fund. All employees between twenty and forty-five years of age, after they have been employed by the firm for two months, may become members of the society. The monthly dues vary according to the rate of wages from 5 to 50 cents, according as the wages are from \$3 to \$12 weekly; the death benefit is \$15 to \$100; the sickness benefit from \$1.00 to \$8.00 weekly. The pension fund has reached \$20,000, and out of the interest on this fund the firm pays to superannuated employees pensions graded in amount according to former wages and period of service.⁷

The International Harvester Company, Chicago, has in preparation an insurance plan for their 20,000 to 25,000 employees in all the affiliated branches of their establishments. At

⁴ *Report*, New York Department of Labor, p. 291.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

the time of this writing the plan has not yet been developed to the point where it is ready for publication.

The Swift Packing Co., Chicago, has branches in Kansas City, South Omaha, East St. Louis, South St. Joseph, South St. Paul, and Fort Worth, with about 400 warehouses and offices in the United States. For their 25,000 employees (sometimes more and sometimes less) this firm has worked out a plan of benefits which has many liberal features.

TABLE II. SWIFT AND COMPANY EMPLOYEES BENEFIT ASSOCIATION

SCHEDULE OF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR MEMBERS UNDER 45 YEARS OF AGE

Members 45 years of age and over may enter on this schedule if they have been in the employ of Swift & Co., continuously from December 31, 1906, to date of entry, and avail themselves of this privilege on or before December 31, 1907.

Weekly Pay of Employees Governing Highest Class They May Enter	Number of Class	Weekly Contributions	Weekly Accident and Sick Benefit	Benefit in Case of Death	Total Loss of Sight of One Eye or Loss of One Hand at Wrist or One Foot at Ankle	Total Loss of Sight of Both Eyes, or Loss of Both Hands at Wrist, or Both Feet at Ankle, or of One Hand and One Foot
\$13.50 and under...	1	\$0.15	\$ 3.00	\$200.00	\$400.00	\$800.00
	2	.20	3.00	400.00	400.00	800.00
	3	.30	4.50	600.00	600.00	1,200.00
	4	.30	6.00	400.00	400.00	800.00
	5	.40	6.00	800.00	800.00	1,600.00
Over \$13.50 and not over \$18.00.....	6	.50	9.00	800.00	800.00	1,600.00
Over \$18.00 and not over \$30.00.....	7	.75	13.50	1,200.00	1,200.00	2,400.00
Over \$30.00.....	8	1.00	18.00	1,600.00	1,600.00	3,200.00

Additional death benefits (as allowed by rules), 5 c. per week for each \$200.00.

Members who have left the service and contribute for death benefit only, 5 c. per week for each \$200.00.

Weekly accident benefit for 104 weeks and reasonable bill for surgical attention.

Weekly sick benefit after the first 6 working-days for 52 weeks and half-weekly benefit for additional 52 weeks.

SCHEDULE OF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR MEMBERS 45 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER AS FOLLOWS:

Members joining between the ages of 45 and 50 years, one and one-half times above contributions.

Members joining between the ages of 50 and 55 years, one and four-fifths times above contributions.

Members joining between the ages of 55 and 60 years, two and three-tenths times above contributions.

The rules of the Swift & Company Employees' Benefit Association went into effect July 1, 1907. The object is to provide payments of definite amounts to such employees as contribute to the fund in case of disability or to their relatives in the event of death. The company agrees to pay operating expenses and to make good deficiency in funds to meet obligations. The advisory committee which has general supervision is composed of seven members chosen by the company and seven others elected by the members. The company pays the wages and expenses of travel of members of the committee. Medical examiners prepare applications, report on the condition of sick or injured members, decide when members are disabled and when they are ready to work, and certify bills for surgical treatment. Disability is defined as physical inability to work by reason of sickness or accidental injury. The contributions and benefits are shown in the table. Membership is voluntary and no provision is made for securing a release from legal liability.

The plan of the United Traction and Electric Company, worked out with the aid of the well-known actuary, Mr. M. M. Dawson, has the highest value for those who wish to draw up articles of a similar kind. The report of the association for 1905 showed receipts of the fund of \$30,226.97; of which the employees contributed \$14,942.40 and the company \$12,831.12. The expenditures for death benefits were \$9,875.00; for sick benefits \$19,744.59. Since the organization the members have paid in \$60,984.30 and the company \$42,846.10. The costs of administration are met by the company and are not counted in reports of expenditures.

The object of the association is to afford aid and relief to sick and disabled members, and to the widows and children of deceased members. Membership is limited to employees of the company. The directors are persons appointed by the company and others elected by the members by ballot. The contributions are in proportion to wages: 10, 15, or 20 cents each week; the members being divided into three wage classes, according to their earnings. These cover those earning less than \$9 per week, \$9 to \$12 per week, or over \$12 per week. The death benefits are \$500,

\$750, or \$1,000, according to class. In case of disability the weekly benefits are \$4, \$6, or \$8. Disability is defined "as total incapacity to carry on any gainful occupation." There is a provision looking to payment of partial benefits for partial disability. The company agrees to pay (1) one-fifth of each death benefit; (2) one-fourth of the amount of contributions by the members, payable weekly; (3) sums to cover expenses of management, adjustment, and litigation of claims; (4) sums to cover deficiencies, to be repaid if there is a surplus. The release clause is significant: "No benefit either for death or disability shall be payable except upon a receipt which shall contain a release in proper form . . . from all liability to the beneficiaries."

The Standard Oil Company. "It has aimed to secure the contentment of its employees by liberal and considerate treatment allied with a pension system, assuring a competency for waning years. About 65,000 employees are or may become eligible for this pension, and no less than 500,000 men, women, and children are directly or indirectly interested in the preservation of the company."⁸

Mr. Francis H. MacLean has recently published the results of a study of insurance schemes in New York City.⁹

Self-insurance against accidents by larger companies is not an unknown thing in New York City. . . . It cannot be said that they have been introduced into many companies. Quite a number of companies do provide hospital care. A smaller group have combined sick and accident benefit systems which are sometimes wholly, sometimes partly, supported by the companies themselves. . . .

The American Manufacturing Company, with factories in St. Louis, Mo., and in New York City, has a system which has been in use for many years and was introduced by the vice-president of the company. It provides for half-time wages in case of either sickness or accident. It includes, of course, immediate medical attention. In case of permanent disability the loss of wage-earning power is estimated and a special trust fund set aside from which the sufferer draws the income for life. The Greenpoint factory of this company is the largest factory from the point of view of number of employees, in New York City. The number runs from 2,000 to 2,200, of

⁸ Statement of Mr. John D. Archbold, vice-president of the Standard Oil Company, in *Saturday Evening Post*, December 7, 1907, p. 32.

⁹ *Charities and the Commons*, December 7, 1907, pp. 1207 ff.

whom about two-thirds are girls and women. There is a large number of minor accidents in this factory, and occasionally a serious one. The cost of the insurance system runs about $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of the weekly payroll. Insurance in a liability company would run about $\frac{1}{3}$ of 1 per cent. Of course it must be remembered that the former covers sickness, which would not be covered by the liability insurance. The vice-president was asked what, viewed solely from the business point of view, was the advantage in the costlier system. He answered without hesitation that the additional cost more than came back to the company through increased regularity in attendance.

This company does not find that the payment of insurance is an unbearable burden which cripples it in competition with companies in the same line which do not have such insurance schemes. Apparently the payment of insurance, in the judgment of the managers, is a good investment.

In the same magazine (p. 1213) is a description of the accident insurance scheme of the New York Edison Company. Mr. E. M. Atkin, chief of the claim department, says that the former policy of insuring with employers' liability companies was abandoned as unsatisfactory, and, since May 1, 1905, the Edison Company has handled the problem at firsthand. Free medical care is given in case of injury and the workman is requested to sign a release of all legal claims. If the accident is due to negligence of the company or any agent, full wages are paid during disability. If the accident is due to the negligence of the workman he may receive one-quarter or one-half wages during disability. In case of fatal accident, the funeral expenses are paid, and a donation made to the family. The company has had about 3,000 accidents since the system was adopted and only five men have sued the company. The costs of litigation being saved, the money is available for benefits to the injured men or their families. The system of records of the causes of accidents enables the company to apply preventive and protective measures by which the number of accidents is reduced.

The illustrations given in this chapter show that the business world in the United States is not in sight of a consistent social policy in relation to industrial insurance, that employers are filled with vague dissatisfaction and are making what they call "practi-

cal" experiments, the most costly and unsatisfactory of all. Gradually the influence of actuaries is making itself felt with advantage, but they have only traditional standards to guide them. Perhaps the formulation of a broad and well-adjusted social policy will grow out of the labors of the society established for the study of labor legislation; and the attempts of Massachusetts, New York, Illinois, and other states to introduce some form of compensation will help to clarify the views of men and formulate their ideas of what is fair and practicable. The suggestions of a state commission are more apt to be free from the bias of narrow interests than schemes invented simply to escape legal burdens and responsibilities without giving an equivalent. One thing seems quite certain; the agitation, discussion, and experimentation of the past few years are bearing fruit and we are moving more rapidly than in any previous time toward a sound basis of agreement.

MUNICIPAL PROGRESS IN BRAZIL—THE CITIES OF THE STATE OF SAN PAULO

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To the people of the United States Brazil is hardly more than a name. We have but a faint and inadequate notion of the great country whose inexhaustible but almost untouched resources arouse the wonder and admiration of every traveler. It is not surprising, therefore, that nothing should be known of the movement for municipal improvement which is sweeping over the country and which soon bids fair to place some of the larger cities of Brazil in the vanguard of civic advance. This movement is not confined to the improvement of harbor and dock facilities, the introduction of electric railways and electric lighting. In fact, it finds its clearest expression in the great work of sanitary improvement.

In the course of the last five years yellow fever has been practically stamped out, smallpox placed in the category of exceptional diseases, and typhoid fever brought under control. The cities of Brazil have been sparing no effort to improve their drainage system, water supply, and system of sanitary inspection. The state of San Paulo deserves special attention because of the remarkable progress which its cities and towns have made in recent years. In the capital city, San Paulo, we find the clearest expression of the new spirit which prevails throughout the state. During the last ten years the city has undergone almost complete reconstruction. Narrow winding streets have given way to broad avenues; a water supply has been introduced, which for purity rivals any in the world; an excellent sewerage system has been completed, public sanitation has been promoted through careful house inspection; a superb isolation hospital and a series of bacteriological institutes have been established, all of which have

contributed to make San Paulo one of the healthiest cities on the American continent.

In order to understand the conditions under which these improvements have been effected, it is necessary to bear in mind the peculiar relations existing between city and state. The constitution of San Paulo assures local autonomy to municipalities in "all matters of special local concern." The state government has given an interpretation to this clause which enables it to take over some of the most important services. In the capital city the water and drainage systems were constructed by the state government and paid out of state funds. The same is true of the educational system from the primary to the high schools. This wide extension of state powers is due to the limited resources of the municipalities. The state government, on the other hand, has an assured revenue of at least ten million dollars annually from the export tax on coffee. This places it in a position to expend large sums for local services and to borrow money at reasonable rates for the execution of the larger local works.

The basis for San Paulo's rapid advance was laid with the completion of the new water supply and system of drainage. A further impulse was given to the city as a residential center by the determined effort of the state government to make the capital city a great educational center. This purpose was made relatively easy of fulfilment by reason of the traditional reputation of the San Paulo schools. As the seat of the most important law school of Brazil and of a number of collegiate institutions such as Mackenzie College, it was only necessary to organize a normal school and some technical schools in order to assure to San Paulo a commanding educational position in Brazil. In the construction and equipment of the normal school no expense was spared. Few of our states can boast of an institution whose influence is so far reaching as the normal school of San Paulo. It has placed primary and secondary instruction on an entirely new plane of efficiency. In order to complete the educational programme the state authorities constructed a polytechnic institute in which thoroughly organized engineering, architectural, and agricultural courses are offered.

During the period of this extraordinary state activity for municipal improvement, the local authorities were also exerting themselves to improve those city services intrusted to their care. The widening of the narrow streets of the commercial center of the city and the construction of new and broad avenues in the peripheral districts were the most important matters demanding attention. After these necessary improvements had been made, the plan for beautifying the city was carried one step farther by the construction of a municipal theater which, when completed, will be one of the finest on the American continent.

In the execution of these great public improvements San Paulo has had the benefit of the loyal and unselfish services of her most prominent citizens. The early traditions of the state, formed during the imperial period, assure to the public service the best talent of the community. It is not surprising, therefore, that we find the executive direction of the city government in the hands of a man whose commanding position in the community inspires the confidence and assures the co-operation of the best elements in advancing the work of civic improvement. During the empire, Dr. Antonio Prado, the present mayor of San Paulo, occupied a political position of great influence. For a number of years he was the recognized leader of the conservative party and also held the position of minister of agriculture in the Imperial Cabinet. During the first years of the Republic, Dr. Prado held himself aloof from public life, but the desire to serve his native city proved stronger than the feeling of political estrangement, and some six years ago he was induced to accept the mayoralty. Under the peculiar system of municipal organization in force in San Paulo the mayor is elected by the municipal council from among its members for a period of one year. Dr. Prado has been re-elected six times. His period of service will always remain one of the finest instances of civic devotion, of which one finds so many in the recent history of Brazil.

No description of San Paulo can be complete without some reference to the excellent transportation system introduced and operated by an American company. The relations existing between the San Paulo Tramway, Light and Power Company

and the local authorities afford one of the few instances of close and hearty co-operation between a city and public-service corporation. The company enjoys a liberal franchise and in return has shown a most liberal spirit in co-operating with the local authorities for the improvement and extension of the city. The congestion of the central districts has been relieved, fares are being adjusted so as to develop new sections, and there is a local pride in the achievements of the company which stands in marked contrast with the distrust and even bitterness of feeling which exist in some of our American communities.

The magnitude of the improvements in the capital city has overshadowed to some extent the advance of the smaller towns. Wherever one travels in the state of San Paulo this advance is evident. One of the most remarkable instances is to be found in the small town of Piracicaba. With a population of little over twenty thousand, the municipal authorities have constructed a system of drainage and have provided a water supply which have made the city one of the most healthful in the state. Not content with this achievement, the local authorities have supplemented the primary and secondary schools of the state with a number of excellent municipal schools. Within the next few months the state government will open one of the finest agricultural schools in South America. Thus Piracicaba has become an educational center, which, combined with its excellent industrial facilities, will make it one of the important cities of the state.

The impulse to this educational awakening as well as the movement for agricultural betterment is traceable to the influence of the recent secretary of agriculture, Dr. Carlos Botelho. To his unbounded faith in the possibility of increasing national efficiency through more advanced technical education, the State of San Paulo owes much of its recent progress.

The most remarkable transformation from a sanitary point of view is taking place in the city of Santos. For many years this seaport town was known as the "foreigners' cemetery." The yellow-fever scourge was so terrible that to spend one night in the town during the summer months involved the most serious risks. Even the inhabitants of other towns in the state avoided

Santos as much as possible. A few years ago a franchise was granted to a Brazilian company to build an extensive dock system. For the execution of this work it was necessary to fill in the entire swamp region of the water front. The result has been the destruction of the mosquito-breeding centers and the consequent disappearance of yellow fever. The state government is now supplementing this work by constructing a modern system of drainage and an English company is providing an improved water supply which will make Santos a healthful residential city. Other towns, such as Campines, Riberao, Preto, and San Carlos, are following in the wake of this movement for civic betterment, and are giving to the other cities of the Republic an example which cannot help but react favorably on the civic life of the Republic.

It is a matter of more than passing interest to us in the United States that in this great Republic of Brazil the foundations for stability and order have been laid and that upon this basis the municipalities are moving forward toward the realization of those ideals of civic and social welfare upon which the development of democratic institutions must rest.

SAN PAULO, BRAZIL

October, 1906

A SOUTHERN VIEW OF SLAVERY

H. E. BELIN
Charleston, S. C.

It is nearing a half-century since the arbitrament of war removed from the body politic for all time that most fruitful source of sectional friction, the institution of slavery. Surely, therefore, it should now be possible for North and South to discuss the subject dispassionately.

I hold no brief for the defense of slavery, but belonging to the fast-thinning ranks of a generation which links together the South of past and present, being closely in touch with the old régime, and having a personal knowledge of conditions then existing, I desire, in the interests of historic truth, to present as concisely as possible an *inside* view of the institution of slavery: First, as regards its effects upon the white race; and secondly, in its relation to the negro, in which last aspect the subject naturally divides itself into two parts, viz., the moral warrant for slavery, and the practical workings of the system as it actually existed in the southern states.

As being in many respects closely allied both to the patriarchal, and the feudal system, the institution of slavery in the United States might be regarded as a "survival," and, like all anachronisms, it naturally jarred upon the sense of fitness in those unacquainted with its special adaptation to the peculiar circumstances of the case.

Before entering upon the subject, however, an explanatory word may not be out of place, to guard against possible misapprehension. First: Desiring only to present statements verified by actual observation, I shall describe the system in my native state; having no reason to suppose that slavery in South Carolina differed in essential particulars from slavery in the other southern states. Secondly: Throughout this paper I propose to speak of general, representative types, not of exceptional,

individual instances. Thus, when speaking of the white race at the South, I refer to the dominant class, not to that insignificant fraction of the population known as "the poor whites," who were utterly without influence, and whose existence was practically ignored. Upon this class there is little doubt that slavery did produce an injurious effect. For to their distorted mental vision labor presented itself as the badge of servitude, and the refusal to labor as the easiest and most conclusive proof of their own superiority to the negro. With them, however, we have no further concern.

It is a total misconception to suppose that the slave-owner exercised an unbounded control over his slaves. Legal enactments in the several states prescribed the limits of his authority. Within these limits it is true the system was liable to abuse; and in the South as elsewhere, to base and ignoble natures the possession of power invited to tyranny. But there were two very effective checks upon this occasional abuse of legal authority: the pressure of public opinion, which was invariably brought to bear upon the offender, and the still more cogent consideration of self-interest. For it was not, as with the employers of contract or coolie labor, merely a question of getting as much work as possible out of an employee within a given time and then being rid of him. If, from overtaxing his strength or from maltreatment of any kind, a slave were physically disabled, he became a burden on his owner for life, and an unmarketable commodity. Therefore, even where humanity was lacking, greed insured the negro against flagrant ill-usage.

As a class, it is a gross injustice to southern slave-holders to assert that they considered themselves the irresponsible owners of human "chattels." No people the world over comprehended more thoroughly and felt more acutely the weight of responsibility entailed upon them by their position. (I may say parenthetically that this weight having been removed, no power on earth could compel them again voluntarily to assume it.)

Now, to consider the effects of the system upon this class. Like all territorial rulers, how limited soever their sphere of control may be, the southern landowner, though not a despot, was

something of an autocrat. By virtue of the position he occupied, his utterances were necessarily to a certain extent *ex cathedra*. And in his intercourse with his fellows he felt himself untrammelled by those considerations of politic expediency which must inevitably hamper men dependent upon the good offices of others for their chance of success in life. In other words, the southern landowner was his own master. And this consciousness of entire independence occasionally begot in him an overbearing arrogance and impatience of opposition.

It is also true that, as a people, these dwellers of the Southland were imbued with a very exalted estimate of their own importance. To themselves, they seemed to be at the center of things, and the world revolved around them. But this assumption of superiority on their part was not so offensive a display of egotism as at first sight it might seem; for it was based, not upon an overweening sense of their own personal merit, but, upon their proud distinction as citizens of the South. For never was patriotism more ardent than theirs. And the knowledge that at the bar of outside public opinion their beloved country was unjustly judged and ignorantly condemned for crimes of which she was wholly innocent, naturally produced the double effect of banding them closely together among themselves in a "the-world-against-me I-against-the-world" sort of brotherhood, and of lowering their opinion of the clear-sightedness and fair-mindedness of all beyond their own borders.

In these respects the institution of slavery undoubtedly exercised a very perceptible formative influence on southern character. But as regards other traits, its effects are not so apparent. Their hot temper and proneness to resentment of fancied slights, for example, cannot with justice be laid to the account of environment. And the charges of indolence and thriftlessness so often brought forward, were at least as much the results of an enervating semi-tropical climate as of the system.

But while it is true that, as a rule, southern people were disinclined to laborious physical exertion, it by no means follows that their lives were spent in idleness. In point of fact, although exempt from manual toil, the average southern planter was an ex-

ceedingly hard-working man ; the number of his dependents, so far from lessening, actually adding to his labors by increasing the demands made upon him. For as I have said, he fully recognized the requirements of his position, and for the most part, honestly endeavored to discharge his obligations to the best of his ability. It frequently taxed to the uttermost his resources, both of purse and brain, to provide for the necessities of those committed to his care. But the bond between a master and his "people" (the word "slaves" rarely passed southern lips except when used officially) was a very strong one, and, to his honor be it spoken, the southern planter rarely shrank from the self-sacrifice involved in securing the welfare of those to whom he felt himself pledged.

With regard to the oft-repeated accusation of illiteracy : while pleading guilty to the indictment itself, so far as a general dissemination of book-learning was concerned, the cause of this illiteracy was to be found, in part at least, in adverse natural conditions. As in all purely agricultural communities the (white) population of the south was sparse and widely scattered. The distances were great, the plantations being so extensive that in country neighborhoods it was impossible to collect scholars enough at any one given point to establish schools. Men of wealth, themselves for the most part university graduates, secured home tuition for their children, or sent them abroad for education (and no more cultivated people were to be found anywhere than these gentle folk of the old South). But, unfortunately, their number was comparatively small, and of the remaining majority, many who would gladly have availed themselves of educational advantages for their families, had these been near at hand, were debarred by want of means from giving them a liberal education.

If, however, judged by the rule of strictly scholastic acquirement, the South fell short, in point of moral education its general standard was a high one. For, given a people with normal sensibilities and healthy moral tone, trained from infancy to regard itself as the defender of the helpless and the support of the weak ; and is it not inevitable that in that people a certain dignity, strength, and self-reliance of character should be developed?

And this was, in point of fact, the effect produced upon the southern whites by the institution of slavery.

So much, then, for the first division of our subject. Now, to consider the second.

For the purposes of this article it is not necessary to enter into the history of American slavery, suffice it to say, that it behooves those who would cast a stone at the South to recall the fact that for the importation of the negro into this country she is in nowise responsible.

Ethically considered, the defense of slavery rests upon the radical and essential difference between the races. That such a difference exists has been proved by the incontrovertible logic of events. For had color been, as claimed, the great differentiating mark between the caucasian and the negro, no outside intervention would have been necessary to bring about emancipation; history witnessing to the fact that—apart from racial inferiority—only by force of numbers can one people be held in subjection by another. The bare fact, therefore, that at the South the blacks greatly outnumbered the whites, proves conclusively the superiority of the latter race. Wherein this superiority consists I shall attempt briefly to indicate.

Apart from ethnological differences which need not here be enumerated, both intellectually and morally there is a great and impassable gulf, fixed by nature between the white man and the black. That the negro's present state of semi-barbarism is the result of generations of slavery is a fallacy pure and simple. As a matter of fact slavery, so far from degrading the negro, has actually elevated him industrially, mentally, and even morally. the term of his involuntary tutelage to the white race raising him to a vastly higher level than that ever occupied by his kinsmen in Africa. For we are to remember that the negro entered upon the stage of mundane existence at quite as early a date as did the white man—nay, some believe at a much earlier one.

Why then is it that, while the white races have emerged from barbarism and steadily ascended, step by step, from a lower to a higher plane of civilization, the negro has remained stationary from the dawn of the world's history up to the present time;

and is today, as much of a savage in his native land as when first he trod the earth?

Must it not be conceded that the race is utterly lacking in the power of initiative; that all advance and betterment must come to it from without? Therein lies the fundamental and rudimentary intellectual distinction between the races. The white race has within itself evolutionary potentialities; the negro race has none.

The few full-blooded negroes who have attained to positions of prominence must be relegated to the category of "freaks," and, like all other freaks of nature, these rare and exceptional cases prove nothing for the race to which they belong. If careful investigation be made, it will be found that the so-called "negroes," who have in any way distinguished themselves above their fellows, are not full-blooded negroes, but half-breeds. And it is to this mixed lineage that their superiority is due.

The moral distinction between the races is equally marked. The negro labors under a racial disability to grasp and apply moral principles. The arraignment may seem a harsh one, but it is fully borne out by facts, as will be testified by all those who from force of circumstances have been compelled to make the negro character a life-long study. In the old South, so well known were his moral limitations that it was an unwritten law never to hold a negro delinquent to account for a certain class of offenses, the injustice of applying to him the rigid code by which white offenders were to be judged being fully recognized.

As in all races, differences of mental constitution of course exist, and there are degrees of virtue and vice. But whereas, the white man's moral code is, theoretically at least, an inclusive one, embracing all the requirements of the moral law; the code of the negro, both theoretically and practically is, so to speak, a purely elective code; even the best negroes failing utterly to perceive the essential connection and interdependence of its several parts.

Like the "new-caught, sullen peoples" whom Mr. Kipling describes as "half-devil and half-child" the negro's nature is a composite one. But it is only just to him to say that in his case the relative proportions are changed for the better, one-quarter

“devil” and three-quarters “child” being a more accurate description of his character. Like the child, many of his virtues are negative. He is neither grasping, nor malicious, nor vindictive. He is naturally confiding, and is easily controlled by those who have won his confidence. He is generous warm hearted, cheerful, and, for the most part, happy-tempered and obliging. He is (also like the child) entirely without foresight and absolutely irresponsible. For him the future is not; the present alone exists.

So much for the one side of his nature. For the other only those whose lot has led them to sojourn among barbarous tribes can comprehend the sudden wondrous change wrought in this people by excitement. Frenzy is the word which best describes the transformation. Those who, but one brief hour before, were laughing, chattering, peaceable members of the community, are subject at any moment to be converted by some trivial occurrence into fierce, howling, blood-thirsty savages. The knowledge of this ever-present possibility necessarily influenced the southerner in his treatment of the negro; and made him look with a jealous eye upon all attempts at tampering with the discipline necessary to hold in check this dangerous element.

In common with all ignorant races, the negro is extremely superstitious and exceedingly credulous, so that he falls an easy prey to the artful and designing. He is also emotional to a degree. This last trait it is which impresses casual observers with the idea of his remarkable religious susceptibility. But a longer acquaintance and more thorough study of his character would show, that to the negro “religion” is simply a pleasurable emotional excitement, having no restraining influence whatever upon conduct.

In ante-bellum days, however, so far as nature permitted, he was trained to tread the paths of rectitude. Such is the negro from the southerner’s point of view, which must of necessity be a realistic one; proximity to the object depriving him of the perspective essential to its idealization.

Next, to consider the practical workings of the system as existing in the southern states.

What the theory of evolution is to the scientist, that the

institution of slavery was to the southern man. It might not be the absolutely true and perfect solution of the negro problem, but it was at least the best "working-hypothesis," known to him for harmonizing the conflicting elements brought into compulsory contact in the South.

To the northern imagination, slavery presented itself as a subversion of the very laws of (American) nature, with a thrill of indignant sympathy the northerner pictured himself to himself as a slave, with his sensibilities blunted, his aspirations blighted, his highest, holiest instincts outraged, and his very manhood crushed out of him. And the sense of this moral degradation, even more than the ceaseless, hopeless toil and the actual physical torture supposed to be inseparably connected with the system, entered like iron into his soul, and his conscience revolted from dooming millions of his hapless fellow-mortals to a fate so appalling.

The North erred—not in condemning the system of slavery conjured up by its own imagination, but in failing to acquaint itself with the actual facts of the case before passing judgment upon it. And this injustice it was which the South resented so bitterly.

First, as regards the cruelties believed to have been constantly inflicted upon the slaves by their masters, I am not willing to assert that instances of cruel treatment were unknown, but I can truthfully say that such cases were the rare exceptions. Neither shall I deny the fact that on plantations flogging was the general mode of discipline. But I altogether fail to see wherein flogging is a more barbarous and revolting punishment when administered to black agricultural laborers, than to white soldiers and sailors. And be it remembered that at the time we are now considering, that humanitarian spirit, which has of late years exerted such a powerful influence on public opinion, ameliorating punishment of every kind, was then unknown. Consequently, it is manifestly unjust to apply present-day standards of discipline to the methods of the past. That the slaves were not generally ill-treated, however, is proved by the wonderful increase in their numbers, for it must be borne in mind that the slave population of the South

was not recruited by fresh importations from abroad but augmented by natural growth. So far from being maltreated indeed, not only were their physical wants supplied, not only were they well fed, abundantly clothed, and comfortably housed, but their spiritual needs were also provided for. In a neighborhood the planters would combine to pay the salary of a clergyman who devoted himself to missionary work on their several plantations. All the ordinances of the church were duly observed, the sacraments were administered, and marriages solemnized. But besides this official church-membership, the negroes were allowed free latitude in the matter of church affiliation, and were Presbyterians, Baptists, or Methodists, according to taste, with "preachers" and "class-leaders" of their own color and choice. Besides its chapel, each plantation was provided with its hospital and its "children's house" (a day-nursery it would now be called), where the children were left each day by the mothers on their way to work under the charge of a competent nurse.

Although the statement seem superfluous to those familiar with southern ways, it may be well to say that on all plantations Sunday was, as a matter of course, observed as a day of rest. Besides this weekly holiday three days were always given at Christmas time, along with a "Christmas treat."

The assertion so often made that slave labor was *unpaid* labor is founded upon a misunderstanding of the facts. True, slave labor was not paid in currency. But the laborer whose toil secured to him food, clothing, and shelter could hardly be said to go unrequited. Besides which, this system laid most effectually that specter of provision for the future which haunts the laboring-man the world over. From the helplessness of earliest infancy, to the feebleness of extreme old age, whether an active, stalwart worker, or a useless, chronic invalid, the negro knew that as long as life lasted, the supply of all his wants was assured. Surely this feature of the institution alone should count for much, in any consideration of the subject, and has never, it seems to the writer, received the recognition which is its due.

Selling negroes away from their homes, and dividing families are also charges which were frequently brought against slave-

holders. As regards the first: It is true that negroes were sometimes removed by sale from one plantation to another, occasionally, even from one state to another; but generally speaking, plantations and negroes were sold together and, except, for the change of masters, the slave's life went on as before without break of any kind. With respect to the second charge: Mothers and children were seldom separated, *never* mothers and young children. As for the fathers of families: as the negro, without exception, holds precisely the same view of the permanence of the marital relation as do the advanced disciples of the new moral cult, no hardship was ever involved, no sentiment outraged by the severance of connubial ties.

Again, with regard to the amount of labor demanded of the slaves: On most plantations "task-work" was the rule. A fair allotment of work was made to each negro, and when that work was done, be the hour early or late, the day's toil was ended. The writer has frequently seen plantation negroes trooping home soon after noon.

It is to be remembered that two problems confronted the South—a labor problem, and a race problem—each of them grave enough to tax the powers of statecraft to the uttermost. The South was altogether an agricultural community dependent for its bread upon negro labor, and negro labor, unless compulsory, was (and is) absolutely unreliable. Thus much for the industrial problem.

For the still graver one: With the overwhelming disparity of numbers in favor of the blacks as between the two classes of its population, in sheer self-defense it was compelled to exercise a vigilant control over the excitable semi-barbarous people in its midst. All honor to the old South in that, while necessarily strict, this control was also both wise and humane!

Thus stands the case, which I have endeavored to present without undue partiality, for the consideration of those interested in the study of an institution vitally and inseparably connected with the history of the South.

THE INSTITUTION AND SOME OF ITS ORIGINAL SINS

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In setting out to write upon the institution and some of its original sins, I am in danger of meeting opposition, almost at the start, from both the sociologist, or the social scientist, and the theologian. The former is not unlikely to protest against the very wide use of the term "institution" which I shall allow myself, perhaps with a philosopher's license, and the latter almost surely will think his theology, dogmatic or historical, assailed by my notion of original sinfulness. The offense to the sociologist will develop in good time, but, as to the theological heresies, there are two things to be said at once. Thus, (1) in the sense of the phrase here intended an "original sin" is just a natural limitation, an inherent condition of the thing, whatever it be, said to be sinful; and (2) such sin, or such limitation or condition, because natural or inherent, because rooted in the very reality of things, cannot possibly be supposed a wholly unmixed evil. Indeed, an original sin of anything must be a defect that the ultimate nature of things in general is ready to take upon itself, to assume responsibility for, and that must be, accordingly, not a hopeless defect, but, so to speak, a defect which somehow is pertinent and useful, and a defect, above all, for which the thing affected is forgiven or from which it is *naturally* saved. How can an *original* sin be a ground of unqualified condemnation? Its mere originality redeems it.

Certain natural inherent limitations of the institution are thus the first interest of this paper, and then, when these have been exposed, or in part even while they are being exposed, an attempt will be made to show how automatically—only this is an unpleasant word—the institution rises above its own limitations.

It sins; but, be it said, to the glory of a progressive life, and so even to its own glorification.

Now, what is an institution? It is *any* manifestly established mode of activity. Of course, this might be taken as referring to anything, definite enough to be seen, the universe over. Such a very broad view, moreover, equivalent though it be to a statement that all visible things are institutions, cannot fail to have some interest. Thales found all things water. The good Bishop Berkeley has had a hearing, though he chose to write seriously upon tar, or a concoction of tar, as the center of things. Why not, then, be as bold as such men and say without hesitation that all things are institutions? Surely, nothing can be real, "really real," that is not thus universal. Still, philosophy is licentious, and in this place it is well to show some restraint. More specifically, then, if not more profoundly, an institution is any manifestly established mode of activity *in the life of human society*, and as so regarded it must also be supposed to have a distinct personnel or clientage. Mr. Bosanquet says: "An institution implies a purpose or sentiment of more minds than one, and a more or less permanent embodiment of it." But, to lapse again from the narrow way, who can help wondering if *any* manifestly established mode of activity, whether in human society or elsewhere, must not imply, I cannot of course say a personnel, but a manifold clientage of some sort? Can activity in general ever be limited to any definite mode, can it ever become specific, without being the activity, not of a single individual, but of some complex or group which is as defined as the activity? Such a question, implying as it does that all true individuality is primarily versatile, possessing an active superiority to definiteness of form, and that the definite is always an aggregate, obviously concerns the chemist or the biologist as well as the sociologist; it also interests the mathematician, not to say even the metaphysician, but it is only put here, not answered. For the purposes of this paper simply to put such a question is worth while, since it indicates quite directly that the institution, specifically that the social institution, may be, if not must be, an affair of the universe itself, instead of merely an affair of human society.

Some, it is true, may even doubt if within the sphere of human life an institution is necessarily social. The definite personnel, here asserted, may not seem to them to be a real need. But, at least at this time, I shall not argue with such doubters. Simply, with Bosanquet and others, I shall consider the institution as if it did imply a more or less numerous constituency. Broader in my view, however, than most, I must still keep in mind, as indicated already, the institution's universality, or at least its possible universality, its cosmic dignity. This wider view cannot fail to deepen the meaning of whatever may appear true of the institution in human life.

In human life every institution in its very nature is addicted to these four sins: dogmatism, opportunism, materialism, and schism. A damning list, certainly; yet, to say no more, original sins have always repaid recognition, not to add careful study. Also the terms in the list are possibly overloaded with ecclesiastical associations, yet he who runs can at least reach the height of generalization from the church to the institutions that are domestic, ceremonial, industrial, political, educational, epistemological, and the like. All human institutions, then, are helplessly guilty of those four sins; the church is by no means alone in her degradation and misery; and, accepting the terms, as well as the condemnation in them, we have only to take them up in order, remembering, as we proceed, that natural inherent defects, such as these are, can hardly be altogether evil.

Dogmatism is probably the most familiar of the offenses in the list. That establishment, the setting of life to some particular manner of thought or action, cannot occur without it is all but axiomatic. Establishment assumes, or always very strongly tends to assume, the self-worth, the essentially intrinsic worth, of whatever it affects. Establishment isolates and exalts; it abstracts; it hypostasizes; with its first assertion it creates a distinction, more or less invidious, between some particular thing and all other things; and this distinction, so strong in tendency, grows sharper and sharper and may end, as so often it has ended, in a seemingly impossible chasm between the immediate and the only mediate, the worthy and the essentially different and un-

worthy, even between—for so the words come to be applied—the supernatural and the merely natural. Yes, in fact, if not in word, the supernatural is always a conceit of the institution, and so plainly it is the inspiration, for good or for ill, of the institution's dogmatism. Could anything be more logical than that an institution, as something manifestly established and in so far self-assertive, should in the first place be arbitrary and in the second place hold itself aloof, which is to say, find sanction for itself in a sphere apart from all other things? So, to repeat, establishment makes and must make what it touches supernatural, and just on this account it leads and must lead to what all men are accustomed to know as dogmatism, to unreasoning creed and cherished cult; subjecting, as also it must, impulses to the tyranny of form, natural experience to imposed authority, even reason to faith. As regards the last subjection there never was and never could be an institution by which reason was not reduced to a mere handmaid. *Intellectus ecclesiae ancilla* is as much a law as a special case having special social and historical references. Indeed, in all her history the church has never seriously taught or practiced anything, the enslavement of reason or anything else, that has not been essentially true to life at large. Supernaturalism, revelation, reason the servant of faith, and all her other great tenets, except for their confining and obscuring names, that are confining more through their associations than through their essential meaning, are as broad and deep as life itself. In so far as anywhere or in any way given to definite habits, customs, forms, life cannot do without those tenets; and although thus to recognize them as so general in their character and meaning, and consequently to think of the church as only a special institution that has abstracted and idealized just these underlying conditions of all institutions, is radically to change the value they have had for many people, nevertheless the conclusion seems unassailable. Whether the church gain or lose by the change is not the question, although many are sure to raise it. Turning, then, to that with which we are concerned and speaking quite abstrusely, to assert the definite in any way or sphere is to set it aloof and to place all that adhere to it in just so far out of touch

and sympathy with what remains of the life from which it has taken form; and such assertion, clearly tending strongly toward the formation of some social caste, is the very essence of dogmatism, an original sin of any institution. Habits, customs, laws, creeds, social classes, doctrines or methods of science, organic forms, and all things else in the world of what is manifest and definite are institutions and dogmatic. They set aloof and exalt. They find sanction, as it were, in another world. They are no sooner asserted, or established, than, lost in their own conceit, they fall out with positive experience.

And dogmatism leads directly to something else; it leads to the second original sin, the sin of opportunism. Possibly a more suitable, although somewhat bolder, name for this is Machiavellism, which implies, however, greater sophistication. Machiavelli will be remembered as one often classified in histories as an anti-ecclesiastical political philosopher. But, whatever Machiavelli's character or temper, and whatever be the better name for the sin now in question, the offense itself springs from the fact that any dogmatic assertion of immediacy and intrinsic worth promptly warrants the use of any means whatsoever, adequate or not, that may be at hand, for the attainment or the maintenance of the asserted end. Moreover, the originality or besetting character of this sin is shown in the fact that under all the circumstances no means at hand can ever be wholly adequate to any asserted end. Any institution is simply condemned *ipso facto* to some compromise with the presented means to its support, and such compromise is opportunism or Machiavellism. Let something be asserted as final, and henceforth, under such dogmatism, all other things will be taken as in some way intended for its service. The end being settled, the particular thing in life to be maintained at any cost being determined once for all, such considerations as scrupulous adaptation of the means employed to the end in view, sympathy of nature between them, or possible degradation or exaltation of the one by the other, become quite impertinent. In short, with just the meaning that has long been attached to the words, given a dogmatic institution, "the end justifies the means;" while, as was sug-

gested and as is especially important to be remarked, no means available can ever be literally and unqualifiedly adequate to the demand. However startling the statement may be at first sight, no one will really question that in all the world there is no single thing, no manner of existence, no specific way or form of life, natural or human, social or personal, which can find anywhere means that are unequivocally serviceable to its faithful expression and preservation. Again, the preservation of any single thing must always, not merely require a certain amount of arbitrariness and dogmatism, but also exact some measure of compromising, or temporizing; and this, if unconscious, we know as opportunism; if conscious and voluntary, as Machiavellism. Perhaps faithful preservation of anything is at best only temporary, and so more apparent than real; perhaps in all the world never a user, however arbitrary and masterful, goes unused; but this possibility only gives additional emphasis to the necessary compromises of any institution.

The church is the institution whose opportunism, or Machiavellism, is most commonly attacked. At a very critical time in history Machiavelli himself was, or at least very significantly may be said to have been, one of her aptest pupils. But again, the church is as far from having a monopoly of this offense as of anything else. Industries, governments, political parties, scientific and philosophical theories, theses of all sorts, that exist of course to be proved, personal characters, and so on indefinitely, have all been tainted with opportunism, with the more or less conscious, arbitrary use of inappropriate, inadequate means. The pecuniary support of some, perhaps all, religious or educational institutions, the many practices in social and in personal life, which are so honeycombed with what is artificial and casuistic, and the often legally correct but decidedly questionable methods of commerce, afford familiar and telling illustrations; and the taint to which they point is original and inevitable, being intrinsic to establishment, to dogmatic assertion everywhere. Perhaps the taint does not tell the whole story, but there can be no doubt about the taint.

Opportunism involves materialism, the third original sin of

the institution. Is there any word so hard to hold to a single meaning as this word "materialism"? Yes, there is possibly one other, the word "idealism." Here, however, contrary to what may be feared, reference is not to any mere metaphysical theory, although in the next paragraph a word or two will be said of the theory of matter as an ultimate substance, but only to the practical "ism." Any resort to means that are at all external to the end pursued, or that are in any measure inadequate or inappropriate or tainted, is essentially materialistic. Moreover, as such resort always rests on the presumption, so natural to an institution, that some single phase or detail of life and experience, some specific interest and established mode of action, has intrinsic worth—which is to say, has in itself the value of the whole of life—this practical materialism may be described also as the habit of treating, or the disposition to treat, some single part of life as if it were the final and self-sufficient whole.¹ Any institution, therefore, just because naturally assertive of some part as if it were the whole, and because naturally dependent on means not altogether adapted, and that can accordingly be used only with some Machiavellian violence, is *originally* sinful or guilty of materialism.

As for the metaphysical theory, the theory that matter is an ultimate substance, perhaps even the only substance, I must say, as if in a parenthesis, that metaphysical materialism seems to be nothing more or less than a generalization from, an abstraction of, all that is mediate or instrumental in life. It is such a generalization supplemented by an institutive treatment, or hypostasis, of the thing abstracted. Idealism, on its side, would then be, as indeed not infrequently has been recognized, only a corresponding abstraction and hypostasis of the end as opposed to the means, of the ideal as opposed to the "materially" real. Historically, every materialism has had its idealism to combat. But plainly, so understood, the metaphysical theory of materialism affords an illustration, though possibly a somewhat subtle one, of the practical "ism." In fact, the metaphysician practices

¹ See an article, "History and Materialism," in which this latter notion of materialism is specially emphasized (*American Historical Review*, July, 1905).

materialism, whether in his dogmatic theory he is materialist or idealist; for from one side or the other he makes an abstraction, and in support of his chosen thesis he uses and does violence to what he has rejected.

But the sins of metaphysics are not specially in question at this time, though metaphysics may be as much in need of conviction as any other department of human life. In the sense now presented, the institution at large is naturally materialistic; and, in view of this charge, if charge it should be called, an objection is quite likely to be brought against what has been said here. Thus, how can the institution be guilty of both supernaturalism and materialism? Without argument of the matter, let some illustrations give their own ready answer to this question. Consider, first, the property greed of the mediaeval, not to say also of the modern, church. Consider, secondly, the hidden sensuality of all hyper-spiritual movements. Consider, thirdly, the dependence of all kings "by divine right" on physical might, on armies and capital punishment and arbitrary, which is to say physical, authority in every form. And consider also the strange logic, by which in moral experience an unworldly rigorism promptly reacts into gross worldliness; by which the confidently unworldly have fewest defenses against the snares of the world when these are really encountered; or by which, in political experience, party fealty seems always to bring some form of compromise and corruption. Indeed, an open, clearly avowed materialism, like that of the opportunist Machiavelli, has much to learn from the hidden and unconfessed practices of its seeming opponent, the materialism of the dogmatic, idealistic, consciously supernaturalistic institution. How piously have kings looked up to God as they have led out their destroying armies! How positively the morally confident, soul-supported person has exclaimed, "I will," only in the end to prove his own betrayer, or "I will not," only to go forth at once to do what he seemed so firmly and so finally to have set himself against! The conceit of supernaturalism, then, even when reinforced, as so often it is, by explicit relegation of all that is material to the region of the illusory and unreal, is no safeguard against materialism; rather

it is the certain danger, and, in the case of the open treatment of the natural and material as illusory, it is in the hopeless and helpless state of the boy who had cried "Wolf! Wolf!" when there was no wolf. In short, supernaturalism and materialism are inseparable; so inseparable that the latter, what with its compulsion, its arbitrary coercions and all, is but the incarnation of the former; and, naturally and originally, every institution is guilty, not of one or the other, but invariably of both.

So the third sin of the institution has now been exposed. The institution is dogmatic, and therefore uncritical toward the means it employs; it is uncritical, or opportunistic, and therefore given to depending on means that are physical or material, that are external to the end and in so far inadequate; and just this dependence is its materialism. This materialism, however, does not conclude the record of the sins. A fourth, original, like the others, and springing up especially in connection with the materialism, remains to be considered; namely, the sin of schism. The institution out of its assertion and self-importance may pray earnestly for deliverance "from all sedition, privy conspiracy, and rebellion; from all doctrine, heresy, and schism;" but, whatever value or utility the prayer may have, the assertion itself can only make it perpetually necessary. Dogmatism, opportunism, and materialism, the great defenses of the institution, are also an earnest, if now I may use a word that will have to be qualified later, of its downfall; for they give life to those agents of destruction, always twin-born, division within and opposition without.

Now, as has been intimated, perhaps the most direct evidence of the schism that must beset every institution is in the necessary incongruity between the end and the available means and in the accompanying tendency materialistically, by deed if not by word, to put stress upon the means. Simply, by the incongruity and by the stress the institution is irresistibly led astray, becoming involved in what is not consistent with its avowed purposes. Of course, mere dogmatic assertion may be relied upon to arouse resistance, and so to stir up doubts among its own warmest advocates; and opportunism needs only to be practiced in order to grow conscious, and, if conscious, then also unsettling; but nothing

so clearly threatens the self-confidence, the integrity and consistency, of an institution and its various claims as an evident discrepancy between the end avowed and the means employed. Let this discrepancy merely arise, as it always must, and be observed, as also it must, and division and opposition are sure to follow.

Division and opposition are unavoidable, because means, if not fully accordant with the end for which they are used, are certain to suggest either a new significance for the accepted end or to demand a different end. Again, discordant means, upon being employed, must exalt or they must degrade the end which they are supposed to serve; and, doing so, they will call coincidentally for both reform and attack, and for these both from within and from without. Simply, "the end justifies the means," but the necessary violence of the means brings new significance to the end. Whence, to introduce now two familiar terms, the life of the institution, through the native conditions of its expression, is always constrained to harbor two conflicting movements, conservatism and liberalism, the two swords, or the two-edged sword, of all schism, the former tending fatally toward the formal and conventional, and the latter toward the radical. Moreover, the necessary appearance of these two movements and tendencies will suggest why division and opposition were but just now said to be twin-born. Quite abstractly put, any specific assertion implies, as it were in its own right or in the conditions of its own rise, positive resistance from things without, and by reason of its dependence beyond itself also inner division against itself. Between the liberal movement without the life of an institution and the liberal movement within the difference can be only one of degree, lying perhaps only in the consciousness and candor with which the attack is conducted. The inner movement, too, is in itself an invitation and cue to the outer movement, if the reverse be not also true. Indeed, the two comprise a sort of natural, though unrecorded, partnership for the accomplishment of just one object—evolution of the institution affected, and coincident revision or reinterpretation of its end.

That there is this partnership, or quasi-partnership, is indicated also by the following. In the life of institutions, say

specifically of political or ecclesiastical institutions, how commonly, if not universally, the opposition makes use of means that the institutions themselves have actually developed and, as it were, placed upon the market, with accompanying directions about their use, for the general consumer. The French Revolution is the stock illustration of this. Spartacus' speech, whether really his or not, so familiar to every schoolboy, is a good statement of it. Machiavelli's anti-ecclesiastical advocacy of the very intrigue to which the church had become so conspicuously addicted shows the same thing; and shows it in a way peculiarly interesting here, since the schism and the numerous incidents of the schism now under examination have been seen to be involved in what was virtually referred to as the natural or innate Machiavellism of every institution. The scientific reply to the creation-alistic theology of the priority of spirit with an equally creation-alistic doctrine of the priority of matter is also a case in hand, although possibly not so generally apparent. And, to stride into a field even more difficult and remote, the poetry of Whitman, so offensive to institutional, conventional ideas of morality, in its opposition only uses material that is plainly present in the minds of the very preachers and teachers whom it has shocked so deeply. Many there are who would prefer Whitman to the conventional moralist's morbid and, if morbid, often prurient consciousness of the sensuous. Is Whitman's poetry, particularly so far as dealing with questions of sex, any less wholesome than so-called purity clubs or than prayer-meetings for one sex only? Moreover, for morality Whitman, who only offends in the way of all radicals, does but do what sooner or later has to be done for every institution. To use a metaphor, perhaps too suggestive in his case, he tears off the old clothing, which moral man has been wearing, as he believes, too long, and takes measurements, with the scientific accuracy so appropriate to the age, for a new suit. At the time the exposure may be thought indecent; but, without meaning to defend all that Whitman has done or written, I have to think it both necessary and serviceable. The dangers of it are certainly no greater than those of morbid brooding over hidden, but not less real, facts; and, however offensive and

indecent, it is the simple fate, which must be inspired with some useful purpose, of every establishment. As there can be no establishment without some concealment, the institution always being a sort of study in chiaroscuro effects, so there can be no concealment, no indirectness, finesse, or intrigue, that sooner or later must not give way to exposure. Remember the eighteenth century. What was its so-called "enlightenment" but a general exposure, indecent and offensive, reckless and rationalistic, of the institutions of the time? But, to conclude this list of illustrations, the poetry of Whitman suggests the much-discussed conflict between art in general and morals—and in this conflict there is additional evidence for the matter in review. Art has usually had more reserve than is commonly found in the writings of Whitman, but all real art is alive with the same tendencies. All real art shows the human in process of being gifted to the natural; the forms and conventions of human establishment becoming the play, the instruments, of life at large. In all real art we can invariably detect the materialism of some institution on the point, at least on the point, of throwing off its conventional disguise. Art—Greek art, for example, or the art of the Renaissance—does but forerun a new dispensation, and in its own time and way it is itself at variance with the traditional order, because, whether avowedly in the opposition or not, it is quick with the schism of the existing institutions, which is to say with the manifest use of the incongruous material, that indeed the institutions themselves have always used, but as if under lock and key. So Greek art transformed patriotism into cosmopolitanism; and the art of the Renaissance, Roman Catholicism into Protestant Christianity.

From all these illustrations it appears that the liberal movement within an institution and the liberal, or radical, movement without, cannot be as distinct as they are sometimes supposed to be. They both employ, only with different degrees of freedom and candor, the same instruments; and doing this they also are both only exposing the lock-and-key methods, the *arcana imperii*, of the institution. They are, then, as said, in a very real sort of partnership, and their partnership shows, as said

also, that division and opposition, always incident to schism, are not two independent movements. The outside opposition is, so to speak, only an important factor in, or a natural incident of, the inside division; it is never just a coincident, but independent attack. Not only, therefore, are the two partners, but also neither one is ever active without the other being so too. The partnership is as original and essential as the schism that it serves. In the terms of personnel, the slavish loyalist and the loyal reformer, on the one hand, and the hostile, though not hopeless, revolutionist and the destructive uncompromising anarchist, on the other hand, are all four parties to the natural disruption of the institution, being, each one of them, in some way and measure committed to the inevitable and inevitably disintegrating materialism; the first two, of course, from within, the other two from without. Of the two extremes in the group, the loyalist and the anarchist, the former is describable as blind to his actual materialism and radicalism; the latter, as equally blind to his implied loyalty. But subtleties of this sort, not less humorous than profound, are unnecessary to the task in hand; only, for him who cares to reflect upon them further, they do suggest what may be the meaning of the invisible, as opposed to the visible, institution. The invisible church, for example, has been either the subtle rational theology, and all the other worldly methods and instruments, with which the church of dogma, *openly* appealing, not to reason, but to faith, not to nature and matter, but to God and spirit, has been mysteriously maintained; or the implicit faith, that truly and actually passeth understanding, of the avowed skeptic and atheist. The schism of the visible institution is thus the very life of the invisible institution.

But now the four carnal offenses, which were to be exposed, have been set forth. Dogmatism, opportunism, materialism, and schism, with all their various incidents, manifestly are sins of the institution, and, in spite of them, if not actually by dint of them, an institution must have or get whatever of worth and virtue may possibly belong to it. Perhaps, as one runs over in his mind all the mean acts, the cruelties and deceptions, the destruction and the treachery, in which one or another of these

sins has found expression, the chance of discovering any worth or virtue will seem very small indeed. Sins always do produce diseases, and, accordingly the life of human society, bound as it is to expression through institutions, may promise to be of interest rather to a social pathologist, wholly morbid in his point of view, than to an idealist or optimist; for is it not conclusive that, given institutions, there must be crimes? Looking, then, to institutional society, we seem to see only either dishonest loyalty or open and destructive violence; which is to say, either hidden crime or public crime. Some, indeed, may imagine they find something else; the life and attitude, for example, of those who consciously say to themselves that the end justifies the means; but here is only a compromise between the two extremes, not anything new or significantly different; and, whether different or not, it can hardly be said to improve the view. And yet there is still left the possibility that what the author of the *Fable of the Bees* said of his hive is really true of human society:

Every part was full of vice;

The whole mass a paradise.

Fortunately, one can find truth in these words without assuming the spirit of Mandeville himself. Thus, there is a fact, to which history, always about as humorous as it is reassuring, bears constant witness, and to which also the argument of this paper has been leading by no very difficult route; this fact, namely, as simple as its figurative statement is commonplace: Institutions always make strange bed-fellows. In the deeper meaning of this commonplace truth, which is as serious to life as it is amusing, and which suggests Mandeville's mingling of vice with whatever is worth while, must lie whatever chance remains for an optimistic view of the institution.

Yes, institutions always make strange bed-fellows. In history, this amounts to saying, wherever an institution takes form, just there wisdom and folly, honesty and dishonesty, lawfulness and lawlessness, are made strangely intimate even to the point of comedy. Life and death are not more intimate, whenever life is expressed through some definite and manifest structure. In history, at a very critical period, thanks only to the institutions, or

to the "law," a reformer and some thieves were crucified together, although—perhaps because—the institutions were themselves already harboring exactly as much dishonesty as honesty, or violence as law and order. But the deeper meaning of such intimacy—just what can this be?

It is the meaning, already proposed, of original sins being redeemed or redeemable by their very originality, except that what was said needs now to be supplemented in two important respects. Such sins, it will be remembered, were declared always to repay study; and this just because they cannot be supposed pure or unmixed. Their impurity, then, or their mixed character, is a reflection of a truth that may be put in these two important ways: (1) Reality—that is, whatever is substantial, whatever is finally true and worthy in life and for life—is and forever must be, I do not say wholly apart from what is definite and visible, but never adequately or completely presented through any definite, visible thing, such as some body of positive doctrine or some specific mode of life, some system of formulated law or some mass of customs and traditions, and (2) all things definite are, therefore, and must be, I do not say unreal, but only "relative." All things definite—that is, all institutions—are whatever they are, are worthy or unworthy, good or bad, true or false, vital or instrumental, only relatively, and for just the reason—certainly a cogent reason—that *the* real or *the* true, *the* good or *the* vital, cannot, in its very nature, be held to any visible form or body, to any name or habitation, to any residence or resting-place. Again, risking tedious repetition, all things institutional are relative for the great supreme reason—a reason which redeems even relativity from unreality—not of course that there is no reality, nor even that what reality there is does not comprise and entertain all things, but that reality can never have a single place where to lay its head. The definite, then, which is the institutional and which is necessarily always relative, can belong to final reality, or can truly serve what is real and worthy, not by being merely either true or false, good or bad, lawful or lawless, but only by always being mixedly either, by always being both, by always putting both in the same bed. In short, the definite or

institutional or relative, just to be real, or to possess anything which reality comprises, must always be, not simple, but mixed; not peacefully self-sufficient, but the residence of opposition and conflict; perhaps, too, not static in nature, but dynamic; say even, not merely formal and structural but also functional.

So, to every institution, its original sins; but, also, to every institution, even through violence, its part in the service of what is real, and through such service redemption of the violating sins. In general, conflict is such a sure redeemer. It saves formal virtue from its emptiness and the sin that transgresses the forms from its license. Yet many will be far from satisfied with this conclusion or explanation. To begin with, they may find it altogether too philosophically subtle. Then, if they are able to forgive the offense of subtlety, by their understanding overcoming the peculiar obstacles, they may still object to the reliance on a principle of universal relativity. Relativity, especially when made a basis of judgments about evil in any form, is very offensive, because, at least in the opinion of many, to all intents and purposes it makes whatever it touches quite unreal. Here, however, the general opinion is very plainly at fault; for, as I have been trying to make clear, the definite and relative, being always necessarily in a state of conflict, is *ipso facto* real or in touch with reality. Thus, however subtly, in just three words: (1) the relative is at least as real as the definite; (2) the definite can itself be real, or belong to what is real, only if mixed, or say only if like a house that is divided against itself, for reality is itself also opposed to any mere definition; and (3) relativity has never actually meant anything but the mixture or division or natural self-opposition of the definite. All that has been said here of the institution, or its sins, has born witness that definition involves, not only opposition, but also division, or schism; and also, only to translate a phrase that will readily be recalled, that the relativity of the visible institution, not is apart from, but *is* the reality of the invisible institution. Whence, the original sins of the institution, incident to the necessary mixture, or division, of what is definite, are real, though relative, or—why not add?—because relative; they are as real as the conflict which every institution,

every formal structure in human life, harbors, and without which none can be justified; they are as real as the "good" which is always associated with them; and they are as real as that absolute but invisible reality which dwells in the conflicts of all things definite, and which is, and can be, maintained only by these conflicts. Thus, even a universal relativism, a relativism declaring all things definite to be relative, is not by any means nihilism; it makes nothing unreal; it simply makes reality just not finally and exclusively one of the things.

But, lastly, the current evolutionary explanation of evil, or more specifically of sins, which appeals to the conditions of growth or progress, is certainly in accord with the explanation here presented. Perhaps the two are identical. I think, however, that, as commonly understood, the evolutionary explanation lacks just one idea, or at least clear recognition of one idea, which the foregoing discussion brings forward. Thus, in a very few words, it is of course quite true that growth demands instability of any structure or institution; and sins, so called, are effective agents of instability, and accordingly cannot be without positive worth. Again, growth implies change in the values of things, and this makes the distinction between the good and the bad, the worthy and the unworthy, the useful and the harmful, a shifting one, besides making both, or all, have a share in whatever is fully worth while. And, once more, under the demands of growth, evil or sin in the part may be quite consistent with the true nature and interest of the whole. All these notions, too, as arguments of the evolutionist, are so well known in these times that they do not require extensive exposition here. But are they not lacking in their appreciation of the very growth on which they rely? Do they not think of it as too radical? Are they sufficiently loyal to a principle of unity and persistence in the changing that their growth implies? Is there any institution that we must not have with us always?

The problem is, of course, a profound one, and as difficult as profound. But let me suggest, at the expense of seeming commonplace, that growth, the true growth of anything you please—a man, an institution, or an ideal—is never merely change; it is

not merely into, nor merely out of, any state or nature, as these phrases seem often, if not usually, to be taken; it is just a condition of a reality that in its very nature can be, only if not merely definite. Make reality definite, give it a pillow, and you ask it to betray its nature, to violate its depth and breadth, to undo its own true unity. Instead, then, of being the change of reality or the supposed development or evolution of reality, growth is more accurately and more safely looked upon as the persistence of reality, or even as just reality. It is reality, so thoroughly real as to be not merely incapable of any particular resting-place, or establishment, but also in a sense even without the need, and so truly one in its nature, so hospitably lawful and orderly, as to include all things definite, not of course in spite of its not being, but just by means of its not being, a single definite thing itself.

So it is by the grace of reality in this sense, or of growth in this sense, that the institution sins but to the glory of a progressive life, and even to its own glorification.

THE PROBLEM OF CIVILIZATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY¹

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Our subject, the problem of civilization in the twentieth century, falls naturally into two parts: (1) what the problem is and (2) a proposed solution of it. The nature of the problem can perhaps best be indicated by showing how it arose. Hence, the first part of the discussion will be chiefly historical and the second sociological.

I. HOW THE PROBLEM AROSE.—According to Heraclitus of old, the world moves by opposites; the law of contradiction is a law of the universe. And many writers of history assert that human progress does not proceed in the path of a straight line, but rather in cycles, or with a to-and-fro movement like the swings of a pendulum. Thus, some 2,500 years ago, after the Old, the Middle, and the New Empires of Egypt, each lasting for about a thousand years, had passed away, the world was roused by a new twofold force—the genius of the Greek and the power of the Roman. The Greek-Roman day lasted for about a thousand years also. Then the world went to sleep for another thousand years; the spirit of progress, like the apocalyptic dragon, seemed to be bound in the bottomless pit. But when the required number of days were fulfilled, some five hundred years ago, the world awoke again, perhaps to fall into another slumber five hundred years from now.

It is with the present period, the last four or five hundred years of the Christian era, that we are here concerned. It, like many other periods, contains two fundamental, and also opposite, movements or tendencies. And these tendencies explain the problem of civilization—or at least one of the most important problems of civilization—in the twentieth century.

¹ A paper read before the Scientific Society of the University of Missouri.

In the life of nations, as of individuals, there are crises or turning-points fraught with momentous consequences for the future. Such a period, for the life of mankind, was the Renaissance. The Renaissance marks the transition from the mediaeval to the modern world. Nearly five hundred years ago a new spirit was born into the world—the spirit of individuality or of liberty. It is strikingly typified by Michael Angelo in his grandest and most celebrated piece of sculpture, the statue of Moses. Michael Angelo's Moses was not modeled after the imperishable creations of the beauty-loving Greeks. It was made to personify the spirit of the new time. The Greek statue was the embodiment of culture and health-giving exercise. But Michael Angelo's Moses is the personification of will; with muscles tense, standing out in cords and bunches, it typifies the strenuous life. The soul of humanity, which had slumbered quietly through the long night of the Middle Ages, had awaked. The love of liberty had revived. And this irrepressible spirit of individuality, immortalized by the great sculptor, manifested itself at once along all lines of civilization. A few instances will suffice to illustrate:

1. *Religion*.—John Huss and Jerome of Prague, Luther and Calvin, Knox and Cranmer, led the revolt against the rule of authority that, in spiritual affairs, had long dominated the Christian world. The Protestant Reformation secured freedom of conscience and proclaimed personal responsibility, as these doctrines had never been realized or appreciated before.

2. *Science*.—The free spirit of man expressed itself in the inventions of the mariner's compass, gun-powder, and printing—the three wonder-working instruments, respectively, of discovery, of conquest, and of enlightenment. It was now that the earth was first discovered—not only the new continents and the islands of the seas, but also its position in the solar system. It was now that the earth was first subdued—not only the wild beasts of the field, but also the unprogressive classes of men. And it was now that the earth was first illumined by that knowledge which is power and that light which is life.

3. *Politics*.—The wars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were manifestations of this spirit of individ-

uality; efforts to obtain a larger degree of liberty—religious, civil, and political. And the movement culminated in the American Revolutionary War and the Declaration of Independence, in the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and in the substitution of the several forms of self-government—local, state, and national—for government by kings or nobles.

4. *Industry*.—In industrial and social life the spirit of the Renaissance overthrew feudalism, abolished slavery, and is gradually effecting the emancipation of woman. It favored freedom of initiative on the part of the individual, and encouraged people to follow the calling they preferred and to go to any part of the world that they pleased.

Now, it may be asked, what is the logical result of this tendency? In one word, it is anarchy. To illustrate again:

1. *Religion*.—The individualism that inspired the Protestant Reformation soon led to the splitting-up of religious bodies into sects, factions, and parties; also to the criticism of creeds and to the doubt of dogmas. Suffice it to mention, in this connection, the writings of the Encyclopaedists, the *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, the *Age of Reason*, and the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Thus Kant, in the preface to his great work, wrote:

Our age is in every sense of the word the age of criticism, and everything must submit to it. Religion on the strength of its sacredness, and law on the strength of its majesty, endeavor to withdraw themselves from it. But by so doing they arouse just suspicion, and cannot claim that sincere respect which reason pays to those only who have been able to stand its free and open examination.

2. *Science*.—The individualism of the Renaissance manifested itself, not in the true scientific investigation, but also in the rise of many pseudo-sciences, and in the wrangles and contentions of scientists and pseudo-scientists. The controversies of Newton and Leibnitz, of Arnauld and Malebranche, and of Jesuit and Jansenist are only a few among many instances.

3. *Politics*.—It is in the sphere of political life, perhaps, that the individualistic tendency was most apparent. It reached its climax toward the close of the eighteenth century, in the partition of Poland, in the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire, in

the French Revolution, in the American Revolutionary War, and in the threatened dissolution of the American union.

4. *Industry*.—In industrial life the spirit of individuality expressed its anarchistic tendency in cut throat competition and in the *laissez-faire* doctrine of the Manchester school.

But, although anarchy is the logical result of the Renaissance movement, it does not necessarily follow that such would be the actual result. The logical result of the leading tendency of a civilization is one thing; the actual result of that tendency, when modified by other, though subordinate, forces, may be quite another thing. Such it was in the present case. The actual result of three centuries of striving for liberty was the age of invention, or the era of industrialism of the nineteenth century.

The age of invention or industry is characterized by the substitution of mechanical power for muscle power to do the world's work. Civilization has passed through three stages in this respect. In the first, the work of the world was performed by the muscles of men and women. In the second, the muscles of animals were used along with those of men and women. And in the third, mechanical power was largely substituted for muscle power. It has been calculated that, at the present time, there are three mechanical slaves in the service of each individual, on the average, of the population of America, Great Britain, France, and Germany.²

And as the nineteenth century was the age of invention and of industrial development, its fundamental social characteristic, or most prominent general tendency, was union and organization. Before the pendulum of progress had swung over to anarchy, it slowed, stopped, and then began to swing in the opposite direction. This also was a natural result; for force is never so effective as when it is most highly organized. And the two conditions making organization possible—viz., scientific knowledge enabling people to foresee the end and direct the means, and mechanical inventions enabling many individuals to work together—were made available by the individualism of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. A few instances will serve to illus-

² Cf. Strong, *The Twentieth Century City*, p. 18.

trate, along different lines of civilization, the spirit of union and organization, as it was manifested in the last century.

1. *Religion*.—In the drawing closer together of different sects and denominations, in the religious congresses, in the non-sectarian churches, in the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, and in other Christian, but non-sectarian, institutions was strongly manifested the tendency toward union.

2. *Science*.—The scientific world became noted for its meetings, associations, and congresses—local, state, national, and international. If an important discovery was made in any part of the world, it immediately became common property. And the investigation of many natural phenomena was conducted by international co-operation.

3. *Politics*.—The spirit of individuality which triumphed in the French Revolution and the American Revolutionary War soon spent its force in the following century. In Europe a new German Empire arose, with the unification of the German people; and a new Italy appeared, with the unification of the Italian people. In America the Civil War resulted in a stronger union of the United States. The heterogeneous provinces of British America were united in a single federation, the Dominion of Canada. Similarly, only recently was formed the Commonwealth of Australia. South Africa is moving in the same direction. Imperial federation is in the air. And some writers advocate not only a union of the English-speaking peoples, but the establishment of an international parliament for the world.

4. *Industry*.—Lastly, in industrial life there arose union or organization everywhere. The organization of capital was accompanied by the organization of labor. Besides department and co-operative stores, there appeared profit-sharing associations, joint-stock companies, and trusts—of state, national, and international importance.

Thus in short, the *Zeitgeist* throughout all the past century was steadily making for closer union and higher organization.

Now, it may be asked, what is the logical result of this tendency? In one word, again, it is socialism. In religion, science, politics, industry, and many other factors of civilization the

streams of tendency are setting strongly in a socialistic direction. Will this be the actual result? Probably not, though no one knows. One thing, however, seems evident, viz., that the best result would be some intermediate movement between the extremes of individualism and socialism, as these terms are usually understood. The desideratum would seem to be the union of these two opposite and yet complementary forces in a form of society that would secure the largest amount of individual liberty, along with the highest degree of organized efficiency. And this is the problem of civilization in the twentieth century. The sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries asserted, and in large measure secured, the rights of the individual; the nineteenth century asserted, and in large measure secured, the rights of society. Hence, the problem of the twentieth century is the harmonious blending of individualism and socialism, in such a manner that liberty will be ruled by law, and law suffused with liberty; that individuality will be regulated by union, and union animated by individuality; that personality will be guided by organization, and organization moved and inspired by personality and genius.

II. THE SOLUTION.—The solution proposed is the development in society, to the greatest extent possible, of the two somewhat opposite and yet complementary social forces, education and organization: education in order to secure for the individual the largest degree of development; organization in order to secure for the community the results of all individual progress. Neither force alone is sufficient. Each is necessary to modify and supplement the other. We will first examine briefly education.

1. *Education*.—Of education there are at present two prominent, but opposing, views. According to the one, education to the largest extent should be encouraged; according to the other, education within certain lines should be restricted. The former system may be called the American; the latter, the continental. In America, generally speaking, education along all lines is encouraged to the fullest extent. The largest education for the largest numbers is the guiding principle accepted. But it is easy to see that, if this policy be continued, after a time the profes-

sions and the higher walks of life will become overcrowded. Hitherto the varied opportunities of a new country, the rich rewards of productive industry, the extent of the field of activity, and the vastness of its resources have contributed to counteract the natural effects of the educational policy. Some of these causes, however, are only temporary; and others, gradually, will come to have a relatively less effect than formerly. It is but a question of time, therefore, when, in the natural course of events, an educated proletariat will appear.

What would be the general effect upon society, it may next be inquired, of an educated proletariat? According to the "divine harmonies" of certain economists, as the professions become crowded, the more efficient men, through natural competition, will drive out the less efficient; and, in this way, the standard of the professions, to the incalculable benefit of society, will be continually raised. That may be a pretty theory, but it is not a true one. The increase in the army of "middlemen," notwithstanding the continuous cheapening in the processes of production, keeps the selling-price of several commodities at many times the cost price. The men who enter the professions are too intelligent, and possess too large a degree of organizing ability, to allow free competition to act in the manner specified. Organization would naturally be resorted to, in order to secure larger profits for all. As professional men would receive less employment—and the more crowded the profession became, there would be the less work for each member to do—they would charge more for their services. Hence, as education increases, the professions will become overcrowded, and professional services will become more expensive. And, as education still further increases, the professions will become more overcrowded, and professional services will become still more expensive; and so on *ad infinitum*.

This is one general effect of the unlimited extension of education. There is yet another to be considered. As the professional classes increase relatively faster than population, people are withdrawn in larger numbers from the productive industries. Hence, not only does the cost of professional services tend to increase, but also that along practically all other lines. Then the

persons engaged in the industries have to produce for an ever-increasing class engaged in the professions, as well as for themselves. And this process goes on indefinitely. Thus it might seem that the last state of society, through the advance of education, would be worse than the first.

It is in order to avoid a state of things like that here described that some persons advocate what may be called the continental system of education, in preference to the American. The continental system may be represented by the German. It is aristocratic, rather than democratic. It makes elementary education free and universal, but makes higher education increasingly expensive as society progresses. And in America, at the present time, there are many strong tendencies making for the continental system; e. g., increase of tuition fees and other expenses connected with higher education, both liberal and professional.

Against the continental system, however, there are two insuperable objections: one on the ground of justice, the other on the ground of expediency. First, it organizes society into classes, which, to a large extent, are not based on natural ability, but on accidents of place or of birth. Consequently, it is unfair in principle. Secondly, it does not secure, except in part—often but in small part—the higher education of those members of society who would acquire it most easily, who would profit by it most largely, and who would make it contribute to the general welfare most fully. Hence, the system does not make for the largest progress or the greatest good of society as a whole.

We have now arrived at an antinomy, which may be stated as follows: (1) The largest education for the largest numbers—i. e., free education, in all departments, for all who can avail themselves of it—is the only educational policy that is consistent with justice and expediency. (2) The largest education for the largest numbers will naturally result in the overcrowding of the professions and the higher walks of life. If this process were continued, under the industrial conditions which now prevail, the burdens laid upon the producing classes would gradually become heavier, and finally intolerable. It would end practically in a caste system.

It is for the latter part of this antinomy that a solution must be sought. Two may be suggested: (1) government regulation, and (2) social organization. It is difficult to believe in the efficacy of the former. An attempt by government to regulate the fees charged by physicians, lawyers, engineers, and other professional men would not be likely to accomplish much practical good. On the other hand, organization, if intelligent and extensive, can perform wonders. It is along this line that mankind should achieve the grandest triumphs, and make the greatest progress in the twentieth century. Education to the largest extent for the largest numbers is a sound principle for human guidance, provided it is accompanied by a sufficient amount of social organization. But organization, although a leading feature of nineteenth-century civilization, is yet in its elementary stages. A discussion of this subject will finish our assigned task.

2. *Organization*.—Above all preceding centuries, the nineteenth will stand out forever as the historical century *par excellence*. As such, it was epoch-making in the life of mankind. It furnished a scientific method for the investigation of all social phenomena. Consequently, in the present century unprecedented social progress may reasonably be expected. It is universally recognized that, as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were noted for progress in mathematics and astronomy, and the nineteenth century for progress in the physical and biological sciences, the twentieth will be noted for progress in the social sciences. Sociology is the coming study. And just as sociology, grounded on the inductions of the physical and biological sciences, and guided by the historical method, becomes the characteristic science of the twentieth century, so new and higher forms of social organization will inevitably characterize the twentieth-century life of the human race.

As a society or community grows, it differentiates. New wants then arise, and new forms of activity emerge to enable the society to satisfy these wants. As distinct groups of persons engage in the different forms of activity, these forms of activity become specialized, and the groups of persons engaged in them constitute the organs of the society; e. g., government, the pro-

fessions, transportation, and the various branches of industry. Each organ, under normal conditions, tends, like the organism itself, to pass through two distinct stages of development; one biological and impulsive, the other sociological and rational. The biological stage is strongly marked by individualism; the sociological, by co-operation. In the transition from the former to the latter the state of anarchy is gradually transformed to the reign of law.

This does not necessarily mean, of course, that under the reign of law either competition is eliminated or progress ceases. It only implies that human activities are rationalized. The genius and inventive impulse of all the individuals are capitalized, and then directed by reason for the welfare of the whole community.

At the present time the different organs of society differ greatly in their degree of development. Some are yet at the beginning of the chaotic stage; some are approaching the reign of law; a very few, in certain countries, are almost rationalized, such as government, education, and one or two forms of industry. In the twentieth century, however, the rational element in the various social organs may be expected to make more progress than in the nineteen centuries preceding. A few instances will now be given, illustrative of what may be accomplished in this direction, first in professional, and then in industrial life.

(1) *The professions.* a) *Medicine.*—The practice of medicine is yet in the biological or impulsive stage of its development. It is organized on an irrational and unnatural basis. For their success and welfare physicians are dependent on the misfortunes of the other members of the community. The greater the amount of sickness among the people, other things being equal, the greater is the prosperity of the physicians. Physicians are paid for curing persons who are sick, or for helping them to depart in peace when they are incurable. And the invalid or his family, those members of society least able to bear additional burdens, are the ones who are required to pay the doctor's bills. Untold suffering exists now, and numberless untimely deaths occur, because many persons, on account of the expense involved, do not call in a reputable physician, or do not consult one until too late. It ought

to be the business of the medical profession to keep the people well, to prevent them from becoming sick, rather than to cure them after they have fallen sick. But if physicians should act according to this principle, in so far as they would succeed, they would cut off their own means of support. Hence, as physicians are dependent now for their living on the sickness and misfortunes of the other members of the community, it cannot reasonably be expected that the body politic will be in good physical or mental condition. A radical change is needed in the organization of the medical profession—a change in the twentieth century analogous to that which took place in the teaching profession in the nineteenth century. The time is coming when a reliable physician will be appointed, on a good salary, in each district or village, two or three in each town, and a superintendent and his staff in every city. They will be retained in their positions as long as they give satisfactory service. And their expenses will be met by a general tax. This change does not imply, of course, that all physicians who do not get appointments will be driven out of practice. Nor does it necessarily mean that all the best physicians will accept public appointments. Just as in the sphere of education there is still a place—a subordinate, though perhaps an essential, place—left for private schools, so in the field of medicine there will always be a place left for independent physicians. But these will be efficient men. Inefficient men will be obliged to withdraw from the profession.

Another important consideration is that a fraction of the number of physicians now employed, if their work were properly organized, would suffice to perform it. Hence, as fewer physicians would be needed than now, the requirements for admission to the profession could be largely increased. The final outcome would be that all physicians would be first-class men, enthusiastic in their work; and the people would be kept in good health, because patients would get good attendance at the proper time.

In this manner the two fundamental desiderata of the practice of medicine would be secured, viz., a first-class service, and this at a reasonable cost. Under present conditions either of these advantages can be obtained, but only by the sacrifice of the

other. First-class medical service is within the reach of only the wealthy few. As a result, the great mass of the people have to resort to the quack and the patent medicines. In an intelligent community the quack and the patent-medicine man would be left without patrons, unless in so far as they might experiment upon each other for their mutual good—or for their mutual evil, as the case might be.

It is scarcely to be expected, perhaps, that this reform in the practice of medicine will be completely effected in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, a change somewhat analogous will be brought about, if our civilization continues to progress. In fact, a good beginning has already been made, in the appointment of sanitary and meat inspectors, the establishment of public hospitals and clinics, and the organization of protective associations.

b) Law.—The organization of the legal profession is almost as irrational as that of the medical. In our day much of the best legal talent is consumed endeavoring to discover exceptions and loopholes in order to render the law of no effect; in other words, lawyers do all that they possibly can to make the way of the transgressor easy. On the other hand, it is here contended that the business of the legal profession should be to cause the law to prevail, and to make the administration of justice a terror to evil-doers. The way of the transgressor ought to be made hard. Furthermore, in our day it is a primary object of many lawyers to foster legal proceedings; for the more lawsuits there are, the more work, and consequently the more pay, there is for the lawyers. On the contrary, it is here contended that a primary aim of the legal profession ought to be to lessen the number of lawsuits; for it is to the advantage of society to have as few disputes as possible, and of these to have as many as possible satisfactorily settled out of court. But if this mode of procedure were universally adopted, many lawyers would have to withdraw from the profession. Their retirement, no matter how it should affect them, would be a great gain to society. For the total interests of the public at large are much more important than the particular interests of any special class. The public must find a remedy for the evil of excessive judicial proceedings. That remedy will be

some form of co-operative organization. The people of a district, or the members of a school or of a fraternal association, will select a reliable and competent firm of lawyers to which they will intrust all their legal business that involves persons outside the district or school, and such legal business as they deem expedient that involves only themselves. The results of such action would be threefold: (1) Inefficient lawyers would find no rest for the sole of their foot within the profession, and pettifoggery would practically disappear. (2) Efficient lawyers would become protectors of the right, and, to some extent, conciliators and arbitrators. (3) As far fewer lawyers would be needed than now, the requirements for admission to the profession could be greatly increased.

A beginning in this work also has already been made. Trusts, corporations, and labor and other organizations have their legal representatives to attend to whatever business may be demanded of them. This is only the beginning, however. Nevertheless, it is auspicious. It opens up an unexplored and unlimited field for future development. Society may confidently look forward to a time when every district will have a reliable government lawyer whose chief business will be to give legal advice, free of charge, to anyone desiring it.

c) *Theology*.—In the sphere of religion the organizing tendency has recently become prominent. This is shown in the union of certain denominations for more effective religious work, and in the closer association of all denominations for more effective philanthropic work. It is, indeed, high time for the clergy to make an effort to regain their lost prestige. The clergy were once the most cultured class in society, and, consequently, the natural leaders of thought. But they have long since fallen from grace. They are now but imitators, and imitators, as Plato would say, who are twice or thrice removed. They are still a conservative force in the community, but have ceased to be a progressive force. Their mantle has fallen upon the scientist, the educator, and the journalist. These are but poor Elishas, however; they do not speak as "the man of God." The clergy ought to reassert their rights. And when they speak again with author-

ity—the authority of inspiration and truth, rather than that of legend or tradition—the people will be only too eager to hear them. The present movement for greater union is the promise of a new and brighter day in this regard.

d) *Journalism*.—One other instance from professional life may be mentioned. Journalism is a modern profession, and it is only just emerging from the biological stage of development. Journalism was never made; it grew—not according to nature, but by chance; and, in consequence, malformation has ever been one of its predominant characteristics. Of late it is thought by some that the journalist, like other professional men, should receive a scientific preparation for his life-work, and no longer be obliged to proceed according to the rule of thumb. It is proposed to establish departments of journalism in some of the larger universities. But everyone knows that journalism cannot be satisfactorily taught by means of theory alone. Every department of journalism should edit a daily paper; for the journalist, like the scientist, requires to have his laboratory and testing apparatus always at hand.

Now it is worthy of note that, at the present time, one of the most vital needs of society—perhaps, everything considered, the most vital of all—is a reliable and independent press—one that would print the truth without exaggeration, one that would be independent of politics and of capitalism, and one that would constantly remain in close touch with the hearts of the people. Probably the best and most practical way of securing a public press that would meet most fully these requirements would be to establish a department of journalism, with a daily paper, at every state university. This paper would be sent free to every school and library within the state, and sold to subscribers at the regular subscription rate. Such a paper, distributed over the land, would do more for true enlightenment and social guidance than all the Carnegie libraries together. This, without doubt, should be one of the early measures of the twentieth century.

(2) *Industry*.—Leaving the consideration of the professions, we turn for a moment to trade and industry. One or two instances, for lack of space, must here suffice. Moreover, owing to

the recent progress of co-operative organization in profit-sharing, and in bringing street railways and water and light plants under municipal ownership, a detailed treatment is not necessary. We select, first, an instance that is general.

a) *Organization of labor*.—It has often been said that all honest work is alike honorable and sacred. That may be true, but all honest work is not alike respected. To make some forms of honest work respectable, these three things are necessary: (1) specialization, (2) proper hours of labor, and (3) sufficient remuneration. The most effective means of securing these requisites is by intelligent organization. Every man and every woman, in the industrial age in which we live, should be trained up to some special calling—i. e., should be given a profession or a trade. In this manner all work would become specialized, and all workers organized.

With the advance of the physical sciences in the last century, the processes of production and distribution were, in large measure, systematized and specialized. With the advance of the social sciences, in the present century, the processes pertaining to consumption—e. g., personal and household services—in like manner will become systematized and specialized. Baking and laundering have been removed from the home; cooking, heating, dusting, and many other household tasks will inevitably be disposed of likewise. When there is a dining-hall in every city block, supplying meals at private houses, or furnishing a table or a dining-room within the hall to every family that desires it, the cooking question will be solved. The work now done by hand, both out-of-doors and indoors, will more and more be done by the use of machinery. Unskilled workers will gradually be transformed to skilled workers. And ultimately the servant girl will disappear, along with the day-laborer.

Moreover, when distribution has been more thoroughly organized, and placed on a strictly economic basis, by means of department and co-operative stores; and when the supernumeraries of the professions have been eliminated and have returned to productive occupations, there will follow a great reduction in the daily hours of labor.

And, furthermore, to the increase of efficiency consequent on the lessened hours of employment, together with that arising from improved individual skill and more perfect organization, will be added a third increase of efficiency resulting from the more extensive use of mechanical inventions. Then will come the golden age of the working-man. As work becomes more and more efficient, it becomes more productive. As it becomes more productive, it is entitled to larger remuneration. As the workmen become better organized, and thus better able to secure the just reward of their labor, wages will increase. No doubt the time will come when some people will receive less than they receive now for doing what everyone wants to do, and when others will receive more than they receive now for doing what everyone wants not to do.

b) *Insurance*.—A more special instance is that of life insurance. The subject of life insurance is one that has recently attracted much attention, and still agitates the public mind. Congress alone can adequately deal with this question. Straight life policies and annuities should be distinguished from the various forms of investment policies. The former two classes of insurance should be a function of the federal government, managed by a commission of experts. In this manner much of the expenses of administration, and all the expenses of advertising and canvassing, would be saved to the policy-holders. A public notice, containing instructions and stating the primary facts about insurance, would be posted up in a conspicuous place in every post-office; and the teachers in the public schools would give, as part of the regular instruction, a few lessons each term on the nature and importance of the subject. The premium rates would then, perhaps, be about half what they are now. Only as much money would require to be paid in on premiums as would be paid out on disbursements; whereas according to the sixty-first annual report of the New York Life Insurance Company, the total income of that company for 1905 was \$103,630,864, and the total disbursements were \$59,326,713; or, more specifically, the total income from premiums was \$83,812,518, and the total disbursements to policy-holders were \$40,391,432. Under the

proposed scheme, practically every man, as he ought, would take out an insurance policy. Then every man, in a new sense, would become his brother's keeper—his brother's health being a particular object of his regard. A solution of this problem might be reasonably expected in the near future, if politicians did not so much persist in trying all the possible wrong ways of doing a thing before adopting the right way.

c) *Railroads*.—We select, in conclusion, the subject of railroads. Much has been said of late about certain prominent evils of railroad administration, but comparatively little has been said about the greatest evil of all. The system of rebates is a flagrant injustice; but it affects directly a comparatively small number of people. Excessive passenger rates are an evil of far greater magnitude. Less has been heard of this grievance because the persons most affected were those least able to obtain the public ear. In Germany, one can travel almost anywhere at the rate of half a cent per kilometer; and in India the railroads make "an average charge for each passenger of less than half a cent a mile."³ Now society, in many respects, is like an organism. And those organisms which are most mobile, other things being equal, are the ones which are most able to adjust themselves to changes in external conditions, and thus are most successful in the struggle for existence. The same holds true of those smaller organisms, the individuals, which are within the larger organism. In Germany, if a workman is out of employment, he can travel, for a few dollars, from one end of the empire to the other. In America, if a workman is out of employment, he has three choices—yea four, if he has money saved; he may deliver up his hard-earned cash to the railroads, or he may try to beat his way, or he may become a tramp, or he may remain where he is. No method can adequately deal with the tramp problem that does not include a solution of the passenger-traffic problem. And the tramp evil, only yet in its infancy, casting its shadow across the horoscope of the future, presents a spectacle truly appalling. Prudence, no less than humanity, demands an immediate solution of the passenger-traffic problem—a solution that will secure to the working-man

³ "Morley's Address on India," *Outlook*, August 25, 1906.

cheap transportation from those places where work is scarce to those where it is more plentiful. The Yankee is often put forward as a shining example of great resourcefulness; but in this respect, when compared with his German neighbor, he is like a barnacle attached to a rock by the seashore, which may luxuriate in great plenty when the tide is high, but must wait in want when the tide is low. The only immediate relief to the Yankee, in a period of depression, is the soup-kitchen, which to him is like a shower of rain or spray to the stranded barnacle. The German, on the other hand, having solved the transportation problem, is able to go in and out with the tide. True, the environment of the German may not be the best possible for his well-being, but, such as it is, he has learned how to make the most of it. And this is something which the American as yet has not seriously attempted.

Congress has recently been grappling with the railroad problem. But it is scarcely to be supposed that any measure which Congress will enact in the near future will secure the much-needed relief. What is imperatively demanded is a passenger rate for the working-classes, varying from half a cent per mile for short distances to one-fourth of a cent per mile for long distances. Nor is this plan utopian. It would only be necessary for the railroads to abolish free passes, to squeeze out the water that has been poured into railroad stock, and to make some commensurate return to the public for value received in money and land, in order to make the plan here suggested practicable. For passenger traffic would then increase many fold, at comparatively small additional cost. And everyone knows, except possibly railroad men, that it is not so much the rate of fare as the number of fares that makes a railroad pay. Cheap excursions have long been an object-lesson in this direction, though apparently one of little educational value. But ere long the social child will open its sleepy eyes, conscious of the light of an ever-brightening day; and, among the epoch-making changes that will then be brought to pass, cheap passenger transportation will be by no means the least significant, nor the least beneficial.

In opposition to the views here advanced it will doubtless be urged that the people are not sufficiently intelligent, and that the organizing faculty in human nature is not sufficiently strong, to enable these improvements to be realized within any reasonable time. In reply, it need only be said that within the last generation mankind has demonstrated a capacity for organization which until then was incredible. Yet the movement has scarcely well begun. For, as the latter half of the nineteenth century was characterized by progress in biology and psychology, the twentieth century will be characterized by progress in sociology and ethics. And just as the rise of sociology has been attended by a new era in social organization, so the continued progress of that science will inevitably be accompanied by increasing power of helpful co-operation. Two great tendencies are moving ceaselessly in this direction; one theoretical, the other practical; one science and education, the other invention and mastery of mechanisms for control of the forces of nature. Science and education, by conferring upon mankind an ever-widening outlook, are developing farther foresight and deeper insight; while the improved mechanical contrivances not only enable labor to be specialized and workmen to be organized, but also serve as the handmaid of the scientific imagination, by means of which new secrets of the universe are disclosed every day.

Moreover, through the advance of the agricultural and the veterinary sciences, the earth in the twentieth century will become many times more fruitful than it was in the nineteenth. Then the population of the globe may increase many fold. Transportation will be further cheapened and distribution further facilitated. New and higher forms of organization will ensue. A new heaven and a new earth will appear. Old things will pass away: all things will become new.

Furthermore, as the ends of the earth are drawn ever closer together, and different races and tongues mingle more freely with one another, everyone will feel, in a sense not realized hitherto, that nothing of humanity is foreign to one. The biological and irrational method of progress, by means of military and industrial warfare, will gradually give place to the sociological and

rational method, through helpful co-operation and sympathetic emulation. The principle of nationality, one of the two great political principles developed during the last century, will gradually become transmuted, and out of national independence will spring international interdependence. The other chief political principle of the last century, the principle of democracy, in Hegelian or in some other fashion, will develop along two opposite and yet complementary lines: centralization with regard to national affairs, and decentralization with regard to local affairs. And on these two principles will ultimately rest the universal government of the world-empire—the kingdom of heaven among men—which has been dreamed of by poets, foretold by prophets, and schematized by philosophers. Then the statesman, in the language of Plato, will be the spectator of all time and of all existence. Then the peace of justice will enable every man to realize his higher nature, to secure a fair field and a square deal. Then the war-drum will beat no longer, and the battle-flags will be furled “in the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World.”

REVIEWS

Races and Immigrants in America. By JOHN R. COMMONS, professor of political economy, University of Wisconsin. New York: Macmillan, 1907. Pp. xiii+242.

It is difficult to give anything but a frankly unfavorable review of this book, unless it be judged as a popular work or as a mere introduction to the subjects of which it treats. To discuss the racial and immigration problems of the United States within the limits of a volume of a little over 200 pages with anything like scientific adequacy is manifestly impossible. What should require several volumes Professor Commons has attempted to accomplish in a single volume, and a very brief one at that. Nowhere does the author explain the purpose of the book, and the reader is left to decide for himself by what standards it should be judged.

Judged by the standards of exact scholarship the work is deficient in many respects. It is particularly deficient on the biological and anthropological sides. The term "race" is especially loosely used, though the author justifies this by saying that the ethnographers use it in the same way, disregarding the fact that this is not the best usage. He says, for example, "Mankind in general has been divided into three and again into five great racial stocks, and one of these stocks, the Aryan or Indo-Germanic, is represented among us by ten or more subdivisions which we also term races." To say nothing of the doubtful propriety of speaking of an Aryan race, there is here the additional impropriety of identifying the Aryans with one of the "five great racial stocks of mankind," presumably the white race, though later the author speaks of the Semitic race as distinct from the Aryans. This is merely an illustration of the ethnological inaccuracies throughout the book. In general the ethnological basis of the discussion is inadequate or inaccurate, judged from a scientific standpoint. The biological aspects of the immigration problem likewise are inadequately considered.

While the standpoint of the author is mainly economic and political, rather than biological and sociological, still it cannot be

said that even the economic and political aspects of immigration receive as full treatment as one could desire. One general thesis of the author, that race antagonism springs from economic competition, is not supported by sufficient evidence. While economic competition undoubtedly intensifies race antagonism, still the researches of race psychologists' have shown it to be quite independent of economic conditions in the narrow sense; and this the author also practically acknowledges in his references to the relations between the Indians and the whites.

On the other hand, if the work is judged as a semi-popular one, or as a brief introduction to the subjects of which it treats, there is much to be said in its favor. While not profound, it is a brief and concise treatment of serious public problems, and is characterized by the good judgment and general sanity which are evident in Professor Commons' works in general. The general point of view and conclusions of the book are undoubtedly sound, and it will serve a useful purpose in introducing to many the serious study of our racial and immigration problems. To one who can spend but a brief time in reading along the line of these problems, but who wishes a general survey of them all, there is no book that can be more heartily commended.

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The Psychology of Religious Belief. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT, PH.D., assistant professor of philosophy in Williams College. New York: Macmillan, 1907. Pp. xii+327.

The sociologist should be deeply interested in the scientific study of religious beliefs and practices; for, as has been frequently pointed out, the history of a civilization is often largely but the life-history of a particular religion. The above work is certainly among the most valuable of recent studies of religion on the psychological side. It is an attempt to interpret religious beliefs upon the basis of the new functional psychology. It seeks the springs of such typical religious beliefs as the belief in God and in immortality, in the life of feeling and instinct. The book certainly throws considerable light upon the psychological genesis of these beliefs in the race, and in the individual. On the whole the author reaches practically the same conclusion as H. R. Marshall,¹ namely, that

¹ See his *Instinct and Reason*.

religious belief is fundamentally instinctive. His argument is convincing, but it may be questioned if he does not minimize too greatly the rational element in religious belief. He tends, indeed, to take the position of Kidd (whom he does not cite, but with an adaptation of one of whose illustrations² he, nevertheless, opens his book), that religion is essentially ultra-rational. The religion of the understanding, like the religion of primitive credulity, is destined to pass away; only the religion of feeling will remain. One questions whether such an argument by reason against reason can be anything more than self-refuting. While the religious beliefs of the masses may be "unreasoned," and while the instinctive element in religion is unquestionably large, yet has not the whole evolution of religion been a progressive rationalization of religious beliefs and practices? Is there any more danger that religion of the understanding will pass away than that the religion of feeling will pass away? Are we not, on the contrary, justified in assuming from the history of religion that the reasoned element in religious belief will become larger and larger?

But the chief fault of the book is that it fails to develop a *social* psychology of religious belief—that is, it neglects the sociological point of view. It continually speaks of the genesis of religious belief as though it were wholly an individual matter, disregarding the social side of the problem. Even in the chapter on "The Value of God" the subject is discussed wholly from the standpoint of the individual. It is true that the author specifically renounces any attempt to treat the social side of religion. But the question is, Can any true psychological explanation of religious beliefs be given without taking the social life into account? Can sociology be separated from psychology in explaining such a psycho-social phenomenon as religion? If it be true that "the psychology of the future will be social to the core," as an eminent psychologist has recently declared, then it would seem that the psychologist in studying religious beliefs must take the social point of view—that is, he must be a sociologist as well as a psychologist.

The book is also weak on the anthropological side. This is shown by the dearth of anthropological authorities cited and even more by the entire neglect of the two great stages of natural religion which spring directly from the primitive animism, namely, totemism and ancestor worship. On the whole, however, the work

² Cf. Kidd, *Social Evolution*, pp. 88 ff.

deserves careful reading by all who are interested in religion in any of its aspects.

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Morals in Evolution. By L. T. HOBHOUSE. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1906. 2 Vols. Vol. I, pp. 375; Vol. II, pp. 284.

The work undertakes a comparative study of rules of conduct and ideals of life. Without assuming any particular theory of evolution, it presents different forms of ethical ideas. The results of the classification, however, when viewed in the light of evolutionary theory present a unity that raises it above any character of patchwork. Obviously a work covering such a wide scope must deal only in outline form with the general line of development and even then must run the risk of important omissions and disproportion in treatment of different elements in the process. This is doubtless the weakest point in what is on the whole an extremely illuminating and penetrating treatment.

Ethical evolution is separated from social evolution, though in fact they are closely related. "The strictly ethical element is the conception of the good whereby man seeks deliberately to regulate his conduct" (Part I, p. 40). Ethical progress is a progress in conceptions, acting through tradition. Among ethical conceptions we distinguish between the rule of action and the reason given for obeying it. The first is embodied in custom and law, the second is intertwined with the progress of thought in general, and religious thought in particular, from which that which is strictly ethical is to be disengaged.

Part I is devoted to the first of these, the standard for measuring ethical progress; Part II, with the basis, or the reasons assigned for following the standard.

The chapters of Part I deal with: The different forms of social organization; the manner in which conduct is regulated; custom and law; marriage and the position of women in savage and in civilized society; the relation between communities, group morality; relations within the group, class relations: property and poverty; a study of private right and community obligation.

The outcome of the progress outlined in the foregoing is indicated on p. 367:

Thus amid all the variety of social institutions and the ebb and flow

of historical change it is possible in the end to detect a double movement marking the transition from the lower to the higher levels of civilized law and custom. On the one hand the social order is strengthened and extended. . . . At the same time the social organization grows in extent.

As these two lines progress the individual comes to a larger realization of rights guaranteed by society and of obligations due society. The development of the two poles, the individual and society, simultaneously, implies in a double sense the realization of humanity, that is, as a personal and as a universal concept.

This first volume is a purely objective study, and presents a large mass of valuable material, gleaned from many sources. The scope is so wide, however, that the progress can be indicated only in outline; and in some cases there are serious omissions that detract from the comprehensiveness of a piece of work which purports to be complete, at least in outline. Thus, he devotes but forty-three pages to a discussion of "Law and Justice," with an appendix of twelve pages on savage conditions. It is impossible in so narrow space to indicate even in outline all the elements involved in law as an expression of ethical status. Law is treated only as a means of punishing wrongs, and justice only as corrective. But distributive justice and law as an expression of the ethical social consciousness are both matters that call for some adequate treatment in a work that attempts to cover the ethical field. Again, the chapter on "Class Relations" is devoted entirely to a discussion of civil rights, with special reference to the history of slavery and serfdom. But this is only one of many class relations that appear within a group. The ethical problems arising from the relations of industrial classes to one another, is one example of many that might be mentioned.

Part II deals with the sanctions of conduct, the reasons men have given for acting in a certain way. It falls into two main divisions: the progress of ethical concepts as growing out of animistic and religious thought; and the development of ethical theory as a consciously distinct reflecting on the meaning and the end of human life. The first four chapters present: the early phases of thought; ethical conceptions in early thought; the world and spirit; monotheism. The last four are: ethical idealism; philosophic ethics; modern ethics; the line of ethical development. The treatment in this volume is thoroughly psychological, well balanced, and broadly sympathetic. The analysis of the ethical content of religious thought, including the Christian, is especially penetrating

and thorough. To a field that has generally been treated almost wholly from the metaphysical or the merely anthropological standpoint, Hobhouse has brought a masterly psychological treatment, which brings into clear relief the worth for actual life of the various lines of religious thought. Here as in the first volume he is forced by the scope of his task sometimes to too summary statements. But there seem to be fewer serious omissions in the second than in the first volume.

Taken as a whole, the work is extremely valuable for sociological as well as for ethical thought. It has brought together a mass of carefully selected material; has woven together the conclusions of specialists in many fields; and has by its breadth of scope and subtlety of psychological analysis shown the significance of these facts and conclusions.

CECIL C. NORTH

Sin and Society: An Analysis of Latter-Day Iniquity. By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. With a letter from PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Pp. xi+167. \$1.00.

For competent persons, who are seriously interested in discerning the signs of the times, this book will perform the service of a high-power magnifying glass. Ethical discriminations which dogmatic morality, or the tide of life, obscures are brought out with the distinctness of a working drawing. There are types of persons whose moral judgments are mere reflections of their interested prejudice. These will like the author no better than Herodias loved John the Baptist, and for closely parallel reasons. People who are mentally and morally capable of putting together the related facts that moral judgments are always estimates of the effects of conduct upon assumed conditions, and that the conditions of present life vary in uncalculated ways from those in which our traditional judgments originated, will find the book a key to most timely ethical discoveries.

Already critics have unmasked the methods of defense likely to be adopted by people who resent the implications of the argument. The first stand is made on the position that the tone of the book is not judicial. If the author were a judge on the bench summing up the case for and against the individual *A. B.* charged with one of the modern forms of sin analyzed in the book, a more colorless style would be in order. The book, however, contains no "thou art

the man." It deals with principles, without presuming to point out their application to individuals. It visualizes qualities in conduct which make action socially helpful or harmful, and consequently right or wrong. It is not possible to make these distinctions too clear. The man who resents a style which makes them vivid has only himself to blame if he is suspected of preferring confusion to truth. The second means of defense is an attempt to convict Professor Ross of apologizing for evils the badness of which he has not questioned, which, however, he rates as less dangerous than other wrongs which have not yet received their proper label. I am inclined to think that, as a pure matter of pedagogic strategy, it was a mistake to set up the categorical contrast between vice and sin, viz.: "By *vice* we mean practices that harm oneself; by *sin*, we mean conduct that harms another" (p. 90). Most people whose consciences are troubled about questions of vice and sin at all are predisposed to the belief that the two categories are not mutually exclusive; that with every vice reaction there goes along some sin reaction, and vice versa. The classification of acts thus regarded as like in kind into dissimilar moral species is likely to affect such persons as virtually a plea for tolerance of the class of acts appraised as less harmful, for the sake of making out a case against classes of acts alleged to be more harmful. That is, the effect on such people in the first instance will be rather to rally them to reassertion of the exceeding sinfulness of vice, than to convince them of the greater sinfulness of sin. This is no proper charge against the logic of the book, but merely a point in diagnosis of the mental conditions against which it must work.

The weakest passage in the book is from the pen of the President of the United States. He says:

You reject that most mischievous of socialistic theses, viz.: that progress is to be secured by the strife of classes. You insist, as all healthy-minded patriots should insist, that public opinion, if only sufficiently enlightened and aroused, is equal to the necessary regenerative tasks and can yet dominate the future (p. xi).

The nature fakir is an innocuous innocent compared with the man who uses the prestige of eminence to confuse fundamental ideas of human relations. Precisely what judicious use of the Socratic method would prove our myriad-minded chief magistrate to have meant by the two sentences, it is impossible to say. That

he wanted to count against the socialists is plain enough, but no one is likely to do much toward correcting the errors of socialism by denying the things in which they happen to have been among the advance agents of truth. There is hardly a more elementary social generalization than that struggle of contending interests is a perpetual factor in human progress. No competent sociologist any longer attempts to make a point against socialism on this non-debatable proposition. The contention must begin when some of the socialists try to force the general proposition into an untenable particular version. "Public opinion," whether enlightened or not, is merely a euphemism for one method of mobilizing interests always engaged in the inevitable struggle. There has not been a day since he entered politics when President Roosevelt himself has not been as clear an incarnation of the struggle element in society as any interpreter of the conflict phase of the social process could wish. Of course it would have been indecorous for Professor Ross to look this gift horse in the mouth. No one will accuse him, however, of the confusion which the President's compromising commendation contains.

ALBION W. SMALL

Administration and Educational Work of American Juvenile Reform Schools. By DAVID S. SNEDDEN, PH.D., Columbia University. "Contributions to Education," Teachers College Series No. 12. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1907. Pp. 206.

The chief significance of this little book is that a professor in one of our greatest teachers' colleges has taken an interest in the administration and educational work in juvenile reform schools. It is to be hoped that it means a closer bond between the teaching profession and the reform schools. This interest should be reciprocal and should prove of value to both the public schools and the reform schools.

The author has evidently collected the reports of the ninety-six, or more juvenile reform schools, has visited some of them, and made up his study on the basis of these reports and visits. It was found difficult to answer a given question from the records of all these schools for there has been no uniformity of record and report. Accordingly many questions have been discussed from the reports of some small group of the schools, the records of which it was

possible to compare. It is represented that the findings in such cases are either typical as to all the schools, or most significant for the problem in hand.

It is the author's conclusion that the probable channels along which further development of juvenile reform schools will run are:

A more perfect classification of the children into groups where mutual intercourse would prove most helpful and least harmful; the development of increased opportunities for free and spontaneous play; the development of industrial training which would make the child more conscious of the purpose of his efforts, even at intermediate stages; and the enriching of the school work by a greater appeal to the self-active tendencies of the child at certain points—all of which seem to be well on the way to realization.

The practice, only begun as yet, of providing separate and special institutions for the feeble minded and for the truant, apart from the reform schools, is commended, and a larger use of the parole system is recommended.

The study is chiefly inductive, no small proportion of the text matter being in the form of quotations from reports. Although there are a number of small errors in composition both by author and printer, and some statements that need further consideration, the book is eminently worth while. It should be in the hands of every superintendent and teacher of the juvenile reform schools of this country and could very profitably be read by all educators who are also citizens.

T. J. RILEY

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

General Sociology: An Analytical Reference Syllabus. By GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD, head professor of political science and sociology in the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb. Published by the University. Pp. 86.

Comparative Federal Institutions: An Analytical Reference Syllabus. By the same. Pp. 133.

1. This very useful analytical bibliography is divided into four chapters: Chap. i, "Characteristics of Sociological Science," under which are five subdivisions; chap. ii, "Elements of Society. The Social Population," with three subdivisions; chap. iii, "The Factors or Causes of Social Phenomena," with five subdivisions; chap. iv, "The Social Processes," with seven subdivisions.

It gives a bird's-eye view of the sociological field with a full guide to the literature available for more minute exploration.

2. This is similar to the work noticed above. It has six chapters with fifty-two subdivisions and furnishes a very full guide to the literature of the subject.

VICTOR E. HELLEBERG

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Development of Western Civilization: a Study in Ethical, Economic and Political Evolution. By J. DORSEY FORREST, PH.D. The University of Chicago Press, 1907. Pp. ix+406.

This is an attempt to outline the genesis of western civilization with the purpose of giving the student the "sociological point of view." The limitations of space compel the author to a very severe selection of the material to be used. He merely indicates, in the first chapter, the contributions of the Jews, the Greeks, and the Romans, to the civilization bequeathed by these societies to Europe in the Middle Ages, when the Teutons overran the Roman Empire. The greater portion of the book (chaps. ii, iii, iv, and v, pp. 68-316) is given up to the development of European society during the Middle Ages with a final chapter on "Social Movements of Today."

Professor Forrest emphasizes the economic, political, and ethical causes in turn as each bears the chief part in the process of change, but keeps the reader in mind of the fact that all these causes are always at work. The clue to the development is the emergence of the individual from practical identity with his small group into full antithesis with human society. His relations with his fellow-men were at first few, rigid, and of very limited extent. Gradually, as reason and social organization grew, these relations increased in number, variety, flexibility, and extent. He is to be defined in terms of the functions he performs for the society of which he forms a part.

With a background in the mind of the student obtained by wide collateral reading, and with oral expansions in the classroom, the book would form an admirable syllabus for a course in which the student should learn to look at human history as a whole and to be able to place in its proper perspective any separate book, period, or movement.

VICTOR E. HELLEBERG

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Social Democracy and Population. By ALVAN A. TENNEY, PH.D., Columbia University. Columbia University Press, 1907. Pp. 89.

Defining social democracy in Lowell's phrase as a form of society "in which every man has a chance and knows that he has it," Dr. Tenney inquires how far the realization of such a type is conditioned by population. Rejecting Kidd's hypothesis that indefinite degeneration must follow upon any such easement in the struggle for existence as social democracy implies, the author shows that elimination by starvation or otherwise is only one of the selective processes; that there is another great type, reproductive selection, which depends upon unlikeness of birth-rates rather than on unlikeness of death-rates. There is, therefore, no reason why a salutary selection might not go on briskly in a society which had eliminated brutality from the struggle for subsistence. Society is already interfering with the propagation of the unfit, and there is no reason why many limitations upon the biological process should not be successfully imposed in a democracy.

More striking, however, is Dr. Tenney's inquiry as to the stability of social democracy in the presence of international competition. He shows that no people can realize social democracy without restricting the birth-rate sufficiently to raise the plane of comfort. Now, what will happen when the society in which men are dear competes with the societies in which they are cheap? At times in the past the dear-men society, thanks to its superior civilization, has had the advantage in numbers and weapons. But no such monopoly of an advancement is possible in these days when a superiority in technique, implements, or weapons is so promptly diffused. The prolific people of the Orient imitate our efficiency, but not our standards of living. In Japan or China, a few thousand progressives modernize army and navy, reorganize financial and commercial systems, and introduce railroads, telegraphs, and factories, but certain factors of high birth-rate, ancestor worship, early marriage, low position of women, etc., lie deep in the customs of the folk and change slowly. Presently in the struggle for colonies or markets, a people multiplying at an oriental rate confront the low-birth-rate occidental society with guns just as good but with more men behind the guns. What then? Unless the latter enjoys an easily defended situation it may be forced to the wall and with it social democracy.

Dr. Tenney concludes that the permanence of democracy in the United States is guaranteed by our happy situation between two oceans. Thanks to our natural barriers, we do not need to vie with our rivals in cheapening human beings. How mistaken, therefore, to throw away our advantages by letting in cheap men, or by developing a population dependent upon foreign trade. In his own words:

Cheap labor is the capitalist's demand. But cheap labor means cheap men. Will the country forego an increased gross wealth and accept increased per capita wealth for a smaller number of better men? Will it protect its laborers from the competition of foreign labor not by tariff on their products, but by preventing the entrance of those who will depress the plane of living? Will it extend the principle on the basis of which it has already excluded the Coolie? Will it make the sacrifice of substituting labor saving machinery even when it could produce more cheaply by obtaining cheap labor? Will it consciously deal with the question of population by means of the social limitations within its control? Will it for the sake of geographical unity and the avoidance of international complications give up the Philippines? To gain time for the gradual reduction of the rate of population increase, will it maintain the Monroe doctrine with a view to sending whatever future surplus population may arise in this country into South America, there in turn to develop American ideals of social democracy in the safety of a second geographical area? Above all, will it do these things before the increase in its own population makes necessary *nolens volens* an entrance into the world's struggle for foreign markets in competition with peoples of a lower plane of living?

The sample given indicates the originality, foresightedness, and statesmanlike breadth of an essay that no scholar or public man can afford to overlook.

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

An English Journal of Sociology.—Both for its importance as a bibliographical item, and as an index of the present sociological outlook in England, we present in full the following publishers' announcement:

Messrs. Sherratt & Hughes have much pleasure in announcing that they will publish, on January 15, 1908, *The Sociological Review*, which will be the only journal of its kind in this country. While France, Italy, Germany, the United States, and other countries have for some years supported sociological publications, no periodical covering the whole field of sociology, and devoted to sociology alone, is at present published in Great Britain. Naturally, many of the subjects which the *Review* will cover are already represented in the journals of various specialisms, but the purpose of the *Review* will be to touch each specialism at a point where it comes into contact with general sociology. It does not lie within its province to cater for the detailed investigations of the regular specialist, but rather to offer him a common ground whereon he may discuss his principles and results with the representatives of other specialisms in the presence of those interested in sociology at large. But from this point of view much of what is written and said under the title of ethics, economics, jurisprudence, and political science; many results of the history of religion, literature, and art; many of the conclusions of anthropology, and the social applications of biology and psychology fall within the sociological purview. In particular, the conductors of the *Review* hope to show that the problems of the day may be just as much objects of a detached and impartial scientific interest as any period in past history, or any phase of primitive life.

Thus to bring together the manifold investigations of the problems of human society and so focus their results as to throw light upon the broad principles of social philosophy and their application in practical life, is the outstanding problem of sociology to the solution of which it is the aim of *The Sociological Review* to contribute.

As the organ of the Sociological Society, the *Review* takes the place of the annual volume of *Sociological Papers* in which the proceedings of the Society have hitherto been published, and of which three volumes have appeared. As the work of the Society has grown it has been more and more felt by the council that a record of transactions alone did not adequately cover the field. Much that is of interest in oral discussion is of less value in the form of print, and conversely, there is often matter suitable for a *Review* which would be out of place in the meetings of the Society. *The Sociological Review* will have the material contributed at meetings to draw upon, but will also be able to go farther afield and obtain articles from those who are not able to read papers, and in this way it is hoped will become the mouthpiece of the whole sociological movement in this country. Further, it is an integral part of the work of a *Review* to give an adequate account of contemporary literature and of the periodical publications which deal with sociological problems. Every effort will be made by the editorial committee to make the *Review* on this side a record, as complete as possible, of contemporary sociology.

The Positive Philosophy of Penal Law.—The same criterion should be used to explain criminality that is used to explain genius. The true cause of the success of the genius is anterior to him; his work is a synthesis, an acceleration of ideas and sentiments that already existed and were in a process of development among a people. It is necessary to seek the cause of criminality, also, in the social environment; the anthropological, organic, and psychic characters are

only the tendencies due to heredity, which can develop or fail to develop, according as they find or fail to find favorable soil.

The social environment is the deciding factor in determining the criterion of crime, in defining the essence of criminality, and in determining the various manifestations and transformations of criminality. The normal individual does not exist. All individuals are more or less a collection of vices and virtues. The point at which just action degenerates into criminal action cannot be determined. The criterion of criminality, therefore, cannot be something absolute, but it changes with time, place, and people. A crime may be defined as the action of a person who, on account of particular psycho-organic conditions and special conditions of the physico-social environments, conflicts with the ethico-social standards sanctioned by a given people at a given historic period. A legal crime is a violation of the positive law; a natural crime is conflict with the ethico-social ideals, customs, and morality of a given period. The progress of civilization does not eliminate crime; only the form is changed.

Education is one of the multiple coefficients of moral redemption. The force of heredity decreases and the force of education increases with ascent in the zoological scale. Melioration in economic conditions is the principal means of arresting the development of criminality. The influence of physical factors is indirect and diminishes in direct ratio to the progress in civilization, because the individual becomes more subject to historical and social factors, and less subject to natural agents.

Sociology ought to be the fundamental guide in the study of criminality from the etiological, as well as from the therapeutic point of view, for the legislator as well as for the scholar.—Francesco Cosentini, "La philosophie positive du droit pénal," *Revue internationale sociologie*, Vol. 15, p. 707, October, 1907.

E. H. S.

Trade-Unionism in Germany.—Trade-unionism in Germany, though of more recent origin than in England, has outstripped the latter both numerically and proportionally. Germany shows an army of 2,300,000 organized workmen, or about 30 per cent. of the workers, occupied in trade and commerce. England has 1,000,000 organized workers, or somewhat less than 30 per cent. of the laborers, in unions. The advance of the movement is typified by the German centralized unions, few of which existed before 1890 when they had 250,000 members, against a membership of 1,797,285 in 1906. The majority of the present-day unions are children of the movement promoted at the end of the sixties of the last century by the leaders of the Social Democracy. Those established at that time were suppressed by the government, because the states of the Empire allowed of no free federation of independent societies dealing with public affairs. In 1890, when these laws were abrogated, these trade-unions became in fact Socialist unions. The shortsighted opportunist politics of Bismarck, which sought to lull the German workers into tame submission by granting them beneficent insurance regulations, etc., could not stop the movement. The unions still find a work to do in "friendly benefits" and in keeping the wages above the level fixed by the "iron wages law." The sum total of the expenditure of the sixty-six German centralized unions in 1906 was 36,963,413 marks. Fighting spirit and fighting efficiency are two different things, and to gauge the economic effect of the increasing number of wage movements in Germany requires more than a few summary figures. The direction of the current indicates economic progress for the workers.—Ed. Bernstein, in *Contemporary Review*, November, 1907.

L. W.

The Scope and the Importance to the State of the Science of National Eugenics.—There is still another science which calls for support and sympathy; which in the near future will demand its endowments, its special laboratory, its technical library, its enthusiastic investigators, and its proper share in the curriculum of academic studies—the science of mankind. What weight has philosophy, anthropology, or political economy at present in the

field of statesmanship? And is not the lesson of history rather that of example and analogy than of true explanation and measurement of national evolution?

The primary purpose of statecraft is to insure that the nation as a whole shall possess sanity; it must be sound in body and sound in mind. No success will attend our attempts to understand past history, to cast light on present racial changes, or to predict future development, if we leave out of account the biological factors.

Francis Galton, in establishing a laboratory for the study of national eugenics in the University of London, has defined this new science as "the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally." The word "eugenic" here has the double sense of the English well bred, goodness of nature, and goodness of nurture. Our science does not propose to confine its attention to problems of inheritance only, but to deal also with problems of environment and of nurture.

The university is the true field for the study of those agencies which may improve or impair our racial qualities. To become a true science, you must remove our study from the strife of parties, from the conflict of creeds, from false notions of charity, or the unbalanced impulses of sentiment. You must treat it with the observational caution and critical spirit that you give to other branches of biology.

In every branch of science there exist, I believe, three chief stages of development: (1) The *idiological*, when men have formed ideas about phenomena on the basis of very limited experience, when they spend their time and energy in discussing these ideas without much reference to the phenomena themselves; (2) the *observational*, a stage fundamental toward any really scientific theory of nature, when men merely observe phenomena critically, and record and describe their sequences; (3) the *metrical*, when men proceed from observation to measurement, to accurate numerical expression of the sequences involved. Any branch of science, until it reaches its third or metrical stage of development, is incomplete. There are few departments of scientific investigation which provide so thoroughly for discipline in all the three branches of science as biology; this is particularly true of its applications to man.

The material of this new science of eugenics, both physical and psychical, may be provided by every large school and university; its methods must be those applicable to mass observations, that is to say, those actuarial methods applied to biological data, which we now term the methods of biometry; the definiteness of its aims and conclusions is illustrated in its adducing evidence and proving: (1) that man varies; (2) that these variations, favorable or unfavorable, are inherited; and (3) that they are selected—thus applying to national growth the Darwinian hypothesis concerning the individual that the sounder one has more chance of surviving in the contest with physical and organic environment. It is therefore better able to produce and rear offspring, which in their turn inherit its advantageous characters. Profitable variations are thus seized on by natural selections, and perpetuated by heredity.

As to variation, in both men and women, its extent has been measured by the biometric school in nearly two hundred cases. The variability in any single local race of men amounts from 4 or 5 to 15 or 20 per cent. of the absolute value of the character.

As to the inheritance of variations in men, there appears no doubt that good and bad physique (physical), the liability to and immunity from disease (pathological), and the moral characters and the mental temperament (psychical) are inherited and with much the same intensity.

As to rational selection, in order that it should be suspended, it is not sufficient to reduce the selective death-rate; it is necessary that the relative fertility of the unfit should be higher than that of the fit. It is at once obvious (from table showing comparison of fertility of deaf-mutes, tuberculous, criminal, and insane stocks with that of more normal classes, that degenerate stocks under present social conditions are not short-lived; they live to have more than the normal size of family. Natural selection is largely suspended, but not the inheritance of degeneracy nor the fertility of the unfit. On the contrary, there is

more than a suspicion of the suspension of the fertility of the fit. Every condition which makes for bad nurture as well as bad nature seems to emphasize the birth-rate.

As we have found conscientiousness is inherited so I have little doubt that the criminal tendency descends in stock. We cannot reform the criminal, nor cure the insane, from the standpoint of heredity; the taint varies not with their moral or mental conduct.

The biological factors are dominant in the evolution of mankind; these, and these alone, can throw light on the rise and fall of nations, on racial progress, and national degeneracy. Consciously or unconsciously, we have suspended the racial purgation maintained in less developed communities by natural selection. We return our criminals after penance, our insane and tuberculous after "recovery," to their old lives; we have the mentally defective flotsam on the flood-tide of primordial passions.

The time seems upon us when the biological sciences shall begin to do for man what the physical have done for more than a century; when they shall aid him in completing his mastery of his organic development, as the physical sciences have largely taught him to control his inorganic environment. To bring this about we need above all two factors: first a knowledge of inheritance, variations, selections, and fertility in man, and the relation of these results to racial efficiency; second, an altered tone with regard to those phases of our sexual life upon which the health and welfare of the nation as a whole so largely depend.—Karl Pearson, in *Popular Science Monthly*, November, 1907. G. A. S.

Back to the Land.—American competition in agriculture is largely responsible for European rural depopulation since 1860. France and Germany have avoided these consequences somewhat by protective duties, and Austria by the development of home industries. "How can the land be managed and employed that it shall be made to pay?" Ownership of land is only secondarily a stimulus to agricultural success. One hundred years ago, a peasant proprietary was unable to cope with capitalistic competition, and it is not likely it could now. The failure of ordinary tillage in England to be remunerative means a demand for new crops, and new methods both of tillage and of marketing; and the small proprietor is not the person to attempt anything new. Some industries of Europe have not suffered from American competition, as cultivation of the vine, of flowers, and Danish dairy farming and poultry raising; but the small holder in England can hardly market his goods at a sufficient price to pay, as compared with the extensive dealer. But very small holdings or allotments, producing for home consumption only, are not open to this objection. It adds to the family income, to the stability of life, and gives a wholesome and attractive home interest. Rapid transit makes this possible also for many artisans. Subsistence farming is capable of indefinite extension. Mill's objections will not now apply with the new attitude toward the doctrine of free trade and the bugbears of the wages fund and overpopulation theories. Its tendency to check the fluidity of labor would not offset its advantages.—W. Cunningham, in *Economic Review*, October, 1907. L. L. B.

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THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY¹

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Social psychology, as the writer conceives it, studies the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association. It seeks to understand and account for those uniformities in feeling, belief, or volition—and hence in action—which are due to the interaction of human beings, i. e., to social causes. No two persons have just the same endowment. Looking at their heredity we should expect people to be far more dissimilar and individual than we actually find them to be. The aligning power of association triumphs over diversity of temperament and experience. There ought to be as many religious creeds as there are human beings; but we find people ranged under a few great religions. It is the same in respect to dress, diet, pastimes, or moral ideas. The individuality each as received from the hand of nature is largely effaced, and we find people gathered into great planes of uniformity.

In shifting attention from the agreements in which men rest, such as languages, religions, cultures, to the agitations into which they are drawn, it is natural to change the metaphor from *plane* to *current*. The spread of the lynching spirit through a crowd in the presence of an atrocious criminal, the contagion of panic in a beaten army, an epidemic of religious emotion, and the

¹ Opening chapter of a forthcoming work entitled, *Social Psychology: An Outline and Source Book*.

sympathetic extension of a strike call up the thought of a current which bears people along for a time and then ceases.

Social psychology differs from sociology proper in that the former considers planes and currents, the latter groups and structures.² Their interests bring men into co-operation or conflict. They group themselves for the purpose of co-operating or struggling, and they devise structures as a means of adjusting interests and attaining practical ends. Social psychology considers them only as coming into planes or currents of uniformity, not as uniting into groups. Since the former determine the latter more than the latter determine the former, social psychology should precede rather than follow sociology proper in the order of studies.

Social psychology pays no attention to the non-psychic parallelisms among human beings—an epidemic of disease or the prevalence of chills and fever among the early settlers of river-bottom lands—or to the psychic parallelisms that result therefrom—melancholia, or belief in eternal punishment. It neglects the uniformities among people that are produced by the direct action of a common physical environment (superstitiousness of sailors, apprehensiveness of dwellers in earthquake countries, independent spirit of mountaineers, the addiction of Englishmen in the tropics to the cork helmet); or by subjection to similar conditions of life (dissipatedness of tramp printers, recklessness of cowboys, preciseness of elderly school teachers, suspiciousness of farmers).

Social psychology ignores uniformities arising directly or indirectly out of race endowment—negro volubility, gipsy nomadism, Malay vindictiveness, Singhalese treachery, Magyar passion for music, Slavic mysticism, Teutonic venturesomeness, American restlessness. How far such common characters are really racial in origin and how far merely social, is a matter yet to be settled. Probably they are much less congenital than we love to imagine. "Race" is the cheap explanation tyros offer for

²As here understood social psychology is, therefore, by no means the same as psychological sociology, for it omits the psychology of groups. The writer doubts whether it is practicable or wise to treat the psychological side of sociology quite apart from the morphological side.

any collective trait that they are too stupid or too lazy to trace to its origin in the physical environment, the social environment, or historical conditions.

Social psychology deals only with uniformities due to social causes, i. e., to mental contacts or interactions. In each case we must ask: "Are these human beings aligned by their common instincts and temperament, their common geographical situation, their identical conditions of life, or by their inter-psychology, i. e., the influences they have received from one another or from a common human source?" The fact that a mental agreement extends through society, bringing into a common plane great numbers of men, does not make it social. It is *social* only in so far as it arises out of the interplay of minds.

Social psychology seeks to enlarge our knowledge of society by explaining how so many planes in feeling, belief, or purpose have established themselves among men and supplied a basis for their groupings, their co-operations, and their conflicts. But for the processes which weave into innumerable men certain ground patterns of ideas, beliefs, and preferences, great societies could not endure. No communities could last save those held together by social pleasure or by the necessity for co-operation. National characteristics would not arise and strife would be the rule outside of the group of men subject to the same area of characterization.

It seeks to enlarge our knowledge of the individual by ascertaining how much of his mental content and choices is derived from his social surroundings. Each of us loves to think himself unique, self-made, moving in a path all his own. To be sure, he finds his feet in worn paths, but he imagines he follows the path because it is the right one, not because it is trodden. Thus Cooley³ observes: "The more thoroughly American a man is the less he can perceive Americanism. He will embody it; all he does, says, or writes, will be full of it; but he can never truly see it, simply because he has no exterior point of view from which to look at it." Now, by demonstrating everywhere in our lives the unsuspected presence of social factors social psychology spurs us to push

³ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 36.

on and build up a genuine individuality, to become a voice and not an echo, a person and not a parrot. The realization of how pitiful is the contribution we have made to what we are, how few of our ideas are our own, how rarely we have thought out a belief for ourselves, how little our feelings arise naturally out of our situation, how poorly our choices express the real cravings of our nature, first mortifies, then arouses us to break out of our prison of custom and conventionality and live an open-air life close to reality. Only by emancipation from the spell of numbers and age and social eminence and personality can ciphers become integers.

Social psychology falls into two very unequal divisions, viz., social ascendancy and individual ascendancy, the determination of the one by the many and the determination of the many by the one; the molding of the ordinary person by his social environment and the molding of the social environment by the extraordinary person. Thus the knightly ideal, romantic love, the *Westminster Confession*, and the belief in public education, are at once achievements of superior persons, and elements in the social environments of many ordinary persons.

For example, we may distinguish three principal sources of the feelings on slavery extant in this country in 1860:

1. *Observation or experience of slave-holding.*—In the South, slavery was profitable and the economic interests of that section became bound up with it. In the North, it was unprofitable and hence men could feel disinterestedly about it.

2. *Imbibing from the social environment.*—In the South, belief in the rightfulness of slavery became first a creed, and then a tradition under which the young grew up. During the seventy years from 1790 to 1860 there was a marked increase of antipathy to the negro and an extension of the color line. By 1835 pro-slavery sentiment had become so militant that abolitionism was no longer allowed to show itself openly. The generation reared in this close atmosphere could not but be biased. Southern opinion became first homogeneous, then imperious, finally intolerant. Southern feeling about slavery reached the pitch of fanaticism. Even the "poor whites" became pro-slavery. In the

North anti-slavery sentiment became predominant, but not intolerant. In each section there formed a psychic vortex, more and more powerful, which sucked in the neutral and indifferent and imparted to them its own motion.

3. *The initiative of the élite*.—In the South, the public men, great planters, and commercial magnates molded sectional opinion in the interest of the slave-holding aristocracy. In the North, poets, divines, orators, philosophers, and statesmen built up the anti-slavery sentiment. Garrison, Phillips, Parker, Lovejoy, Stowe, Beecher, Lowell, Thoreau, and Whittier proclaimed the mandates of the voice within the heart.

Of these three factors the first is not social at all, the second exemplifies social ascendancy, and the third, individual ascendancy.

Again, to drive the distinction home, let us consider the factors that determine the boundary line between Catholicism and Protestantism in Europe. There is:

1. *The affinity between the confessions and the people*.—Says Taylor:

The dolichocephalic Teutonic race is Protestant, the brachycephalic Celto-Slavic race is either Roman Catholic or Greek Orthodox. In the first, individualism, wilfulness, self-reliance, independence are strongly developed; the second is submissive to authority and conservative in instincts. To the Teutonic races Latin Christianity was never congenial, and they have now converted it into something very different from what it was at first or from what it became in the hands of Latin and Greek doctors. The Teutonic peoples are adverse to sacerdotalism, and have shaken off priestly guidance and developed individualism. Protestantism was a revolt against a religion imposed by the South upon the North, but which had never been congenial to the northern mind. The German princes, who were of purer Teutonic blood than their subjects, were the leaders of the ecclesiastical revolt. Scandinavia is more purely Teutonic than Germany, and Scandinavia is Protestant to the backbone. The Lowland Scotch, who are more purely Teutonic than the English, have given the freest development to the genius of Protestantism. Those Scotch clans which have clung to the old faith have the smallest admixture of Teutonic blood. Ulster, the most Teutonic province of Ireland, is the most firmly Protestant. The case of the Belgians and the Dutch is very striking. The line of religious division became the line of political separation, and is conterminous with the two racial provinces. The mean cephalic index of the Dutch is 75.3, which is nearly that of the Swedes and

the North Germans; the mean index of the Belgians is 79, which is that of the Parisians. The Burgundian cantons of Switzerland, which possess the largest proportion of Teutonic blood, are Protestant, while the brachycephalic cantons in the East and South are the stronghold of Catholicism. South Germany, which is brachycephalic, is Catholic; North Germany, which is dolichocephalic, is Protestant. Hanover, which is Protestant, has a considerably lower index than Cologne, which is Catholic. The Thirty Years' War was a war of race as well as of religion, and the peace of Westphalia drew the line of religious demarcation with tolerable precision along the ethnic frontier.

Wherever the Teutonic blood is purest—in North Germany, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Ulster, the Orkneys, the Lothians, Yorkshire, East Anglia—Protestantism found easy entrance, and has retained its hold, often in some exaggerated form. In Bohemia, France, Belgium, Alsace, it has been trodden out. In Galway and Kerry it has no footing. The Welsh and the Cornishmen, who became Protestants by political accident, have transformed Protestantism into an emotional religion, which has inner affinities with the emotional faith of Ireland and Italy. Even now Protestantism gains no converts in the South of Europe, or Catholicism in the North. Roman Catholicism, or the cognate creed of the Greek and Russian Orthodox churches, is dominant in all those lands where the brachycephalic race prevails; Protestantism is confined to the dolichocephalic Teutonic region.⁴

2. *The initiative of religious leaders.*—The work of Huss, Luther, Knox, Calvin was, of course, a decisive factor in the formative years of Protestantism. It is less to-day, seeing that the teachings of the earlier leaders have struck root and become a tradition. Nevertheless, even now, the frontier between the confessions is disturbed by the shifting of a Newman from one side to the other.

3. *The authority of numbers and tradition.*—Only the very independent mind turns Catholic in Scandinavia, where all but one in a thousand are Lutheran; or Protestant in Portugal, where all but one in ten thousand are Catholic. In religion, moreover, parental upbringing is well-nigh decisive. Save among migrants few converts are made by one side from the other. Every man denies that his faith is inherited, or thrust upon him by circumstances. On the contrary, he imagines that it is a matter of intelligent free choice. But this is an illusion. The recognized ascendancy of remote historical factors in determining the relig-

⁴ *The Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 247-249.

ious preferences of peoples emphasizes how non-rational and unfree are the religious adhesions of men. The Irish are devotedly and stubbornly Catholic because their aforetime oppressors were Protestants. Not present causes, but Smithfield, the Armada, Knox, Claverhouse, etc., make England so Protestant, Scotland so Presbyterian. Long-forgotten struggles with non-Christians made Spain so bigoted as she is today, and Russia so Orthodox.

The second and third of these determining factors are social, but not the first. It is evident, then, that the great rival to imitation as the key to social uniformities is affinity. Thus it has been maintained that there is an inner sympathy between agriculture and orthodoxy, between commerce and heresy, between machine industry and skepticism, between art and socialism.

The affinities, or suitabilities, that govern choices present themselves more clearly in races than in peoples, in peoples than in communities, in communities than in individuals. Thus great numbers of individuals are Catholic from some form of imitation, yet the brachycephalic races seem to be Catholic from affinity. Innumerable persons wear tweeds and cheviots on account of fashion, yet the ultimate reason for the vogue of these stuffs is their suitability to certain damp, chill climates. Despite the mob-mind in them, the Crusades display a good deal of rationality. They were expeditions for the conquest of powerful talismans. There is probably an affinity between parliamentary institutions and the English-speaking peoples on their present plane of culture. The frequent ill-working of such institutions in southern Europe and South America suggests that among the Latins they persist by imitation.

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE
VIII
INSURANCE PLANS OF RAILROAD CORPORATIONS

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Even if afterward we give separate treatment to special branches of the insurance of railway employees—accident, sickness, death benefits, pensions, and superannuation—it seems wise at first to treat each system as a whole. It is difficult to separate the items, and the companies themselves bring the various branches under a common scheme and administration, each part being understood only as it is considered in relation to all others. It is in this way that Riebenack goes to work in presenting the results of his valuable studies to which in this chapter we are so deeply indebted, although independent studies have been made with other sources, and some of the conclusions reached are different from his.¹

According to official statements² there were in this country, on June 30, 1902, 202,471.85 miles of railroads. In 1892 there were only 171,563.52 miles. The number of "steam-railroad employees" reported by the census of 1900 was 461,909 males, 149,230 females; total, 611,139. Riebenack gives the mileage for 1903 as 205,000 and the employees as 1,312,537, but he includes persons of all classes who are engaged in this occupation. His own study covered railroads with a mileage of 73,351.76, with their 653,267 employees. This means 35.8 per cent. of total mileage and 49.7 per cent. of employees. His work is based on returns from 140 railroad companies, 64 having

¹ See *Railway Provident Institutions in English-Speaking Countries*, by M. Riebenack, comptroller of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company (Philadelphia, 1905); pp. 31, 357, and index. The reports used by Mr. Riebenack, are for the year 1903. Since his study was made many changes have been made in some of the companies. Materials are not easily accessible to bring details up to date.

² *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1903, pp. 403, 495.

made no response to requests for information. The volume contains much interesting information about other forms of "welfare work" with which we are not here concerned.

A summarized statement of the results of this important study is thus given:

The nine purely relief department roads hereinbefore discussed represent an aggregate of 31,000 miles of roadway, or about 15 per cent. of the total railway mileage of the United States, with employees numbering 318,000, or about 24 per cent. of the total number of railway employees in the country, and an insurance membership of 206,000 employees, or practically 65 per cent. of the total number of employees identified with the service of the roads involved. The combined average annual disbursements of these departments aggregate about \$2,230,000, while their combined disbursements since organization approximate \$37,150,000.³

The railroad companies in the United States have made thus far the most important contribution to the promotion of industrial insurance. They are under the control of men who have large views and highest ability. Mr. Bryce says of these men: "these railroad kings are among the greatest men, perhaps I may say the greatest men in America."⁴ The long life of these corporations is also favorable to large and permanent schemes of betterment, and if we add the enormous resources of the companies we may account for their leadership in this field.

Hospital service.—This is the most primitive form of relief. The necessity of having surgical and medical help at hand at all times was forced upon the attention of railroads at an early period. The first hospital department was established by the Southern Pacific Railroad in California in 1868, though before that time companies were obliged by circumstances to make arrangements for emergencies with physicians and private hospitals. Riebenack received reports from 35 railway companies with hospital organization, representing an aggregate of about 70,000 miles and 360,000 employees, and treating annually over 275,000 cases. Ten of these companies report that they make payments for this service, either to their own hospitals or to others under contracts, out of purely railway revenue. The cost

³ Riebenack, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁴ *The American Commonwealth*, Vol. II, pp. 530-53, 2d ed.

of hospital service to the Pennsylvania system during the year ending December 31, 1903, was \$20,567.50. The rates paid by employees are from 25 cents to \$1.00 per month. The company usually provides hospital buildings, free transportation, and occasionally supplies "operative deficiencies." The medical staff is organized under a chief surgeon or physician with division and local surgeons and physicians distributed at convenient points along the lines of road, and a corps of hospital surgeons. Specialists are employed when desirable. Under these arrangements the fees paid are simply for medical services; in case of injury the damages are settled by agreement or litigation. Occasionally the members of families of members are received for treatment in the company hospitals at reduced rates. Some attention is given to providing first aid to the sick and injured by lectures from medical men to groups of employees and by placing packets of bandages, medicines, etc., at convenient points ready for use.

Insurance in private companies.—After hospital service the next step forward toward an adequate insurance system has been taken by those roads which secure favorable terms for life insurance with private companies. The railway companies, by the use of their authority as employers and by directions given to their clerical force are able to save much of the cost of solicitation and collection of premiums. They are thus in a position to secure better terms than an individual employee could do, and their own contribution of collection, sometimes with a moderate subsidy, facilitates the process and diminishes the burden on the employees. Several forms of this experiment may be cited.

In some cases the company merely arranges for a canvass of solicitation by agents of the insurance companies. The Bangor and Aroostook Railroad Co., with its 412 miles, and 1,320 employees, is in this group. The Illinois Central Railroad (4,301.10 miles, 34,249 employees) secured favorable rates from reliable accident insurance companies. The Norfolk and Western Railroad Co. (1,722 miles, 15,394 employees) has a similar plan. The employees are classified according to the risk

to which they are exposed from "select" to "special hazardous." The ordinary indemnities are: \$500 death benefit or \$2.50 weekly indemnity, as a minimum, and \$1,000 death benefit or \$5 weekly allowance, as a maximum. Higher amounts may be insured in less hazardous classes. The company collects the premiums by deduction from the payroll. On February 1, 1904, 3,865 out of a total of 15,394 employees held some insurance.

Similar plans are those of the Texas and Pacific Railroad Co. The premiums range from \$10.20 to \$61.20 per annum; weekly indemnity, \$5 to \$25 per week; death benefit, \$500 to \$5,000. The railroad deducts premiums from the payroll and receives commission of 5 per cent. Out of 8,177 employees only 1,250 are insured.⁵ The Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co., in addition to securing death benefits and accident indemnity, also has sickness insurance covered by the same premium. Various forms of policy are offered. It is estimated that the private company is saved about 41 per cent. of the cost of business, since it has no expense for soliciting and collecting premiums; and hence it can give lower rates. The "health" insurance costs \$6.00 per year for each \$5.00 of weekly sick benefit applied for. At the close of 1903 only 517 employees out of 5,338 were insured, and these carried \$780,100 for death benefits and \$7,097 for monthly indemnity. The annual receipts, \$12,633.48, were made up of \$11,761.92 contributions of employees and \$871.56 by the company.

In some cases the company pays a part of the premium. Thus the Chicago and Alton Railroad (915 miles; 7,339 employees) in 1899 made a contract with an insurance company for a life and accident policy, agreeing to pay one-half the premiums for the hazardous classes and 30 per cent. for the non-hazardous. This plan seems to have been abandoned on the ground that the insurance company could not carry the risk at rates agreed. The Union Pacific Railroad (2,933.7 miles, 15,338 employees) on January 1, 1901, agreed to pay one-third the premiums of the hazardous and one-fourth of the premiums of the other classes.

⁵ Riebenack, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

We find a different type of insurance where the railroad company itself conducts an accident-insurance business and in addition settles on an equitable basis for injuries which might fairly be supposed to involve legal liability. The Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad, in June, 1893, organized a scheme for issuing policies securing benefit in case of accident or death. Persons over 65 years of age are debarred from participation, unless they have come to that age in the service of the company. The premiums paid are: for office men, station men, passenger conductors, tower men, and flag men, one-half of 1 per cent. of wages; freight-train men and switchmen, 2 per cent. of wages; all others, 1 per cent. of wages. The benefits are: for disability due to accident, one-half of usual wages not exceeding 50 weeks, the total not more than \$1,000; for death benefit, one-half of wages of one year not exceeding \$1,000, with funeral expenses and physician's bill, not to exceed \$1,000; deductions being made for previous payments on indemnities. The company gives free surgical attendance, makes good deficiencies in the fund, and administers the business.⁶ The object is to provide sound accident insurance at lowest cost. By reason of their employment, the hazard of accident resulting in personal injury is so great that the premiums charged by the ordinary casualty company are almost prohibitive, and only a small percentage of the higher-priced railroad men can afford to pay these rates. The ordinary accident policy is "provided with so much red tape and contains so many conditions precedent that the collection of benefits is usually the result of some kind of compromise, so that the employee is practically without protection, and without protection he usually becomes a charge on the company," says Mr. H. F. Jones, the administrator of the plan. At first the plan was optional, and the men could accept or decline membership. So many of the employees availed themselves of the opportunity that to facilitate the handling of matters pertaining to it, it was made compulsory in May, 1895, with all employees except those in non-hazardous branches of the service. The premiums are deducted from the payroll and the benefits are paid monthly as the wages

⁶ Riebenack, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

are paid. The experience of the company is that the scheme has reduced suits by employees to a minimum and given to the employees much more than they would have been paid if they had entered suit. By careful attention to preventive and first-aid devices and prompt medical help the number of accidents and the duration of disabilities have been considerably reduced. Gratuitous contributions have ceased. After the first shock of the hurt abates the employee who is injured has a better feeling toward the company on account of the prompt and substantial indemnity paid. The plan is advantageous to all parties concerned.

Philanthropic endowments.—The one conspicuous example of this type is the Andrew Carnegie Fund. On March 12, 1901, Mr. Carnegie gave to the Carnegie Company, Pittsburgh, Pa., \$4,000,000 in trust, the interest to be applied in providing relief for employees of the Carnegie Company in all its works, mines, railways, shops, etc., and for those dependent upon such employees who are killed; also to provide small pensions or aid to such employees as, after long and creditable service, need such help in their old age. On December 31, 1903, the report mentioned 284 cases of accident, 168 deaths, 189 pensioners. Total disbursements, \$228,866.02. The Bessemer and Lake Erie Railroad Company (207 miles, 2,676 employees) comes under this trust, the "Andrew Carnegie Relief Fund." Employees are not required to contribute to the fund. The accident benefits are: 75 cents per day for 52 weeks to an unmarried man, and one-half this rate afterward. Married men receive \$1.00 per day, with an additional benefit of 10 cents for each child under 16 years of age; one-half rates after 52 weeks. Death benefits: maximum payment, \$1,200. Deficits in the fund are met by ratable reductions in the allowances. Total disbursements amount to \$9,168.75; accident benefits to \$4,788.75; death benefits to \$4,380.00.⁷ Some visitors in the region where the fund is administered have the conviction that the fund is somewhat abused by malingerers.

Still another type is that of mutual insurance associations of

⁷ Riebenack, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

employees. The employees of the Ann Arbor Railroad Co. (291.9 miles, 1,563 employees) in 1899 formed an association for mutual insurance. The company itself assumes no responsibility. The membership in 1903 was 850 (out of a total of 1,563). The premiums are graded according to the hazard of occupation. The minimum premium for station agents and clerks is 25 cents per month, with a weekly indemnity of \$5 and a death benefit of \$1,000. The maximum premiums and allowances are: for firemen and engineers, \$1.62 per month assessments, weekly indemnity \$10, death benefit, \$2,000; for freight brakemen and switchmen, \$1.74 monthly assessments, \$7 weekly indemnity, \$700 death benefit. The premiums and indemnities of the sick fund are: a premium of 35 cents per month gives a weekly indemnity of \$5; 50 cents gives a weekly indemnity of \$7.50; 70 cents gives \$10. A funeral benefit of \$100 in case of death from causes other than accident is paid. Premiums are deducted from the monthly payroll. The receipts during the year 1903 were \$11,686.20.

The employees of the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad Co. (1015.09 miles, 5,449 employees) organized an association in 1876, which has a membership of 1,610. There are two classes of members: those who pay \$1 assessment on the death of a member and receive a death benefit of \$500; and the other who pay \$2 and receive \$1,000. Accident benefits are \$5 per week in case of injury in Class A, while in Class B a benefit of \$1,000 is paid for loss of both legs, both eyes, both arms, or one leg and one arm. The average annual mortality has been 12.4 per thousand.

Regular relief departments.—These organizations represent the most complete methods of sickness and accident insurance known in the United States. The old-age and disability pension schemes will be considered separately. The employees of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. took the initiative in insurance schemes with their relief organization on May 1, 1880. This was practically a mutual insurance association. But the first railroad corporation to organize a relief department of its own, according to Riebenack, was the Pennsylvania Company,

on February 15, 1886. The Baltimore and Ohio company established its relief department April 1, 1889. These schemes have served as models for others.

We take the Pennsylvania Railway Relief Department as a typical example for detailed description, and it will not be necessary to give so much space to others formed on the same pattern though differing in some particulars. The Pennsylvania system east and west of Pittsburgh has 10,913.89 miles and 172,024 employees; east, 5,852.44 miles, 117,928 employees; west, 5,061.45 miles, 54,096 employees. Branch lines are included in the system. From the year 1874 the employees had urged the management to consider the subject, but only in 1886 (February 15) was a plan organized under the title, "The Pennsylvania Railroad Voluntary Relief Department." This was the first absolutely independent relief organization in the United States for railroad employees. The relief department for lines west of Pittsburgh was established July 1, 1889. Both plans are on essentially the same basis and may be described together. The object is to provide definite benefits to members disabled by accident or sickness, or to their dependent relatives in case of death.⁸

The contributions of the company.—The railroad corporation guarantees the fulfilment of the obligations assumed, takes charge of funds, is responsible for their safe keeping, supplies facilities, and pays expenses of administration (including salaries of officers, medical examiners, clerical force), pays interest on monthly balances, and approves securities of investments. The company administers by a superintendent with assistants. The general supervision is vested in an advisory committee, seven of whose members are elected by members.

Membership.—All classes of employees are eligible. The maximum age for entrance to the service of the company is 35 years, except where professional qualifications are required. The employee forwards his application for membership to the relief department and, after medical examination, signs a form of contract. Any employee under 45 years of age may become a member if he passes a satisfactory medical examination.

⁸ Riebenack, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-72.

The total membership on December 31, 1903, was 104,151, out of 172,024 employees. The following table shows the membership by classes:

TABLE I

CLASS	LINES EAST			LINES WEST		
	Workmen	Members	Percentage of Members	Workmen	Members	Percentage of Members
Officials, etc.	24,093	15,833	66	7,988	4,436	56
Telegraphers.	2,702	1,878	70	1,340	985	74
Conductors.	3,606	2,969	82	1,508	1,394	92
Brakemen.	13,087	11,352	87	3,213	3,027	94
Engineers.	4,403	3,487	78	2,198	2,062	94
Firemen.	4,779	4,381	92	2,328	2,260	97
Switchmen.	4,180	3,637	87	3,515	3,018	86
Machinists.	27,612	18,990	69	10,587	8,894	84
Station agents.	24,745	13,301	54	7,586	1,908	25
Irregular workmen. .	1,001	679	68			
Total.	110,327	76,507	69	40,263	27,984	70

Membership payments are fixed and uniform without reference to occupation, and differences are based on wage classification, as will be seen in Table II.

TABLE II

Class	Lines East Monthly Earnings	Lines West Monthly Earnings	Monthly payments
I.	Less than \$35	Not over \$40	\$0.75
II.	\$35 to \$55	\$40 to \$60	1.75
III.	55 to 75	60 to 80	2.25
IV.	75 to 95	80 to 100	3.00
V.	95 upwards	Over \$100	3.75

An employee is permitted to change from one class to another within certain defined limits.

TABLE III
SHOWING BENEFITS ACCORDING TO CLASSES

	1st Class	2d Class	3d Class	4th Class	5th Class
Accident—					
Daily indemnity up to 52 weeks.	\$0.50	\$1.00	\$1.50	\$2.00	\$2.50
After 52 weeks.	0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25
Sickness—					
Up to 52 weeks, after 3 days	0.40	0.80	1.20	1.60	2.00
After 52 weeks.	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00
Death benefit.	\$250	\$500	\$750	\$1,000	\$1,250

The company occasionally, in meritorious cases, extends the relief beyond 52 weeks out of its own funds as a gratuity. Funeral expenses are paid out of death benefits. The average annual mortality rate per thousand members has been 12.6 (east) and 12 (west).

The income of the relief fund is from these sources: membership contributions; company appropriations, when necessary, to make up triennial operative deficits; income and profit arising from investment of money on hand; gifts and legacies; free use of buildings, transportation, and other facilities supplied by the company for conducting the department business; relief from all operating expenses which are borne by the company. In the event of a surplus, at the end of any three-year period of operation, after allowing for liability incurred and not paid, such surplus is devoted exclusively to promote a fund for the benefit of superannuated members, or in some other manner for the sole benefit of members of the relief fund.

The total receipts since the establishment of the department have been \$19,950,940.94, made up as follows:

LINES EAST OF PITTSBURGH

From membership	\$11,672,717.39
From the Company	2,544,348.11
From other sources	422,027.04
<hr/>	
Total receipts east of Pittsburgh	\$14,639,092.54

LINES WEST OF PITTSBURGH

From membership	\$4,342,321.95
From the Company	969,526.45
<hr/>	
Total receipts west of Pittsburgh	\$5,311,848.40
Aggregate receipts of Pennsylvania system	\$19,950,940.94

The average receipts per annum for lines east of Pittsburgh, \$813,282.91; and for lines west of Pittsburgh, \$404,554.73, or a total each year of \$1,217,837.64.

The total disbursements since the establishment of these funds have been:

LINES EAST OF PITTSBURGH

For accident	\$2,246,454.10
For sickness	4,455,618.80
For death	4,851,434.88
For operating expenses	1,815,641.54
For superannuation allowances	148,662.15
Total	<u>\$13,517,811.47</u>

LINES WEST OF PITTSBURGH

For accident	\$1,162,281.65
For sickness	1,473,124.60
For death	1,687,241.22
For operating expenses	754,607.81
Total	<u>\$5,077,255.28</u>
Total disbursements of entire system	\$18,595,066.75

The average disbursements per year, for lines east of Pittsburgh, have been \$750,989.53, and for lines west of Pittsburgh \$381,260.40, or an aggregate of \$1,132,249.93 for the entire system.

The advantages claimed for the relief department over the older conditions are: Indemnity is provided in case of disablement from accident or sickness and death from accident or natural causes, at minimum cost. The cost of insurance in regular companies is ordinarily prohibitive for those in hazardous branches of railroad employment. Free surgical attendance is furnished in case of injury received during the performance of work for the company, and artificial limbs are supplied and other similar articles needed by injured persons. There is no fee for entrance nor for medical examination, nor any special dues, taxes, or assessments. The member is exempt from paying dues during disablement except for the month in which the injury occurred. There is no danger of forfeiting insurance from non-payment of dues, since these are collected from the payroll so long as the member is at work. All expenses of administration are paid by the company, so that contributions are devoted entirely to payment of benefits. Death benefits cannot be taken for debt, payments being made only to designated beneficiaries. Neither employees nor employers are troubled by

subscription solicitors for disabled men, as was the case before this plan went into effect.

A surplus fund from the relief department east of Pittsburgh accumulated since 1886 amounted to \$751,256.25, the interest on which is devoted to superannuation allowances. From this fund 1,408 retired members have received \$148,662.15; the expenditures in 1903 were \$43,875.12. On lines west of Pittsburgh no surplus has been accumulated, and so no superannuation payments have been made. Of pension schemes mention will be made later.

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad system.—This company, with its 4,410 miles of way and 55,688 employees, was one of the first to organize insurance for its employees. An association of employees was formed May 1, 1880, and the company itself established a relief department March 16, 1889. Out of 20,606 members of the old association 19,467 joined the new department. The company annually gives \$6,000 to the relief fund, or, when it is not needed there, to the pension fund. It contributes \$10,000 annually for medical examinations; provides office room and furniture; gives the services of officers in administration; is responsible custodian of the funds; and guarantees payments of rates promised. The company endeavors to provide partially disabled employees with occupation suited to their abilities. This company has three forms of benefits—relief, pensions, and savings schemes; here we consider only the first. While the administration is conducted by the company there is an advisory committee on which the employees are represented. Members are classified according to wages.

TABLE IV

WAGE CLASS	MONTHLY DUES		DAILY BENEFITS			DEATH BENEFITS		
	1 Div.	2 Div.	Accidents		Sickness	Accident	Sickness	
			26 Weeks	After			Ordinary	Max.
A, up to \$35.....	\$1.00	\$0.75	\$0.50	\$0.25	\$0.50	\$ 500	\$ 250	\$1,250
B, \$35 to \$50....	2.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	1.00	1,000	500	1,250
C, \$50 to \$75....	3.00	2.25	1.50	0.75	1.50	1,500	750	1,250
D, \$75 to \$100...	4.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2,000	1,000	1,250
E, over \$100....	5.00	3.75	2.50	1.25	2.50	2,500	1,250	1,250

The benefits for disablement are not paid for Sundays and holidays. The higher rates for accidents are paid during the first 26 weeks and then the lower during the subsequent disability. Sickness benefits are paid after the first week for 52 weeks. The death benefits where death is due to sickness are ordinary and maximum as shown in the table.

Employees not exposed to special risks of accidents may insure for natural death benefits only, or for both natural death and sick benefits at 25 cents per month, which is also the cost of additional natural death benefits. The modes of payment are made quite flexible to be adapted to various incomes and hazards. Membership is said to be voluntary though preference is given in the retention of employees to those who belong to the relief department. No person over 45 years of age is admitted to membership without approval of the president of the company.

The total receipts since the establishment of the plan have been \$9,520,628.80; of which membership payments furnished \$8,730,415.40, the company paid \$344,590.75, and other sources \$445,622.65. The average receipts per year have been \$410,962.38. The receipts for the year ending June 30, 1903, were \$775,646.43; from members, \$712,595.82; from company for operating expenses, \$10,000; reserve fund, \$6,000; interest, \$35,115.04; bonds redeemed, \$10,000; miscellaneous, \$1,935.57. Total disbursements since the beginning, \$8,691,061.88; for accident benefits, \$1,468,259.96; sickness, \$2,257,336.38; death, \$3,781,304.95; operating expenses, \$931,373.04; other \$252,787.55; average disbursement per annum, \$375,153.75. Disbursements for the year ending June 30, 1903, were, \$732,102.97; for death benefits, \$178,500.00 (accidents); death benefits (natural causes), \$152,090.00; disablement from accident \$129,362.00; disablement, sickness, \$178,867.38; surgical expenses, \$14,909.81; refunded to members, \$12,274.68; advances, \$2,564.80; operating expenses, \$68,076.18. The total membership June 30, 1903, was 41,783, or about 90 per cent. of the entire working force of the company. The total membership is divided between hazardous and non-hazardous occupations; the

former include 28.75 per cent. and the latter 71.25 per cent. The surplus funds at the close of each fiscal year are used either to reduce the next year's contributions, or to increase the amount payable for natural death or to increase pensions.⁹

The Cleveland Terminal and Valley Railroad Co. (88.38 miles, 1,088 employees) has a department closely akin to the Baltimore and Ohio Relief Department. The total receipts from membership dues during 1903 were \$17,148.65. Total disbursements during 1903 were \$9,304.42; for accidental deaths, \$2,000; for natural deaths, \$500; disablement from accident, \$3,126.67; disablement from natural causes, \$3,094.95; surgical expenses \$582.80. The number of members was 995 (399 in hazardous class and 596 in non-hazardous class).

The Philadelphia and Reading Railway Co. established its relief association October 30, 1888. The contributions and benefits are the same as those of the Pennsylvania system. An additional \$100 is paid with each death benefit out of the surplus fund without regard to class. The yearly surplus is used for the superannuation fund or in some other way for the benefit of the members. The maximum age for admission to membership is 45 years. Benefits are not paid longer than 52 weeks, but the claim to death benefit does not cease with that period. The employee loses his rights when he ceases to be an employee, except that if he has been a member 3 years he may retain rights in the death benefit. The company contributes 5 per cent. of the amount paid by employees and makes good deficiencies in funds if there are any. The total receipts since establishment of the fund have been \$4,049,494.11; from members, \$3,362,678.05; from company, \$443,831.68; other sources, \$242,984.38; average receipts per year, \$269,966.28; receipts for the year ending November 30, 1903, \$299,940.11. The total disbursements since the beginning have been \$3,596,727.96; for accidents, \$880,574.66; sickness, \$895,794.16; death, \$1,436,708.05; operating expenses, \$375,077.25; other, \$8,575.84; average annual disbursements, \$241,765.54. Disburse-

⁹ Riebenack, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

ments for the year ending November 30, 1903, were \$292,-423.41; for death benefits, accidents, \$46,250.00; death, natural causes, \$64,550.00; accidental death, from surplus fund, \$10,-200.00; death from natural causes, from surplus fund, \$15,-100.00; death benefits to former employees, \$3,500.00. The total death benefits were \$139,600.00. Disablement benefits were for accidents, \$65,152.50; natural causes, \$70,016.30; surplus fund, \$316.20 (accidents); surplus fund (natural causes), \$651.90; total, \$136,136.90. Salaries and expenses of medical examiners were \$16,186.51. The expenses of operating the association during 1903 were \$33,658.40, of which the company paid \$17,471.89 and the relief fund paid \$16,186.51. The company also contributed \$12,955.02 to the fund—\$30,466.91 in all. The average annual mortality per 1,000 members was 12.1. The membership on November 30, 1903, was 18,951, or 80 per cent. of employees.

The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad (4,138.87 miles, 17,512 employees) established its relief association April 1, 1899; but this company already had a relief and hospital department under the previous title of the corporation, the Plant System. The rates of contributions and benefits are so near those of the Pennsylvania system that they need not be repeated. In 1903 there were 8,129 members, about 62 per cent. of the working force. The membership was distributed according to grades: general office and station employees, 23 per cent.; trainmen, yardmen, telegraphers, 23 per cent.; enginemen and firemen, 12 per cent.; machine and car-shop employees, 25 per cent.; track department employees, 17 per cent. Members of the family of an insured employee are permitted to enter a company hospital for needed treatment at reduced rates. The release clause is very explicit:

Acceptance by the member of benefits for injury operates as a release and satisfaction of all claims against the company for damages arising from or growing out of such injury. If any suit is brought against the company for damages all obligations of the Relief Department will be forfeited. If a claim for damages is settled without suit or by compromise, such settlement will release the Relief Department and the company from all claim.

The Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. (8,324 miles, 38,350 employees). The relief department was established March 15, 1889, and went into operation June 1 of the same year. The basis of contributions and benefits is similar to that of the Pennsylvania system. Arrangements are made for commutation of benefits in case of grave injury on payment of a lump sum, the injured man being required to sign away his right to bring suit under the employers' liability law. The sums paid range from \$800 to \$3,200 for loss of hand or foot above the wrist or ankle, or twice these amounts in case of loss of both hands or both feet, or of one hand and one foot. Membership may be continued after leaving the service, in case of three years' of previous service and one year of membership in the department. The maximum age of admission is 45 years. The rate of mortality is stated to be 8.7 per 1,000 per annum. The receipts of the fund from the establishment of the plan to December 31, 1903, were: \$4,368,215.69, of which the employees paid \$4,197,912.42, the company \$42,532.94 for deficiencies, and \$127,770.33 came from other sources. The average annual receipts have been from all sources, \$337,489.90. The total disbursements since the beginning, \$4,592,579.36: for accident benefits, \$1,432,372.94; sickness, \$1,127,247.00; death, \$1,167,019.50; operating expenses, paid by the company, \$865,939.92; the average disbursements per annum, \$332,504.71. The company is custodian of the funds and advances money to meet obligations. Surplus funds are invested in securities. The membership on December 31, 1903, was 22,141, about 58 per cent. of the working force. Of the engineers 95.97 per cent. were members; of firemen, 96.56 per cent.; of conductors, 90.09 per cent.; of brakemen, 96.39 per cent.; of trainmen, enginemen, and yardmen as a group, 95.59 per cent.; of all others 48.87 per cent.

The objections of many of the employees of this road to the feature of the scheme requiring an injured man to sign away his rights to sue the company under the liability law in order to enjoy benefits from the fund which was created chiefly by the contributions of the workmen have grown more strong with

time and led to the introduction into the legislature of Illinois of a bill to make such use of the relief fund illegal:¹⁰

providing that in all actions hereafter brought against any employer to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee or where such injuries have resulted in his death, no contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, pension, or indemnity for injury or death entered into or on behalf of any employee, nor the acceptance of any such insurance, relief benefit, pension, or indemnity by the person entitled thereto, shall constitute any bar or defense to any action brought to recover damages for personal injuries to or death of such employee, and providing that upon the trial of such action against such employer the defendant may set off therein any sum such employer has contributed toward any such insurance, relief benefit, pension, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee, or in case of his death, to his personal representative.

The lower house adopted this bill by a very large majority vote on February 28, 1907.

The Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. (1,398 miles, 18,621 employees), established a relief department January, 1878, to provide indemnity for accidents, but without sickness insurance. There is no medical examination for admission, nor age conditions. Officers of the company administer the plan, and the company pays the costs of management. The fund is replenished by assessments levied at intervals of four or five months and not to exceed \$3 in any case. The company pays an amount equal to the sum of the contributions of the employees. Benefits are paid on the basis of the contributions to the credit of each member at the time of injury. Employees receive accident benefits, at the rate of three-fourths of the amount of contributions for the call during which injury occurred, for every week day, exclusive of holidays, for a maximum period of 9 months, if disability continues so long. A burial benefit of \$50 is paid, and the family of the deceased employee receives an allowance for every working day, at the rate of three-fourths of the amount of his contributions for 2 years. The cost of surgical and medical care is deducted from this payment. Artificial limbs are paid for out of this fund. Contributions are not refunded whether

¹⁰ 45th Assembly, House Bill 16, February, 1907.

the employee is dismissed or leaves the service voluntarily. The total receipts from the beginning to 1903 were \$938,796.52, of which the company paid one-half. The average annual receipts were \$36,107.56; total disbursements during the period, \$924,236.35; average for each year, \$35,547.55. Membership in 1903 was 6,505, about 35 per cent. of the entire working force: employees in train service, enginemen, firemen, conductors, brakemen, 80.9 per cent.; maintenance-of-way, 31.3 per cent.; maintenance of equipment, 32.1 per cent. It may be noted here that this company accepts the principle of paying half the cost of accident insurance in addition to paying expenses of administration of the fund.

The Long Island Railroad Co. (391.76 miles, 5,415 employees), organized its department January 1, 1886. The fund is administered by the president of the company and eight others, of whom five are elected by the employees and three are appointed by the president. The company pays the salary of the secretary, interest on funds, and furnishes office room. The membership dues are based on salaries and deducted from the payroll.

Members in Class I, with a salary of \$60 and over per month pay \$1 monthly dues and receive weekly benefits of \$9; the death benefit in this class is \$400. In Class II, wages \$40 to \$60, dues are 75 cents, benefits \$6.75, and death benefit \$300. In Class III, the wages are \$40 and less, the dues 50 cents, the weekly benefit \$4.50, and death benefit \$200. Benefits begin on the eighth day and continue six months. The total receipts since the establishment of the fund have been \$382,395.00; the average per year, \$21,244.17. Receipts for the year ending January 31, 1904, were \$58,884.32; total disbursements, \$367,233.00; average per year, \$20,401.83. Payments during the year ending January 31, 1904, were \$42,186.86: disablement from accidents, \$10,373.34; natural causes, \$15,011.37; death benefits, accidents, \$7,300, natural causes, \$9,300. Stationery and printing cost \$202.15. The membership was 4,700, about 87 per cent. of the total working force. The annual rate of mortality per 1,000 was 14.

The purely relief department roads hereinbefore discussed represent an aggregate of 31,000 miles of roadway, or about 15 per cent. of the total railway mileage of the United States, with employees numbering 318,000, or about 24 per cent. of the total number of railway employees in the country, and an insurance membership of 206,000 employees, or practically 65 per cent. of the total number of employees identified with the service of the roads involved; and this membership percentage would be largely increased were the computations based on the exclusion of non-membership employees, who are so because of ineligibility for membership, owing to age or physical disqualifications. The combined average annual disbursements of these departments aggregate about \$2,230,000 while their combined disbursements since organization approximate \$37,150,000.¹¹

Pension schemes of railroads.—The first railway corporation to establish a pension fund was the Baltimore and Ohio (October 1, 1884). The present standard of pension funds was established about the year 1900. The following table presents the essential facts.¹²

TABLE V

GROUP	No. EMPLOYEES	RETIREMENT AGE		ENTRANCE AGE
		Voluntary	Involuntary	
Group A.....	126,799	61-69	65-70*	35-40
Group B.....	46,378	under 65	65	45
Group C.....	2,678	under 60	60
Group D.....	4,454	60-64	65	35-45
Group E.....	11,953	65-69	70	35-45
Group F.....	228,040	65-69	70	35
Group G.....	33,307	60-69	70	35

* 70 sedentary; 65 active.

In Group A were the following roads: Atlantic Coast Line; Houston and Texas Central; Illinois Central; Oregon Railroad and Navigation Co.; Oregon Short Line; San Antonio and Aransas Pass; Southern Pacific; Union Pacific. In Group B: Baltimore and Ohio. In Group C: Bessemer and Lake Erie (in connection with Andrew Carnegie Endowment Fund). Group D: Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburgh. Group E: Central of New Jersey. Group F: Chicago and Northwestern; Pennsylvania System, east and west; Philadelphia and Reading. Group G: Delaware, Lackawanna and Western. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé road established its system in 1906.

¹¹ Riebenack, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

¹² Riebenack, *op. cit.*, p. 9, addenda.

There were, in the year 1903, 16 such organizations in operation and 2 in preparation. The roads having such departments had more than 50,000 miles of railway, or about 24 per cent. of the total railway mileage of the country, and about 500,000 employees, 38 per cent. of the working force. The annual appropriations were not over \$1,350,000. Eight of the roads had set aside a fund of about \$600,000. Twelve of the roads had expended, up to the end of 1903, \$2,500,000 and the companies had on their rolls 3,200 pensioners. In the United States the beneficiaries make no contributions to the funds; the corporations meet the entire expense. The income is derived from the interest on a definite sum which is made the basis of the plan, and additional appropriations are made as required. In some cases the company simply assumes responsibility for a maximum annual disbursement.

The objects of the departments are uniformly to provide for compulsory retirement from service at 65 or 70 years of age, with anywhere from ten to thirty years' continuous service, on a fixed pension allowance, computed, usually, at 1 per cent. of the average monthly pay for the ten years next preceding retirement, for each year of service. Involuntary or compulsory retirement takes place between ages 65 and 70, and voluntary retirement, growing out of incapacitation, between ages of 61 and 69 years.¹³

The plans devised by the Baltimore and Ohio and by the Pennsylvania companies are models for the others. In the American schemes all employees are included without regard to grades and classes.

The Massachusetts Labor Bulletin, January, 1907, presents a table (Table VI) which shows the results of the various railway pension systems so far as known from reports then published.

In the typical system the pension is optional with the road and no definite sum is promised. Mr. Riebenack interprets the policy in this language:

It stands for an annual allowance of money . . . without an equivalent in labor or otherwise—generally, however, in consideration of past services. The pension allowance is purely an optional railway disbursement from railway revenue exclusively, the employee making no contribution whatever to the scheme, which is absolutely subject to company direction and control.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

TABLE VI

COMPANIES	COMPANY PAY- MENTS TO FUND SINCE INAUGURATION	EXPENDITURES FOR ALLOWANCES FOR PENSIONS SINCE INAUGURATION	NUMBER OF PEN- SIONERS CARRIED AT END OF 1905	AVERAGE AGE OF RETIREMENT		AVERAGE LENGTH OF SERVICE OF THOSE RETIRED		NUMBER OF DEATHS SINCE INAUGURA- TION
				Years	Months	Years	Months	
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co.	\$ 13,587.56	\$ 10,070.46	39	70	...	28	6	9
Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co.	873,300.00*	829,741.91*	377*	66*	5	480*
Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry. Co.	50,000.00*	2,868.71*	8*	64*	6	22*	1½	...
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.	276,441.26	276,441.26	279	69	..	33	..	56
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co.	78,863.93	78,863.93	146	66	..	35	..	26
Houston & Texas Central R. R. Co. .	11,101.43	11,101.43	24	64	6	34	..	2
Illinois Central R. R. Co.	250,000.00†	70,856.20†	159†	66	10	33†	3	20†
Oregon Railroad & Navigation Co. .	50,000.00	2,002.70	4	76	..	24
Oregon Short Line R. R. Co.	3,133.55	3,133.55	10	68	...	26
Pennsylvania R. R. Co.: East of Pittsburgh.	2,032,945.42†	2,004,087.59†	1,810	71	3	34	2	890
West of Pittsburgh.	645,474.04§	634,397.55§	656	71	1	33	11	215
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co.	19,973.10†	19,073.10†	89†	3†
Union Pacific R. R. Co.	30,492.58	39,492.58	63	68	..	30	..	5
Canadian Pacific Ry. Co.	410,000.00*	26,785.01*	142	67	5	18	5	29**

* Data to June 30, 1905, end of fiscal year.

† Returns for year ending December 31, 1903.

‡ Includes \$28,857.83, department operating expenses.

§ Includes \$11,166.49, department operating expenses.
** Up to December 31, 1905.

Control is exercised either through an autonomous department or directly by officers of the company. Being not a legal contract but a gratuity, it has only such assurance of permanence as comes from the will of the corporation. It does not seem probable, however, that the corporations will recede from their plans, because these are so advantageous to the company; but there is no legal obligation to continue. No definite amount is promised and usually provision is made for ratable reductions in pensions when the income does not cover the expenses. Allowances are as a rule based on age and service. Lump sums are not paid in settlement of claim, and allowances cease at death of the pensioner. The aggregate mortality of pensioners since the establishment of the schemes up to the end of 1903 was 1,150.

Since the system adopted by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé R. R. Co. is one of the most recent developments of the pension idea it is herewith presented in some detail.

Of the motives and advantages of this scheme Mr. George E. Tunell, secretary of the Board of Pensions, says:

The pension system will relieve the strain and stress of life's struggle before, as well as after, retirement. . . . While the pension allowances in themselves will not be large enough to enable anyone to live in the manner of life maintained before retirement, they will be a substantial help, especially to those who have received small wages. It was not designed that the pension system should remove the necessity for saving. It was expected that it would act as another inducement to thrift and industry, and that, by giving new hope of an independent old age free from want, an additional incentive would be given to work and save. To be near a goal that is worth while should make all eager to reach it.

The pension system the company has devised is the most liberal in existence, and it marks a big advance over all others now in force. It may be of interest to point out a few of the features in which our system departs from those of all other railroads.

On the Santa Fé no additional restrictions are placed on the employment of new men, and no employee will be arbitrarily retired simply because of having reached the age of 65, or 70 years, as the case may be. Employees will be retained in the service as long as they are able to perform their duties satisfactorily, or some new duty that is less arduous and exacting. Retirement will be for incapacity alone, the Board of Pensions deciding when a man is too old to remain in the service.

The Santa Fé plan also differs from all others because it distinguishes between the men who have received small salaries and those who have enjoyed large salaries. It discriminates between those whose opportunities to lay something by have been limited and those who could put something aside for a rainy day and yet have many of the comforts of life. To all whose salaries have been moderate our system is more generous than any other; first, because it gives the pensioner of small salary a larger percentage of his whole salary for each year of service; and, second, if this does not amount to at least \$20 a month, it is raised to \$20, this being the smallest pension the company will give any pensioner. An illustration will show how much more generous our system is. Under the system in force on any other railroad a man who had worked for twenty years at a salary of \$50 a month would receive a pension of \$10 a month, while under our system he would receive \$20 a month. On the Santa Fé there will be neither very small nor very large pensions, because of the minimum and maximum provisions of our system. Under all other systems there is no limit either to the smallness or the bigness of pension allowances. No other system draws a line between those having good opportunities to save and invest and those who have not had such opportunities.

Our system is also unique in recognizing exceptionally long and efficient service. The Board of Pensions has power to increase the ordinary allowances by 25 per cent. for unusual merit.

The amount of pension any person may be granted by the Board of Pensions will depend on three conditions: (1) The amount of highest average monthly pay received during any consecutive ten years of service; (2) the number of years in the service of the company or of its auxiliary companies, and (3) the character of the service taken in connection with the length of the service.

The lowest pension is \$20 and the highest \$75 a month. No pension is allowed to any officer or employee who shall make or enforce any claim against the company for damages by reason of any injury or accident occurring within three years prior to the date when such employee shall be retired or leave the service. A person who leaves the service for two months loses his claims and must enter as a new employee. No person who becomes an employee after the age of fifty is entitled to a pension. The rate of pension is reckoned by counting for each year of service an allowance of $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of the first fifty dollars of the highest average monthly pay of the officer or employee during any consecutive ten years of service, and, in addition, $\frac{3}{4}$ of 1 per cent. of any excess of such highest average monthly pay over fifty

dollars; but no pension must be less than \$20 nor over \$75 a month.¹⁴

CRITICISM OF RAILWAY RELIEF FUNDS

The fairest starting-point for a criticism of the railway schemes of industrial insurance is the recollection of the condition of affairs in railway occupations before these plans were introduced, and a survey of the general neglect of this obligation by other employers at this time in the United States. Judged in this way the managers of the great transportation corporations deserve credit for their humanity, foresight, and energy in establishing and administering these funds. They represent an enormous advance upon anything hitherto known in this country, and they point the way to further progress. Their example is already stimulating other employers to think and act in the same direction. Their carefully kept records furnish a fund of statistics of experiences which will aid in improving future schemes. If at certain points we compare these pioneer methods with those more advanced in Europe, and especially in Germany, it is only because progress is desirable and comes partly by comparison; and because it would be fatal to settle down into national self-congratulation and stagnation when the fact is that we are only in the infancy of the movement. That the rail-

¹⁴ Since the Grand Trunk Railway has important business in the United States its recent scheme of pensions, which went into effect January 1, 1908, deserves mention here. For many years the Grand Trunk Railway Insurance and Provident Society has furnished sickness and accident insurance and a death benefit. The new old-age pension plan has many excellent features. Officers and employees are to be compulsorily retired on reaching the age of 65 years, except by special action. A disabled employee may be retired at 60 years after 20 years of service; and any employee, after a service of 10 years may be eligible for a pension during disability. The rate of pensions is fixed by taking 1 per cent. for each year of continuous service on the highest average rate of pay during any ten consecutive years of service. Thus an employee in continuous service from the age of 30 years to 70 with the highest average rate of wages between 40 and 50 of \$1,000.00 per annum, would receive forty one-hundredths of \$1,000.00 or \$400.00 per annum. No pension is to be lower than \$200.00 per annum. No employee who sues the company for damages on account of personal injuries sustained by him in the course of his service will have any claim for pension. No legal right to hold a position or to receive a pension is given by this plan. The pension fund is administered by a pension committee.

way companies have found it economically possible and even profitable to go so far is a complete refutation of the oft-repeated assertion that, beyond paying market wages nothing further can be done; and the humanitarian reasons already given by the managers of these funds puts to silence the claim that social care of wage-earners is no part of the duty of employers. A breach is already made in the Chinese wall of the antiquated "economic-man" theory; an opening is already happily made for still larger applications of the same principles. Our criticisms are designed to show in what directions the movement will logically and naturally carry us.

Motives of the companies.—As the managers of these companies must report to the stockholders they have thus far aimed to show that the expenditures on insurance made by them were justified on the ground that they increased the efficiency of the employees and so tended to produce higher dividends on investments. But there is also recognition of social obligation of capitalists who are in places of power.

The railroads began and are still moving on the principle that there is indissoluble mutuality of interest between employer and employee These provisions, so evidently actuated by truly humane purpose, have inevitably resulted in improved mental, moral, and physical conditions, thus developing a reciprocal feeling between capital and labor, and at the same time energy has been vitalized and ambition stimulated among the rank and file of railway employees.¹⁵

As will be shown, these desirable results have been achieved chiefly at the cost of the employees; the aid of the companies being valuable but financially subordinate in case of sickness, accident, and death benefits. In case of old-age pensions, however, the burden is carried entirely by the companies. But from any point of view the employees have great advantages. They are interested in the administration of the relief departments; they are directly represented by their elected representatives on the advisory committees; the department serves as a friendly bond between workmen and employers; misery and sorrow are mitigated; the health and force of the workmen are improved,

¹⁵ Riebenack, *op. cit.*, p. 8; see also address of J. C. Bartlett, in 1897, before the St. Louis Railway Club.

and labor becomes thereby more productive and remunerative. Ordinarily the employee when injured prefers to accept the certain, and considerable indemnity offered in ready cash by his fund to the uncertain outcome of a costly legal process which will make him lose his occupation when restored to health or his pension in old age. The manly virtues are fostered, since the workman no longer is obliged to accept charitable relief as in former days. An unsystematic, unorganized, and unequal charitable relief is displaced by a purely economical method, in which the burdens are equitably distributed over many, and the advantages may be taken without loss of self-respect. After a long illness the employee does not return to work discouraged and enfeebled by a load of debt, with his savings dissipated by expenses. That part of his earnings which might in many cases have gone for drink or other useless consumption under this system goes to purchase insurance against a time of need. The provision for immediate medical and surgical aid helps to prevent much illness, and men are not driven to return to work before it is safe, since they and their families have means to meet the more urgent needs of existence. At first the administrators and clerks were unwilling to accept the burden of caring for the fund, because it demanded many new duties and extra work; but gradually the manifest advantages won their approval.

Security of funds and payments of indemnities.—There seems to be no ground for doubt that the funds are secure and that the promises of the relief department will be met. The companies guarantee the financial obligations and have a plan which provides for payments as they are required by the contracts.¹⁶ The significance of this fact cannot be too strongly emphasized. It means that only under expert management and in connection with very large associations of men is social insurance real "assurance." The honesty and efficiency of administration are here guaranteed as substantially as they can be made under private management; and the publicity of accounts is further security for sound business management. Much of the

¹⁶ Riebenack, *op. cit.*, p. 32; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 310, 315.

subjective value of insurance to working-men lies in the certainty that what they pay out will sacredly be kept for the purpose for which they have made sacrifices and parted with their hard-earned money.

Adaptation.—The division of the members into five classes is a suitable means for its purpose which is to make

the expenses and benefits of insurance proportionate to the abilities and needs of the different classes of employees. Further elasticity has been secured by the provision in the constitutions of practically all the departments, that members may, if physically sound, be assigned to a higher class than that to which the amount of their wages would entitle them, and by the opportunity offered them to take out additional death benefit insurance.¹⁷

Adequacy.—The indemnities, as already shown in the tables, for disablement for accident and sickness, and the death benefits from both causes are sufficient to meet moderate demands.

Equity of the burdens.—In the description already given the distribution of cost of insurance for sickness, accident, death, old age, and incapacity, the division and placing of the burden have been stated. In one respect the railway corporations seem to have the most liberal plan yet offered—they pay the entire cost of old-age pensions. The only shortcoming here lies in the guarantee of specific amounts; "ratable reductions" in the payments of pensions are provided for. The legal basis of the system is not absolutely reassuring, since all rests on the good-will of the company, and no contract or legal obligation exists. In a country with a completely developed system of insurance the provision for invalidism and old age is placed on the solid foundation of a specific legal obligation and funds are provided, under public control, to meet the obligation. There is little probability, however, of the abandonment of these schemes by any railway corporation.

Why do the companies prefer to assume the entire cost of the invalidism and old-age pensions? The usual answer is that if the employees pay part of the premiums they must be admitted to share in the administration, and this might complicate relations with the trade-unions. Perhaps there are other reasons. Perhaps the companies are not ready to make contracts abso-

¹⁷ Willoughby, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

lutely binding them to provide pensions in the future. During the time of experiment the management must feel its way along and modify measures according to experience. It is not necessary to keep a very large fund on hand for accident or sickness insurance; the income covers the expenditures each year or within a relatively short period; but in the case of pensions one must reckon with long periods for which large funds must be held in reserve.

The accident insurance is closely connected with sickness and life insurance, and this fact somewhat complicates the situation, especially as the employing company is legally liable for disability only where it is due to the negligence of the employer. In criticism of the schemes under review we must keep in mind the employers' liability law elsewhere discussed. It could hardly be expected that a private company would move very far in advance of the requirements of law. Indeed it may be said to the credit of the companies that they have voluntarily organized and substantially aided the departments of accident insurance without direct legal compulsion. At a time when the narrow legal provisions of the employers' liability law were generally regarded as substantially equitable, when it was supposed that each employee individually assumed the ordinary risks of a hazardous occupation in the act of accepting employment and was expected to provide for himself out of wages and savings, it was an almost revolutionary step for an employing corporation to admit that this ethical and legal rule was not satisfactory, and to make at least partial provision for indemnities by associated action with the workmen and by making considerable contributions to the funds. But as the community comes to discover and accept the principle of "professional risk," that a business which does not make good, as far as indemnity in money can do it, the losses of human energy as well as of broken and worn out machinery, is parasitic and socially bankrupt, the schemes of the railroad companies will no longer satisfy the reason and conscience of men. According to the new ethical principle which has practically won acceptance in Europe, the employers should pay all the cost of accident insurance, and the question of

liability for negligence should not be considered except where there is manifest criminal action. But these railway schemes compel the men to pay much the larger part of the premiums out of their wages; and then they are liable to lose their claim upon the fund if they claim their legal rights under existing liability laws. Indeed it was chiefly to escape from the annoyance and cost of damage suits that the scheme was founded. There are antagonistic opinions on this point, and in fairness both must be stated.

Mr. Riebenack states the side of the corporations thus:

The applicant for fund membership enters into an agreement with the fund to accept, in the event of sustaining disablement by injury while in the service, and in the performance of service duties, the accident benefits specifically prescribed in fund regulations. This is a distinct agreement, with a good and valid consideration, made between proper contracting parties, and, therefore, invested with due legal status. . . . This manner of fund agreement does not deprive the member from instituting legal proceedings instead of taking the rate of compensation offered by the fund. It does provide, however, that when the member disregards his plain obligations under its terms, he thereupon forfeits his rights to fund benefits, and the question of company compensation will then depend wholly upon the merits of the case from a purely legal standpoint.¹⁸

The same opinion is defended by E. R. Johnson, in *Railway Departments for the Relief and Insurance of Employees*, 2d ed., March, 1900, p. 99; and by J. C. Bartlett, in *Railway Relief Departments*, 1897.

Willoughby represents another point of view:¹⁹

Even the little contribution that they (the corporations) do make is more than offset by the fact that the companies have used these departments to protect themselves against suits for damages on the part of their employees. The regulations of all the departments stipulate that members, or their beneficiaries, must elect, whether they will sue the companies for damages on account of the injuries they have received, or accept the benefits of the relief fund. If they choose the former, they thereby forfeit all claim to the latter, and the acceptance of the latter acts as a renunciation of all legal claims they may have against the companies. The departments are largely supported by the members themselves, and the receipt of benefits in return should in no way abridge their legal rights. The provision

¹⁸ Riebenack, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹⁹ *Working-men's Insurance*, p. 316.

that the benefits, as far as they are paid from contributions made by the roads, should be considered as a part payment of any damages that might be recovered against the company might possibly be defended, but that the act of bringing suit should work a forfeiture of acquired rights is thoroughly immoral and contrary to public policy. The men have made payments for a particular purpose. That to cancel their rights is an injustice, it would seem must be beyond question.

The objections of the employees are gathering force for an attack on these schemes on grounds similar to those urged by Willoughby. Thus Mr. E. E. Clark, former representative of the Order of Railway Conductors, has said:

The employees of the companies which conduct such departments in speaking when they are not afraid to speak plainly generally express the conviction that in so far as an employee who is a member of the department is concerned, he feels that if he should withdraw from it he would incur the displeasure of his employers, and that, when the opportunity is offered, a fellow employee who retained membership in the department would be given a preference over him, and that so far as applicants for employment are concerned, the man who is not ready and willing to join the relief department, is not needed and does not secure employment.

The applicant for membership in a relief department is required to execute a contract that, in the event of his being injured in the performance of his duties and of his accepting the benefits provided in the department for such cases, he thereby releases the employing corporation from all liability under the statutory or common law. This means that if a member of the department is injured through neglect of the company or of its agents and, believing that no permanent disability is to ensue, he accepts the first month's benefits provided by the relief department and tendered by the company and, later, finds that he is disabled for life or his death ensues, all efforts to recover damages from the company are forestalled by the company pleading the contract which the employee signed when becoming a member of the relief department.²⁰

Mr. Clark admits that the contract is legally valid under the common law, but claims that it is unjust and cites the Iowa law forbidding the making of such contracts as the right method of correcting the evil. The bill introduced by employees of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy road in the Illinois legislature of 1907 shows that this revolt is general and before long will be successful. The relief departments must be fair and not take advantage of the employees in their economic need of employ-

²⁰ *National Civic Federation Review*, March, 1905.

ment to force upon them an inequitable contract under the pretense that they are free to accept or reject it. It is evident that this dispute would cease if the principle of the British compensation law or some insurance law requiring the employers to pay at least half the premiums and all expenses were to be introduced.

The necessity for accident insurance is made plain by the statistics of casualties in the railway service. Only in this occupation have we approximately accurate records, and this because the federal law applied through the Interstate Commerce Commission makes reports of accidents obligatory. The report of the commission for 1904 shows the number of railway accidents from 1888 to June 30, 1904. The number of employees killed was: in 1888, 2,070; in 1904, 3,632; injured: in 1888, 20,148; in 1904, 67,067. There has been an actual increase in every class of casualty, with employees, passengers, and others. The use of safety devices of certain kinds, introduced after long opposition and delay, has diminished the frequency of casualties resulting from coupling and uncoupling cars. But from other causes the danger of accident has increased both relatively and absolutely. "In 1894 the liability to fatal injury to employees was as 1 to 428; in 1904 it stands as 1 to 357. If this comparison be made for trainmen, the liability to fatal accident in 1894 was as 1 to 156; in 1904 it was as 1 to 120." If the corporations were legally obliged to pay all the premiums for accident insurance, as is done in Germany, instead of throwing most of the cost on their employees, this increase of disabling and fatal casualties would be reduced. The managers would discover devices for preventing this economic leak. So long as they can compel the workmen to bear the larger part of this burden this incentive to discover and introduce safety appliances is wanting.

The question is often discussed whether membership is compulsory or voluntary; for the situation is all the more irritating to the men if they believe that they are economically compelled to sign contracts which they regard as inequitable. The testimony of Mr. E. E. Clark places beyond question the fact that the employees do regard themselves obliged to become members

even against their judgment and desire as a condition of securing or retaining employment or promotion. Mr. Riebenack's statement may be regarded as the official view of the companies:

Membership is purely voluntary. As a matter of fact compulsory membership is prohibited by the United States Arbitration Act of June 1, 1898. It is sometimes held that membership is nominally voluntary but practically compulsory. This view undoubtedly rises from the circumstance that the companies, in accordance with the principle observed by all large business undertakings requiring the constant employment of large numbers of men, exercise the generally conceded right to decide upon the physical fitness and general qualifications of applicants for positions in their service. In carrying out this principle the discriminations made between applicants may appear to the uninformed to indicate a disposition to enforce compulsory membership. . . . This is an erroneous conclusion.²¹

In another place he says:

In reductions of force, temporary or permanent, preference as to retention in the service will be given members of the Relief feature, other things being equal, over those in the same grades of service who are not connected with said feature.²²

It is precisely this kind of preference which the employees feel to be "compulsion."

*Age classification in relation to death benefits.*²³—The premiums paid by the men are classified by wage-earnings but not by ages. The fund thus raised is held for payments of indemnities not only for sickness and accident but also for death; and in this latter fact we come into the field of life insurance. It is a generally accepted principle of life insurance that premiums ought to be graduated according to age, since it is unjust to compel a young man to pay as much as an older man. Perhaps it would be difficult in practice to grade the premiums by ages so long as all are paid confusedly into one fund; and this would seem to be an objection to such confusion. An element of unfairness remains which could be removed only by treating each kind of insurance apart, and fixing the premiums to meet the average risk by age and by form of occupation.

That part of the fund which is paid by the employees for life insurance proper (death benefits) was paid with the hope and expectation and understanding that it should be available

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 311, 312.

for their families in case of death. The part paid for protection in case of disablement by accident or illness was contributed only to meet the needs of the current year. When the corporations upon discharging a man decline to reserve for him any equitable claim on the fund they violate a plain moral right which life insurance practice and legislation have long recognized. That the workman is required to sign away this claim in advance when he enters the relief department does not alter the fundamental moral equities of the situation. Here also the failure to distinguish between accident and sickness insurance on one side and death benefits on the other leads to error and wrong. It is fair now to quote the defense made by the official representative of the railway departments:

No provision is made for the return to members of the relief fund who leave either the service or the fund, of any proportion of their contributions, for the reason that during their connection therewith they have been protected against sickness and accident at a minimum cost, and to make repayments would necessitate an increase in rates, which would entail added expense to all members. It is also a fact that the laws of some states prohibit the continuance of fund death benefits after employees leave the service of the interested corporation, as being an infringement on and violation of existing legislation for the government of insurance practice.

In some companies the right to continue in the fund after leaving the service, on condition of regular payments of dues, is recognized.

These criticisms, if valid, prove only that the schemes ought to be revised and improved; in spite of them it remains true that the relief departments secure accident and sickness insurance at relatively low cost and represent an important advance on the conditions before their establishment. The next step is to secure national and state legislation requiring the companies to furnish adequate insurance against loss by accident, disease, and invalidism due to the employment, on condition that they be released from further liability, except in case of wilful negligence and violation of laws requiring protective devices.

SOCIAL CLASSES IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY ¹

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Many questions supposed to have been definitively settled have been revived and brought into new prominence under the searchlight of modern sociological theory. The discovery of the principle of the natural origin of political society and the juridical state out of gentile society and kinship organization through the struggle and amalgamation of races is having an effect upon social problems analogous to that which the discovery of the principle of natural selection has had upon biological problems. One of the time-worn social problems of this order is that of the origin and nature of social classes.

Approaching this problem from the new point of view, we find that it constitutes an integral part of the general social process inaugurated by the race struggle. There are no social classes in gentile society. They must have developed along with all the other institutions which had their origin at that stage. If so, out of which one of those early institutions have they developed? Can the sociologist trace them back to their primary source, as the anatomist traces any organ of the body back to its original layer in the embryo?

As is well known, one of the first effects of the conquest is the subdivision of the amalgamating group into a series of more or less distinct strata called castes. The conquering race becomes the high caste and the conquered race the low caste. Between them there soon develops an intermediate caste necessary to the life of the group. The high caste differentiates into a sacerdotal caste and a warrior caste. The intermediate caste is developed out of the intelligent elements of both the conquering and the con-

¹ Address of the president of the American Sociological Society at its second annual meeting in Madison, Wis., December 28, 1907.

quered races and conducts the business of the new society. The lower caste performs the labor for all, either as a great slave population or as an artisan class, often divided up into a great number of hereditary sub-castes or guilds.

Now the simple truth is that the social classes that we find today in the most advanced nations of the world are the outgrowth and natural successors of those primary subdivisions of society, or castes. They are modified castes and have not been greatly transformed during the historic period. The four so-called "estates" of European history, so clearly recognized in the eighteenth century, correspond well to the four great castes of India. The Brahminic caste, or priestly order, became the First Estate, the lords spiritual, the clergy; the Kshatriyas, or warriors and ruling class, took the name of the Second Estate, the lords temporal, the nobility; the Vaisyas, or merchants, brokers, and business class, scarcely differ from the Third Estate, the commons of England, the *bourgeoisie* of France; and the Sudras, or laborers and artisans, are clearly represented by the Fourth Estate, the modern industrials, the proletariat.

But the castes of India are not the only castes, and it is now known that they exist in all countries that have undergone the race struggle, and that they are in all essential respects the same in all, being found in great completeness even in Polynesia. With the lapse of ages, especially in India where the race struggle probably first took place, these castes became firmly established and were regarded not only as the order of nature but as the divine order. It was forgotten that they arose from conquest. All traces of those remote events were lost, and the higher castes were believed to be really superior and the lower really inferior. This is clearly shown by the text of the Laws of Manu. We there read that:

The Brahmin in coming into the world is placed in the first rank upon the earth; sovereign lord of all beings, he watches over the preservation of the treasure of civil and religious laws. A Brahmin, by his very birth, is an object of veneration, even by the gods, and his decisions are an authority for the world; it is the Holy Scripture which gives him this privilege.

All that the world contains is in a manner the property of the Brahmin; by his ancestry and his eminent birth he has a right to all that exists.

A Brahmin, if he is in need, may in all safety of conscience appropriate the goods of a Sudra, his slave, and the king may not punish him; for a slave has nothing that belongs to him in his own right of which his master may not deprive him.

A Brahmin possessing the Rig Veda entire would not be soiled by any crime, even if he had killed all the inhabitants of the three worlds and accepted food from the vilest of men.

The Kshatriyas cannot prosper without the Brahmins; the Brahmins cannot support themselves without the Kshatriyas; by uniting, the sacerdotal class and the warrior class rise in this world and in the other.

Blind obedience to the orders of the Brahmins, versed in the knowledge of the holy books, masters of the house and renowned for their virtue, is the chief duty of a Sudra and procures for him happiness after his death.

To serve the Brahmins is declared the most praiseworthy action for a Sudra; everything else that he may do is without recompense for him.

A Sudra must not amass superfluous wealth, even when he has the power; for a Sudra, when he has acquired a fortune, vexes the Brahmins by his insolence.

A man of low caste who attempts to sit down by the side of a man of the highest class shall be branded on his haunches and banished.

Let the king cause boiling oil to be poured into his mouth and ears if he has the impudence to give advice to Brahmins relative to their duties.

He who has relations with a degraded man is himself degraded; not alone in sacrificing, in reading the Holy Scriptures, or in contracting an alliance with him, but even in getting into the same carriage, sitting on the same seat, or eating at the same table.

Such are the rigid laws by which the higher castes have sought to separate themselves from the lower, and they have succeeded in causing it to be believed, not only by the higher castes but also by the lower ones themselves, that there exists a fundamental difference based on inherent qualities and belonging to the nature of things. This idea still clings to the mind of man, and modern social classes are conceived to be marked off from one another by nature.

The Greeks were a conquering race who invaded Greece as well as Asia Minor ages before the Homeric period and subjugated the peoples whom they found there, reducing them to slavery. As written history began much later still, it had been wholly forgotten who the slaves were, and they were looked upon as simply inferior beings created to serve the high-caste race with which alone all Greek history and literature have to do. All

know that Plato and Aristotle spoke of the slave population in this tone, contending that both they and all "barbarians" were intended by nature for slavery, a proposition which Aristotle considered "self-evident." His most classic expression, familiar of course to all, but needed at this point, was:

There are in the human race individuals as inferior to others as the body is to the soul, or as the beast is to man; these are beings suitable for the labors of the body alone, and incapable of doing anything more perfect. These individuals are destined by nature to slavery because there is nothing better for them to do than to obey. . . . Nature creates some men for liberty and others for slavery.²

This view scarcely differs from that of the classical economists with regard to wage-earners, and it reflects somewhat accurately the popular ideas even today on the question of social classes.

The slaves of Greece and Rome, the plebeians of later Rome, the serfs and villains of feudal times, and the laboring and menial classes of all ages have belonged to a different race from that of the citizens, patricians, nobles, lords, and upper classes generally. They represent the conquered races of the world, and had occupied those social positions since long before there was any written history of the countries in which they lived. It is this fact that concealed their true origin for so long and obscured the great ethnic principle that underlies the social classes. The idea prevailed universally that they were *naturally* inferior, and that the existence of social classes was a natural condition and must always continue. But it is now beginning to be seen that the existence of lower classes was the result of early subjugation in the struggle of races which took place in the savage state of man.

Although this truth was discovered by sociologists, still the sociologists are among the last to recognize it. Certain jurists have seen that it accords with the history of jurisprudence and are bringing it forward as the groundwork of that science. Speaking of blood-revenge in primitive societies, M. Raoul de la Grasserie says:

It does not exist among castes or classes, for these do not originate at the beginning. They are formed only after the conquest. The Pariahs of India

² *Politics*, I, 5.

are conquered peoples. The *roturiers* of France were the Gauls conquered by the Franks. There must be two peoples of different race and civilization in order that the superior blood remain pure from the inferior blood. . . . Classes at the height of their intensity are castes. These latter are not found in every country, but probably have so existed, and classes may be regarded as attenuated castes. . . . The members of one caste do not, at least originally, belong to the same race as those of another. The Pariahs of Hindustan are conquered peoples; the serfs and villains of France belonged to the Celtic nation opposed to the Germanic of their lords. Of course this difference has often been effaced, but it was the fundamental distinction.³

It is, however, the ethnologists who have most clearly perceived this truth and who are best prepared to illustrate it. How closely the social classes in Greece resembled the castes of India is shown by M. Topinard when he says:

In Athenian times, a while previously to Solon, the proportion of the population was as follows: Citizens of all classes, 9 per cent.; strangers, subject to severe restrictions, 18 per cent.; slaves, 73 per cent. The warrior, magisterial, and priestly classes were the higher classes; the merchants, the artisans, and the agriculturists formed the middle class; the common laborers, the lower class or plebs.⁴

The same author, speaking of the castes of India, says that their aim

was to prevent a mingling of the conquering Aryans with the Dravidians, and consequently the absorption of the former. The first caste was composed of Aryans supposed to be pure, the second of Aryans and Dravidians crossed, the others of Dravidians. The black aborigines were excluded from the classification, and bore the name of Pariahs.⁵

Other ethnologists have made similar and even more explicit statements of the same kind. Thus Westernmarck says:

Castes are frequently, if not always, the consequences of foreign conquest and subjugation, the conquerors becoming the nobility, and the subjugated the commonalty or slaves. Thus, before the Norman conquest, the English aristocracy was Saxon; after it, Norman. The descendants of the German conquerors of Gaul were, for a thousand years, the dominant race in France; and until the fifteenth century all the higher nobility were of Frankish or Burgundian origin. The Sanskrit word for caste is "varna," i.e., colour,

³ *Annales de l'institut international de sociologie*, Tome XI, Paris, 1907, pp. 153, 181, 182.

⁴ Paul Topinard, *Science and Faith, or Man as an Animal and Man as a Member of Society*; translated by Thomas J. McCormack; Chicago, 1899, p. 201.

⁵ Topinard, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

which shows how the distinction of high and low caste arose in India. That country was inhabited by dark races before the fairer Aryans took possession of it; and the bitter contempt of the Aryans for foreign tribes, their domineering spirit, and their strong antipathies of race and of religion, found vent in the pride of class and caste distinctions. Even to this day a careful observer can distinguish the descendants of conquerors and conquered. "No sojourner in India," says Dr. Stevenson, "can have paid any attention to the physiognomy of the higher and lower orders of natives without being struck with the remarkable difference that exists in the shape of the head, the build of the body, and the colour of the skin between the higher and the lower castes into which the Hindu population is divided." . . . The Incas of Peru were known as a conquering race; and the ancient Mexicans represented the culture-heroes of the Toltecs as white. Among the Ben-Amer, the nobles are mostly light-coloured, while the commoners are blackish. The Polynesian nobility have a comparatively fair complexion, and seem to be the descendants of a conquering or superior race. "The chiefs, and persons of hereditary rank and influence in the islands," says Ellis, "are almost without exception, as much superior to the peasantry or common people, in stateliness, dignified deportment, and physical strength, as they are in rank and circumstances; although they are not elected to their station on account of their personal endowments, but derive their rank and elevation from their ancestry. This is the case with most of the groups of the Pacific, but particularly so in Tahiti and the adjacent islands." Among the Shans, according to Dr. Anderson, "the majority of the higher classes seemed to be distinguished from the common people by more elongated oval faces and a decidedly Tartar type of countenance."⁴

We thus perceive that the conditions described are by no means confined to India. The race struggle has been universal, and everywhere it has produced the same effects. The first important institution to grow out of it is that of caste, and social classes even of the most modern times and in the most advanced nations are all consequences, modified forms, and true survivals of the original system of caste. Their ethnic character is never wholly lost sight of, and notwithstanding the great and universal panmixia of races, enough ethnic traits remain to preserve a rude distinction between the higher and lower social classes in every country of Europe, and even in America.

All this may seem to prove the correctness of the prevailing view that the lower classes are really inferior to the upper. If

⁴ Edward Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, 3d edition, London, 1901, pp. 368, 369.

they represent conquered races they certainly must have been inferior to their conquerors at the time of the conquest, at least in military power, otherwise they would not have been conquered. To meet this objection fully it would be necessary to enter into the whole question of the struggle of races and primitive social assimilation, which of course cannot be done at this time.⁷

In simple assimilation the contending races are really equal, neither having as yet been conquered. The success of one in subjugating the other is in that case due to some special circumstance which chanced to give it the mastery. This may have nothing to do with any inherent superiority of the one over the other. In compound assimilation, which is the only form of which there are any historical examples, the superiority of the conquering race is usually due to its having undergone a larger number of assimilations than the conquered race, whereby it has acquired a higher social efficiency. This does not prove any inherent superiority, since the greater social efficiency is due to superior equipment. There are historical examples of the conquest and subjugation of superior races by inferior ones. When war became a business certain nations prepared themselves exclusively for war. They marshaled armies and invaded foreign countries where the arts of peace were being pursued, and easily conquered them. When in the year 1260 of our era Kublai Khan, trained in the art of war so successfully practiced by his grandfather Genghis Khan, marched his conquering legions into China, subdued it, and established the present Tartar Dynasty in the Celestial Empire, it was a case of a relatively low, semi-barbaric race conquering a far higher and more civilized race. Few Englishmen, I imagine, will admit that a Saxon is essentially inferior to a Norman Frenchman, yet the last great conquest of England was the Norman conquest.

A certain kind of inferiority of the lower classes to the upper is admitted. There is physical inferiority and there is inferiority in intelligence. This last is not the same as intellectual inferiority. Their physical inferiority is due entirely to the conditions

⁷ See Gumplowicz, *Der Rassenkampf*, Innsbruck, 1883; Ratzenhofer, *Die sociologische Erkenntnis*, Leipzig, 1898; and compare *Pure Sociology*, chap. x.

of existence. As a subject race, as slaves, as overworked laborers or artisans, as an indigent and underfed class, their physical development has been arrested and their bodies stunted. These conditions long continued have told upon them through heredity and have brought about whatever physical inferiority they manifest.⁸ Their unequal intelligence has nothing to do with their capacity for intelligence. Intelligence consists in that capacity together with the supply of information for it to expend itself upon.⁹ We see therefore that both kinds of inferiority of the lower classes are extraneous and artificial, not inherent and natural.

I need not here go again over the ground already several times traveled, to show that, as a matter of fact, every time that the lower classes have been brought under conditions where they could manifest their natural and inherent equality with the upper classes they have done so in such a manner as to leave no doubt with regard to that equality.¹⁰ I shall therefore leave that aspect of the case and pass to the consideration of another quite different aspect upon which very little has ever been said.

I refer now to the admitted natural inequalities of men. This is observed on every hand by all, and so ingrained is the idea that the lower classes of society are such by reason of these natural inequalities that there has never been any attempt to analyze the subject with a view to ascertaining whether this is really true or not. Whenever the abolition of social classes is hinted at it is pronounced utopian, and the common and supposed final answer is that if we were to suppose them once really done away with, on account of the natural inequalities of men, they would almost immediately be restored, and every man would find his level. This usually closes the argument, and I have yet to see any attempt to answer it. And yet this is really such a superficial view that it falls to pieces upon the simplest inspection. It

⁸ *Pure Sociology*, pp. 286-89, 446, 447.

⁹ *Applied Sociology*, pp. 39, 91-95, 269-71.

¹⁰ *Publications of the American Economic Association*, third series, Vol. V, No. 2; *Papers and Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting*, Part II, pp. 187 [431]-190 [434], New York, May, 1904; *Applied Sociology*, pp. 97-101.

receives its death blow the moment we recognize the obvious fact that all these natural inequalities are to be found in all classes and within every class, and that no degree of intellectual deficiency is ever sufficient to cause its possessor to be removed to a lower social class. The weakest minds occur in the highest classes, and Lord Dundrearys are by no means rare. This does not make them any the less lords. We might well wish that social classes were based on some such rational grounds as this theory assumes. Unfortunately such is not the case, and not only are weak minds found in the higher classes, but, what is perhaps worse, strong minds are found in the lower, where they have no chance to work to any purpose. As Professor Huxley said of exceptional men, "no man can say where they will crop up; like their opposites, the fools and knaves, they appear sometimes in the palace and sometimes in the hovel."¹¹

But this, while it completely overthrows the prevalent view that social classes are based on natural inequalities, is far from being the last word on that subject. We have seen that social classes are wholly due to artificial conditions, and that the inequalities which they manifest are all artificial inequalities. These have the effect to produce social cleavage or social stratification. They place one man over another regardless of his worth, and generate the whole series of inconsistencies and misfits with which society is afflicted.

Now natural inequalities also have a powerful effect on society. It is not the opposite of that produced by artificial inequalities. It is entirely different. As we have seen, they have no tendency to produce social classes, but they permeate every class alike. Moreover, their effect, instead of being injurious, is highly beneficial. Natural inequalities rarely tend to make one man superior or inferior to another. They simply make men different from one another. This is highly desirable. Of course there are brilliant minds and there are feeble minds. An excess of the latter quality relegates its victim to the class of social dependents. It becomes a pathological condition. Society cares for these wards, to whatever class they may belong. With them

¹¹ *Fortnightly Review*, January 1, 1878, p. 57.

we have nothing to do. But the principal inequalities belong to normal minds. They simply represent mental differences. No two minds are exactly alike. Mind is capable of almost infinite variation. There may be a thousand varieties no one of which can be called inferior to another. Apparent inferiority is usually due to some peculiarity. Very few minds are perfectly balanced. Some faculties are developed at the expense of others. No normal and sane mind can be deficient in all its faculties. The faculty called "common-sense," the one which makes its possessor appear normal and sane, may be poorly developed, while some other mental power may be greatly in excess. There is a kind of intellectual compensation by which all are equal but in very different ways. Many great geniuses, as all know, have been deficient in the commoner qualities. There is probably no one who does not have some strong side if it could be known. Many no doubt fail during their whole lives to find expression for the chief powers that they possess. If all could have adequate opportunities there would be no member of society incapable of performing some useful service.

Now it is these very inequalities, however extreme, that cause the efficiency of the human race. The actions of men are a reflex of their mental characteristics. Where these differ so widely the acts of their possessors will correspondingly differ. Instead of all doing the same thing they will do a thousand different things. The natural and necessary effect of this is to give breadth to human activity. Every subject will be looked at from all conceivable points of view, and no aspect will be overlooked or neglected. It is due to this multiplicity of view-points, growing out of natural inequalities in the minds of men, that civilization and culture have moved forward along so many lines and swept the whole field of possible achievement.

While therefore the effect of artificial inequalities may be said to be *vertical*, in producing social stratification and creating social classes with all their baleful consequences, that of natural inequalities may be called *horizontal*, spreading out in all directions and compassing the whole earth.

It follows that the great end of all social arrangements should

be to discourage artificial inequalities and to encourage natural ones. It would be a great gain if the former could be abolished altogether, and could this be done, as we have seen, natural inequalities would have no tendency to re-establish them. We should have but one social class, or rather, we should have no social classes. All would stand on an equal footing and be enabled to put forth all their energies.

In the present state of society, even in the most advanced nations where the obliteration of class lines has already gone so far, about 80 per cent. of the population belong to what we still call the lower classes. These, although they possess natural inequalities as clearly marked as are those of the upper classes, are practically debarred from their exercise to any useful purpose. Statistical investigations, as I have shown,¹² prove that, notwithstanding their superior numbers, they furnish less than 10 per cent. of the agents of civilization, and that relatively to population they furnish less than 1 per cent. Their influence in the progress of the world is therefore practically nil, although their capacities are the same as those of the higher classes to whom, notwithstanding their small numbers, nearly all progress is due. This is entirely the result of the social stratification caused by artificial inequalities. The abolition of social classes, could it be accomplished, would therefore increase the efficiency of mankind at least one hundred fold.

It is no part of the purpose of this address to propose any method of social reform. Its aim is solely to put in a clear light the true nature of social classes, their historical and ethnic origin, and their wholly artificial character. It is hoped thereby to remove them from the list of superficial studies which start from no sound premises and lead to no safe conclusion, and to bring them fairly within the purview of scientific sociology.

¹² *Applied Sociology*, p. 208.

THE BASIS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

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Inasmuch as economics is commonly defined as the science of wealth, and wealth as the sum of things which have value, it would seem that value is the central concept of the science. But value, as the economist uses the term, depends upon scarcity and never exists without it. Moreover, assuming only that it is appropriable, everything which is scarce has value. That is, with the qualification already named, value and scarcity are always found together and never separated. Therefore, one might define wealth as the sum of appropriable things which are scarce. Scarcity means insufficiency to satisfy wants. However abundant a thing may be, speaking absolutely, if there is not as much as is wanted, it is scarce; and however rare it may be, speaking absolutely, if there is as much as, or more than, is wanted, it is not scarce. So much by way of definition.

The fact of scarcity implies a lack of harmony, or a conflict, between man and nature. The fact that man has wants which nature does not completely satisfy means nothing if not that man is out of harmony, to that extent at least, with his material environment. Productive labor is merely man's way of trying to improve these imperfect relations. But he not only labors to increase the supply of things which are scarce, he must also economize in their use, that is, he must try to make them go as far as possible. That is what it means to economize. Things which are scarce, therefore, make up the category of economic goods, or wealth—to return to the point from which we started. These are the only things toward which our habitual attitude is an economic one.

That there is a deeper harmony lying hidden somewhere beneath this glaring disharmony between man and nature is quite possible. At least no one can positively assert that it is not so.

It may be true, as some profoundly believe, that these natural discomforts, with the necessity for work which accompanies them, furnish a discipline which is necessary for our own highest good. Being thus driven by a *vis a tergo* toward our own highest good, we may be in harmony with our surroundings in ways which do not appear to our immediate sense of self-interest. But this whole question lies within the field of philosophical conjecture, and nothing positive can be affirmed on either side. Meanwhile, there is no doubt whatever that men are sometimes cold and hungry and tired and sick, and we might as well accept these facts as meaning what they seem to mean, viz., that we are not in complete harmony with our natural surroundings.

That phase of the disharmony between man and nature which takes the form of scarcity gives rise also to a disharmony between man and man. Where there is scarcity there will be two men wanting the same thing; where two men want the same thing there will be an antagonism of interests; where there is an antagonism of interests between man and man there will be questions to be settled—questions of right and wrong, of justice and injustice—and these questions could not arise under any other circumstances. The antagonism of interests is, in other words, what gives rise to a moral problem, and is, therefore, about the most fundamental fact in sociology or moral philosophy.¹

This argument does not overlook the fact that on many points there is harmony between man and man, as there is between man and nature. There may be many cases where there is a complete harmony of interests, but these give rise to no problem and therefore we do not need to concern ourselves about them. On those points where man and nature are in complete harmony, in those cases, for example, where nature furnishes, unaided, all that we need, there is no problem for us to concern ourselves with. Toward all non-economic goods, for example, that is, toward all goods which exist in sufficient abundance for all our wants, our habitual attitude is one of indifference or unconcern. We do not give more than a mere passing thought to those relations between

¹ Cf. the author's article on "The Economic Basis of the Problem of Evil," in *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. I, No. 1.

man and nature which are already perfect; but the whole industrial world is bent on improving those relations where they are imperfect. Similarly with the relations between man and man; where they are perfect, that is, where interests are harmonious, why should we concern ourselves about them? As a matter of fact we do not. But where they are imperfect, that is, where interests are antagonistic and trouble is constantly arising, we are compelled to concern ourselves, whether we want to or not. We do this in various ways: we work out systems of moral philosophy and theories of justice, after much disputation; we establish tribunals where, in the midst of interminable wrangling, some of these theories are applied to the settlement of actual disputes; we talk and argue perpetually about the proper adjustment of antagonistic interests of various kinds; in fact, that is about all we do outside of our strictly private affairs.

That underneath all these disharmonies there is a deep underlying harmony of human interests is the profound belief of some. But this belief, like that of a harmony between man and nature, is not susceptible of positive proof. It rests upon philosophical conjecture—and faith. To be sure, it is probably true that most men, even the strongest, are better off in the long run, under a just government where all their conflicts can be wisely and accurately adjudicated than they would be in a state of anarchy. This is sometimes construed into an argument in favor of the harmony of human interests, because all alike, the strong as well as the weak, are interested in maintaining a just government. But the argument is too violently paradoxical to be taken very seriously. It literally means that interests are so very antagonistic that, in the absence of a government to hold them in check, there would be such a multiplicity of conflicts wasting the energies of society, that in the end everybody, even the strongest, would suffer. While it is an excellent argument in favor of government, it is the poorest kind of an argument in favor of a general harmony of human interests.

Returning to this twofold conflict, we find that, fundamentally, there are only two practical problems forced upon us. The one is industrial and the other moral; the one has to do with the

improvement of the relations between man and nature and the other with the improvement of the relations between man and man. But these two primary problems are so inextricably intermingled, and they deal with such infinitely varying factors, that the secondary and tertiary problems are more than we can count.

Is the conflict between man and nature the fault of man or of nature? The question would have more point if we merely inquire as to the conditions which give rise to the conflict, without trying to locate the blame anywhere. The bounty of nature varies, of course, in different environments; but in any environment, however bounteous, there are two factors of human nature which will inevitably result in economic scarcity. One is the indefinite expansibility of human wants, and the other is the illimitable power of multiplication.

The well-known expansive power of human wants, continually running beyond any means provided for their satisfaction, has always attracted the attention of moralists. "When goods increase, they are increased that eat them: and what good is there to the owners thereof, saving the beholding of them with their eyes?" is the point of view of the Preacher. The same aspect of life, obviously throwing man out of harmony with nature, was what gave point to the Stoic's principle of "living according to nature." To live according to nature would necessarily mean, among other things, to keep one's desires within such limits as nature could supply without too much coercion. Out of the view that the conflict of man with nature is a source of evil grow two widely different practical conclusions as to conduct. If it is assumed that nature is beneficent and man at fault, it follows as a matter of course that desires must be curbed and brought into harmony with nature, which is closely akin to stoicism, if it be not its very essence. But if it is assumed that human nature is sound, the only practical conclusion is that external nature must be subjugated and made to yield more abundantly the means of satisfaction. Needless to say, this is the theory of the modern industrial spirit.

Even if the wants of the individual never expanded at all, it is quite obvious that an indefinite increase in the number of

individuals in any locality would, sooner or later, result in scarcity and bring them into conflict with nature and therefore into conflict with one another. That human populations are physiologically capable of indefinite increase, if time be allowed, is admitted, and must be admitted by anyone who has given the slightest attention to the subject. If populations do not increase indefinitely it is not for lack of procreative power; it is rather for lack of the means of subsistence according to the standards which they have set for themselves.

This consideration reveals a third form of conflict—perhaps it ought to have been called the second—the conflict of interests within the individual himself. If the procreative and domestic instincts are fully gratified there will inevitably result a scarcity of the means of satisfying other desires, however modest those desires may be. If an abundance of goods is to be assured, those instincts must be held in check. Either horn of the dilemma leaves us with unsatisfied desires of one kind or another. This is a form of conflict, like that between man and man, from which there is no possible escape. The cause lies deeper than forms of social organization; it grows out of the relation of man to nature. But this is only one illustration of the internal strife which tears the individual. The mere fact of scarcity means that if one desire is satisfied it is at the expense of some other. The money or time which is spent in getting one thing cannot be spent for something else which is also wanted. This is the situation which calls for economy, since to economize means merely to choose to gratify the more important desire and leave the less important unsatisfied. Economy, therefore, always implies a threefold conflict, a conflict between man and nature, between man and man, and between the rival and conflicting interests of the same man.

This suggests the twofold nature of the problem of evil. Evil, in the broadest sense, merely means disharmony, since any kind of disharmony is a source of pain to somebody. But that form of disharmony which arises between man and nature has, in itself, no moral qualities. It is an evil to be cold and hungry, to be struck by lightning, or consumed by microbes. But to evils of this kind, unless they are in some way the fault of other men, we never

ascribe moral significance. It is also an evil to be robbed, cheated, or otherwise injured, by another man, and we do ascribe moral significance to evils of this kind, to any evil, in fact, which grows out of the relations of man with man. But, as already pointed out, this latter form of evil—in other words moral evil—grows out of the former, which may be called non-moral evil. Any true account of moral evil must therefore begin with the disharmony between man and nature.

Let us imagine a limited number of individuals living in a very favorable environment where all their wants could be freely and fully gratified, where there was no scarcity nor any need for economy. Under a harmony with nature so nearly complete as this, there could arise none of those conflicts of interests, either within the individual or among individuals, since the gratification of one desire would never be at the expense of another. There being no conflict of interests, there could never arise a moral problem, and that would be paradise. But suppose that wants should expand, or new wants develop, or that, through the gratification of an elemental impulse, numbers should increase beyond any provision which nature had made. Paradise would be lost. Not only would labor and fatigue be necessary, but an antagonism of interests and a moral problem would arise. Human ingenuity would have to be directed, not only toward the problem of increasing the productivity of the earth, but toward that of adjusting conflicting interests. The problem of justice is yoked together with the problem of production; both arise from the same conditions.

This theory of the origin of evil is already embodied in a well-known story, which need not be interpreted as having any historical basis whatever in order to have a profound meaning, more profound than even its orthodox interpreters have ordinarily seen in it. Once upon a time there was a garden in which lived a man and a woman, etc. All their wants were fully satisfied by the spontaneous fruits of the earth. There was no conflict with nature, no struggle for existence, no antagonism of interests. But the gratification of a certain desire brought increase of numbers, and increase of numbers brought scarcity,

and scarcity brought antagonism of interests and the necessity for work. Paradise was lost. It is not necessary to imply any moral guilt, it is only necessary to see the inevitable outcome of the situation. With natural instincts which inevitably bring man into conflict with external nature, the factors of the subsequent development of social and moral problems were all locked up in the situation described in the story.

In this antagonism of interests which grows out of scarcity, the institutions of property, of the family, and the state all have their common origin. No one, for example, thinks of claiming property in anything which exists in sufficient abundance for all. But when there is not enough to go around, each unit of the supply becomes a prize for somebody, and there would be a general scramble did not society itself undertake to determine to whom each unit should belong. Possession itself is not property; but when society itself recognizes one's right to a thing and protects him in that right, that is property. Whenever society is sufficiently organized to recognize a right and afford it some measure of protection, there is a state. And there is a family wherever there is a small group within which the ties of blood and kinship are strong enough to overcome the natural rivalry created by scarcity, and create a kind of unity of interests. This unity of interests within the group is sufficient to separate it from the rest of the world and from other similar groups among which the natural rivalry persists. Saying nothing of the barbarous notion that wives and children are themselves property, even in the higher stages of social development, it is the desire to safeguard those to whom one is bound by ties of natural affection, by sharing with them the advantages of property, which furnishes the basis for the legal definition of the family group.

Closely related to the right of property, parts of it in fact, are several other rights, such as that of contract, of transfer, of bequest, and a number of other things with which lawyers occupy themselves. It would be difficult to find any question in the whole science of jurisprudence, or of ethics, politics, or any of the special social sciences, for that matter, which does not grow out of the initial fact of economic scarcity and the consequent

antagonism of interests among men. This shows as nothing else can the underlying unity of all the so-called social sciences, that is, all the sciences which have to do with the relations between man and man; and it shows also that the unifying principle is an economic one. Even the so-called gregarious instincts are very probably the outgrowth of the economic struggle, the advantage of carrying on that struggle in groups giving a selective advantage to those groups which develop gregariousness over those which do not. But whether this be true or not, the problems which furnish the *raison d'être* for all the social sciences have their origin in the common soil of economic scarcity. That is to say, though there may be human relations capable of being studied which do not originate in this way, such relations furnish no practical problem, and the sole motive for such study is mere scientific curiosity. Such study is merely scholastic. But these human relations which furnish us with real problems, problems which are vital and upon which our ability to direct our own evolution depends, rest upon an economic basis.

This does not necessarily constitute economics as the master-science with the other social sciences as subordinate to it; but it does signify that if there is such a thing as a master-science, economics has the first claim to that position among the social sciences. The economic problem is the fundamental one, out of which all other social and moral problems have grown.

It has already been suggested that, in the case of the family at least, the fundamental rivalry which grows out of economic scarcity is counteracted by another motive, viz., natural affection. But this is not the only counteracting force. As the individual looks out upon the world, with himself at the center of his field of view, he will see the antagonism of interests as an all-pervasive fact. But within a series of concentric circles he will see that this all-pervasive conflict is balanced against, softened, or modified by a considerable variety of counteracting forces. Within the smallest of these circles, viz., the family, the counteracting force, which may be called natural affection, so completely overcomes the basic conflict, in the normal case at least, as to cause it to be lost sight of and to create a kind of community of interests. In a wider

geographical group known as the state there is a counteracting force, called patriotism or loyalty, much weaker than natural affection as a counteragent, which, though not obscuring the all-pervasive conflict, yet modifies it into what is known as economic competition. Outside this group, but including the civilized world, is a group within which a still weaker tie, the feeling of kinship through a common culture, modifies the all-pervasive struggle. Though the condition is coming more and more to be one of competition, it is still one of latent warfare, but of warfare according to civilized principles. Outside this circle and including all mankind, the conflict is softened merely by the feeling of a common humanity, and the condition is one of latent warfare softened by none of the ameliorations prescribed by international law. Still outside this circle lies the whole non-human universe where, generally speaking, there is no counteracting force and where the normal condition is one of appropriation of the weaker by the stronger.

Of course there are other circles and groups, such as the church, the lodge, the trade-union, etc., where varying degrees of counteraction are found, but the more characteristic groups are probably those already named. The circles described are those surrounding the average civilized man. The width of the circles within which the varying conditions named would be found would depend upon the degree of socialization of the individual. At the bottom of the scale would be found the cannibal whose attitude of appropriation would include the whole world, human and non-human, outside of a very narrow circle, say his own tribe. At the opposite end would be the religious vegetarian who would not assume the attitude of appropriation until he had gotten outside of the whole animal kingdom. Again, there may possibly be an individual here and there in whom the feeling of humanity is so strong as completely to overbalance the general antagonism of interests and lead him to treat all mankind as the normal individual now treats the members of his own family. In case we were all so constituted we should have communism, whatever the form of social organization might appear to be. But such

individuals, if they exist at all, are so few and far between as to be negligible.

Certain other bases of conflict, such as the desire to be conspicuous as against envy, and the desire for power as against resentment, are not only secondary to the one already outlined, but they really grow out of it. The only conspicuous form of antagonism which is not directly associated with the fact of scarcity is that between the factor of scientific curiosity, leading us to delight in the discovery of new things, over against the factor of mental inertia. These two factors, present in every person but combined in different proportions, not only produce a conflict within the individual but between different individuals. This is really the basis of the so-called conflict between science and religion, which is nothing more nor less than a conflict between the scientific spirit, continually seeking to find out new things, and the religious spirit, continually seeking to get itself adjusted to a system of belief upon which it can rest undisturbed. So far as religious opinions themselves are concerned, they are merely old scientific theories no longer resting necessarily upon evidence but retained because of the unwillingness of its supporters to reconstruct the whole body of their beliefs and opinions. For the theory of the origin of this form of conflict there is also to be found its mythical setting. And this is embodied in the story of the box of Pandora whose curiosity and uncontrolled desire to pry into things let loose a swarm of plagues upon the earth, as was the case according to another story when Eve partook of the forbidden fruit. Both stories, when properly interpreted, come to have a striking significance for the sociologist.

I am aware that the considerations which I have presented may seem rather commonplace, but that fact need not affect their value, I hope. Whether we agree with Burke or not, that there are not many new discoveries made in moral philosophy, we must nevertheless admit that many of the fundamental facts in sociology have been known and understood for a very long time.

DISCUSSION

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Professor Carver gives us a materialistic interpretation of society and one which in its essentials I do not believe can be successfully assailed. Bringing us back sharply from the refinements of the psychological economists he gives us a timely reminder that the subject-matter of economics is after all material wealth—scarce things—in its relation to human wants.

The term fundamental may be used in two senses and it is open to Professor Carver to show that the conflict of economic desires is the foundation of social conflict in either or both of these two senses. In the first place, economic conflict is fundamental if it can be shown to be the germ from which have developed historically all the important conflict phases of modern society. In this sense then the present importance of economic conflict will depend upon the number and strength of these survivals of, or outgrowths from, this primitive struggle for wealth and income in whatever form. In the second place, economic conflict is fundamental if it can be shown to be the constant and necessary result of man's relation to his environment, both physical and social, if it can be shown to be the form of struggle or competition that persists after all others have ebbed away, and to be the inevitable condition not only accompanying other forms of conflict, as long as these continue to exist, but underlying all our social organization so long as nature and human nature remain what they are. It is by no means necessary to attempt to prove that all forms of social conflict are merely forms of economic conflict, although a fair case might be made out for that proposition. This however would involve a controversy over the definition of the term "economic." As I understand Professor Carver, and I think this point should be kept very carefully in mind, he does not pretend to say that economic conflict is the sum total of conflict in society; he distinctly leaves room for other "conflict stimuli," and he cannot therefore justly be charged with putting a part for the whole. But he does make economic conflict fundamental in both the senses just noted. He gives us no mere genetic interpretation of conflict. The conflict of desires for wealth and income either within the same individual or, more easily seen, between individuals, was not only the primitive motive force of organization, selection, and progress; it remains today the basis of social conflict and social organization. Personally, I do not see how this thesis can be disproved without denying at once the validity of the law of diminishing returns, the expansibility of human wants, and the effectiveness of the desire for offspring in increasing population beyond any assigned limit.

Had he had time Professor Carver would undoubtedly have made his argument still stronger, from the evolutionary standpoint. Not only do diminishing returns, on the one hand, and the desire for offspring and the insatiability of wants, on the other, make social disharmony through the conflict of material interests inevitable, but the human race is also unfortu-

nately in possession of an inheritance from its animal ancestors of a passion for fighting, of a cunning in capturing prey, of a love of circumventing the other fellow, which find outlet in numerous nocuous and innocuous ways in our present-day life, which fortify present causes for economic conflict, and which stand as great, if not insuperable, obstacles in the way of the early success of universal peace, whether international, intercorporate, or inter-individual. The egotic interest, the love of glory, the thirst for power, the gaming instinct, are largely survivals of this genetic past when primitive man was becoming definitely conscious of himself through conflict with nature and other men for subsistence, and for the (then) distinctly economic possession and asset of wives and concubines. The law of self-preservation is not merely a biological law, it is an economic law, one which the modern expansion of wants has extended into a law of self-preservation at a certain standard of living. Every struggle to maintain a standard of living, whether it is a strike of trade-unionists or an individual's choice of one of two ways of spending a dollar, is an economic struggle. It is this struggle, fundamentally, that necessitates standing armies and policemen and courts and tribunals of arbitration, that necessitates the law of property and of contracts, that stimulates the solidarity of groups and group interests. The necessity of limiting economic conflict in the interests of production is the mother of social organization. Sociality and expediency are largely synonymous terms.

It will not do, furthermore, to say that Professor Carver takes into consideration only material interests and leaves out of account the higher, so-called spiritual elements of life. What he does do, and we need the reminder, is to recall to us the fact that the satisfaction of all these higher desires is conditioned by the material basis of civilization. Just as surely as our present material development itself is based on a limited supply of nitrogen compounds in the soil and on a coal and iron supply which seems far from inexhaustible, is the gratification of recreational, educational, religious, and cultural desires, impossible without a solid basis of material wealth, both national and individual. Ability and capital are constituents of the "opportunity" of which the honored president of this society is so powerful a champion. Without capital there is no leisure, without leisure no culture, no invention, no science. This is a trite line of reasoning, but that destroys neither its truth nor its sociological importance. That opportunity is such an unequal matter, is so conspicuously absent for uncounted millions, is due to the fact that the lower economic groups through their very massiveness (we call them "the masses") are not successful competitors in the economic struggle. With them it is philoprogenitiveness versus standard of living, an individual struggle in which standard of living is worsted. The "masses" being out of all proportion to their wealth, necessarily lack wide opportunity for the satisfaction of the higher desires. One other fact, also, helps explain lack of opportunity. Society has not yet found a very successful method of

arbitrating the economic conflict. The social man is weaker than the economic man.

Nevertheless, save by some form of compromise and arbitration, we cannot make the economic life less a blind individual or narrow group struggle and more of an engine for positive social progress than it is now. Without such arbitration of desires, within the individual and between individuals, neither the simple nor the strenuous life will avail to solve the social problem. Through compromise alone, in my opinion, can we escape the sharpness and destructiveness of the threefold conflict outlined by Professor Carver. It is a question of bicycles and books versus babies, of prosperity for the few and poverty for the many versus a moderate, continent, comfort for all—for all so long and only so long, as the semiofficial cry that goes up in this country and in Europe for a large population, irrespective of quality or resources, is not carelessly and heedlessly followed.

The longing to escape the limitations of this material basis of civilization is pathetic in its universality, and in the unreal idealism into which it forces itself in its effort to explain away pain and evil and struggle for existence. The strength of this longing is attested by the zeal with which people belittle the importance of the economic motive in explaining social organization and processes, and by the entirely disproportionate influence they attribute to other, possibly independent, forms of conflict. The lost paradise of the past and the hoped-for heaven of the future were ideals constructed by the elimination of diminishing returns and the suspension of the sex impulse. Thus at one fell swoop the population problem and the subsistence problem were solved—mythically—on paper, as it were. Church and state, both Catholic and Protestant, have for centuries preached content and self-sacrifice and future reward without materially lessening the imperiousness of present wants, or conspicuously blunting the horns of the dilemma upon which we find ourselves. It seems to me that most of our philosophy has in fact sidled prudently around the economic foundation of life and swerved gallantly off into the ideal, just as a good deal of our systematic ethics has built up theories of right and wrong in complete obliviousness to the evolutionary, the struggle, the economic sources from which our notions of morals have been derived.

Economic conflict may be restricted, as Professor Carver has pointed out, within larger and larger social groups. It will not do however to be too optimistic about the ameliorative influence of ever-widening social bonds in counteracting the conflict of economic interests. Counteraction takes place effectively only when possible conflicts within the group are provided against, and especially when we are sure that inter-group conflict is not stimulated to about the same degree that intra-group conflict is allayed. I do not think that Professor Carver gives this fact due weight. How far the sum total of conflict is really lessened by social groupings is a question. Is it not entirely possible, at least, that we restrict or discourage conflict within the

group only to find it bursting forth, with all the fury of pent-up power, in conflict between economically antagonistic groups? Conversely, the presence of impending conflict between groups or classes or races is often the motive-force compelling people to unify. Germany accomplishes something like national unity, only to fall with crushing force upon France. The inevitable conflict with Russia for control of land upon which to place an expanding population gives a great impetus to the growth of Japanese unity. Laborers no sooner combine to restrict individual competition than employers do the same, and a new mode of warfare is the result. The greater the commercial unity of one country—the more efficient its industrial organization—the keener its conflict with other countries for the markets of the world, a form of competition that did not before exist in any intensity. Even the family, while limiting conflict on one side, tends to intensify it on the other. Within the family sympathy overrules selfishness, but the man with a family will be a harder competitor, whether a bricklayer or a stock speculator, than his unmarried brother. Sympathy, moreover, is playing something of an uphill game, considering the impersonal and corporate organization of modern industry. Patriotism, also, which Professor Carver mentions as a restrictive influence, as it undoubtedly is in part, is of two kinds, and the one most often in evidence is of the "trade-follows-the-flag" brand. It is not a very strong ally of universal peace projects. National conflict, class conflict, race conflict—would any of these be so serious if they were not in large measure economic conflict in disguise?

I believe, then, that Professor Carver has demonstrated, as fully as possible within the time at his disposal, that the economic conflict "is about the most fundamental fact in sociology or morals." Glad as I should be to disagree with him, I find myself essentially in accord with his conclusions. At the same time the fact that "the economic problem is the fundamental one, out of which all other social and moral problems have grown," even should it be widely admitted a fact, does not, in my opinion, signify that economics has first claim to the position of master science among the social sciences. There is still need of a specific economic science and of a "sociology"—the latter to give more due attention to the economic motive and the economic conflict than it has as yet given.

PROFESSOR E. A. ROSS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Professor Carver has explained with faultless logic the origin of the economic factor in social conflicts. But I think he puts the part for the whole. Economic scarcity is probably the principal cause of conflicts, but by no means the only one. He insists that moral evil grows out of non-moral evil, i. e., out of the disharmony between man and Nature. If this were so, how could so many quarrels arise in a leisure class lifted far above economic solicitude? Think of the countless duels between European cavaliers or

Japanese *samurai* on account of a word, a gesture, or a look construed as a slight or an insult! Think of the brawls between gentlemen in the streets of mediaeval Italian cities—Montagues against Capulets, etc. In fact it seems as if the swollen, interfering egos of haughty nobles provoke more conflict than the conflicting economic wants of the needy commoners.

Besides *cgotic* conflict there is conflict arising from *sex scarcity*. Was the Kadi a fool whose first remark was—whenever two brawlers were brought before him—"Find the woman"? Have not most of the schemes, rivalries, stratagems, treacheries, and duels of those lifted above economic worry related to women? The multiplication and refinement of economic wants is well-nigh paralleled by the multiplication and refinement of genesic wants. Professor Carver says that a society in an environment sufficiently bountiful to supply all their desires for goods would be a paradise. Would it? Suppose there were not enough comely women to go around? How about the rivalries of suitors?

He traces the institution of the family to "the antagonism of interest which grows out of scarcity." Surely the giving to the man a permanent legal hold upon a woman, analogous to the property right, originates in that jealousy which prompts the male to want to keep the female all to himself. Unhampered, the economic factor tends to polygamy—the appropriation of numerous women by the rich. The establishing of obligatory monogamy is a limitation upon the economic factor, and marks the triumph of the sex cravings of the many over the monopoly power of the few.

Along with the *economic* exploitation of the weak by the strong has often gone *sex* exploitation. "Booty and Beauty" have been the two spurs pricking the young men of the tribe to the warrior life. Sometimes the beaten people binds itself to deliver every year to the conquerors not only a tribute of produce, but also a tribute of maidens. Recall the feudal lords' *jus primae noctis* and the fact that in certain Malay states the sultan not only exacts his dues of taxes, but requires every maiden to pass through his harem.

Again there is a scarcity of *glory* as well as a scarcity of *goods*. "Gold and glory" are often held out as inducements to wage warfare. Many a tribe, ruling class, or dynasty has attacked its neighbor just to wreak its lust for domination, or to make the world resound with the fame of its prowess. There is also the *religious* motive to conflict, the desire to procure women to dedicate to the national god, captives to sacrifice, or proselytes to swell the number of his worshippers.

I think I perceive beside the *interference of interests* another great cause of conflict, viz., *consciousness of difference*. Does anyone suppose that the pressure of the Chinese upon the California labor market in 1879 would have sufficed to create an opposition resulting in Chinese exclusion had there not been in these immigrants certain striking physical and cultural differences for the agitation to seize upon? The most determined attempts have been made to interpret religious schisms and religious wars in economic terms; and they

have failed. Political scientists, in setting forth the conditions under which a stable political society can be formed by a people, take care to postulate not only a certain agreement of interests, but a certain community in blood, language, religion, culture, etc. Is this not a recognition of the principle that heterogeneity is one root of conflict? Professor Carver's theory would oblige us to discard the contribution that Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer have made to sociology. For they both assume that the process of reciprocal accommodation and increasing resemblance between the conquerors and the conquered socializes them with respect to one another and removes at last the roots of their original antagonism.

I am willing to grant the all-pervasiveness of economic interest, and to put economics as the first in importance of the social sciences. But economics is not the master science, because the motives it considers can by no means explain all the phenomena. The only master science for social phenomena is sociology.

PROFESSOR EDWARD C. HAYES, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

It was said, in the opening paper, that the other forms of struggle grow out of economic struggle. It would be quite as true to say that what passes for economic struggle frequently grows out of egotic, or some other non-economic motive.

Grant that the sociologist of insight will detect an economic motive as the spring of much of the political struggle, and other ostensibly non-economic conflict. It must equally be seen that ostensibly economic struggle is largely an expression of desires other than the physical wants calling for material things. Why is it that the great mass of those men who already have an income that is adequate to their comfort continue in business? Why is it that the great magnates of trade and commerce are still in the race? Because it is a race. Not bread and butter, but victory, success, sense of achievement, and a socially triumphant self, are the prizes sought. It is the desire for such prizes, and the *Thätigkeitstrieb*, the urge to "wreak one's self," more than the needs of the body for material things, that keep men turning the wheels of industry on the greatest scale.

Another point: The third form of conflict mentioned in the paper was the conflict between different desires that arise within the individual breast. Even this he would have arise from the desire for, and the scarcity of, material things. I do not trust even Professor Carver's logic to make that convincing. The struggles within us are not expressions of one kind of motive. It is the variety of our motives that gives to life its interest and value, and its difficulty. Because of it we have been credited with original sin, with natural depravity. Now we do not deserve that bad reputation. Life is so complicated a proposition that one of the motives is likely to have its way at the sacrifice of the other values that are at stake, and so we make

a mess of life—not because our natural motives are bad, but because they are diverse; and it is the very richness and worth of our endowment that occasions the great moral difficulty.

This is true, not for individuals only, but for societies also. Appraisal of *things* is only one of the forms of social valuation. The most important differences between societies are in the valuations that prevail in them and the corresponding motives and ambitions that prompt the activities of their members. The most fundamental social progress is progress toward the prevalence of a rational balance of social valuations and of motives due to social suggestion and control. The greatest social problem grows out of the diversity of motives and is incomprehensible when any single kind of motive is taken as the sole clew.

MRS. C. P. S. GILMAN, NEW YORK CITY

I would like to make one or two points as to the pressure of economic interest.

If conflict is due to the lack of economic goods, would it not be in proportion to that lack? In those parts of the world where life is most difficult, as in Iceland, would not the struggle be keenest? But do we find that so? Again, if scarcity of goods causes conflict of interests between individuals, would not conflict be in proportion to numbers? But do we find the most crowded nations, like China, most combative? Then, have we not the economic fact that individual interests are best subserved by equitable distribution and that we should profit more by peaceable co-operation? If this is true, does it not show some other factor bringing on conflict when we should be better off without it?

We should recognize two things: The first is the fact that we, on the one hand as individual animals and on the other hand as members of a social group, carry within ourselves the recognized *ego* interest and the equally recognized *social* interest; and there is conflict between them in every human soul. But there is still another thing: economic conditions have produced among various groups of animals (such as the well-worn examples of the bees and ants) perfectly peaceable communal organization. But these structures are distinctly of a gynocentric nature, while the human race has been androcentric. In both sexes egotic motives are found, though in the male preponderantly. It is the turkey cock who struts as well as fights. Combat is an essentially male sex-instinct.

PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

I do not care to enter into a discussion, in any proper sense of the term. Let me merely call attention to one or two facts that have an important bearing on our problem.

Whether conflicts all grow out of economic conditions or not, depends upon the construction that we give to the word "economic." According to

accepted definitions of "economy," the economic adjustment is not the fundamental or the primary one for any organism. The first life necessity of the organism is not to take in food—it can wait a few minutes for that; it is to resist or to withstand certain environmental influences. There is a limit to the light, to the electrical tension, to the heat, to the mechanical pressure, that can be endured. Adjustment of the organism to these things is the beginning of psychological, as it is the maintaining of physical, life. It is an adjustment to degrees, to shadings, to congruities, to harmonies, and to admit this is to acknowledge that the primary adjustments are aesthetic, rather than economic. We shall one day base our economics upon aesthetic premises, as we are attempting today to base other social sciences on economics.

PROFESSOR E. H. VICKERS, TOKIO, JAPAN

It seems bold to question such a carefully reasoned paper without having an opportunity to have thought it over, but a protest against the general thesis brought out in this paper, it seems to me, should be made, because the fundamental conflicts are the ones which the writer has put in the third class. Professor Carver said the first and fundamental conflict was between man and nature; the second between man and man, and the third the conflict of interests in the individual. I would like to say that it is in this third group we find what is fundamental.

The egotic interests of which Professor Ross spoke are of two classes: (1) leading us to something better in social as well as individual life; and (2) leading us to something worse. We are on the wrong track, we are after the wrong thing, when men continue to struggle for an abundance of the scarce goods. If the Orient has had a lesson for us, it is in impressing us with the fact that we have got to be satisfied by limitation. We must put a limitation upon our desires, and that is one way in which we come to true social and individual happiness. To illustrate what I mean: if a man is suffering from the disease of drink, is it best for him to have more drink? Is it right to concede that he should struggle for more drink? When we are putting our civilization upon a purely materialistic basis, we are fighting for more drink.

The basis of social conflict is therefore in this conflict of motives of the individual; which uplift or drag down the individual. We need to recognize *that* conflict as fundamental. When we are after the wrong thing we give a license to those motives which are leading us as individuals in the wrong way.

DR. EDWARD T. DEVINE, NEW YORK CITY

The chief objection that I have to the rejoinders thus far made is that they seem to leave the writer of the paper undisputed in the field of economics. I am, therefore, inclined to join issue distinctly upon economic grounds.

As I look out upon the human race from the individual point of view, the great economic fact which I see is not one of conflict, but one of choice. The difficulty that seems to me to lie in the materialistic explanation that has been given is that it misinterprets what actually takes place with nine-tenths of these choices. There are ever, to be sure, some people who are on the margins, and who are actuated by the sort of motives described, but the great body of mankind seems to me not to be influenced by these motives at all. It is the choice of the higher thing that influences them. With some people it may be a question of Bicycles versus Babies. In such a case it is not so much a conflict within themselves as a sacrifice, and a sacrifice is always an indication of a surplus. The thing we see is not an economic struggle modified and influenced and softened by a thousand other considerations, but these other influences which are themselves the fundamental consideration.

PROFESSOR LESTER F. WARD, BROWN UNIVERSITY

I feel as though I might express at least what I think is the view of the Sociological Society—that Professor Carver need not feel aggrieved by the fact that most of the speakers have taken issue with him. He has been kind enough to come into our meeting with a paper written upon an essentially economic basis with a view to showing us how broad that great science of economics is; and we are grateful to him for having done so.

Most of us appreciate the vastness of the economic struggle, but the more I look at the general doctrine of historical materialism, or the economic interpretation of history, or by whatever other name we may call it, the more it narrows down relatively to the other motives and factors of history.

Now if it becomes a question of definition; if the economists are to maintain that all interests are economic; then of course the whole field is theirs. But is it true or proper that the word "economic" should be thus expanded? Should it not be confined to the nutritive side, leaving reproduction and the other motives out of the economic field? The more we look at it, the more the economic side contracts and the more the reproductive, the aesthetic, moral, and all the sociogenetic motives loom up on the horizon of our sociological discussion.

We have already had presented the moral and the aesthetic side of these highest derivative motives. But little has been said of the intellectual factor in the world. Professor Carver, in an admirable book which he has compiled, recognizes himself in his introduction that the intellectual motives of mankind have produced the entire progress of civilization. Yet these are not at all included in his economic scheme.

PROFESSOR T. N. CARVER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

This discussion seems to be a kind of a laboratory demonstration of the fact that there are various forms of conflict. Perhaps it is unsafe to allow

economists to define their own science, but it is at least equally unsafe to allow its enemies to define it. If we economists are to be allowed only such space as the representatives of other sciences are willing to leave us, I am afraid that we shall soon find ourselves standing on the point of a needle.

As to the question, Is choice the fundamental fact? I really cannot discuss it at all, because it seems to me that choice is a form of conflict. The third form of conflict which I tried to outline in my paper really includes all that has been said for the contention that choice is an elementary social fact.

As to the contention that it was curiosity which made Eve eat the apple, allow me to say that I do not care what her motive was, or whether there was any motive or any Eve. The essential point is that whatever the motive, or whatever the historical setting, the normal result of the gratification of the sexual instinct was the increase of numbers, and increase of numbers brought scarcity, and that threw man out of harmony with nature. Moreover, I took pains to define scarcity in relative terms. Therefore it does not seem necessary to argue the question whether the conflict is more intense where population is most dense or where it is less dense. Relatively to human desires it is quite possible that scarcity is less in China than in this country. Since scarcity, as I pointed out, may result from an expansion of human desires as well as from an increase of numbers, it would seem also that the so-called opulent classes may come about as far short of complete satisfaction as the less opulent classes. Their motives for the struggle for more than they have may be quite as strong as the motives of any class.

The point raised by Professor Giddings seems to be the key to the whole question. I am quite willing to admit that there may be a form of conflict more elementary than any economic conflict. The individual may find himself in a conflict with nature which does not show itself at once in the form of scarcity. The weather may be colder, for example, than our bodies are fitted by nature to endure. But out of this situation develops the need for fuel, shelter, and clothing, and these things are scarce. This elementary conflict between man and nature speedily reaches the stage of scarcity, in other words, the economic stage, and then it passes almost instantly into the social stage, or the stage of conflict between man and man.

It has been suggested that problems of sex and of population do not belong to the economist. I only need to remind you that these questions were treated by economists as a matter of course long before sociology was heard of.

It is argued that the desire for glory has been one of the great causes of social conflict. But what is the desire for glory? It seems to me to be nothing but the desire to be first in the conflict merely for the distinction which it brings. The conflict may be based upon strictly economic motives, but some souls become so filled with the spirit of conflict as to forget what the fight is all about and delight in the fight for its own sake, and in victory for its own sake. That is glory.

As to the so-called natural bumptiousness of the human male, it seems to me to have originated in much the same way. Owing to economic scarcity, the race has developed under conditions of conflict, and those tribes and other groups have survived who have been best fitted, mentally as well as physically, for the conflict. Those peaceful souls who have sought to avoid conflict have gone to the wall. The story of the Moravian towns in southern Ohio had probably been repeated thousands of times in the formative period of our own race. By the sheer process of selection, a type of man has been evolved who loves fighting for its own sake—a fighting type. The desire for glory is only another term for this formative bumptiousness.

As to the importance of the principle of "consciousness of kind," it seems to me to be as great as it can seem to anyone. But its function is that of a counter-agent. The universal and all-pervasive conflict of interests is the basic fact; but this conflict is counteracted by the consciousness of kind, in various of its manifestations, by natural affection within the family, by patriotism and loyalty among the citizens of the same state, etc. The case of the cannibal is probably the extreme of weakness of any counteracting force. At the opposite extreme is that of the religious vegetarian who thinks it wrong to take the life of any fellow creature for our own gratification.

COMPETITION

PROFESSOR LINDLEY M. KEASBEY
University of Texas

"If a sober socialist can be found, let us invite him to share in the discussion"—such was someone's suggestion. I trust I am betraying no confidence; the quotation is from a letter to our secretary, and the phrase appealed to me particularly: "If a sober socialist can be found!" Shortly afterward I was asked to open this discussion. Put two and two together. You all know I am a socialist—professionally of the chair, personally of the floor, a sitting and standing socialist, if you choose. So it's only a question of my sobriety. Individualists are never called to account—did you ever think of that? They are expected at all times to be sober, and all that goes therewith, safe and sane and sound; it is only socialists that are suspected of intellectual inebriety, unsoundness, insanity, and so forth. But in this instance, believe me, a sober socialist is addressing you on the subject of competition.

In current discussions there is so much confusion, I shall endeavor to establish some distinctions—in the first place between competition and selection. As I see it, selection is an *organic* phenomenon, competition is a *superorganic* phenomenon. Organic evolution is the outcome of an interaction between *variability* and environment, super-organic development is the outcome of an interaction between *utility* and environment.¹ Interaction in both instances is accompanied by struggle resulting in survival; in the organic instance survival is effected through adaptation and selection, in the superorganic instance survival is effected through production and competition. Then again, selection operates only from generation to generation, whereas competition is operative at all times; the former is effected through natural, the latter through cultural, laws. Hence to alter the effects of selection, you

¹ See my *Civology*.

must proceed from biology—or anthropology, so far as human beings are concerned—and apply the principles of its subsidiary science, eugenics; to modify the effects of competition you must proceed from sociology—or civology, I should say—and apply the principles of its subsidiary science, economics. I wish I might enlarge on this subject, there is so much to say concerning selection. In the hope that Professor Cooley will continue this side of the discussion, I shall confine myself to the economic end of the argument and consider only competition. Here again confusion exists regarding the parties concerned.

We think of competition as if it were always among individuals, as if human beings only were competing with one another. Such is not the case, or entirely the case. As a matter of fact competition occurs *within* and *among* the three factors of production, only one of which is individual. Under our laws of private property, land and capital *belong* to individuals, but that's a far cry from being individual; labor is actually the only individual factor of production. Hence when competition occurs *within* the labor factor it bears upon individual laborers; when competition occurs *between* labor and the other two factors it bears upon individual laborers; whereas when competition occurs within the land or capital factor, or between these factors and labor it bears only on the owners thereof. This distinction is significant and far-reaching withal—again I should like to elaborate.

Furthermore, competition occurs only at the margin, at the margin *within* each productive factor, at the margin *among* the three productive factors. Above these margins are differential stages of lessening competition ending in absolute monopoly. If in any way one or more of these margins can be controlled, monopoly runs down the line again and competition diminishes accordingly. All this is abstract, but I trust comprehensible. Now let us examine the situation in detail. We speak of the three factors of production—land, labor, and capital. I'm inclined to think of them as “powers”—powers of production, or productive powers.

Land, in the first place, is the source of *physical* productive power, generative or mechanical as the case may be. Being

physical, land is an *extrinsic* power, derived by the individuals who exercise it from their physical surroundings. Under the existing individualistic régime this extrinsic productive power is exercised by private individuals—natural and juristic personalities—in their own interests; under the ideal socialistic régime—stop! my sobriety is at stake; to save myself I'll resort to aposiopesis. Then again land is a *differential* productive power. Differential because embodied unequally in units of extension; no two lots, no two acres, for instance, possess precisely the same amount of productive power. Competition occurs only at the margin, you know; consequently the owners of differential lands are above its pressure; secure in the possession of a differential monopoly, recipients (by the grace of society) of an unearned increment, they are actually advantaged, for the lower competition forces the margin the larger their differential returns. The single tax would restore this differential to society, and reduce differential owners to marginal terms, but, you'll observe, these self-same land owners exercise political power precisely in proportion to their possession of productive power. "Empire," Harrington said, "follows the balance of property." They can scarcely be expected to tax themselves. If only the people were all powerful as we assume—but that's a different tale, tending toward socialism, so I'll desist.

Labor, in the second place, connotes *personal* productive power, which again is of two sorts: muscular and mental. Being personal, labor is an *intrinsic* power, emanating actually from the individuals who exercise it. Communists say individuals should dedicate their personal power to the public—perhaps they will some day (even now there are a few); Socialists—there I go again, I can't stay sober—socialists argue for individual ownership of personal power, to each laborer the full value of his product. But back to the point. Labor is intrinsic and unlike land in this; but like land in that it constitutes a differential. As physical power is embodied unequally in acres, even so is personal power embodied unequally in individuals. No two laborers possess precisely the same amount of muscular and mental ability. Here again competition occurs at the margin, whose lower limit

is determined by the standard of life. Aye, there's the rub! Owing to the increase of population, immigration, and the iron law of wages, competition keeps forcing down this marginal standard. Look away from old countries; turn your gaze from cities (it's enough to sicken you); prate about "the economy of high wages;" deprecate the past; appreciate the present; have faith in the future—still the facts stare you in the face. Is it necessary for me to say they're horrid facts? Competition is lowering the marginal standard of life. And as the standard goes down under competition, selection enters in, eliminating the unfit and allowing only the fittest to survive. There's humor in this phrase "fittest," a ghastly sort of humor, for the fittest in this instance are those whose wants are atrophied, though their physique is enduring. In this respect, be it said, Mongolians and negroes are fitter than Caucasians, many Europeans fitter than Americans. Above this margin the pressure diminishes through differential stages to the point of all but absolute monopoly. However, owing again to the increase of population and immigration, these labor differentials are in no sense so secure as those of land. Unionism tends to establish them, to be sure, but not always effectively; whether wisely is open to discussion, though under present conditions there is no other way that I can see to accord to labor its differential dues. I only wish, in existing circumstances, unionism might monopolize the margin and so establish a decent standard of life.

The opposite of laborer is loafer—etymologically, I mean; economically, "capitalist" is the accepted antithesis—it comes to the same. Attribute this to my intellectual inebriety; excuse the jibe and consider with me this confusing concept, capital. In its abstract sense, capital constitutes a *fund of purchasing power*, and a *fluid* fund withal, embodied in coin and credit instruments. And inasmuch as every unit of coin or credit is precisely as powerful as another of the same denomination, money is a marginal power. So in its abstract sense, capital constitutes a *marginal, fluid fund of purchasing power*. Applied in production abstract capital becomes concrete by being embodied in capital goods for sale on the market. So in its concrete sense capital consists of a collection

of goods conveying *selling power*. No two stocks of goods convey precisely the same amount of *selling power*, so capital in the concrete constitutes a *differential*. All this is familiar enough to economists. Not so the source. Should capital be considered as an intrinsic or an extrinsic power? Suppose we strike middle ground and say capital is derived from *society*. Exchange (which is essentially a social institution) constitutes a catch-basin. From laborers' savings—such as they are—countless tiny rivulets flow; from landed differentials, abounding streams; intermittently from mines and conquests come cascades of gold and silver; still another source is speculation, and so on. Accumulating in the catch-basin, fermentation occurs—provided the level of confidence is undisturbed—credit expands, the fund of capital increases, capital goods pass out as selling power to flow back into the catch-basin again as a fluid fund of purchasing power. Fanciful? yes, and unscientific besides, but what other means is there by which to explain, if I could, so complicated a subject in so short a time? Starting from the fallacy of saving, we say capital is stored-up labor, and assume forthwith that those who control it labored correspondingly to produce it. Rather is it the other way around: those who labored—and saved forsooth—(they're mostly under the sod or in the urn) to produce capital have little or nothing to say concerning the control thereof. It's all wrong and—I was going to add—socialism is the only remedy. But I'm considering competition: how does competition operate within the capital factor?

Capital in the abstract is entirely marginal, consequently among the money owners competition is operative all along the line. A lowering of the rate of interest is the result. Every dollar earns less to be sure, but inasmuch as there is no limit put upon the number of dollars a man may own, the hardship is not so severe. Consider in comparison the marginal laborer's lot! Capital in the concrete is differential, advancing like land and labor from the margin to almost absolute monopoly. Some of these differentials are naturally secure; others are shored up artificially by franchises, patent rights, tariff privileges, and combinations of all kinds. Nay more, even the margin is now

monopolized; and classic economists asserted: profits tend to decline toward a minimum! So they would, so far as they are marginal, if free competition could prevail.

Among the powers of production also, competition occurs at the margin. The marginal power is always the most abundant, those that are comparatively deficient occupying differential positions. In new countries where labor and capital are scarce and land is abundant competition cuts down the landlords' returns to insignificant differentials. Such was the case in America some years ago; such is still the case in Texas to a considerable extent. In an old country where land is all appropriated and capital is controlled, laborers go on increasing in numbers through the natural laws of population and the conventional laws of immigration. Such is the state we are rapidly arriving at in America, with the result that nowadays competition bears heaviest upon the one intrinsic, individual, human productive power. So, being subjected to the pressure of competition both *within* their group (except so far as through unionism they can establish their differentials) and *between* their group and the others, laborers, as the phrase goes, "get it coming and going." What wonder then that they organize? What wonder that they are ready to revolt—not against masters, as slaves and serfs before, but against the system that allows land which is national to belong to the few fortunate and capital which is social to accumulate in private hands.

That such a system is unjust is too obvious to argue; that it is uneconomic also is evident enough. That which is unjust may continue to persist, that which is uneconomic is sure to desist. So convinced am I of this that I am inclined to prophesy: In the course of national competition, the capitalistic system will succumb; in the course of international competition, the socialistic state will succeed. Accord to each individual laborer the full value of his product, let society absorb the rest. Then and then only will the united state (or States spelt large, if you choose) become a power in the world for wealth in first instance, and for righteousness as well.

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR C. H. COOLEY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

It seems to me that the fundamental point touched upon by Professor Keasbey's paper and indeed the fundamental point always touched upon in questions of competition is the meaning of competition in relation to organization. There is the great point. The socialists want organization and they find competition, and therefore many of them oppose the latter. Professor Keasbey, however, does not take this ground, I think. He apparently admits that competition of a better sort is a remedy for the existing condition.

Now what is the meaning of competition in this regard? I take it to be simply an organizing process. The world is full of various agents. These agents in one way or another are continually getting displaced in the social structure, by the death of individuals, the decay of groups and systems, etc. Some method must be found of constantly building up the organization. If there is any other method of doing this than competition in the broad sense I do not know what it is: I have never seen any plausible scheme of socialism that did not provide for this. There must be some means of comparing and selecting the agents and adapting them to their work.

Competition is not merely a cause of organization; it is also an effect. As everywhere else in the interdependent social system, we find all influences interacting, each a cause of change in the other. Organization is a cause in that it furnishes motives and standards and methods for competition. These things are determined by custom, by law, by public opinion, by the inherited ideas of men.

Taking these points for granted, we come to the question, What is the matter with existing competition? I should say the matter is simply that existing competition shares in the prevalent disintegration of social structures. We are all familiar with this disintegration; it is chiefly though not entirely economic in its origin. It extends into the church and into the family and more or less into every phase of social organization. The result is that the standards, the methods of competition, today, are very far from being what the most enlightened human nature would desire to have them. They are what is sometimes called "individualistic" in the bad sense of the word.

Perhaps I can best indicate this by taking an example. Let us suppose there is a ship sailing on the seas, properly manned with officers and crew. Now, here is an organization. It may not be apparent at first that competition is going on in this little society; but it is. If a mate does well, he may very likely get appointed captain on the next cruise, or his wages may be raised. Or again, this ship may be competing with another ship across the ocean, and various advantages may accrue if it succeeds. Here is well-ordered competition, in which merit succeeds. That is to say, the test of success is something for the good of society, namely, the welfare of the ship

and of commerce. But suppose this ship quite unexpectedly in the dark runs upon an iceberg. The captain and the crew are thrown into the water. The society immediately and entirely disappears. The individuals are all struggling in the water, and a new kind of competition takes place. From the good of the ship or society, it falls back on the animal instinct for self-preservation. Man becomes a mere brute under these conditions. The customs and modes of thought that keep society on a proper level are destroyed.

Something analogous to this is widely prevalent in present society, especially in the industrial world. I might show this without difficulty by some illustrations; but this is done every day by the socialists.

To pass on to the question how competition may become better: It is by building up the social organization through competition itself and raising the level of that competition by the ordinary methods of human endeavor. After all, the ultimate criterion of these things is what men want, and if we try hard we can get it.

You ask perhaps what kind of organization I think is going to replace the present objectionable disorganization and so bring about a better state of competition. As to that I don't know very well. I am rather clear, however, on one point: the coming organization will not be all of one kind. I do not agree with those socialists who look to the overwhelming predominance of the central state as the solution of the question. I should call that a blanket socialism that is stifling to the healthy activity of society. What I am inclined to expect is that there will be a very considerable development of control and operation by the central state, also a growth of the principle of co-operation apart from the central state and an increase of protective and self-assertive groups, in the nature of labor unions, and so on.

I expect also, regarding the state, that there will be a good deal more tendency toward socialism in the local units than there will be in the central state. Local units have the advantage of preserving the comparison and experimentation that make it possible for society to choose the best types and prevent any one type from becoming unduly ascendant.

I think finally that the shrewd sense of the Americans will preserve the good old Anglo-Saxon tradition of checks and balances. It is better to have these checks and balances than it is to aggrandize any one agent at the expense of all the rest.

PROFESSOR T. N. CARVER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

I would merely like to make the point that the ideal which Mr. Keasbey brought out would not bring us anywhere near socialism, that is, the ideal of distribution according to productivity or service. The crux of the question is: Who shall appraise the service? If the service is to be appraised by certain public functionaries, that would be socialism, as I understand it. If, however, the service is to be appraised and paid for by those who receive it, you have individualism, as we now have it in essential particulars.

We sometimes make the mistake of assuming that all production is social. The baker who bakes a loaf of bread may in an impressionistic sort of way be performing social service, but the real service is to the man who eats the bread, and therefore it seems to me that we might leave the appraisement and the payment of the service to the man who receives it, i. e., to the man who eats the bread. If we do that we haven't socialism, by any means, nor anything resembling it.

PROFESSOR E. A. ROSS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

We had a certain idea in mind in putting up for discussion the question, "Is competition becoming too intense?" We had in view certain specific problems that are up today in this country. Is it right that children are being swept into the competitive vortex and urged to do their utmost; or is there a necessity for some effort to hold them out of that maelstrom? Is it all right that women are drawn into the competitive vortex with nothing to shield them from the hardships of long hours of labor, night work, etc.? Shall we trust to competition to take care of these things? Or is it time that certain limitations should be placed upon such competition?

Labor unions are limiting the rate at which work is to be performed. They don't want to be pressed. They disapprove of "pace-makers." Now, this certainly is a limitation upon competition. Is it good or bad, wrong or right? Then again, consider the demand which President Eliot voices—that the tenure of position on the part of the wage-earner should correspond to the tenure of office of government employees; namely, to remain until by some disinterested tribunal they are declared incapacitated for that position. Not merely the grouch of a foreman, but an impartial investigation would then determine if a man may keep his job.

Is the demand for a securer tenure justified? Such is the type of question we had in mind. For my own part, I believe that in competition certain forces are at work which should be restrained in order to prevent competition from going to unwholesome extremes.

PROFESSOR U. G. WEATHERLY, UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA

It has seemed to me that the issues raised by both of the papers at this session are essentially the same. To determine whether competition is unwholesomely intense it is necessary to study its fundamental nature and its limits. I believe that under existing conditions in the economic field in America most of the competition which is socially deleterious and which in the end calls for social regulation is found not in the great central mass of society but at its two extremes. Among the least efficient class industrially the struggle retains many of the characteristics of the primordial struggle for existence. Unskilled, unorganized labor requires protective legislation to guard against abuses of which the sweatshop is an extreme type. Here com-

petition is waged for the primary animal necessities. The organization of labor shields the individual worker from the worst features of this type and from the need of protection from the outside. At the other extreme the possessors and manipulators of great bodies of capital engage in struggles wherein the weapons are railway systems or whole industries. The war of the titans and the hurling of mountain masses is repeated, to the danger and disturbance of the existing order. With this class the stimulus to over-competition is not the need of any external good but the mere lust of battle or the love of the game. Among the men whose fortunes have already reached unwholesome dimensions the competitive spirit is even more likely to become pathologic than among the necessitous. Now in both groups there is an evident trend away from individual competition and toward intergroup competition, that is, competition between groups occupying the same general field. The next few decades will probably witness a diminution of the friction between diverse groups like capitalists and laborers, and a marked increase of competition of one labor group with other labor groups, and of one capital mass against other capital masses. A general unionization of labor and a fairly complete aggregation of capital into organic bodies would tend to produce this result, since it would clear the field of the older type of individual competition. Labor groups would then clash with other labor groups whose wage interests conflicted, and capital combinations would compete primarily with other capital combinations whose products could be substituted the one for the other.

PROFESSOR GRAHAM TAYLOR, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

There is another phase of this subject, namely, the restriction of individual competition in order to preserve the right of the freedom of contract. Our present industrial system is more and more making collective bargaining an economic necessity. Many who bargain collectively as capitalists and employers entirely fail to recognize the necessity of the employees bargaining collectively in order to preserve their right to the freedom of contract. Men who calmly and complaisantly pool all their money and their brains and who appoint some president of a corporation to act as their walking delegate insist in the name of the freedom of contract that the laborers shall not do precisely the same thing. Now, by an instinctive feeling of self-protection and self-preservation the working-men act collectively. They appoint an agent to represent them. He goes up to bargain for them. He is instantly discarded. Their representative is not given the right to represent, and all in the name of the laborer's right to preserve the freedom of contract. Why, there is no freedom of contract where one side has to bargain individually with another side that may bargain collectively. The objection to the right of the laborer to bargain collectively is usually made for the sake of the non-union laborer. But I

think that is also a great misrepresentation. I have long resided in a predominantly non-union population of working people. But in a time of strike that whole neighborhood is absolutely a unit on the side of the strikers. They obey an Eleventh Commandment which is, "Thou shalt not covet or steal thy neighbor's job." Individual competition must as an economic necessity, be curtailed by collective bargaining if the right of the freedom of contract is to be preserved.

J. BURRITT SMITH, ESQ., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

If a mere lawyer layman may speak, I would like to say a few words. It seems to me that the question before the meeting has scarcely been touched and no one has sought to answer it.

"Is competition becoming too intense?" This is the substance of the question. It does not mean merely for women and children, but throughout the nation, in the great industrial movement, is competition becoming too intense? A lawyer would present a few important facts that settle that question one way or the other. I will mention four of these.

Away back in the beginning of this nation we saw certain things that the government could do. We have been adding to those, year by year, until it is surprising how many things cities and states and the nation are doing. The purposes of government are being extended more and more into the *business* of the people, because they believe they can get better conditions and service by such extension of powers.

We organized corporations, and corporations from the small beginnings have gone on growing until they have become almost equal in power to the governments that created them. They came to recognize the fact that their ability to make profits is curtailed and prevented by competition. Then they began to combine. The railroads pooled their earnings, and when that was prevented by law, they organized trusts and combinations by which the corporations are getting together, because they know that competition is too intense, and is destructive.

Then laborers found that they were at the mercy of the corporations and those who wanted to make big dividends for stockholders; and now we have in the labor unions a recognition of the same fact that competition, as it exists, is not sufficient to regulate these matters. Hence men in labor unions come together and stand solid one way, right or wrong.

Then the people at large, recognizing that corporations have gone too far and that the labor unions or other organizations are not sufficient to remedy the evils, go a step farther and give the matter of regulation to the states or the nation. Examine the statutes of any single state and see there the laws that have been passed regulating and restricting corporations and their charges, modifying and determining hours of work, determining how and whether women shall work, and whether there shall be seats in stores,

and how and whether children shall be worked, all recognizing that competition is so intense and keen that there are certain evils attending it that must be regulated to protect workers and the public.

Take the recent public utilities bills of the state of Wisconsin or New York and there find an example of how the state is going into these questions and regulating corporations. The state here steps in and fixes the standards and methods of the competition that shall exist or the service that shall be rendered in the business of public utilities, and at the same time protect the people from the abuses that arise out of the elimination by organization and combination of healthy and wise competition. Every one of these laws centers back in the question of competition, and the moving spirit is better service for the people. Competition is the great thing that is working wrong. Monopoly is only a lack of competition secured because competition is too intense.

There is in man a social instinct. I believe that the most profound single quality that is possessed by the human race is that social instinct, that makes all men want to come together and have business, mental, and spiritual contact by co-operation rather than war by competition. When we have warfare instead of the enjoyment and helpfulness of co-operation; when we thus bring in social strife, we have something abnormal and contrary to the very constitution of every man and woman. And just so sure as that condition is abnormal and wrong and leads to warfare, just so sure, somewhere, some time, we shall reach that condition where men will seek to change it and establish new conditions. Today I believe we are reaching that. In this land of intelligence and prosperity, competition is getting to its fruit-bearing stage and compelling a change in laws and public action.

It is already recognized by the national government, by the corporations themselves, by the laborers, and by the state, that competition is becoming too intense. The beginning already made by public regulation and ownership, is opening the way for wider and wiser public co-operation, as a means of destroying the evils of competition—the growing and destructive war of modern commercialism. Just how far this public remedy will be applied, and just what form it will take, no one can tell, perhaps, and it is not necessary to consider it in discussing the present question. Every pulsation of the present intense commercial system answers the question under discussion in the affirmative. Competition has already become too intense.

IS SECTIONALISM IN AMERICA DYING AWAY?¹

PROFESSOR FREDERICK J. TURNER
University of Wisconsin

A satisfactory discussion of whether American sectionalism is dying away, demands inquiry into what sectionalism has been in this country, and what are its bases; after this has been attempted, prediction will find a ground on which to act. Mindful of the traditions of the historical craft, I shall offer some suggestions on the preliminary questions and shall not venture far in the uncertain sea of prophecy.

The student of American history since the Civil War, and especially in the last decade, seeing the sweep and power of the nationalizing movement, may readily agree with Secretary Root that "our whole life has swung away from old state centers, and is crystallizing about national centers." From this it might also be assumed that sectionalism is passing away with the decline of the state. But the state has shown marked vitality since these words of Mr. Root, and, in fact, history does not justify us in laying so much stress upon the state as the anti-national factor in our development. From the point of view of constitutional law and the division of legislative functions, the rôle of the state has, of course, been highly important. But, after all, the deepest significance of state resistance to the nationalizing process has lain in the fact that state sovereignty was the sword wielded by sectionalism. It is because the state was one of a group with common interests menaced by federal action that its protests had power. When we look at underlying forces of economic and social life, and at the distribution of political power in the Union, we find that sectionalism antedated nationalism, that it has endured, though often concealed by our political forms, through the whole of our history, and that it is far from certain that it would

¹ A paper read before the American Sociological Society, Madison, December 28, 1907.

pass away though the state should be extinguished; indeed it might gather new vitality and power from such an event.

There are degrees of sectionalism, varying from that exhibited in the struggle of North against South over the slavery issue, culminating in war between the sections, to the lesser manifestations of resistance to national homogeneity and to the power of a national majority. I shall recognize as tests of sectionalism all of those methods by which a given area resists national uniformity, whether by mere opposition in public opinion on the part of a considerable area, or by formal protest, or by combining its votes in Congress and in presidential elections; and also those manifestations of economic and social separateness involved in the existence in a given region of a set of fundamental assumptions, a mental and emotional attitude which segregates the section from other sections, or from the nation as a whole. Sooner or later such sectional influences find expression in politics and legislation and they are even potential bases for forcible resistance.

Geographical conditions and the stocks from which the people sprang are the most fundamental factors in shaping sectionalism. Of these the geographical influence is peculiarly important in forming a society like that of the United States, for it includes in its influence those factors of economic interests, as well as environmental conditions that affect the psychology of a people.

The United States is imperial in area. If we lay a map of Europe upon a map of the United States constructed to the same scale, the western coast of Spain would coincide with the coast of southern California; Constantinople would rest near Charleston, South Carolina; Sicily near New Orleans; and the southern coast of the Baltic would fall in line with the southern coast of Lake Superior. Thus, in size the United States is comparable not with a single nation of Europe, but with all of Europe, exclusive of Russia. It is also comparable with Europe in the fact that it is made up of separate geographic provinces, each capable in size, resources, and peculiarities of physical conditions to be the abode of a European nation, or of several nations. American history is in large measure still colonial history—the history of the exploration, conquest, colonization, and development of these

physiographic provinces, and the beginnings of a process of adaptation of society to the section which it has occupied. The movement is too new, too incomplete, to allow us to affirm that the influences of diverse physical sections have as yet worked out their effects upon the American nation.

American society has spread westward into the wilderness. It has shown a sectionalism arising from the opposition of interests between the outer edge of this advance where nature reduced man to the primitive conditions of the frontier, and the older areas of occupation where social development had progressed farther. The sectionalism of East and West has been a migrating sectionalism in American history, for regions once typically western have later under a process of assimilation become characteristically eastern with all the phenomena of complex and developed society, economic and social. Thus the sectionalism due to the movement of American settlement into the wilderness is a declining sectionalism. It is by no means in immediate prospect of extinction and in view of the persistent effects of social habits and ideals this process will be influential as a sectional influence long after the westward movement of American society itself has ceased.


But, in the long run, as American society loses the mobility stimulated by the artificial and transient opportunities of free land and the demand for labor in sparsely occupied areas, the sectionalism due to physiographic conditions, economic interests, and constituent stocks of settled societies will persist, if sectionalism persists at all.

How far have these factors already produced sections in the United States, and how far have these sections given way to a movement of national uniformity?

Writing in the middle of the eighteenth century, Thomas Mitchell proposed that the English colonies be divided into northern, middle and southern unions, "three distinct and different countries, separated from one another by natural boundaries; different in situation, climate, soil, products, etc., while the several colonies included in these divisions, which we look upon as separate countries, are all one and the same country in these respects."

This early recognition of these separate colonial divisions, while the settlements were still limited to the seaboard, is significant of the fact that physical conditions and component stock had almost from the beginning produced three coastal sections, New England, the Middle Region, and the South. I shall not take the time to characterize them, nor to point out how their separate economic interests controlled the history of politics and legislation in the later colonial period, the Revolution, the confederation, and the era of the dominance of the federal party. It was only in the presence of superior danger that these mutually repellant groups were drawn into union; only by sectional compromises that they achieved a constitution; only by the fact that the Middle Region was a buffer area, a fighting ground, and consequently afforded an opportunity for breaking the impact of sections and of affording a means of accommodating rival interests and shifting the balance of power, that the union held together in those early years. The fierceness of resistance of the Jeffersonian democracy of South and West, to the federalism of commercial New England, is well known. The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions constituted a platform for sectional defense. The equal fierceness of New England federalism's opposition to the triumphant Jeffersonian democracy is equally well known. The Hartford Convention was the expression of the revolt. Parties in this era were distinctly sectional as anyone may see by examining the maps of presidential elections, or of votes in Congress on test issues. The existence of sectional differences between New England, the Middle Region, and the South today will not be denied.

On the whole, however, as capitalistic development has progressed, foreign immigration swarmed in, urban populations widened their influence and absorbed the country places for their playgrounds, and especially as the traditional spiritual faiths and moral convictions tend to pass away, the similarities between New England and the Middle Region tend to increase; while the seaboard South finds itself in continued contrast with these northern sections, but increasingly absorbed into the interior southern section. And yet in spite of the blurring of these old divisional lines, it may well be a question whether New England with its



PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN OHIO, INDIANA, AND ILLINOIS, 1856, 1868, 1888, and 1900.

The Democratic counties are shown in black, the Republican in white.
 Map A shows in black the settled area of Illinois at the close of the period of southern settlement; it shows also that the South occupied the forested area leaving the prairies to be taken by the northern settlers.
 Map B shows the Free Soil vote in 1844 after the northern stream began to flow. The area shown is that where the vote was 1 per cent. or more of the total vote.
 Map C shows the location of the Western (or Connecticut) Reserve in Ohio, a New England area, consistently Republican.

PLATE II (1)






PLATE II (2)



THE BLACK BELTS IN 1850


NOTE.—Reproduced from article by Professor U. B. Phillips, in *American Historical Review*, XI, 810. The shaded areas show where the negro equaled or outnumbered the whites; in the darkest they were 75 per cent. of the total population. The sketch map of Georgia at the side shows: (A) Northern Georgia, grain raising; (B) Cotton Belt; (C) Pine Barrens, mixed agriculture; (D) Coast, raising sea-island cotton and rice. See *Report of American Historical Association*, 1901, II, 140. Compare Plate V, *post*.

PLATE III (1)




PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION, 1876
■ Republican Counties
□ Democratic Counties
▨ No returns, territories
etc.

Note.—Republican
presidential electors were
chosen by the legislature
in Colorado (50 R.
24 D.).



1892



PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION, 1892
■ Republican Counties
□ Democratic Counties
▨ Populist Counties
▤ No returns, territories,
etc.

1904

PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION, 1904

- Republican Counties
- Democratic Counties
- ▨ No returns, territories, etc.





PLATE IV




From *The Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia.

WET AND DRY MAP OF THE SOUTHERN STATES, 1908

NOTE.—The white sections represent Prohibition territory; black, licensed-saloon territory; shaded, modified-license territory, dispensaries, distilleries, etc., or territory which is partly wet and partly dry. Georgia and Alabama have state prohibition, therefore the areas favoring the saloon do not appear in those states. Compare the election of 1876. For Missouri and Arkansas compare Plate 55, Census Atlas, 1900, showing density of negro population. See the map below.

PLATE V



NOTE.—From Twelfth Census, *Bulletin Number 8*. The map of 1880 does not greatly differ from that of 1900, and it serves also to illustrate the presidential election of 1876 (Plate IV, ante).

only opportunity for sectional expansion in the direction of Canada, with its industrial life threatened by the transit of manufacturing toward the areas of production, might not at some indefinite future find its interests in closer relations with the adjoining Canadian area, and develop a new economic sectionalism under a conceivable political union of Canada and the United States, or of Canada and New England.

I turn from conjecture to ask attention to another type of section, significant because it is concealed by the way in which it lies within, but not identical with, the lines of several different states. There are many such sections which have had real influence upon our history but which the historian with his eyes fixed upon nation and on state has largely overlooked.

The Piedmont Plateau, or upland area of the South reaches from the fall line, behind the old tidewater, southwestward to the Alleghany Mountains, in a long belt running from Pennsylvania to Georgia. It is familiar to the geologist, less so to the historian; and yet important, and illustrative of what is occurring elsewhere at present. Historically, it was closely associated with the Great Valley of Pennsylvania and its continuation, the Shenandoah Valley, as well as with the Alleghany Mountains. The section comprised in these physiographic provinces runs like a peninsula from Pennsylvania southward to the rear of tidewater, until it touches the northern edge of the gulf plains. Cut off from tidewater not only by the falls of the rivers—the head of navigation—but also by a parallel strip of pine barrens through much of its length, this region was in many respects a projection of the Pennsylvania type into the very midst of the South. It was settled in the middle of the eighteenth century largely by migrations from Pennsylvania of Scotch Irish, Germans, and English pioneers, having little contact with, or resemblance at first to, the seaboard life, either economically, politically, or socially. It was the first distinctively western region, non-slave holding, grain and cattle raising, a land of dissenting sects, of primitive democratic conditions, remote from the coast, and finding the connection with Baltimore, Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania valley, both in spiritual and economic life, more intimate than with the tidewaters of Maryland, Virginia, North

Carolina, and South Carolina, within whose boundary lines it chiefly lay. In every one of these states contests occurred between this up-country and the coast. Indeed the local history of each of these colonies and states in the period from 1750 until about 1830 is perhaps dominated by the antagonisms of the up-country against tidewater. In every one the tidewater minority area, where wealth and slaves preponderated, ruled the more populous primitive interior counties by apportionment of the legislatures so as to secure the effective majority of the representatives. Unjustly taxed, deprived of due participation in government, their rights neglected, they protested, vainly for the most part, in each of these colonies and states. But all this long struggle of a section with definite social and economic unity and separate interests, and with enduring influences upon the history of the interior, must be worked out from fragments in the monographic treatment of the individual states. A whole section was engaged for nearly three generations in a struggle for its interests. Since the section acted in separate states the movement was obscured. But it was the existence of this section that gave Jefferson his power. It produced the men themselves, or the ancestors of Andrew Jackson, James K. Polk, and Abraham Lincoln, and gave to them the traits and the following that made possible their career and their contributions. We can infer the influence of the section as we see the towns for retail trade develop along the fall line at the edge of the Piedmont, gradually relieving the country from direct commercial colonial bondage to England. We note its increasing political power, by such evidences as the advance of the capitals to its eastern edge, as that of Virginia's from Williamsburg to Richmond in 1779; South Carolina's to Columbia in 1790; North Carolina's to Raleigh in 1791, Pennsylvania's to Lancaster in 1799 and to Harrisburg in 1812. From the Piedmont came the men who demanded statehood for the western settlements in the Revolution, basing their demand on the antagonism between their interests and those of the coast.²

² Compare the author's paper on "Western State-Making in the Revolutionary Era," *American Historical Review*, Vol. I, pp. 70, 251.

The significance of the Piedmont area was diminished when the cotton plant crossed over to the section, bringing slavery with it, in the period from about 1800 to 1830. Just prior to the completion of the ascendancy of slavery over the Piedmont, this section showed a sharp contrast with the tidewater South, in its friendly attitude toward federal internal improvements and tariff and, in general, its responsiveness to loose-construction legislative programmes. Even in the matter of slavery there was a final struggle between this section and the coast in each state for some means of ridding the South of this labor system. The independence of the state of West Virginia is an enduring evidence of the antagonism of interests between the interior and the seaboard, and the attitude of the other mountain districts in the Civil War was a grave disadvantage to the South. Helper's *Impending Crisis* was an exposition of ideas not uncommon in this whole interior section.

The section, however, became far larger than the hill and mountain region of the Piedmont and Alleghany system. As the pioneers of the Piedmont had pushed into Kentucky and Tennessee in the period of the Revolution, so their descendants in the years when slavery was transforming the up-country, moved across the Ohio in great numbers, and up the Missouri and into the northern portions of the gulf plains. The whole area occupied by the non-slave-holding poorer southern pioneers had a community of prejudices, traditions, fundamental assumptions, religious tendencies, ideals, and economic and social interests, and these are still clearly traceable and influential.

In the Mississippi Valley the colonization of different stocks resulted in interesting sectional groupings which may next be considered as a means of illustrating how such groupings affect political history. I have just spoken of the settlement of the southern pioneers in the hilly and forested areas of southern Indiana and Illinois and the similar regions of Missouri. In the Old Northwest this movement continued till it reached the non-forested prairie lands, which were almost untouched by 1830. In the Southwest the same kind of population passed from Kentucky and Tennessee and from the parent Piedmont region into

northern Alabama, eastern Mississippi, and into Arkansas and Texas.

A different stream entered the Northwest about 1830 and continued to flow with little interruption until the Civil War. This stream had its original source in the hill country of western and northern New England. Between 1800 and 1820 colonies of these people occupied central New York and the margin of the Great Lakes in that state and in Ohio, especially in the Connecticut Reserve. A combined New York and New England stream poured into the prairies in the succeeding generation, taking up the work of colonization of the northern Mississippi Valley at the boundary where the southern element had met the prairies and had stopped. Between the settlers of the northern region and those to the south were sharp antagonisms which showed themselves in many ways.

In the Southwest in the same years between 1830 and 1860, the planters entered the Gulf plains in increasing numbers, bringing cotton culture and slavery to this section as they had before brought it to the Piedmont. They sought especially western Georgia and the black soils of central Alabama, and the alluvial lands of the Yazoo district along the Mississippi River. We have thus four zones within the Mississippi Valley: (1) the New England-New York area; (2) the southern settlers north of the Ohio River in free states; (3) the southern settlers in the border area including West Virginia, the hill country of Kentucky and Tennessee, Missouri and Arkansas, where slavery was a subordinate element, and (4) the cotton kingdom of the lower South.

I will next ask your attention to these maps ³ which show how clearly party action has reflected the influence of these sectional groupings.

In the first series of maps, Democratic pluralities in presidential elections are shown in black for the counties of the Old Northwest, from 1856 to 1900. It is seen that the New England-New York area, is consistently Republican, and that

³ See Plate I. The elections chosen are typical. If the whole series were given, the similarity in the sectional subdivisions would be made even more striking.

the southern zone, especially in Illinois, shows Democratic majorities. So clearly marked is this in the latter state that the map might almost serve for one exhibiting the areas of the forests extending like a huge delta along the Illinois River, in contrast with the prairie lands. So deeply seated is political habit that in election after election almost the same party sections are seen in all these states. On the whole, the explanation for this grouping would appear to be that the different stocks followed their different habits; and that psychological tendencies, rather than the physiographic fact of prairie against forest, determined sectional alignment. But the physical conditions determined the location of the stocks, and they continue to exert an influence.

In the next map ⁴ is to be seen the votes of the Gulf states in the election of 1836 when Van Buren and White were contestants. The relation of the Whig vote to the cotton soils, and consequently to the areas of densest negro settlement and of wealth is obvious and interesting, while the Democratic area is equally striking confirmation of the attitude of the region of the poor whites. In this election the party alignment in the Old Northwest is somewhat confused by the candidacy of Harrison, a favorite son of the section, on the Whig ticket. New England and New York, moreover had not at that time reached Illinois in force.

These maps may be taken as typical. In all elections in the United States clearly marked sections appear.⁵ For the most part there is a tendency for similar sections to reappear through long periods. The subsections, if I may use the term, appearing within the larger sections, are limitations upon the unity and permanence of sectional existence. The majorities are but slight as a rule, and are therefore in danger of reversal. But the existence of these heterogeneous subsections renders the section as a whole less stable and its action less inevitable except in cases where unusual issues arise, stirring up moral stimuli or direct interests. As a rule, party discipline is sufficient to exercise a desectionalizing and restraining influence because the party fol-

⁴ See Plate II.

⁵ See maps for 1876, 1888, 1892, and 1904, in Plates III, (1), (2), (3), (4).

lowing is, as Professor Giddings⁶ has pointed out, made up of varied and more or less antagonistic groups held together by adjustments of interests and the party must therefore avoid extreme policies if it would hold its majority together. Were parties, however, broken into numerous small factions, as they may be in the future, each representing special interests, the shock of opposing sections might be more direct and obvious.⁷

Next let us observe the physiographic areas of the Mississippi Valley. In many respects the region is a single section in economic interests and in the traits of the people. It is a region certain to have a profound influence, for it could hold many European nations, and it is credited with being capable of sustaining a population of three hundred million souls. Physiographers divide this empire into the lake plains, prairie plains, gulf plains, Ozark Mountains, and great plains. Historically the lake and prairie plains (roughly, the north central group of states) have had a community of experience and influence, while the men of the gulf plains have been for the most part rivals, and for a brief period bitter foes of the men of the lake and prairie plains. Part of this opposition is the result of climatic contrasts, part of it is the secondary result of differences in economic interests, but the most of it arises from the presence of the negro as a governing consideration in politics, industry, and social structure.

In the course of this rivalry the New York-New England element of the North, aided by German immigrants, established its control over the section of the lake and prairie plains. It made alliances, in economic life, politics, and education, literature, and religion with the Middle Region, especially with western New York, and with New England. Railroads extending across

⁶ "Conduct of Political Majorities," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, p. 116; see also his *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 285, 293.

⁷ On the conflict of interests as a fundamental process in social development see Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 209, 248, 280, 282, 305, 307; A. L. Lowell, *Report of American Historical Association*, 1901, Vol. I, pp. 321, shows that party voting in legislation is less common than is popularly supposed; A. Johnson, *Yale Review*, November, 1906, points out the nationalizing tendency of party organization.

the same zone broke the ascendancy previously exercised by the Mississippi as the avenue of transportation for the lake and prairie plains, and the Ohio valley. A section of mutually interdependent states was established in the North at the same time that similar relations bound together the various sections of the South. The Civil War followed and the men of the lake and prairie plains controlled the government while they fought the men of the gulf plains for the possession of the Mississippi Valley and the preservation of the Union.

The survivals of this sectionalism between North and South seem slowly to be giving way. But the negro is still the problem of the South and while he remains there will be a southern sectionalism.⁸ If the negro were removed, it seems not unlikely that the unity of the Mississippi Valley would once more have free play in presenting common interests in the greatest of all our sectional areas. Such a movement as that lately promoted by President Roosevelt in favor of a vast system of internal improvement of the Mississippi and its tributaries and their connection with the Great Lakes, taken together with the effect of the Panama Canal in building up the Gulf ports would tend to restore the old significance of the Mississippi and the railroads parallel to it as trunk lines, and it would so emphasize the natural unity of the valley, and so press forward its interests in national appropriations, that the remoter outcome might be a new sectionalism over an area vaster than any previous section. Such a section, however, would in truth be the nation; and the Atlantic and Pacific coasts would then constitute peripheral sections. While the negro problem exists it is doubtful whether transportation and commercial interests alone can give the Mississippi Valley a sectional consciousness, though they are certain to create sectional alignments in congressional votes upon appropriations.

Other great sections must be considered in estimating the permanency of sectionalism. The Pacific coast is so obviously isolated by the mere fact of distance from the regions which permit dense settlement, as well as by the barrier of mountains

⁸ Compare maps in Plates III, etc., for evidence of the persistence of the negro as a sectionalizing force.

and deserts, that a sectional attitude may be expected to increase rather than diminish there as society settles to stable conditions in the United States. More important even than this, perhaps, is the Asiatic problem. Fronting the Orient, the coast is certain to develop its separate point of view in reference to the problems of the Pacific Ocean, oriental trade, and oriental immigration. What the negro is to the South, as a sectionalizing influence, that the Mongolian stock is to the Pacific coast. On race issues the two sections may form political alliances and thus strengthen the resistance of each to what may be the tendency of national legislation and diplomacy. If the nation in the interest of its foreign relations should attempt to impose upon the Pacific coast a policy of the open door to oriental immigration, the sectionalism of that province would show no signs of dying out. However, in many respects, industrially, commercially, socially, as well as geographically, the Pacific coast is itself divided into sections, more or less inharmonious. But there is a distinct tendency to draw together in intellectual life. Such organizations as the Pacific coast branch of the Historical Association has a sectional significance as well as a national aspect.

Passing over other extensive natural sections of the West, such as the region known as the Inland Empire of the far Northwest, with its sectional self-consciousness, shown in trade relations, educational and religious conventions, and so on, I wish to allude to the important bearing upon American sectionalism of the Arid Region. The activity of the federal government in the reclamation service is a striking illustration of how old individualistic principles and the *laissez-faire* conception of the government may give way to a semi-socialistic policy. The general government as land owner has become, for the vast spaces of the arid region, the builder of huge irrigation works. By the conditions on which it disposes of the land and the water privileges, it preserves a parental control over the social and economic conditions of the section. It owns and operates quarries and coal mines for its uses. It experiments with new crops, tells the farmers what and when and how to plant, and even contemplates the

rental of the surplus water and steam power generated by and for irrigation uses, for the purposes of manufactures.

This aspect of sectionalism is, however, an illustration of how sectional conditions may affect a national transformation and increase national power, rather than the reverse. Its bearing upon the possible production of sectional resistance to these new national tendencies on the part of the older regions, where capitalistic exploitation has had such important power in shaping national action, is obvious. Just as the eastern section of wealth and commercial and manufacturing interests today resents the present policy of the administration in economic matters, so, later, the development of national power in dealing with the arid area and the Mississippi system is certain to produce sectional reaction in those older regions that have formerly shaped nationalism.

The nationalizing tendencies are at the present time clearly in evidence. The control of great industries has passed to a striking extent into the hands of corporations or trusts, operating on a national basis and centered in a few hands. Banking and transportation systems show the same tendency to consolidation. Cities are growing at a rate disproportioned to the increase of general population, and their numerical growth is only a partial index of their influence upon the thought as well as the economic life of the country. On the whole, in spite of rivalry, the business world of these cities tends to act nationally and to promote national homogeneity. The labor organizations are national in their scope and purposes. Newspapers, telegraph, post-office, all the agencies of intercourse and the formation of thought tend toward national uniformity and national consciousness. The co-operative publication of news furnished by national agencies, the existence of common ownership and editorial conduct of chains of newspapers, all tend to produce simultaneous formation of a national public opinion. In general, the forces of civilization are working toward uniformity. Even the religious life and organization take on the national form.

Nevertheless, I, for one, am not ready to believe that it is clear that sectionalism is to die out. To take the matter of transportation as an illustration: any attempt at political control of

rates by direct national legislation would produce injustice to some sections and undue advantages to others. Sectional alliances and conflicts would appear in congressional votes. If, on the other hand, such transportation control is left in the hands of a board, either the board will recognize the existence of sectional necessities on some basis of justice—not easy to find—or it will itself reflect sectional combinations to the disadvantage and exploitation of the minority section. The factor of distance from a market, as well as the factor of a sectional distribution of crops and other economic activities, will always tend to produce sectional diversities and conflicting interests in the vast area of complex geographical provinces which makes up the United States. It will be many years before the sectional distribution of the stocks, with inherited customs, institutions, and ways of looking at the world, will cease to be reflected in the sectional manifestation of public opinion and in the sectional distribution of votes in Congress.

The sectional influence in the selection of the president is a case in point. As economic and political power passes from section to section, the presidency has in the past tended to fall to the area of greatest energy and power. Thus the era of commercial influence of the Northeast saw the presidencies of the two Adams. But the rival, and for the most part dominant, influence of the agricultural section led by Virginia brought in the rule of the Virginia dynasty. The transition of power to the trans-Alleghany lands witnessed a struggle between Clay, of Kentucky, and such Tennessee leaders as Jackson, White, and Polk for leadership of these lands. There was a distinct era of influence of these two states exercised through their widespread colonies in the West, when Benton, Grundy, Bell, and others had the reigns of government. The transition of power to the cotton kingdom was marked by a tendency on the part of the leaders of that section to select northern men to serve their purpose; but the real center of power was in the lower South in the decade before the war. The war and the period immediately following showed the passage of political energy to the Old Northwest, whence came Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Harrison, and McKinley,

and a host of other leaders in the cabinet and in Congress. More recently the formation of a new sectional influence is shown in the importance of the movements led by Bryan and by Roosevelt, who is deeply affected in his point of view by his sojourn in the newer lands of the trans-Mississippi West. So it is likely to continue. The sectionalism that continues to shape political action underneath the forms of nationalism is not dying out.

In conclusion, divesting myself of the historical mantle, in order to venture upon the rôle of prophet, I make the suggestion that as the nation reaches a more stable equilibrium, a more settled state of society, with denser populations pressing upon the means of existence, with this population no longer migratory, the influence of the diverse physiographic provinces which make up the nation will become more marked. They will exercise sectionalizing influences, tending to mold society to their separate conditions, in spite of all the countervailing tendencies toward national uniformity. National action will be forced to recognize and adjust itself to these conflicting sectional interests. The more the nation is organized on the principle of direct majority rule, and consolidation, the more sectional resistance is likely to manifest itself. Statesmen in the future, as in the past,⁹ will achieve their leadership by voicing the interests and ideas of the sections, which have shaped these leaders, and they will exert their influence nationally by making combinations between sections, and by accommodating their policy to the needs of such alliances. Congressional legislation will be shaped by compromises and combinations, which will in effect be treaties between rival sections, and the real federal aspect of our government will lie not in the relation of state and nation but in the relation of section and nation.

⁹ By way of illustration, reference may be made to my *Rise of the New West* ("American Nation," Vol. XIV), wherein I have attempted to exhibit the play of sectional forces in the period 1820 to 1830.

[*The discussion of this paper will appear in the May number.*]

IS RACE FRICTION BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES IN THE UNITED STATES GROWING AND INEVITABLE?¹

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On the evening of December 17, 1855, there assembled a gathering of the colored citizens of the city of Boston to do honor to a member of their race. The man was William C. Nell, a name familiar to students of negro history. The occasion was the presentation to him of a testimonial of appreciation of his labors in behalf of the removal of the color line from the public schools of Boston. The event commemorated the crowning achievement of a purpose formed and a work begun some twenty-six years before. It marked the close of a quarter-century of patient and unrelenting struggle with established law and custom. The meeting was made memorable by the presence of such men as Wendell Phillips and William Lloyd Garrison, who rejoiced with their colored brethren that "the prejudice against color was dying out." This was the keynote of all the addresses made—the faith that the final surrender of this long-stormed citadel marked the passing of the prejudice of race.

Fifty-two years later in November of the present year, a great concourse of Boston's colored citizens assembled in Faneuil Hall to protest against the steady and wide increase of race prejudice in America. The meeting was addressed by the gray-haired son of the great abolitionist, in tones which were far from sounding an echo of the hopeful, long-forgotten words of his father.

And after this more than half-century of American advance in moral and intellectual and material things, we too have come together, in the free atmosphere of this academic seat, to con-

¹ A paper read before the American Sociological Society, Madison, Wis., December 30, 1907.

sider coolly and dispassionately the causes which really lay behind these two meetings in Boston—farther apart in spirit and in purpose than in time. We have come to inquire whether friction between the white and negro races in America is growing and inevitable.

In the first place, what is race friction? To answer this elementary question it is necessary to define the abstract mental quality upon which race friction finally rests. This is racial "antipathy," popularly spoken of as "race prejudice." Whereas prejudice means a mere predilection, either for or against, antipathy means "natural contrariety," "incompatibility," or "repugnance of qualities." To quote the *Century Dictionary*, antipathy "expresses most of constitutional feeling and least of volition;" "it is a dislike that seems constitutional toward persons, things, conduct, etc.; hence it involves a dislike for which sometimes no good reason can be given." I would define racial antipathy, then, as a natural contrariety, repugnancy of qualities, or incompatibility between individuals or groups which are sufficiently differentiated to constitute what, for want of a more exact term, we call races. What is most important is that it involves an instinctive feeling of dislike, distaste, or repugnance, for which sometimes no good reason can be given. Friction is defined primarily as a "lack of harmony," or a "mutual irritation." In the case of races it is accentuated by antipathy. We do not have to depend on race riots or other acts of violence as a measure of the growth of race friction. Its existence may be manifested by a look or a gesture as well as by a word or an act.

A verbal cause of much useless and unnecessary controversy is found in the use of the word "race." When we speak of "race problems" or "racial antipathies," what do we mean by "race?" Clearly nothing scientifically definite, since ethnologists themselves are not agreed upon any classification of the human family along racial lines. Nor would this so-called race prejudice have the slightest regard for such classification if one were agreed upon. It is something which is not bounded by the confines of a philological or ethnological definition. The British

scientist may tell the British soldier in India that the native is in reality his brother, and that it is wholly absurd and illogical and unscientific for such a thing as "race prejudice" to exist between them. Tommy Atkins simply replies with a shrug that to him and his messmates the native is a "nigger," and in so far as their attitude is concerned that is the end of the matter. The same suggestion, regardless of the scientific accuracy of the parallel, if made to the American soldier in the Philippines, meets with the same reply. We have wasted an infinite amount of time in interminable controversies over the relative superiority and inferiority of different races. Such discussions have a certain value when conducted by scientific men in a purely scientific spirit. But for the purpose of explaining or establishing any fixed principle of race relations they are little better than worthless. The Japanese is doubtless quite well satisfied of the superiority of his people over the mushroom growths of western civilization, and finds no difficulty in borrowing from the latter whatever is worth reproducing, and improving on it in adapting it to his own racial needs. The Chinese do not waste their time in idle chatter over the relative status of their race, as compared with the white barbarians who have intruded themselves upon them with their grotesque customs, their heathenish ideas, and their childish new religion. The Hindu regards with veiled contempt the racial pretensions of his conqueror, and while biding the time when the darker races of the earth shall once more come into their own, does not bother himself with such an idle question as whether his temporary overlord is his racial equal. Only the white man writes volumes to establish on paper the fact of a superiority which is either self-evident and not in need of demonstration, on the one hand, or is not a fact and is not demonstrable, on the other. The really important matter is one about which there need be little dispute—the fact of racial differences. It is the practical question of differences—the fundamental differences of physical appearance, of mental habit and thought, of social customs and religious beliefs, of the thousand and one things keenly and clearly appreciable, yet sometimes elusive and undefinable—these are the things which

at once create and find expression in what we call race problems and race prejudices, for want of better terms. In just so far as these differences are fixed and permanently associated characteristics of two groups of people will the antipathies and problems between the two be permanent. We speak loosely of the race problems which are the result of European immigration. These are really not race problems at all. They are purely temporary problems, based upon temporary antipathies between different groups of the same race, which invariably disappear in one or two generations, and which form only a temporary barrier to physical assimilation by intermarriage with native stocks.

Probably the closest approach we shall ever make to a satisfactory classification of races, as a basis of antipathy, will be that of grouping men according to color, along certain broad lines, the color being accompanied by various and often widely different, but always fairly persistent differentiating physical and mental characteristics. This would give us substantially the white—not Caucasian, the yellow—not Chinese or Japanese, and the dark—not negro—races. The antipathies between these general groups and between certain of their subdivisions will be found to be essentially fundamental, but they will also be found to present almost endless differences of degrees of actual and potential acuteness. Here elementary psychology also plays its part. One of the subdivisions of the negro race is composed of persons of mixed blood. In many instances these are more white than black, yet the association of ideas has through several generations identified them with the negro—and in this country friction between this class and white people is on some lines even greater than between whites and blacks.

Race conflicts are merely the more pronounced concrete expressions of such friction. They are the visible phenomena of the abstract quality of racial antipathy—the tangible evidence of the existence of racial problems. The form of such expressions of antipathy varies with the nature of the racial contact in each instance. Their different and widely varying aspects are the confusing and often contradictory phenomena of race relations. They are dependent upon diverse conditions, and are no more

susceptible of rigid and permanent classification than are the whims and moods of human nature. It is more than a truism to say that a condition precedent to race friction or race conflict is contact between sufficient numbers of two diverse racial groups. There is a definite and positive difference between contact between individuals and contact between masses. The association between two isolated individual members of two races may be wholly different from contact between masses of the same race groups. The factor of numbers embraces indeed the very crux of the problems arising from contact between different races.

A primary cause of race friction is the vague, rather intangible, but wholly real feeling of "pressure" which comes to the white man almost instinctively in the presence of a mass of people of a different race. In a certain important sense all racial problems are distinctly problems of racial distribution. Certainly the definite action of the controlling race, particularly as expressed in laws, is determined by the factor of the numerical difference between its population and that of the inferior group. This fact stands out prominently in the history of our colonial legislation for the control of negro slaves. These laws increased in severity up to a certain point as the slave population increased in numbers. The same condition is disclosed in the history of the *ante-bellum* legislation of the southern, eastern, New England, and middlewestern states for the control of the free negro population. So today, no state in the Union would have separate car laws where the negro constituted only 10 or 15 per cent. of its total population. No state would burden itself with the maintenance of two separate school systems with a negro element of less than 10 per cent. Means of local separation might be found, but there would be no expression of law on the subject.

Just as a heavy increase of negro population makes for an increase of friction, direct legislation, the protection of drastic social customs, and a general feeling of unrest or uneasiness on the part of the white population, so a decrease of such population, or a relatively small increase as compared with the whites,

makes for less friction, greater racial tolerance, and a lessening of the feeling of necessity for severely discriminating laws or customs. And this, quite aside from the fact of a difference of increase or decrease of actual points of contact, varying with differences of numbers. The statement will scarcely be questioned that the general attitude of the white race, as a whole, toward the negro would become much less uncompromising if we were to discover that through two census periods the race had shown a positive decrease in numbers. Racial antipathy would not decrease, but the conditions which provoke its outward expression would undergo a change for the better. There is a direct relation between the mollified attitude of the people of the Pacific Coast toward the Chinese population and the fact that the Chinese population decreased between 1890 and 1900. There would in time be a difference of feeling toward the Japanese now there if the immigration of more were prohibited by treaty stipulation. There is the same immediate relation between the tolerant attitude of whites toward the natives in the Hawaiian Islands and the feeling that the native is a decadent and dying race. Aside from the influence of the Indian's warlike qualities and of his refusal to submit to slavery, the attitude and disposition of the white race toward him have been influenced by considerations similar to those which today operate in Hawaii. And the same influence has been a factor in determining the attitude of the English toward the slowly dying Maoris of New Zealand.

The character and violence of race friction or conflict will depend upon the immediately provoking cause but will be influenced by a variety of accompanying considerations. Open manifestations of antipathy will be aggravated if each group feels its superiority over the other. They will be fewer and milder when one race accepts the position of inferiority outwardly, or really feels the superiority of the other. In all cases the element of individual or racial self-assertiveness plays an important part. The white man on the Pacific Coast may insist that he does not feel anything like the race prejudice toward the Chinaman that he does toward the Japanese. In truth the antipathy is equal in

either case, but the Chinaman accepts the position and imputation of inferiority—no matter what or how he may really feel beneath his passive exterior. On the other hand the Japanese neither accepts the position nor plays the rôle of an inferior, and when attacked he does not run. Aside from all question of the relative commendable traits of the two races, it is easy to see that the characteristics of one group are much more likely than those of the other to provoke outbreaks of antipathy when brought into contact with the white race. We need not ask what would be the situation in India, and what the size of the British garrison there, if the Hindus had the assertive and pugnacious characteristics of the Japanese, veiled though the latter are behind a bland and smiling demeanor.

It is a common remark that the relations between the white and negro races in this country are not "as good," as the expression runs, as they were before the War. The fundamental cause of most race friction is in the operation of racial antipathy which leads to the denial by one race of the racial equality of another, coupled with the assertion of equality by the other party to the contract. *Post-bellum* racial difficulties are largely the manifestation of friction growing out of the novel claim to equality made by the negro after emancipation, either by specific declaration and assertion, or by conduct which was equivalent to an open claim, with the refusal of the white man to recognize the claim. The commonest mistake of race-problem discussions is that of treating such problems as a heritage from slavery. Slavery was responsible only in so far as it was responsible for bringing the races into contact. The institution, *per se*, was not only not the cause of the problem, but, on the other hand, it actually furnished a basis of contact which as long as it existed minimized the problems which result from racial contact upon a plane of theoretical equality. We may obtain a conception of an American race problem without the background of antecedent slavery relations, if we can imagine the situation which would be created by the precipitation upon the population of the Pacific Coast of a million Japanese. The late Professor Shaler, of Harvard, summed up with absolute accuracy the function of

slavery in making possible relations of mutual amity between the white and negro races in this country when he declared that, "the one condition in which very diverse races may be brought into close social relations without much danger of hatred, destructive of social order, is when an inferior race is enslaved by a superior." His opinion was that "this form of union is stronger than it has appeared to those who have allowed their justifiable dislike of the relation to prejudice them as to its consequences." Professor Shaler struck one of the keynotes of the *ante-bellum* situation when he said that slavery made impossible any sort of rivalry between the races. He declared his utter detestation of the institution, but said it should be recognized that "it was effective in the prevention of race hatreds." To quote his words:

Moreover, it brought the two races into a position where there was no longer any instinctive repugnance to each other, derived from the striking differences of color or of form. If the negroes had been cast upon this shore under any other conditions than those of slavery, they would have been unable to obtain this relation with the whites which their condition of bondage gave.²

But Professor Shaler recognized the innate potential force of antipathy of race and he observed that "it remains to be seen whether the race hatred, which was essentially lost during the period of slavery, will return in the condition of freedom." Twenty-one years have elapsed since Professor Shaler wrote, and it is in the light of these two decades of additional experience that we are today attempting to answer his query.

It is impossible to discuss here, as I should like to do, the broader question of race relations, as preliminary to an inquiry into relations in this country between whites and negroes. We may, however, suggest some of the more elementary principles of such relations as a basis for a reply to the concrete question before us. In the first place, I lay down as a fundamental law of racial contact the proposition that the terms and conditions of racial association will be dictated by the stronger of the two parties to such association, actuated by motives of self-interest,

² N. S. Shaler, "Race Prejudice," *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1886, pp. 516,

or by instincts of self-preservation. In the second place, the resulting relations will be least conducive to friction when the terms insisted upon by the stronger race are accepted without protest by the weaker. The converse of this follows as a corollary, that the relations which are most conducive to friction are those under which the conditions laid down by the stronger party are not accepted by the weaker. The friction which racial contact engenders under such conditions will be in proportion to the degree of the insistence of one party upon its terms of association, and of the resistance to such conditions offered by the other.

The absence of *ante-bellum* racial friction was due to the general acceptance by the negro of the status assigned him by the white race. The farther removed the two races are from this basis of association, which Professor Shaler declared to be the only one upon which they could safely have been brought together in the first place, the greater the probability that friction will follow contact between them. The whole matter resolves itself into very simple terms. The simpler the relations between diverse races, the less friction there will be; the more complex the relations, the greater the friction. The simplest relations possible are those in which the relative status of superior and inferior is mutually accepted as the historical, essential, and matter-of-fact basis of relationship between the two. The most complex relation possible between any two racial groups is that of a theoretical equality which one race denies and the other insists upon. The accepted relation of superior and inferior may exist not only without bitterness on one side, or harsh feelings upon the other, but it may be characterized by a sentiment and affection wholly impossible between the same groups under conditions demanding a recognition of so-called equality. We should try to gain a clear idea of the importance of this mutual recognition of a different racial status in minimizing racial friction, and of the significance of the converse condition in increasing it.

The northern white man often remarks upon the inconsistent position of the southern white man. The former objects more than the latter to personal contact and association with the negro,

but theoretically, he is willing to grant to the negro the full exercise of all the legal rights and privileges which he himself enjoys. The southern white man, on the other hand, does not object to personal association with the negro—provided it be upon terms which contain no suggestion of equality of personal status—but he is not willing to grant the privileges which his northern brother concedes to the race in the mass. The truth is that the difference between their respective attitudes is largely a matter of fiction. It is more apparent than real. The attitude of the northern man toward the matter of personal association is really the natural attitude of the white man. It is the unconscious expression or feeling of instinctive racial antipathy in its elementary form. The attitude of the southern man toward the same association is in reality the wholly artificial product of the relations made possible by slavery. The northern man prides himself on not “looking down on the negro,” as the expression goes. He regards him unconsciously as theoretically, potentially, his racial equal. His unconscious mental attitude does not immediately upon personal contact establish between himself and the negro the relation of superior and inferior. He is conscious only of strangeness, difference. But in the presence of this difference his mind reacts normally, and a sufficient degree of latent antipathy is aroused to create a natural barrier, which he merely “feels” and does not attempt to explain. On the other hand, through the influence of generations of association under the purely artificial relations of slavery, the mind of the southern white man instinctively responds to accustomed contact upon inherited lines with the unconscious concept of an inequality of racial status which neutralizes or prevents the operation of racial antipathy. In other words, to borrow Professor Shaler’s illustration of the operation of slavery in destroying race hatred, the long-continued association has destroyed the normal operation of elementary racial antipathy. In its primary form, it is simply not provoked by an association to which it has long become accustomed. It may be asked at once, if such association has been sufficient thus to impair what is claimed to be an instinctive mental impulse, and not only to do this, but to establish in lieu

of such a feeling, relations and sentiments of genuine and unquestioned affection, why it is not able to destroy all racial antipathy and thereby in time enable the races to live together in absolute concord? Where is the ground for even the possibility of increased racial friction? The answer is not difficult. The potential results of long-continued racial contact and association may be fully granted, for the sake of discussion. But the question is the primary one of accomplishing the association. Our original proposition is that racial harmony is greater under an association determined by one party and accepted by the other. This was precisely what made for such relations under slavery. But slavery is dead, and with the passing of the generation of whose life it was an accepted part, both black and white, the relations which it slowly evolved are passing also. A new basis of contact is presented—that of unconditional equality. It is a basis which the white race is not willing to concede in practice, whatever the white man may do in theory, and hence we have the essential elements of racial friction—a demand for and a denial of racial equality.

Whether or not race friction in the United States is increasing and inevitable depends upon the attitude of the two parties to the racial contact. Does the American negro demand racial equality, and does the American white man deny it? The latter branch of the question we shall attempt to answer first. Racial antipathy, which we have said to be the basis for the “lack of harmony,” and the “mutual irritation,” which we translate as race friction, is practically universal on the part of the white race toward the negro, and is beyond question stronger in the so-called Anglo-Saxon stocks than in any other. If it is less apparent in one place than in another, the difference is a mere incident to differences of local condition. It is protean in its manifestations—and subject to such a variety of provoking causes as to defy classification. It is exhibited here in the individual, and there in the mass, and elsewhere in both. One man may draw the line against association in a public conveyance, another at the relations of domestic service. One may draw it in the public dining-room of a hotel, another at his private table.

One man or one section may draw it in the public schools, another only in fashionable establishments for fashionable young women, or in private academies for boys. Here and there we find a man who realizes no feeling at such contact, and he imagines himself to be "free from race prejudice." But even for him there exists the point of racial recoil, though it may be reached only at the altar or the grave. It is, after all, merely a difference of degree. Racial antipathy is a present, latent force in us all. As to this we need not deceive ourselves.

At no time in the history of the English-speaking people, and at no place, of which we have any record, where large numbers of them have been brought into contact with an approximately equal number of negroes, have the former granted to the latter absolute equality, either political, social, or economic. With the exception of five New England states, with a total negro population of only 16,084 in 1860, every state in the Union discriminated against the negro politically before the Civil War. The white people continued to do so—North as well as South—as long as they retained control of the suffrage regulations of their states. The determination to do so renders one whole section of the country practically a political unit to this day. In South Africa we see the same determination of the white man to rule, regardless of the numerical superiority of the black. The same determination made Jamaica surrender the right of self-government and renders her satisfied with a hybrid political arrangement today. The presence of practically 100,000 negroes in the District of Columbia makes 200,000 white people content to live under an anomaly in a self-governing country. The proposition is too elementary for discussion, that the white man when confronted with a sufficient number of negroes to create in his mind a sense of political unrest or danger, either alters his form of government in order to be rid of the incubus, or destroys the political strength of the negro by force, by evasion, or by direct action.

If we survey the field of economic contact we find but one considerable area in which the white man permits the negro to share his occupancy practically upon equal terms. That field is

the southern part of the United States. The unusual conditions there are the direct and immediate product of relations established, or made possible by slavery, coupled with the maintenance of a rigid color line, which minimizes, if it does not prevent racial friction. This condition, like the other purely artificial products of slavery favorable to amicable race relations, is changing, and will disappear with the increased tendency toward general uniformity of labor conditions and demands throughout the country. Such measure of freedom of economic opportunity as the negro has is not due to any superior virtue on the part of southern people, any more than is the larger political tolerance of the north due to any peculiar virtue of that section. Each situation is a mere incident of general racial conditions. Outside the South, whether in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, the Middle West, or New England, the absence of economic racial friction is due to the economic segregation of the negro. The race outside the South is in the main confined to humbler occupations, where the absence of white competition makes for racial peace. I am speaking of the many, not of the exceptional few who here and there are not discriminated against. What is true of the North is true of South Africa. Economically, every country apparently is either a "white man's country" or a "black man's country." It does not exist half one and half the other—always excepting the South. In South Africa the great problem is to get white men to work at trades with black men, or to permit black men to work at them at all. The white colonist either monopolizes a field himself—despite the fact that his numbers render the effort ruinous—or he permits the negro to monopolize it. He will not share it equally.

But it is in the sphere of relations which the world calls social that the white man's attitude toward the negro becomes most uncompromising—at least the attitude of the English-speaking white man. This too is universal. This social prejudice is no respecter of geographical lines. Its intensity varies of course with local influences—primarily with differences of numerical distribution. But that is a mere superficial consideration. This form of "race prejudice," if we elect so to designate

it, is probably more fundamental and far reaching than any other.

This fact is clearly recognized by Professor Kelly Miller, of Howard University, who says:

Where two races of widely different corporal peculiarities and cultivated qualities are brought into contact, serious frictional problems inevitably arise. . . . The American negro may speak the same language, conform to the same institutions, and adopt the same mode of religious worship as the rest of his fellow men, but it avails him nothing in the scale of social eligibility, which is the one determinative test of all true equality. . . . Without social equality, which the Teuton is sworn to withhold from the darker races, no other form of equality is possible.³

I shall add this further reflection: If slavery is the cause of race prejudice, why has slavery not produced it among the Arabs toward their negro slaves? Slavery is not the cause, nor is the Christian religion its cure, nor does Mohammedanism or Catholicism prevent it. The reason of its non-existence among the Mohammedans is not because of Mohammedanism, but because the Mohammedan is an Arab or a Moor. It does exist among the Berbers of Morocco, notwithstanding their Moslem faith. These Berbers are not only prejudiced against the negroes, but their prejudice has created continual unrest in Morocco, through their refusal to acknowledge fully the present sultan because of his negro blood. The reason that this prejudice is less pronounced in Catholic than in Protestant countries is because of the fact that the Catholic countries which have had most to do with negroes are mainly Latin countries, and the Latin's prejudice of color is nowhere as strong as the Teuton's. Under similar racial conditions the Catholic Teuton is just as much influenced by racial antipathy as his Protestant brother. It is not a question of religion or slavery, of Protestantism or Catholicism. It is finally and fundamentally a question of race.

In spite of all our protestations of democracy, the people of this country are not superior in their racial charity to the people of other parts of the world. I question if we are even as liberal in that regard as the average of Caucasian mankind. I sometimes feel that the very democracy among American white men

³ *The Southern Workman*, November, 1900, pp. 601, 602.

of which we boast so much develops a concomitant intolerance toward men of another race or color. Without other fixed or established distinctions in our social order, we seem instinctively to take refuge in that of color, as an enduring line of separation between ourselves and another class. Now and then, as the southern part of our country comes to be more dispassionately studied, an occasional observer finds himself puzzled by the conclusion that among its white population the South, taken as a whole, is the most democratic part of America. In the presence of the negro, and by contrast and comparison, all white men are equal. A horizontal racial line is drawn between the two sections of the population. All on one side of the line are conceded certain privileges and a certain status, based not upon merit but solely upon the accident of color. To the whole group on the other side of the line a certain status is assigned solely because of identity with another racial class. In each case what should be controlling differences within each group, along certain fairly tangible lines, are wholly ignored. In steadily increasing degree, it seems to me, certain privileges and a certain place in the larger life of the country are coming to be regarded as the peculiar and particular asset of Caucasian racial affiliation.

We have seen the fulfilling of DeTocqueville's prophecy that emancipation would be but the beginning of America's racial problems. The history of the world is a more open book today than it was a half or three-quarters of a century ago, and we have a larger perspective of racial contact. One of the editors of *The Wealth of Nations* has justly said that Adam Smith was instrumental in bringing different nations and cities closer together through a realization of their interdependence. But there is apparently a line which distantly related races cannot yet cross in safety. Such races have been brought into more intimate contact since the great economist lived, and the association has given rise to problems unknown to his generation, yet probably as old as the time when the first two groups of strangers on earth came together in suspicion and distrust. The diverse peoples of the world do not yet understand each other. Perhaps

they never will. We have no excuse if we wilfully blind ourselves to the stubbornest facts in human experience, and persist in regarding racial antipathy, or "race prejudice," as a mere passing relic of slavery, peculiar to one part of the country. We can make no progress even in the comprehension of our problem if we circumscribe our vision by any such narrow view. It was Jefferson's opinion that the emancipation of the American negroes was one of the inevitable events of the future. It was also his conviction that the two races could never live together as equals on American soil. His solution was colonization, but the time for that had probably passed when he wrote. As late as 1862 Lincoln expressed practically the same opinion as Jefferson. To a delegation of negroes he said:

You and we are different races. . . . Your race is suffering, in my judgment, the greatest wrong inflicted on any people. But even when you cease to be slaves, you are yet far removed from being placed on an equality with the white race. . . . The aspiration of men is to enjoy equality with the best when free, but on this continent, not a single man of your race is made the equal of a single man of ours. Go where you are treated the best, and the ban is still upon you.⁴

To me the problems of racial contact, of which friction is but one, seem as inevitable as apparently they did to DeTocqueville and Jefferson and Lincoln. But I have no solution, because of my conviction that in a larger, final sense there is no solution of such problems, except the separation of the races or the absorption of one by the other. And in no proper conception is either of these a "solution." We do not solve a problem in geometry by wiping from the blackboard the symbols which are the visible expression of its terms. The question which the American people must first be prepared to answer, if they demand a solution of their problem, is whether, within a period which may practically be considered, they will grant to another race, darker, physically different, and permanently distinguished from themselves, all and singular the rights, titles, and privileges which they themselves enjoy, with full and complete measure of equality in all things, absolutely as well as theoretically. If they can do this, they will reverse the whole history of their own

⁴ *Works of Abraham Lincoln*, Nicolay & Hay, Vol. II, pp. 222-223.

people, and until they do it, not only will there be race friction here, but it will increase as the weaker race increases its demands for the equality which it is denied.

Thus we return to the first branch of our inquiry—the attitude of the negro as one of the determining factors in the increase or decrease of race friction. It is more difficult to answer for him than for the white man. The latter has a history in the matter of his relations with other races, perfectly well defined to anyone who will study it candidly. He has either ruled or ruined, to express it in a few words, and pretty often he has done both. It has been frequently said that the negro is the only one of the inferior, or weaker, or backward, or undeveloped races (the terms are largely interchangeable and not at all important), which has ever looked the white man in the face and lived. But for all the significance the statement holds, we have only to go to Aesop's fable of the tree which would, and the tree which would not bend before the storm. I know of no race in all history which possesses in equal degree the marvelous power of adaptability to conditions which the negro has exhibited through many centuries and in many places. His undeveloped mental state has made it possible for him to accept conditions, and to increase and be content under them, which a more highly organized and sensitive race would have thrown off, or destroyed itself in the effort to do so. This ability to accept the status of slavery and to win the affection and regard of the master race, and gradually but steadily to bring about an amelioration of the conditions of the slave status made possible the anomalous and really not yet understood race relations of the *ante-bellum* South. The plain English of the situation was that the negro did not chafe or fret and harass himself to death, where the Indian would have done so, or massacred the white man as an alternative. In many respects the negro is a model prisoner—the best in this country. He accepts the situation, generally speaking; bears no malice; cherishes no ill will or resentment, and is cheerful under conditions to which the white man refuses to reconcile himself.

This adaptability of the negro has an immediate bearing on the

question before us. It explains why the negro masses in the southern states are content with their situation, or at least not disturbing themselves sufficiently over it to attempt to upset the existing order. In the main, the millions in the South live at peace with their white neighbors. The masses, just one generation out of slavery and thousands of them still largely controlled by its influences, accept the superiority of the white race, as a race, whatever may be their private opinion of some of its members. And, furthermore, they accept this relation of superior and inferior, as a mere matter of course—as part of their lives—as something neither to be questioned, wondered at, or worried over. Despite apparent impressions to the contrary, the average southern white man gives no more thought to the matter than does the negro. As I tried to make clear at the outset, the status of superior and inferior is simply an inherited part of his instinctive mental equipment—a concept which he does not have to reason out. The respective attitudes are complementary, and under the mutual acceptance and understanding there still exist unnumbered thousands of instances of kindly and affectionate relations—relations of which the outside world knows nothing and understands nothing. In a Boston colored magazine some month since,⁵ Miss Augusta P. Eaton gives an account of her settlement work among negroes in that city. In describing relations where colored and white families live in contact, she says, “The great bond of fellowship is never fully established. There is tolerance, but I have found few cases of friendly intimacy.” Here is just the difference between the two situations. “Friendly intimacies,” probably not in the sense meant by Miss Eaton, but friendly and kindly intimacies, none the less, do exist in the South, despite all we hear to the contrary. They are the leaven of hope and comfort for white and black alike in what does appear to be a pretty big lump of discord. In the mass, the southern negro has not bothered himself about the ballot for more than twenty years, not since his so-called political leaders let him alone; he is not disturbed over the matter of separate schools and cars, and he neither knows nor cares anything about “social equality.”

⁵ *Alexander's Magazine*, June, 1907, p. 93.

I believe there may develop in process of time and evolution a group of contented people, occupying a position somewhat analogous to that of the Jamaican peasant class, satisfied in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and afforded the full protection of the law. I believe it is possible for each of the various groups of the two races which find themselves in natural juxtaposition to arrive at some basis of common occupancy of their respective territories which shall be mutually satisfactory, even if not wholly free from friction. I express a belief that this is possible, but to its accomplishment there is one absolute condition precedent; they must be let alone and they must be given time. It must be realized and accepted, whether we like it or not, that there is no cut-and-dried solution of such problems, and that they cannot be solved by resolutions or laws. The process must be gradual and it must be normal, which means that the final basis of adjustment must be worked out by the immediate parties in interest. It may be one thing in one place and another thing in another place, just as the problem itself differs with differences of local conditions and environment. We must realize that San Francisco is not Boston, that New Orleans is not New York. Thus much for the possibilities as to rank and file.

But what of the other class? The "masses" is at best an unsatisfactory and indefinite term. It is very far from embracing even the southern negro, and we need not forget that seven years ago there were 900,000 members of the race living outside of the South. What of the class, mainly urban and large in number, who have lost the typical habit and attitude of the negro of the mass, and who, more and more, are becoming restless, and chafing under existing conditions? There is an intimate and very natural relation between the social and intellectual advance of the so-called negro and the matter of friction along social lines. It is in fact only as we touch the higher groups that we can appreciate the potential results of contact upon a different plane from that common to the masses in the South. There is a large and steadily increasing group of men, more or less related to the negro by blood and wholly identified with him

by American social usage, who refuse to accept quietly the white man's attitude toward the race. I appreciate the mistake of laying too great stress upon the utterances of any one man or group of men, but the mistakes in this case lies the other way. The American white man knows little or nothing about the thought and opinion of the colored men and women who today largely mold and direct negro public opinion in this country. Even the white man who considers himself a student of "the race question" rarely exhibits anything more than profound ignorance of the negro's side of the problem. He does not know what the other man is thinking and saying on the subject. This composite type which we poetically call "black," but which in reality is every shade from black to white, is slowly developing a consciousness of its own racial solidarity. It is finding its own distinctive voice, and through its own books and papers and magazines, and through its own social organizations, is at once giving utterance to its discontent and making known its demands.

And with this dawning consciousness of race there is likewise coming an appreciation of the limitations and restrictions which hem in its unfolding and development. One of the best indices to the possibilities of increased racial friction is the negro's own recognition of the universality of the white man's racial antipathy toward him. This is the one clear note above the storm of protest against the things that are, that in his highest aspirations everywhere the white man's "prejudice" blocks the colored man's path. And the white man may with possible profit pause long enough to ask the deeper significance of the negro's finding of himself. May it not be only part of a general awakening of the darker races of the earth? Captain H. A. Wilson, of the English army, says that through all Africa there has penetrated in some way a vague confused report that far off somewhere, in the unknown, outside world, a great war has been fought between a white and a yellow race, and won by the yellow man. And even before the Japanese-Russian conflict, "Ethiopianism" and the cry of "Africa for the Africans" had begun to disturb the English in South Africa. It is said time and again that the dissatisfaction and unrest in India are accen-

tuated by the results of this same war. There can be no doubt in the mind of any man who carefully reads American negro journals that their rejoicing over the Japanese victory sounded a very different note from that of the white American. It was far from being a mere expression of sympathy with a people fighting for national existence against a power which had made itself odious to the civilized world by its treatment of its subjects. It was, instead a quite clear cry of exultation over the defeat of a white race by a dark one. The white man is no wiser than the ostrich if he refuses to see the truth that in the possibilities of race friction the negro's increasing consciousness of race is to play a part scarcely less important than the white man's racial antipathies, prejudices, or whatever we may elect to call them.

In its final analysis the sum and substance of the ultimate demand of those Americans of African descent whose mental attainments and social equipment identify them much more closely with the Anglo-Saxon than with the negro masses, is definitely and clearly stated in the words of Dr. Dubois:

There is left the last alternative—the raising of the negro in America to full rights and citizenship. And I mean by this, no half-way measures; I mean full and fair equality. That is, the chance to obtain work, regardless of color, to aspire to position and preferment on the basis of desert alone, to have the right to use public conveniences, to enter public places of amusement on the same terms as other people, and to be received socially by such persons as might wish to receive them. These are not extravagant demands, and yet their granting means the abolition of the color line. The question is; Can American negroes hope to attain to this result?⁶

With equal clearness and precision, and with full comprehension of its larger meaning and significance and ultimate possibilities, the American white man answers the question in the language of another eminent American sociologist, Professor Edward A. Ross, in contrasting the attitudes of Anglo-Saxons and Latins toward other races on this continent, says:

The superiority of a race cannot be preserved without pride of blood and an uncompromising attitude toward the lower races. . . . Whatever may be thought of the (latter) policy, the net result is that North America from

⁶ *The East and the West*, January, 1904, p. 16.

the Behring Sea to the Rio Grande is dedicated to the highest type of civilization; while for centuries the rest of our hemisphere will drag the ball and chain of hybridism.⁷

And thus the issue is joined. And thus also perhaps we find an answer to our own question, whether racial friction in this country is increasing and inevitable.

⁷ *The Foundation of Sociology* (1905), p. 379.

[*The discussion of this paper will appear in the May number.*]

REVIEWS

The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures. By ARTHUR F. BENTLEY. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Pp. xviii+499. \$3 net.

This is a real book. It is more genuine than it would be if it were more attentive to the minor literary conventions. Its author has in the first place all the qualifications which are conditions of winning the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from one of our foremost universities. He cannot be dismissed as unworthy of attention by the academic folk because he is not of their guild. His rough riding over more or less dignified theories is not the helplessness of a *Sonntagsreiter* with no training for the saddle. On the contrary he would probably not suffer by comparison with the majority of professors in the subjects which his book traverses if he were suddenly forced to compete with them in a searching examination on the technical literature of their fields. Added to this, he has the qualifications acquired by apprenticeship to the newspaper business, in which he made his way from the rudiments of reporters' duties to membership of the editorial staff of a leading Chicago daily. It can hardly be said that he is "at home" both among scholars and among men on the street, because in the sense of thinking and feeling as they think and feel it is doubtful if he makes himself very intimately one with either. He rather cultivates the attitude of an amused analyzer of the whole process, while he is gravely discharging his vocational function within the process. He knows the human game at first hand, however, through more variations than most philosophical writers, so that if his argument is not convincing it is surely not because he is outclassed by those to whom the reasoning is addressed.

In the author's own words, this book is an attempt to fashion a tool. I am not quite sure that I can describe the use to be made of this tool in terms that Dr. Bentley would accept, but as I understand him he wants to construct a tool which will serve to analyze and measure all the varieties of cause and effect which make up those processes of control which are indicated approximately by the term government. Thus it is a study in what most of the sociologists

would call the theory of social dynamics. The method is first, destructive, or negative criticism; second, constructive, or positive criticism. That is, Part I, entitled, "To Prepare the Way," arraigns a series of theorists, and charges them with attempting to put into circulation each a particular variety of false and futile interpretation of what actually occurs in society. Part II, "Analysis of Governmental Pressures," contains the author's substitute for these mischievous explanations. This notice will merely hint at the main thesis of the book, and will confine itself to a relatively unimportant preliminary.

Dr. Bentley begins by illustrating at great length, in Part I, what he chooses to regard as vicious interpretations of social processes. His reasoning appears first in criticism of instances chosen from everyday speech. Drawing his conclusions from them, he says, (p. 16),

The illustrations . . . show what kinds of explanation we currently make and currently find satisfactory for events around us. Their common characteristic is that some psychic quality, of goodness or badness, of love or hate, of intelligence or lack of intelligence, or some mixture of such qualities, is taken to explain what the actors have done. . . . Now the feature of these personal qualities to which attention must specially be given is that they are looked upon as a sort of "thing" acting among other "things" in the social world. They are a sort of "stuff," different, or not different, as one likes, from the material "stuff" of the world, but in either case interacting with the latter in series of events that can be linked together with each event in the series explaining the other that comes after it. For example, Tom sees the bully maltreating the boy. The bully act is there first. It knocks against Tom's "sympathy." The sympathy makes Tom act in a particular manner. The bullying is stopped by the impact. Brain states, or soul states, forming this "stuff"—it is all one in the practical explanation.

It is like billiard balls on a billiard table. The cue ball is some moral or other feeling, or capacity, and it knocks against another ball, which is some other person, or thing, or institution, and shunts it off to knock in turn against a third ball, which may be either a feeling or a thing. Thus the social process is supposed to go on.

Is this too crude a statement of such explanations? I readily admit its crudity. But does not the ordinary discussion of the place of education in social life adopt just this theory? Does it not treat so many boys and girls as having so many minds made up of so much feeling or thought-stuff? Does it not say, come let us heap up thought-stuff in such and such ways and it will produce the results we desire later on? And is it not by the proof of experience forever and ever wrong? I am not denying that educa-

tion exists and that it has its place. . . . I am only denying the "stuff" theory or explanation that is used in connection with them. I am denying that such an explanation explains anything.

The illustration and Dr. Bentley's explanation go much farther toward illustrating and explaining a crucial trait in his own thinking than toward clearing the way for the conclusion at which he aims. In the first place, the most evident peculiarity in his theorizing is insistence that the center of attention of those whom he criticizes is his center of attention, or if it is not it ought to be. Thus, if I am policeman or truant officer or parent or teacher, when Tom mixes with the bully, and if I ask, "Why did he do it?" Dr. Bentley demands that my "why?" shall be the last proposable psychological or sociological "why?" But my question is in fact nothing of the kind. It is the parental, or pedagogical, or magisterial "why?" and it is quite conceivable that even after I had threshed out social dynamics with Dr. Bentley to the last limit of analysis, and had been convinced by him, "sympathy" would still remain the best available symbol of the solution as applied to this particular action of this particular Tom.

This vagary is typical of Dr. Bentley's whole method as a critic of other writers. That is, he violates one of the most elementary rules of literary and historical exegesis, viz.: An occurrence, whether a theory or any other phenomenon, must be explained by its connections with its own attending circumstances. It must be judged with reference to the actual system of relations in which it had its setting, not as though it were an incident of other real or hypothetical conditions. My purpose, let us say, was to find out whether for practical uses blame or praise was Tom's due when he fought the bully. Dr. Bentley declines to take my view of my own purpose, and elects to judge me as conducting research in abstract social dynamics. Not only that, but when I sum up my account of Tom's actions in terms of "sympathy," Dr. Bentley takes the liberty of translating my explanation into the billiard ball analogy. Whether I am hod-carrier or philosopher, nothing that the term "sympathy" implies to my mind may have any resemblance to this unauthorized version. But Dr. Bentley's method of clearing the way is first to crowd it with men of straw,¹ and this specimen is no more arbitrary than those which he proceeds to construct by practicing like license with specified writers.

¹ That he is half-conscious of it appears on p. 26.

These might have proposed his problem, and might have held the views about it which he attributes to them, but as a general proposition they did not, and the issue which he makes with them is essentially fictitious.

In short, Dr. Bentley quarrels with uses of words which may have been entirely appropriate to the purpose which the writers had in mind, but which are assailable if one first forces upon them the interpretation that their authors had something entirely different in mind, viz., Dr. Bentley's present problem. If similar petulance were observed in a child in arms, the diagnosis would be not science but worms. The only visible way to placate this fretfulness would be absolutely to bar verbal recapitulations of every sort. The psychologist or sociologist with the problem of swallowing a lunch in time to catch a train would be estopped from urging the waiter with the plea, "I'm in a hurry." That would be predicating a state of soul-stuff which explains nothing! To escape Dr. Bentley's condemnation he would have to make his assertion in terms which would be equivalent to a detailed table of contents for the latest treatises on psychology and sociology. While getting the subject of his sentence fitted out with a predicate that would quiet Dr. Bentley, the helpless psychologist would not only miss his train but starve to death. Innocent and laudable uses of language, by means of which we escape such extremes, are the principal basis of fact on which Dr. Bentley founds his charges against virtually every social theorist who has ventured to publish.

The authors to whom the most space is devoted in Part I are, in the order in which they are discussed, Small, Spencer, von Jhering, Ward, Westermarck, Gurewitzsch, Gumpłowicz, Karl Pearson, F. A. Woods, Morgan, Giddings, and Dicey. The alleged vice of these types is that the first group, including Woods, posits "feelings and faculties" as social causes, while the other group sets up "ideas and ideals" as causes.

I have no interest whatever, except an entirely impersonal one, in attempting to defend or to justify myself against Dr. Bentley's use of me as one of the most awful examples, but as I am better acquainted with the facts in my own case than elsewhere I may use it as an actual instance to go with the supposed situation of Tom and the bully. The method of the book assumes that I have been pursuing one and the same specific purpose, whether I was addressing sophomores or seers, and that pur-

pose was invariably the problem of ultimate psychological analysis of social dynamics with which the second part of the volume before us attempts to deal. Putting together formulas which have connotations scattered along the whole range between talks to school boys and arguments with metaphysicians, and treating them as terms with a common denominator, Dr. Bentley has given me a character for mental incoherence which would acquit me of any charge, before any jury, on the plea of irresponsibility. If I had faced as many ways, and said as many things about the same subject-matter, as Dr. Bentley affirms, supposing that a person guilty of such intellectual gyrations could be able to achieve a lucid interval, I should celebrate it by subscribing to every word which he has said to my discredit. The truth is, however, that in order to make me available for pointing his moral, Dr. Bentley has in every instance vitiated his interpretation in advance by the fallacy of ignoring the center of attention which must always be the clue to the meaning.

Unfortunately we have not yet invented words enough to go around unless we use most of them in senses that vary greatly under different circumstances. Dr. Bentley's stock device of assuming a mechanical uniformity in situations to which language is applied, and of demanding invariability in the content of terms, leaves no chance for anyone to escape the ban of inconsistency, unless possibly by restricting oneself to judgments expressible by mathematical or chemical notation.

Speaking for the moment of American sociologists only, and reducing the details of individual effort to a composite picture, the truth is that, since the publication of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883, the principal business of the sociologists has been less to explain social situations than to create a constituency capable of perceiving that there are social situations to be explained. To be sure, we have discussed every type of subject within the sociological horizon, from description of local groups to ultimate dynamics. We have tried to arrest the attention of all sorts and conditions of men, from wage-earners to social philosophers. We have tried to adapt ourselves to their various prepossessions and modes of thinking. We have used their terms if possible. We have often been overstocked with the *ad-hominem* argument. This was all incidental to the initial purpose of bringing social situations, and at last the whole social process, so within the field of view that a quota of competent

thinkers would recognize the existence of problems which the older social sciences had not discovered. Dr. Bentley does not appear to understand this, and his general attitude commits him to the opinion that, if such was the case it was all wrong, and we ought to have started at the bottom and confined ourselves to the elementary problems of social dynamics until they were disposed of for good. Most of us did not think so, and if I could begin over again with the benefit of present experience, my programme would not be essentially different from that which I instinctively followed. To be sure, it led me, while I was feeling my way along, to say a great many things which would look foolish to me if I were to inspect them with a view to reiterating them in our present situation. They do not cause me regrets when I think of the circumstances in connection with which they were written. Dr. Bentley not only puts together sentences of mine which were written years apart, and others which were addressed, some to youth in their teens and others to the maturest people I could imagine, but he shuffles sentences taken from different parts of the same book, and obviously referring to quite different problems, in such a way as to isolate them entirely from the purpose that might explain them. He then pronounces the whole conglomeration a hopeless confusion. So it is, but it is a confusion of his own deliberate and ingenious making, and the process of his chop logic in producing the chaos turns on the original fallacy of charging the writer throughout with the critic's purpose, instead of trying to discover the writer's purpose.

What I have written on sociology has been in effect the record of progress—by no means always in a straight line—from most elementary to less elementary analysis of social phenomena, always with the emphasis on the social, rather than on the psychical factors which would some day be traced out as the ultimate elements of the social. While I have at times approached the precise problem that Dr. Bentley proposes, I have always avoided it as much as possible, on the express ground that it was work for the psychologist rather than the sociologist. Since Dr. Bentley wrenches sentences from their context, ignoring the fact that they are concerned with almost any other phase of sociology more than with this particular one which is paramount for his interest, and since he condemns them because they are not a coherent system of doctrines, as the German says *aus einem Guss*, about a question which none of them

ever properly raised, he would be liable to a much more serious charge, if the explanations were not found in the trait referred to at the outset, viz., the initial inability to entertain the idea that another thinker may or can have a center of attention different from his own.

Dr. Bentley masses his destructive criticism of my supposed system of social dynamics upon a classification of objects of human desire, which Professor Vincent and I first published in a little book which we do not call sociology at all. We aimed it at sophomores, and when we rewrite it we shall assume that even less technical analysis will appeal more forcibly to the sophomore mind. The book was intended merely as an eye-opener, and is psychology or sociology only in the sense in which elementary "nature-study" is biology. In that book we divided the objects of human desire into six classes, indicated respectively by the group words, health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, rightness. That is, all the things which we find people valuing may for convenience be assembled in or distributed among groups so designated. So far as we ventured into explanation that was quasi-psychological, we tried to visualize the play of wants in everyday people in terms of familiar objective stimuli classified for short in these six groups. On the one hand I have never for a moment imagined that this classification went to the bottom of psychological analysis, but on the other hand all the criticism that has been directed against it has counted very little against the experience of Professor Vincent and others, as well as my own, that it is an effective grouping of human aims for rough descriptive purposes. Whether for subbeginners in sociology, or for the maturest thinkers on some of its phases, the classification has proved to be a workable tool. Whenever it ceases to be available, I have no more weakness for it than I would have for a cross-cut saw when I wanted the work of a screw-driver. Dr. Bentley delivers the finishing blow to this classification in particular and to my dynamic interpretation in general with the taunt that I have never done anything with it. I should have said that, for one thing, I had used it half a generation as a whetstone for the minds of students, among whom I am glad to have numbered for a short time Dr. Bentley himself. I should not have claimed that because of it, but I should have pointed out that at least in spite of it some of them have since cut down to deeper distinctions than I found them making when that sharpener was put into use upon

their intellects. I should have said too that if Dr. Bentley or any one else would prove that I had ever regarded the offending classification in any other light than that indicated, I would cheerfully confess myself converted from the error of my ways, and would never more regard Dr. Bentley's Part I, as much ado about nothing.

This brings us to the main point of which my case is merely the most handy illustration. With slight changes of details, the same manufactured issue appears in Dr. Bentley's criticisms of all the other writers cited in Part I. That is, if they were interpreted with reference to their own center of attention, not to his, their availability as edifying examples would very largely disappear. The consequence is that, instead of preparing the way, Part I goes far out of its way to take on a needless and serious handicap. No one capable of reading the first five chapters of the book, whether acquainted with the authors discussed or not, is likely to reach the important part of the argument with as strong presumption in favor of the judicial competence of the author as would have been probable if those chapters had not been written. They are not relieved by a single gleam of evidence that the author has the slightest working acquaintance with the historical spirit. All his judgments of other writers are impressed by a single stamp, which is as wooden and inflexible as the molds in a brickyard. One hundred and seventy-two pages are consumed with a cumulative exhibit of the author's limitations. In a dozen pages he might have said what was worth saying, and so as to promote rather than prejudice his central purpose. The main thing is that popular speech, semi-technical usage, and even strictly scientific idiom employs language which taken literally connotes superficial and obviously erroneous explanations of social occurrences. Almost without exception the sociologists exemplify these loose and uncritical uses of terms. The obvious inference is that there is need of radical analysis of the psychic elements presupposed in explanation of social processes. If Dr. Bentley had been satisfied with so much, he might have drawn illustrations from the same writers whom he has cited, and they would doubtless have been quite willing to admit the propriety of his claim. By interpreting them as using the terms with reference to his problem, when in fact they were concerned each with from one to scores of quite different problems, all calling for occasional use of the same psychic terms, but obviously without

suspension of traditional liberties in adapting words to context, he raises needless suspicion either of his candor or of his competence.

But all this refers to the non-essential part of the book. The remainder, in spite of the unfortunate introduction, is worthy of rank as an event in the history of social science. No serious student of the essentials of social problems can afford to consider the argument *res adjudicata* until it shall have been weighed in many balances and tested in many crucibles. This *Journal* will give liberal space to criticism of Dr. Bentley's hypothesis. My own impression, which I shall hold subject to correction, is that his theory of social motivation substitutes for the individual billiard balls by which he supposes others to explain social dynamics, group boulders, in which his account leaves no more place for psychic factors, than we can discover in the masses of rock that make up an avalanche.

ALBION W. SMALL

Wage-Earner's Budgets: A Study of Standards and Cost of Living in New York City. By LOUISE BOLARD MORE.

With a preface by FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1907.

This interesting little volume is the first fruits of the Greenwich Social Settlement resident fellowship for the scientific investigation of various social and economic aspects of city life.

The study has the intelligent backing of the influential Greenwich House Committee on Social Investigations, composed of E. R. A. Seligman, as chairman, with Franz Boas, E. T. Devine, L. Farland, F. H. Giddings, H. R. Seager, and V. G. Simkhovitch as fellow members. Mrs. More is the first holder of the fellowship and has embodied in the present volume the results of an intensive study carried on extensively. The data represent a selection intelligently and scientifically made. Under the exigencies of the case families of the poorest type were excluded, and a few small shopkeepers are included. On the whole the figures are valuable, because of the sane, scientific use made of them. The author established cordial personal relations with the families studied, and was thus enabled to overcome the inherent prejudice of artisan families against the amateur sociologist on the one hand, and was fortunate on the other hand in being able to prevail on the majority of families studied to keep simple accounts. After preliminary methodo-

logical and geographical considerations the budgets are taken up for analysis. Each family is studied by occupation, nativity, size, income, and expenditures.

Sixteen tables are devoted to this important part of the investigation: statistical description of each family; relation of number of children to total size of family; number and percentage of families having incomes within classified groups; expenditures and percentage of expenditures for various purposes by classified incomes and size of family; comparison of expenditures of twenty-five families of various sizes, having incomes between \$800 and \$900; expenditures and percentage of expenditures for various purposes by classified income and nativity of head of the family; income and expenditures per family by nativity of head of family with percentage of expenditures for various puposes; a study of sources of income; distribution of amount devoted to sundries in families in which expenditures for sundries is a given percentage of entire expenditure; analysis of expenditures included under sundries by general nativity of head of family; families reporting a surplus or deficit, or neither surplus nor deficit, with the amount, by nativity of head of family; number of families of skilled and unskilled laborers, and of clerks, etc., by classified income; relative skill by nativity of heads of families; incomes and expenditures of dependent families; comparison of incomes and expenditures of dependent families, with averages for all families, by classified incomes; comparison of dependent, independent, and all families having incomes under \$600, and also of those having incomes under \$900. The standard of living is studied very carefully, both in a general way, and by types of graded incomes, under \$600, under \$900, under \$1,200, and over \$1,200. A description and analysis of family budgets follows, and the present investigation is lucidly compared with those of Le Play, Engel, Booth, Rowntree and the U. S. Department of Labor. The conclusions, which are truly conservative, and are understatements rather than overstatements, are of interest. The average size of family was 5.6, the average income for the 200 families was \$851.38. The average expenditure was \$836.25, as follows: food \$363.42; rent \$162.26; clothing \$88.45; light and fuel \$42.46; insurance \$32.35; sundries \$147.31. The average surplus was \$15.13.

In the author's opinion a "fair living wage" for a workingman's family of average size in New York City should be at least \$728 a

year, or a steady income of \$14 a week. And in this she is right. If she errs she does so by way of understatement rather than overstatement. It is to be hoped that this study will make school, and will be followed by similar studies, on more extensive plans, both in New York and in the nation at large.

HUGO P. J. SELINGER

CHICAGO

A valuable reading list on the care of dependent children is published by the Brooklyn Public Library, entitled *The Welfare of Children*. It is a useful index on various phases of this subject.

C. R. H.

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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Socialism in Italy.—The Socialist ideal takes different forms in different countries. In Italy it is characterized by less antagonism between industrial individualism and collectivism than in England and some other places. Under the initial leadership of Bakunin it took on largely a materialistic protest against militarism and ecclesiasticism. With the coming of Marxian and German ideas the collectivist or state side of the doctrines got exclusive control of the party, eliminating anarchistic ideas. Ferri and Lombroso have continued this line of work, the latter becoming a partisan rather than a nationalist.

The Socialist party early became divided into Reformists and Revolutionists, which were partly reunited by Ferri. His work, however, was soon undone. As a result of armed governmental attempts to put down peasant strikes in the south, the whole of Italian labor united in a strike. This was followed by a general strike on the governmental railways. In both cases the Socialist party leaders failed to take action in the striker's favor, and the proletariat felt itself sacrificed to party interests. This led to a reaction against political action in favor of the anarchistic theory of direct action through education and agitation to bring on an economic revolution. The Socialist party consequently went through another reorganization and ultimately a separation by the Revolutionists or Syndicalists. Meanwhile the influence of Bakunin, Kropotkin, Reclus, Malatesta, and other anarchists were appealing to the non-politically inclined socialists, who had already had a taste of the "lop-sided individualism of Stirner and Nietzsche." This change began soon after the seventies and eighties. Cheap literature and agitators facilitated its growth. Dissenting concerted action now passed into the hands of flexible trades unions or workers' syndicates. This led to the Syndicalist Congress (June-July, 1907) representing one hundred thousand members of affiliated organizations. It voted almost unanimously for secession from the party, for direct action, for an anti-state conception of politics, for anti-militarism and anti-clericalism. The Syndicalists immediately turned their attention to the development of the economic power of the peasants; some successful strikes resulting together with a strong show of solidarity.

Constant fluxion of ideas is the hope of socialism in Italy. It breaks down old doctrinal barriers and helps to find what social service is best suited to different individuals. The Socialist party will be stimulated to greater political efficiency by the sight of the renewed activities of "direct-action" Socialists, their trades unions, co-operative societies, etc.—Karl Walter, *Economic Review*,

The Church and the Working-Man.—Many public champions of labor October, 1907. L. L. B. accuse the church of alienating the masses, of arraying its power upon the side of the moneyed interests, and of the consequent failure to solve the social problems of the age. If true, this is much to be regretted. What is the cause? Which party is to blame?

Almost every book in the church's charter—the Bible—is written from the standpoint of the people. If the Church is faithful to its charter it must uphold the dignity and moral rights of labor.

The early church bridged the gulf between the plebeian and the patrician. After the church's spiritual decline was over, it took a leading part in the Renaissance. At all times it has held the people, till now. But labor had not formulated a programme of its own up to the present industrial era. The church has not yet adjusted itself to the new industrial struggle. Hereby is the disagreement of church and labor.

One attitude of the modern church toward labor is that of *indifferentism*, naming the labor movement a class struggle. It forgets that the only way to abolish struggle is to interfere. Another attitude is that of *preoccupation*. The church has no time for the problem of the unemployed. Another attitude

still is that of *ethical timidity*. The demand for a "simple gospel" is a mistake, or cowardice. The church has contented itself with almsgiving without attempting to get at the causes of poverty. It has neglected the most important of all, the matter of a sufficient wage. It needs to insist upon concrete justice, but must ignore special partisan programmes. Lastly, is the attitude of *suspicion*, due to a failure to grasp the situation. Church leaders have not seen that capital has the balance of legislative power, that suffering from changes in methods and machinery falls upon the worker alone, that the worker is himself part of a machine working at its pace and idle when it does not work. Labor organizations, with whatever mistakes, must be interpreted with these facts in mind.

The antagonism of labor and of trades unions is not as much to Christianity as to the church. This is illustrated by religious services held in shops. The avowed principles of trade unionism seem just. The real danger is from an imported socialism, which is attempting to capture the labor movement. There is a conscious attempt here to create class hatred and class struggle between employer and employee. It is from this class the most positive opposition to the church comes. The intelligent working-man still looks to the church to return to the interests of the people. Such a response has been largely made in the last ten years. Instance the work of General Booth, of church organizations for labor interests, and of new methods and means of reaching the working-man in shop and elsewhere. Yet the radical Christian socialist calls this "coquetting with labor." Much must yet be done by way of education for the new order of things.—J. W. Cochran, *Annals American Academy*, November, 1907.

L. L. B.

Philosophy and Life.—The influence of the university upon modern life is lamentably small. Its instruction reaches but few; its research work reaches more and is more important. The university student is of an intellectual aristocracy as rigid and unbending as the old aristocracy of the past. The university is not wholly to blame. Especially the newer universities would welcome all classes, but they will not come till our society sees the need of giving a few years of life to teaching people to think. In modern civilization there is lacking the intellectual enthusiasm existing among all classes of the times of Socrates and Plato. The teaching of philosophy is epigrammatic, formal, dead. The world ignores the whole business, because teaching is divorced from life. The usefulness of the universities is openly questioned. The primary need of England today is to make it clear to all that life is only half-lived which is not instinct with philosophy, or the science of living. Philosophy must cease to be merely a theoretical study for experts. Socrates' experience shows that untrained minds can follow the discussions, if they deal with interests rather than abstractions. The university must get back nearer to its original ideal. Much of the utility of university extension and settlement work is lost because lecturers generally give too little attention to the auxiliary arts. The senses of sight and hearing must be appealed to by means of gesture and modulation, and no attitude of condescension can be taken if the interest of an audience of artisans is to be maintained.

Modern conditions, especially the socialist movement, have led to much reading, but it is too much without guidance. The institution capable of giving this guidance, the university, is separated from the mass of readers by a gulf, which both the socialist movement and the universities and their clientele are widening. The universities must cast off formalism and teach life. When they do this the people will become interested in them and their usefulness will be widened and deepened. A means for accomplishing this is for the universities to get connected with mechanics' clubs and institutes in which their undergraduates can come in actual contact with workers, help them in their reading, and spread some of the more important facts of sociology, and above all bring philosophy into contact with daily life.—J. G. Leigh, *Economic Review*, October, 1907.

L. L. B.

Races and Mental Diseases.—The uncertain ground of Race Pathology, is tread upon by Dr. Bela Révész in an article on "Races and Mental Diseases," in *Archiv für Anthropologie*, July, 1907. Race he uses in the sense of any ethnical more or less homogeneous group. It is uncertain what social causes tend to produce mental diseases in any one particular group, but it seems to be more or less true, that the more the civilization of a people tends to make the individual more resistant to the influences of the struggle for existence, by the harmonious development of his physical and mental powers, the more it tends to give him a healthy philosophy of life and to form his individuality in such a manner that it is neither too slavishly lost in the general social aggregate, nor, on the contrary, is it opposed to the interests of the community, the surer will the individual be never to acquire any mental diseases. It is beyond dispute that the diminution of mental diseases is to be achieved only through a purposeful advancement of cultural conditions.

An analysis of the mental diseases of the races of Asia, discloses the fact that they are due mainly to inferior physical and mental powers. The widely spread hysterical and neurasthenic diseases of Japan are due, first, to the complete giving up to an antiquated civilization, Buddhism; secondly, to the strong efforts required in connection with the adaptation to a new civilization. A further analysis of the mental diseases of the Malays brings to light the effects of suggestion as a prominent factor in the process, inferior intellects being more apt to fall under its spell.

In Africa we notice the curious phenomenon that the native of Algeria is practically immune to the ravages of alcoholism in spite of the enormous quantities of it consumed. Drunkenness is practically unknown and when it occurs it is of very short duration. The same is true of the natives of Zambezia. The negroes of Africa present the practical immunities to paralysis progressiva, a fact the more remarkable as the same conditions are found to hold true among the American negroes. The author asks himself if the reason for this is not to be found in the smaller part taken by the negro in intellectual life. The most frequent forms of insanity among the negroes in the United States seems to be mania, and the less frequent paralysis progressiva, or softening of the brain, which observations seem to coincide with those made upon the negroes of Africa. The negroes of Brazil consume a great deal more alcohol than the European, and are less subject to its fatal results. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that the Brazilian negro consumes his alcohol purer than the European.

As to Europe, the writer finds mental diseases connected with inferior intellect, as is the case with peasants of the Vendée and of Russia.

M. S. H.

The Psychology of New Romanticism as Social Manifestation.—New Romanticism in literature and its psychological and sociological causes and origins is discussed by Dr. I. Axelrod in *Die neue Zeit* of November 9, 1907.

He finds New Romanticism connected with the individualistic tendencies of modern life, and the origin of the latter he brings back to the philosophy of Nietzsche. But the New Romanticism is only formal in its worship of the blind strife for existence for its own sake. The claim of Nietzscheanism that it wants to establish new values he finds absolutely false. For in this purposeless agitation no new values have been established, nor have any of the old values been destroyed. Nietzscheanism is essentially the ideology of the bourgeoisie. It preaches the doctrine of the superman, a superman distinguished from the masses not by degree, but by kind. As such, however, it is only an apology for the class struggle that is going on in modern society. Consciously or unconsciously, the teachings of the New Romanticism are a protest against the attempt at the uplifting of the masses. The superman cannot be realized on this earth, believe the New Romanticists, and therefore they are strong opponents of socialism. The cry of degeneration raised by the New Romanticists the writer explains as being a warning to the bourgeoisie and the existing social order to the effect that they cannot afford the prevailing supersensibility nervousness if they want to keep their power.

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RATIONAL IMITATION¹

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The purging of the mind from every kind of prepossession or prestige gives room for either *origination* or *rational imitation*. Now, origination, i. e., invention or discovery, is so difficult that it will always be the prerogative of the few. In a well-knit society, even those who have the originality to invent, find usually that someone has anticipated them, and learn from another what they might in time have found out for themselves. The frequency of nearly simultaneous origination by two or more persons proves how brief is the interval, after the discovery or invention is *ripe*, before it is actually made. This is why nearly every element in our body of culture has been propagated from *one* point. The youthful D'Alembert discovered for himself many theorems already known, but not for long was such genius allowed to run to waste. The ingenious shepherd lad, James Ferguson, who invented a clock, a watch, and a celestial globe, might, if he had stayed with his sheep, have devised many other contrivances already known to mankind. But even he was found and educated so that, instead of continuing to invent the invented, he enriched his fellow-men with the orrery, the tide dial, and the eclipsareon.

In *rational imitation* our attitude toward a practice depends in no wise on the prestige or discredit of those who have adopted

¹ Chapter from a forthcoming textbook on Social Psychology.

it or of the time and place of its origin, but only on its apparent *fitness*. Likewise our attitude toward a proposition depends solely on its appearance of truth, i. e., its *probability*. The rational imitator is not fascinated by the great man or the crowd. He is impressed neither by antiquity nor by novelty. He is as open to what comes from below him as to what comes from above him in the social hierarchy. He is *conservative* in that he keeps every precious inheritance from the past until he has found something better; he is *radical* in that he goes to the root instead of judging by mere surfaces. On the one hand, he regards the existing device or institution as a provisional thing that will some day be surpassed; on the other, he knows that not one out of ten innovations that sue for his favor is an improvement on the thing as it is. When the transforming forces are most active and society is in a dynamic condition, he will figure as a "heretic," "upsetter," or "disturber;" in the lull he will be called "mossback," or "obstructionist." For him, however, social life is always a process. Seeing everything in flux, he realizes the relativity of our dearest mental furniture, our moral standards, social theories, political philosophies, and party programmes. He distrusts yesterday's thought not as unsound, but as unfit for today's occasions. Most institutions he knows are in the grasp of a current of change which relentlessly antiquates not only the wisdom of the fathers, but even the conclusions of his own youth. Hence he combats the somnolence that creeps upon us in the thirties, insisting, though the years pass, that it is still forenoon and not too late to think.

The accumulations of changes on the rational principle is *progress*; of utilities, *practical* progress; of truths, *intellectual* progress. Moral progress and aesthetic progress do not come about essentially by origination and rational diffusion. Progress in these departments is usually the consequence of material or intellectual advancement. The sparing of captives began as soon as men reached the agricultural stage and were able to set their captives to productive labor. In our Northern states the abolition of African slavery seems to have come about in consequence of the general adoption of expensive farm implements which slaves

could not be brought to use skilfully or carefully. The improvement in the status of the wife flows from the necessity of making matrimony more attractive, now that so many industrial and professional careers are open to women. That militant ethical opinion which slashes now here, now there, laying low at each stroke some wrong or abuse, is the outcome of improvements in the apparatus of publicity. As cases of a moral advance that has been conditioned by intellectual progress may be cited: the humanization of punishments in consequence of the diffusion of scientific ideas of crime and penalty; the abandonment of judicial torture owing to the psychological demonstration of its futility; the restriction of child labor following upon our fuller knowledge of the bodily and mental growth of children; the introduction of safety appliances in industry after investigations unveiling the vast and bloody tragedy of industrial accidents.

There are certain elements of culture that tend to diffuse by rational imitation, viz., the *practical arts* and the *sciences*. To be sure, in each of these authority is recognized and followed. This could hardly be otherwise in view of the immense advantages of the specialist. But the foundation of such authority is not *prestige*, but *past success*. It is perfectly rational to treat as an authority in his line the general who has won every battle, the lawyer who has gained every suit, the physician who has saved every case; to withdraw some of our confidence from the civil engineer when his bridge falls, from the astronomer when his prediction fails.

Two causes can be assigned why rational imitation prevails more in the practical arts than in manners, dress, amusements, or the fine arts.

1. The spur of competition hastens the triumph of the fittest tool, machine, or process, but not of the fittest garment, ceremony, or sport. Armed with the lever of competition one progressive man can lift out of the rut the ninety and nine unprogressive men. One dentist practicing painless dentistry forces all other dentists. One manufacturer marketing safety bicycles coerces all makers of big-wheel bicycles. One nation arming

itself with rifled cannon compels other nations to throw their smooth bores on the scrap heap.

2. Exact measurement enables us to discover the better of two practical types—electric or cable cars, natural or creosoted railroad ties, overshot or turbine wheels, Jersey or Durham cows, alfalfa or timothy grass. But there is no means of exactly comparing the recreation afforded by bridge whist with that from diavolo, the fun of baseball with that of golf, the spell cast by the realist with that cast by the romancer, the thrill from Shelley's poetry with the thrill from Kipling's poetry, the pleasure from a Bougureau painting with the pleasure from a Manet.

It is owing to this difference that there are "schools" and "movements" in the fine arts, never in the practical arts. Thus we hear of the Della Cruscans, the Lake School, the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, the Symbolists, the Decadents, the Secessionists, the Aesthetes. In music there persist, side by side, Italian opera and German opera; in literature, the romanticism of Scott and Hugo and the realism of Balzac and Tolstoi. A great artist like Michael Angelo or Wagner becomes, in spite of himself, the founder of a school, the members of which, having no touchstone of discrimination, copy eagerly his faults as well as his excellences, and, moreover, being without any means of measurement, exaggerate his technique to the pitch of the grotesque. If, by a skilful disposition of lights and shadows on the nude figure, the painter suggests the knotted muscles that go with violent action, his imitators will make their lights higher and their shadows deeper in the hope of producing even greater effects. If the composer disfigures his work by introducing the *Leitmotif*, then his followers will sow their compositions with absurd *Leitmotifs*. All this because there is no way of assaying masterpieces and parting the gold from the dross. Criticism, to be sure, aspires to appraise by objective and universal standards, so that our acceptance or rejection of art methods or works may be rational; but the standards of one generation of critics are the mockery of the next, so that criticism is, after all, little more than one man's liking or dislike.

There are two causes why science diffuses in virtue of

rational imitation, but not theological, metaphysical, political, or ethical thought.

1. The application of a science in the practical arts tests the truth of its doctrines. Thus boring and mining test geology, practical sanitation tests pathology and bacteriology, synthetic chemistry tests analytical chemistry, while spectrum analysis, telephony, wireless telegraphy, and X-ray applications test the principles of physics.

2. In science every important statement must be *verifiable*. This it is that distinguishes the fabric of modern science from all previous fabrics, e.g., the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas. Science is credible, not because the intellectual power of its builders surpasses that of the Alexandrian philosophers or the mediaeval Schoolmen, but because of its *method*. Each of its great strides dates from some happy experiment or observation. Torricelli's experiment of balancing 32 feet of water against 30 inches of mercury ends "Nature abhors a vacuum." When Newton measured the relative velocities of sound and light, he put a quietus on the argument that we see the lightning before we hear the thunder "because sight is nobler than hearing." Galileo's detection of Venus's phases with his telescope gave the Ptolemaic system its *coup de grace*. Foucault's pendulum made visible the earth's rotation. The laboratory study of carbonic acid gas destroyed Agricola's theory that the suffocating gases in mines are the breath of malignant imps. Franklin's kite ends the vision of God "casting thunderbolts." The finding of half-digested fragments of weaker animals in the fossilized bodies of the carnivora upset Wesley's theory that the carnage now going on among the animals is the result of Adam's sin.

In consequence of this distinction there are "schools" and "movements" in philosophy, theology, political and ethical "thought," but not in true science. Individual scientists, like Haeckel or Weismann, may speculate, but science, while appropriating their verifiable discoveries, rejects their speculations. In philosophy we have the school of Plato and the school of Aristotle, the Realists and the Nominalists, the dualists and the monists. In ethical thought there are the followers of Tolstoi and

the followers of Nietzsche. In political thought there are the disciples of Rousseau and of De Maistre, of Webster and of Calhoun. In social philosophy we meet with Fourierites and Owenites, St. Simonians and Marxists, authoritarians and anarchists. In all these the prestige and authority of the great man come into play. But the genuine scientist wins no disciples, founds no school, leaves no personal impress. Nothing is taken on his *ipse dixit*.² The obituary notice of him in the journals of his science is cold and impersonal—his work, and the singleness of aim, close application, and intellectual power that made possible his work—that is all; nothing of his personal appearance or daily life, none of the sayings and incidents that are lovingly preserved by the disciples of the philosopher or the founder of a religion.

The practice of rational imitation grows and ought to grow. But its growth may be either *extensive* or *intensive*. In the one case the practice extends to new layers of the population; in the other, it invades new departments of thought and activity.

One great aim of all culture-diffusing agencies should be the increasing of the number of those who imitate rationally. Universal instruction, free libraries, high-class periodicals, college settlements, the exercise of the suffrage, women's clubs, experience in voluntary associations—all can play a part in emancipating people from blind imitation. It is not enough to break the yoke of custom. The radical spirit, coupled with political and social equality but without enlightenment, simply puts mob mind in the place of custom as lord of life. To justify itself democracy must be much more than a political movement, or even a social movement. Its goal is not attained by giving every

² Kepler's main reasoning as to the existence of a law for cometary movements was right; but his secondary reasoning, that comets move nearly in straight lines, was wrong. His successors verified the former and accepted it, tested the latter and rejected it. Says White (*History of the Warfare of Science with Theology*, I, p. 203), "Very different was this from the theological method. As a rule when there arises a thinker as great in theology as Kepler in science, the whole mass of his conclusions ripens into a dogma. His disciples labor not to test it, but to establish it; and, while, in the Catholic Church, it becomes a dogma to be believed or disbelieved, under the penalty of damnation, it becomes in the Protestant Church the basis for one more sect."

man a vote, or even an opportunity. It must include a great culture movement aiming to lift all to a plane of discrimination and rational choice. Then, whatever element gains control of society, the Dark Ages can never recur.

The *intensive* growth of rational imitation means the entrance of science with its verifiable statements into realms ruled hitherto by authority, tradition, or convention. We see it in the substituting of scientific hygiene for transmitted rules of ablution, propriety, and abstinence; of meteorology for empirical weather lore and the guesses of weather "wizards;" of psychiatry for doctrines of witchcraft and demoniac possession; of comparative anthropology for the legend of a "chosen people." An ethics basing its norms on human nature and the nature of the social organization is superseding the alleged commandments of Deity, the precepts of ancient sages, the customs of the fathers, and the edicts of Mrs. Grundy. Sociology, regarding the family as a purely social institution, to be constituted not according to tradition or ecclesiastical decree, or the intuitions of great writers, but with reference to individual happiness, social welfare, and race interest, promises to end profitless controversies as to whether marriage is a sacrament or a contract; bigoted denunciation and passionate defense of divorce; the "woman's sphere" dogmas; and the appeal to the prescriptive division of labor between husband and wife. The light from child study will guide in matters that have been the football between venerable pedagogic falsehood and sentimental faddism. A scientific economics, acquainted with human nature, the conditions of industriousness, thrift and enterprise, and the laws of group survival, and judging an economic institution not by subjective standards but by the way it tends to work out in the long run, will displace "natural right" dogmas and end the barren age-long controversies over the ethical basis of property, the morality of land ownership, and the rightfulness of interest or inheritance. A jurisprudence embodying a scientific apprehension of society's needs and of the relation of law to society, will thrust aside legal doctrines based on a primitive tradition, a remote code, the "wisdom of our ancestors," or the apocryphal "reasons"

offered by the commentators. Comparative politics, coupled with comparative legislation, will render it unnecessary to take as beacon the philosophy of some political sage, a Rousseau or a Burke, a Hamilton or a Jefferson.

In the practical arts, likewise, the blindly imitated is yielding to the reasonable or demonstrated. Each of the arts is, in fact, coming to be applied science. One has but to mark the intimate dependence of the practice of medicine on pathology, of nursing on hygiene, of plant and animal breeding on biology, of brewing on bacteriology, of cooking on chemistry, of fruit raising on horticultural science, and of farming on agricultural science.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ORIENT FOR THE OCCIDENT

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The Manchus have a saying: "The man who comes from a strange locality is contemptible; the thing which comes from a strange locality is precious."¹ The Mongols have a saying: "The thigh-bone of an elk cannot be fitted into a saucepan, and a stranger does not jibe with a stranger."² And all large groups of men have similar sayings, representing the recognition of a deep-seated sentiment of hostility to outsiders. Strictly speaking this prejudice toward outsiders must be regarded as an organic attitude common not only to mankind but to all animal forms possessing a certain degree of memory, emotion, and gregariousness. This feeling is of course connected with the struggle for life, and is, in fact, primarily based on the instinct of fear.

Gregariousness not only affords objective benefits in the way of solidarity and co-operation, but on the subjective side involves a recognition of likeness between members of the group, and a limitation of affection to those sharing that likeness. The struggle for existence implies a hostile attitude toward the world at large—toward all objects which have not by association and co-operation become a part of the group personality. In a group whose existence depends on its solidarity, signs of solidarity in the way of similar appearance, behavior, and sentiments give a feeling of security, and any unlikeness is a sign of danger. It is not necessarily felt to be such, but genetically it is such.

A group having a common origin and a common history must have to some degree a memory, a consciousness, and a personality in common, and common emotional reactions. In

¹ Rochet, *Sentences, Maximes et Proverbes Mantchoux et Mongols*, p. 62.

² *Ibid.*, p. 111.

nature war is the rule and peace the exception, and the fear-and-hate attitude of a whole group toward another is merely individual fear and hate writ large.

The unlikeness of a different group is brought to the attention and excites prejudice in two ways: (1) by signs manifested in the bodily habits, and (2) by signs manifested in social habits. The surface signs of unlikeness naturally strike the senses more forcibly, and among these the skin is perhaps the bodily characteristic which most provokes prejudice, because most obvious. Every race is habituated to its own skin and has a warm feeling for its own color, and a different hue excites feelings of distrust, fear, and something akin to rage. Livingstone says:

There must be something in the appearance of white men frightfully repulsive to the unsophisticated natives of Africa; for on entering villages previously unvisited by Europeans, if we met a child coming quietly and unsuspectingly toward us, the moment he raised his eyes and saw the men in "bags," he would take to his heels in an agony of terror, such as we might feel if we met a live Egyptian mummy at the door of the British Museum. Alarmed by the child's wild outcries, the mother rushes out of the hut, but darts back again at the first glimpse of the fearful apparition. Dogs turn tail and scour off in dismay, and hens, abandoning their chickens, fly screaming to the tops of the houses.³

An Australian woman had a child by a white man: she smoked it and rubbed it with oil to give it a darker color.⁴ The children that are born [in Mabaar] are black enough, but the blacker they be the more they are thought of; wherefore from the day of their birth their parents do rub them every week with oil of sesamé, so that they become as black as devils. Moreover, they make their gods black and their devils white, and the images of their saints they do paint black all over.⁵

In the Malay Archipelago—

the standard of perfection in color is virgin gold, and as a European lover compares the bosom of his mistress to the whiteness of snow, the East Insular lover compares that of his to the yellowness of the precious metal.⁶

With regard to other physical aspects the same law holds.

³ *The Zambesi and its Tributaries*, p. 181.

⁴ Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, English translation, Vol. I, p. 263.

⁵ Marco Polo, *The Book of Marco Polo concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East*, Book III, chap. 18.

⁶ Crawford, *History of the Indian Archipelago*, Vol. I, p. 23.

Among the Manchu those women are preferred who have the characteristic Manchu form, that is to say a broad face, high cheek-bones, very broad noses, and enormous ears, and the prize beauty is the one on whose face you can set a saucepan without touching her nose.⁷

A servant of the king of Cochin China

spoke with contempt of the wife of the English ambassador, that she had white teeth like a dog, and a rosy color like that of potato flowers.⁸

It is well known also that the predilection for group traits is extended to the characteristic dress, to tattooing, scarification, filed or blackened teeth, flattened head, and other voluntary alterations and deformations of the body. Mrs. Gray remarks in this connection:

A Chinese lady looks elegant until she moves, when she loses all grace to our eyes (not though to the Chinese, who consider the gait of a small-footed woman most elegant), as she hobbles about supporting herself on the arm of an attendant.⁹

On the other hand the oriental regards some of our fashions with equal horror: The dress of oriental women is designed to conceal the figure while that of our women is designed to accentuate it.

To an Oriental a corset, which increases the waist line and the plasticity of the figure, is the extreme of indecency—far worse than nudity. It seems like an application of the art of the courtesan to appeal to sensuality.¹⁰

These skin and other surface prejudices are, however, really in a sense superficial, wearing off with long-continued familiarity. The Egyptian women are slender, and that type is preferred by the men, and the slender form is praised in Egyptian love songs, but the Egyptian who long resides among the corpulent and unctuous black women of Africa comes to prefer their color and their form. Livingstone and Stanley both report in this connec-

⁷ Cf. Pallas, in Prichard, *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind*, 4th ed., Vol. IV, p. 519.

⁸ Waitz, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 305.

⁹ *Fourteen Months in Canton*, p. 51.

¹⁰ Cf. Vambery, *Sittenbilder aus dem Morgenlande*, p. 49, quoted by Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 426.

tion that they were much shocked at the cadaverous appearance of whites after a long residence among blacks.¹¹

This same degree of preference and prejudice exists in the region of social habits. Aversions in this connection are well illustrated by the food tabus. Food prejudices have no logical basis, but are the result of group usage. Not to speak of our unreasonable aversion to horse and dog flesh, in the face of our consumption of swine, cannibalism, the strongest of all our food tabus, is very superficial in its nature. Those who practice it do so with complete naïveté and those who do not can become accommodated to the practice when circumstances force them to begin it.¹²

One of the most striking features of these race aversions, however, is their violent and uncompromising character under the ordinary run of habit and their rapid and complete conversion into their opposites when some advantage in the way of distinction or security is involved in the new attitude.

The negro loses his prejudice against the white skin in America and seeks to acquire it. Slaves returning to Sierra Leone in 1820 assumed the rôle of whites, even called themselves white, and the natives "bush niggers." The successful activity of the white stimulated them to acquire, if possible, the signs of whiteness. Similarly the Japanese for fifty years have been diligently acquiring our habits, with the view of equaling our activities, and in the degree that they showed ability equal to ours along our own lines we began to have a fellow-feeling for them, and even a very warm admiration. They looked charming to us in their own country, and we were progressing toward social, political, commercial, and matrimonial alliances with them, when the genial currents of our soul were frozen by the discovery that they were dangerous. In our own country they are better fruit growers and farmers than we are and their standard of living is lower. They are therefore a menace, and there begins to be a

¹¹ Livingstone, *loc. cit.*, p. 379; Stanley, *Through the Dark Continent*, Vol. II, p. 462.

¹² Steinmentz, "Endo-Kannibalismus," *Mittheilungen der anthropologischen Gesellschaft im Wien*, Vol. XXVI, pp. 1 ff.

reinstatement of the hate attitude, especially on our western coast; but it is to be noted that this feeling is now rather a class prejudice, based on economic fear, than the original race prejudice.

It is usually held that the conflict of races is fundamentally economic, and in a proximate sense this is true. The bulk of conflict has always turned on food and on the territory involving the food supply. But it is important to note in the first place, that gregariousness and tribal organization have both been the outgrowth of the fact that food is secured to better advantage in combination than in isolation, and in the second place that in the early forms of society, as in the later, there has always been an eagerness to establish trade connections with outsiders, even when no thought of any other connection was entertained. In many cases trade has been carried on between savage tribes who were unable to overcome their fear and prejudice sufficiently to meet each other, and who secured interchange of commodities either through the mediation of an old woman, or by depositing wares at a given point and leaving them, with an indication of the price. The other party either accepted the proposition and left goods in payment, or left notice of a counter proposition and temporarily retired. In many cases also trade relations were kept up between savage tribes actually at war, it being agreed that traders from either tribe would not be molested. The whole history of the relation of England and China has likewise been a remarkable and almost comic illustration of the fact that two groups instinctively antipathetic may yet feel driven to come into economic relations. The establishment of the "Co-Hong," as a trade intermediary between these two countries and the employment of the old woman as a go-between in savage tribes are, in fact, the same type of mediation. I take it that the whole history of trade is an experiential expression of the fact that wider relations really mean greater security on the food side; and I see no reason either why there should be any limitation to the operation of the principle, under proper control, short of the inclusion of the population of the whole world. The question of economic adjustment is merely a particular phase of the question

of adjustment in general, and this is after all a question of mental conditions. The mind is the organ of adjustment, and it is in conditions of consciousness that we must look both for the origin and the resolution of race conflict.

When we come, then, to examine this question on the side of consciousness, we find that when the mind of the group has a certain degree of homogeneousness there is little tendency to change and little conflict. In animal societies we find a stable equilibrium, because the consciousness is instinctive, representing typical reactions to habitually recurring types of situation. In the family, as it is constituted among ourselves, consciousness is relatively uniform and conflict is reduced to a minimum. Similarly, early tribal society and the half-cultural stages represented by China, and by Japan before her awakening, have a relatively uniform and simple consciousness. The basis of life is habitual, and the traditional stimuli are mandatory. Such peoples are not distinguished by the transmission of a body of scientific knowledge to the younger generation, but by their insistence on certain traditions and forms which are deeply stamped on the character of every individual. Less plasticity and originality are thus secured but greater conformity and solidarity. The population acts as one man, but it is not an intelligent population, because habits of skepticism, dissent, and change are absent. Their solidarity is gained at the expense of plasticity, and is based on the activity of the spinal cord rather than the cerebral cortex. We may suspect indeed that some groups remain stationary primarily because the fixation of habit so essential to groupwise action has been overdone, and the power of change lost.

The scientific and speculative habits which lead to skepticism, dissent, and change are particularly difficult where a people has reached a considerable level of culture, as in the case of the Hindus, the Chinese, and the Jews, where a theocratic or aristocratic form of government tends to consecrate and perpetuate old habits, or where the oral word is reinforced by the written record. Such a people is inclined to associate its grandeur, of

whatever type that may be, with its characteristic habits and to identify its very existence with their perpetuation.

The persistence of the Jews as a peculiar people in the midst of Christian states can be explained only if we have in mind the fact that they have carried with them the extremely formal ritual of the Old Testament and persisted in its practice among a people peculiarly inhospitable to begin with—on account of the association of this race with the death of Jesus. The result is that the Jew has preserved his characteristic forms and his characteristic consciousness, to such a degree that even today Kosher kitchens are being installed on the great ocean liners. In contrast with this the European peasant, having no great past and anxious to get away from his past whatever it may be, becomes characteristically American in the second generation.

In contrast with the eastern, the western nations have the habit of change. We are the people of the "multiple hypothesis." We have an experimental method in science, with a large body of general ideas, and their application in different practical fields, and we have the historical method, enabling us to see principles behind a mass of details. The white nations are also all well advanced toward the democratic régime, which means at bottom that freedom of action and a reasonable protection in such a course secures more invention in every sense of the word, and a consequent increase in power. With the cortex in control, in the possession of many general and useful scientific notions, and with a premium on invention, we are rapidly increasing our control at least over the inorganic world.

But on the social side we are not doing well. The common consciousness developed in tribal society through the participation of all in enterprises involving common food and common defense, has been destroyed by the enlargement of the group beyond tribal proportions, the differentiation of occupations and the division of labor, we have a divided consciousness. The old instinctive solidarity developed largely through activities of the spinal cord has been broken up and has been only incompletely restored through the operations of the cortex. The human mind is a very precious possession, but it is also a very dangerous one.

Its exercise implies the breaking up of old habits, both those growing out of animal instinct and those established through "folk-thought," and the interval between the disturbance and the reaccommodation is necessarily one of anarchy and *laissez faire*.

There is at present a general disturbance of consciousness and failure of ideals among ourselves, indicated by the manipulation of the many by the few in industrial life, by the failure of many, indeed of most, to command the leisure and the access to copies which would develop their characteristic powers, by the fact that the reproductive life is so little controlled that idiots and imbeciles are increasing at a more rapid rate in some localities than the normal population, while at the same time the half of the population consisting of women is largely excluded from constructive work and given over to the vanities.

That control, indeed, which we have regained in our enlarged society is almost wholly through mechanical aids, and these are applied to the human environment with the precision and ruthlessness which characterizes their application to the inorganic world. We have freed our slaves, recognizing in this that no man is an alien, to be treated as an economic value, as we treat inanimate things. But psychologically speaking our population is still divided into alien classes and the negro is not only still in virtual slavery, but the capitalistic manipulator treats the laborer and the public as inanimate things, possessing only economic value—or is only just beginning not to do so.

It appears, therefore, that our class problem and our race problem are at bottom the same thing, differing only in degree. The disparity in consciousness is greater between races than between classes, and in addition our race-prejudice and tribal arrogance survive and inhibit human reactions toward the oriental and the negro, cutting them out of our system and leaving them completely alien. At the same time the oriental is getting possession of our system or of that part of it which is superior to his own from the standpoint of control, and we begin to feel that our civilization is threatened. Owing to ease of communication a rapid movement of integration is going on,

and while all people will not rapidly become of one blood, they are with the swiftness of thought becoming of one consciousness. In the hands of one alien race white methods are having a more complete and rigid application than we have been able to make of them, and we begin to fear that we have raised a devil which we cannot lay. On the score of hard labor and a low standard of living we cannot compete with the oriental, and the oriental world is large enough to overwhelm us and smite us with a sword which we have put into his hands. And when we reflect that if a world-conflict for racial supremacy arises, all the colored races of the world will inevitably combine against the white, and that the yellow and black races are even now vaguely contemplating such a combination, we may well be affrighted.

I cannot here rehearse the historical relations of the West and the East, but in any comparison of the Orient and Occident we must not disregard the fact that we are in the habit of overestimating our own superiority, and ignoring traits of the oriental which have value either from his standpoint or in point of fact. We have a passion for change, the oriental has a profound respect for permanence.

China is one of the oldest and most respectable nations in the world. Her moral and social systems are in some points superior to our own. She is inclined to peace and is the mother of useful arts. Her people are the most industrious in the world and feel least the irksomeness of labor. What superiority we possess over them we owe to the habit of looking for the general law behind particular details, a trick which we caught from the Greeks, who perhaps themselves caught it from Asia, and bettered the instruction. Our advancement is slight, except in the development of a control of nature. In the slums of our great cities and in the lot of our very poor we present a spectacle more unrelieved of misery than can be found in China or perhaps in the whole world. Historically also our demonstrations toward China have been both so good and so bad, and withal so inconsistent, that her attitude toward us has necessarily remained suspicious and hostile. The operations of General Gor-

don in suppressing the Tai-ping rebellion certainly gave her a profound impression of power and justice, but must at the same time have excited her fears; while our magnanimity in connection with the famine of 1878 was more than offset by our action in forcing her to continue the opium traffic, our seizure of her territory, and our exclusion of her citizens.

From the standpoint of China we are an upstart, bullying an older and dignified nation. She loves peace, but she is obliged to prepare for war. We have hectored her until like an elderly and retiring citizen beset by young Hooligans she is reluctantly arming herself. That Christian civilization should force a great and peaceful people to devote its resources to the imitation of our hideous preparation for war is a mockery and a debauchery, and that is the view the Chinese take of it.

The case of Japan is different. She was not debauched, at least not in the fighting line. She went on a spree in the 80's and adopted the French corset, the code Napoleon (the latter with modifications), and other European habits which did not represent the genius of her national life, but it was only a spree, and she is coming to her senses. On the fighting side Japan has had a history very similar to that of Europe. She had the same feudalism, the same wars between great houses, and a system of Bushido closely resembling the fighting side of our chivalry, but of so finished and exquisite detail that chivalry looks coarse beside it. Moreover Japan is young, almost as young as we are, and her habits were more broken up in course of the historical changes through which she had passed. Her modernity enabled her to see the advantage of our science and firearms. When Commodore Perry made a demonstration of them she said on the spot: "We must have them." She was already the fighting cock of the Far East and was easily lessoned in the fighting line. No nation indeed ever accepts anything from another unless it is ready for it. A jump from savagery to civilization would be like a jump from arithmetic to calculus, and could not be made. Japan was ready and waiting. The colony is always more ready to change than the mother country—the very fact of movement in space and the new accommodations

involved set up a habit of change—and both Europeans and Japanese are, I take it, colonists from Asia.

At the same time Japan has a juster appreciation of the elements of grandeur in Chinese civilization than we have and is actually deriving her moral and aesthetic stimulations from China, or is beginning to turn back to China and away from us. China is the Greece of Japan.

In spite of all this, we have the grand advantage of being in possession of general ideas and of the habit of developing general ideas, and these are the secret of progress.

While we are working under strain, I cannot think that we are in danger of making a failure. Psychology teaches us that what a situation dominated by habit or by inadequate ideas needs is shock; and this, at any rate, is coming from the Orient. The mind is never inclined to work up to the limit of its capacity unless a strain is thrown on the attention through the failure of old habits to work satisfactorily; and it is probable that in connection with the disturbance of western habits by pressure from the East, stimulation will not only be provided for a recommendation which will avert catastrophe in that direction but also for a radical revision of our western civilization.

Human progress seems much to resemble the principle of change of type called by De Vries mutation. Contrary to the old theory held by Linnaeus, that nature never makes a leap, De Vries holds that specific changes in nature are always by leaps. In human society also some crisis or incident—the emergence of a great man, of a new mechanical force, of an idea like liberty, the discovery of a new continent or the impingement of one group upon another—causes a new focusing of attention, new directions of energy, new strains, new ideas, and a leap in progress. The history of mankind shows also that a large group is favorable to progress. Invention in mental life corresponds to variation in nature, and in both cases change is favored if the scale of operations is enlarged. Isolation not only does not provide the proper stimulation and suggestion, but results in a hardening of habits and

aversion to change. With every extension of intercourse—as in the case of the contact of central Europe with Greece and the addition of America to the old world—there follows a change of pace and of copies. But America and Europe, Europe and Greece, represent essentially the same type of life, and the younger group has had no stimulation to depart from the copies of the old. The contact of Orient and Occident means a world-wide enlargement of environment, richer not only in the raw stuffs for new social and mental constructs, but in the stimulations to work out these constructs. On the theory of probabilities, the vast population of China and the fresh and brilliant minds of the Mikado's empire, unprepossessed by western habits, and their vision unobscured by western blind-spots, but possessed of western ideas and equipped with western standpoint, will contribute materials which will tend at once to unify and to enrich our common consciousness.

"There is that scattereth and yet increaseth." Ideas tend to disturb habits, but it is ideas which again establish habits of a larger content. The failure of a group to progress is due to the failure of crises to break up old habits, and the decadence of a group which has once made progress is due to the failure to produce ideas rapidly enough or to disseminate them widely enough to accommodate to the strain introduced through internal change or external shock. The downfall of the Roman Empire, for instance, is popularly attributed to luxury, but was it not rather due to the fact that the means of communication, especially printing, were not developed to the point of reconstructing the consciousness of the rapidly inflowing barbarian population? We are safe because we have the habit of seeking change. We produce our own crises, and we have the means of communicating the resulting ideas rapidly and universally.

While it is evident that increasing communication between the white and yellow races means more strains, new accommodations, new ideas, a fuller and richer consciousness, and a more rational control, it is, I think, impossible to predict the precise steps which will be taken in further development, or the order in which these steps will be taken.

We have, however, a general indication of the method of progress in the history of general ideas, and in the fact that a people may become dominated by useful ideas almost to the point of mania, and to the exclusion of non-useful or harmful interests. The Germans became obsessed by the idea of research early in the last century, and their results have contributed incalculably to the increase of rational control. The newest branch of sociology, eugenics or conscious race-culture, has possibilities of race amelioration second, perhaps, to no other single science, if only it can once possess the minds of men, push out the flimsy, tawdry, formal, and ostentatious ideals of society life, inspire the world with the idea of children untainted alike in body and mind, and purify the race by the elimination of the insane, the idiotic, the diseased from birth or from excess, and the habitual criminal.

And if also the ideas implied in eugenics come to the front and touch our imaginations, the production of new, beautiful, and superior types by the mixture of races will be watched with scientific interest and even with artistic enthusiasm. From this point of view race differences will become a trait of attraction rather than repulsion, and all sentiments about the life or death of any particular group will fade out of the feelings. Or rather, our prepossessions and repugnances will be constantly reforming with different contents, but with that degree of openmindedness which characterizes our adhesion to and dissent from scientific theories. For I myself do not look for the elimination of personal, sectional, and racial difference in type and feeling, nor do I think such a consummation a thing to be wished. Variety is itself a delight. Difference, dissent, and conflict answer to our psychological make-up and are bound up with our stimulations. But that degree of consciousness of kind represented by advocates at law who "fight manfully and eat and drink as friends" will leave our emotions running high without rendering us too soft for practical purposes.

Both ethnology and trial by combat have demonstrated that the Oriental is not our inferior by endowment, but only by habit. In some respects, indeed, he is not our inferior at all. On the emotional side he is our superior, as we are his superior on

the intellectual side. And from the standpoint of the reconstruction of our own consciousness the yellow races are of far greater immediate significance to us than the black. The black race as a whole is so completely out of our class and has so completely failed to develop any values peculiar to itself that we find it difficult to have intellectual commerce with it, even when it is near at hand. The unlikemindedness of the white and yellow races is very great also but the difference is one of kind, not degree, and culture finds its way across on the same level more easily than it works up and down. I think it is not improbable, therefore, that the yellow peril will not only provide us with stimulation for the reformation of our own consciousness but that the practice work in that connection—the technique of transformation thus developed and the softening of our prejudices—will put us in the way of handling the black question also. I recognize that the great masses of the negro are just above the threshold of the brute in consciousness but I believe this is a defect of copies more than of mental machinery. I am aware also that you cannot hustle the East, and that racial repugnance seems to us to be rooted in our nature almost as deep as appetite itself. But the capacity of the mind and feelings to adjust to changing conditions is almost without limit. To acquire the degree of likemindedness which will secure the pursuit of life under conditions fair to all, will of course require time; but when ideas are once set in the saddle they ride very fast, and while the unification of human consciousness may not be a matter of a few generations, and probably will not be, it may well be accomplished within a period of historical rather than geological time.

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR PAUL S. REINSCH, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Professor Thomas has taken a view very natural to a man who realizes the intellectual possibilities of a union of the Orient and the West; who sees that through the approach between the oriental and the western civilizations our life will be very much enriched; who feels, as a critical student of our own civilization, its defects, and sees how they may be remedied by what the oriental may have to teach us. I think it is very proper for him to take

this optimistic view in his opening paper; there is certainly great hopefulness in the situation.

But if we are to consider the subject of what conflict stimuli exist, and the existence of which we cannot deny, it is the less pleasant duty of those who are to engage in this discussion to insist more fully on those points of difference by the presence of which the situation is overcast, because, even with this hopeful view of the outcome, the only wise ground to take is to recognize that these great divergences in views and interests do exist and will exist until we have reached a new synthesis of East and West. Now I do not wish to take up by any means a summary or general discussion of these stimuli. I wish simply to refer to one or two of them.

The most evident, the most obvious is, of course, that which we call race prejudice, that cover with which a race surrounds itself unconsciously, or even, in later stages, consciously, for self-protection, and which works such a great injustice in the relations between individual and individual. Now we may consider ourselves tolerably free from race prejudice as against the oriental. But we occasionally meet with it in the most unexpected quarters; so for instance the letters of Lafcadio Hearn show that he felt the deepest antipathy for the Japanese—he, the man who entered most intimately into their psychology, who has portrayed their civilization in the most attractive manner. Professor Thomas spoke of Japan as essentially modern; and from one point of view her rapid progress certainly enables us to speak of Japanese in those terms. But in Hearn's opinion the Japanese race is primitive as the Etruscans, and so distant from us that we cannot understand it. If Lafcadio Hearn could have these feelings of distance with reference to the men among whom he had lived and whom in many ways he admired, we can understand the lack of sympathy among the merchants or traveling men who come into contact or competition with them.

The second stimulus is the lack of space. Think of what it would mean if another great area of China should be reduced to aridity, as has happened in the past. What does it mean to the world today that the Japanese inhabit a land that is small and overpopulated? We know ourselves what it means with respect to our own country. This surplus of population is seeking outlets and is seeking them to a large extent in North and South America. The development of Japanese immigration into South America is extending, and there is a source for future conflict and misunderstanding on account of the Monroe Doctrine which very few have thought of; so that the voyage of our fleet to the Pacific may be looked upon as the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine against Japan as well as its former declaration against Europe.

There are of course many other stimuli for conflict, but the third obvious one is that of commercial and industrial rivalry. In this case the stimulus is very concentrated, and embodied in a small group of men, namely the

oriental merchants; in China, as you know, these merchants are congregated in the extra-territorial ports. Now there was never an organization effected in the world in which conflicts of interest assume a sharper emphasis than the foreign settlements of China, because they are republican in form, and are governed by alien laws, while their denizens insist that the entire force of European and American nations shall stand back of them. When Mr. Taft was at Shanghai he horrified the Europeans by speaking of the sovereign rights of China over Shanghai, because it seemed to involve the admission that China might assume the exercise of that sovereignty at some future day.

PRESIDENT CHARLES D. TENNEY, PEI YANG COLLEGE, CHINA

It is hardly fair to ask me to express my undigested opinions after you have listened to so careful and admirable a paper on this subject. You have had pointed out to you the natural causes of the antipathy between the yellow and white races. Of course these are causes that cannot be removed. You know that we white people are called in China the "foreign devils." That term is better translated the "foreign ghosts," because the origin of the term is the uncanny appearance that we present to the Chinese with our light hair and our blue eyes. Occasionally in China you see an albino, and you may be certain that every albino in China has the nickname of "the foreigner."

This of course we cannot get over—the natural antipathy of the people of one race and appearance for those of another. But the great cause of antipathy between the white and yellow races is something that can be removed, and that is mutual ignorance. Now, though I agree with almost everything that Professor Thomas has said to us, I thought that in one section of his paper he did an injustice to the Chinese, when he spoke of their wonderful homogeneity. To an observer, of course, who has not penetrated into the inner life of the Chinese, they seem to be very much alike. But if you get into the actual Chinese life, you realize that there is just as much individuality in the Chinese race as there is in ours. The fact is that the Chinese development of language has been such as to form an almost insurmountable intellectual barrier between us and them. If you are able to overcome that barrier and enter into the intellectual life of China you find that they are a people who have their poetry, their philosophy, their history, that their scholars are critical in their examination of historical records, that they delight in the same sort of literary criticism and discussion that we do; but it is on a plane that we cannot easily attain to. They have developed a literature which is so totally different from anything that we are familiar with, that we cannot appreciate it without very thorough preparation.

Now ignorance on both sides is the principal cause of hostility. When we first appeared on the shores of China the Chinese regarded us as a race of savages who had no learning and no intellectual laws, but that we represented brute force. They looked upon us as mechanically ingenious savages, and it

was a great surprise to them to find that we could be influenced by considerations of reason. Even to this day, when a European or an American has mastered the language, he finds that the people of the interior express surprise when they find that they can discuss things with him and argue with him and that he can appreciate them. They have thought that we were actuated only by principles of brute force, that we have a will which we wish to enforce upon them, and that we do it by force; but when they find that we can talk about the reasonableness of a thing, they are surprised.

We have never given them credit for their intellectuality, and they have never given us credit for our intellectuality; and my experience in China has been that just as soon as people come on to common ground, either by our acquiring their knowledge or by their acquiring ours, nine-tenths of the antipathy at once disappears. At the present time, as you know, the Chinese race has elected to adopt our modern system of study, in addition, of course, to the study of their own classical literature. All their mentality, up to the present time, has gone into the study of ethics and of their own classical literature. Now that they have begun to study and appreciate the value of science, they are feeling a new sympathy with us.

What we want to guard against is mutual contempt. After all that is much more important in separating the peoples than any differences in the color of their skin. People can come together as friends only upon the basis of mutual respect. I have lived a quarter of a century in China, and I respect the Chinese. I respect their intellectual ability and their attainments in their literature. I recognize in them a thinking mind, and the Chinese are beginning to recognize the same in us.

I feel that we are at the beginning of the most important epoch in human history. The Chinese, representing a quarter of the population of the world, have held aloof from us, and they have now decided to enter into the modern family of nations.

The question is, how are we going to receive them? Professor Thomas has already told us that all the influences of Chinese education and ethical culture tend toward peace and away from war. Even the Chinese written character "wu," military, indicates their estimate of military affairs, for an analysis of the written character shows its meaning to be "to stop the clashing of spears." But, as Professor Thomas has said, they are being forced into a military attitude. Now, we have just reached a point where we are beginning to realize that the principles of our own religion call for peace, that arbitration is better than fighting; and I say we are now at the most important period of human history, because if we admit the Mongolian race on this basis, all the teachings, all the influences of their history would tend to cause them to unite with us cordially upon this new platform of arbitration; but if we are backward in this, the consequences to ourselves are going to be disastrous. We all believe that the real civilization of the world

is linked up with this great question, and if we are able to move forward rapidly enough in our measures for the abolition of war the Chinese will join with us as brothers in the new era of peace.

MRS. J. O. UNGER, FORT WAYNE, IND.

The short paper which I am to read has no direct connection with the chief paper of the afternoon, but is rather a contribution to the general subject of race-struggles and their results. It is to represent the views held on this point by Dr. Ludwig Gumplowicz, for many years professor of sociology and political science at the university of Graz, Austria. Living in a country where race-conflicts have always been especially predominant and severe and have shaped its politics to a great extent, he was no doubt led to give more thought to this subject than to any other and arrive at a theory quite his own. Some authorities have claimed for him the honor of being the actual founder of a true science of sociology in so far as he was the first to attempt to explain the origin and evolution of the state on strictly scientific principles, through the action of natural laws. According to him the race-struggle lies at the very foundation of society, is the condition of the origin and development of the state and without it no state, no civilization at all would have been possible. In discussing social conflicts, antagonisms, and struggles between races and nations as well as between social classes, too little attention has perhaps been paid to the constructive value of these conflicts. And yet this is no doubt one of the most important aspects of the subject. Are struggles, conflicts, antagonisms of any kind destructive, degenerative, to be discouraged, or are they constructive, progressive, to be encouraged? There lies the crux of the whole matter. Gumplowicz, as I said before, holds the latter view. Everywhere in nature we have conflict or at least contact of heterogeneous elements endowed with inherent forces, and out of this contact arise new elements, new formations, new states or conditions of things. The formation of a people, a nation, a state, or the *social process* differs in no fundamental way from the other great processes of nature, which were active in the formation of things, the cosmical or sidereal, the chemical, the vegetal, and the animal processes. In all these we have the same constituent features or distinctive characteristics, namely: (1) original heterogeneous elements; (2) a contact, interaction, or conflict between these, due to inherent antagonistic forces, and (3) the production or *creation* of something new which did not exist before. In other words every nature-process is *creative*; creation is not limited to one creative act at the beginning of things, by one supernatural power, it is going on continually all around us; the world is not eternally the same, but forever changing and evolving. And this is as true of society or the social process as of any other phenomenon and process. And one of the means of this evolution, this creative activity, is conflict.

Let us see how this is to be explained more in detail.

Going back in imagination to the very beginning of our geological epoch, we find our globe peopled by innumerable hordes, tribes, or ethnological groups, each one held together by certain syngenetic feelings: blood relationship, customs, language, and religion (as far as these are at all developed), but looking on all the outside groups as something entirely foreign and unrelated, different in all the above-named things, even, perhaps, in appearance; therefore to be feared and shunned, or, if contact cannot be avoided, exterminated and destroyed. These groups are the sociological units. Roaming through an ever-widening territory in their search for food, they must finally clash and, having not as yet risen very high above their animal ancestors, the result is the same as when animals of different species or those of the same species that want the same hunting-ground, clash: a fierce battle ensues, a war of extermination in which the stronger or more cunning or better-equipped group must conquer and the other is destroyed. Probably all races have passed the primitive phase, called cannibalism. We know that some such races survive even today.

Finally, however, we may assume that these clashes became too frequent, the conquered tribes too numerous to be devoured; besides, growing intelligence, sharpened, no doubt, by these struggles and the necessity of superior cunning and strategy, suggests a better use to be made of the bodies and energies of the conquered foe: he can be enslaved and made to work. *And it is now that the real process of the evolution of the state begins.* As long as the conquerors merely turn their victims into food, the procedure is but a continuance of the animal process, but as soon as they are kept alive and turned into slaves with all their fierce energies and primeval passions still burning within them, the process takes on a different face. The energies of the conquered foe must be put to work, and, in order that in some unguarded moment they may not turn against and destroy the conqueror, this work must be continuous and ardent.

Up to this time the activity of the savage had been but temporary and intermittent, just sufficient to produce for him the means of subsistence and rudest shelter, but it had not produced anything of permanent value; but now the necessity arose of finding continuous employment for these new energies, chafing in sullen hatred under the bondage of the conqueror. How the savage was taught to labor is a chapter in the history of humanity which would probably not be very pleasant reading. We may look with admiration and wonder at the relics of ancient history which are left us as proofs of such work, the pyramids of Egypt, the immense temples and palaces of Assyria, Persia, and ancient India, but we seldom realize the amount of suffering, misery, and patient toil, embodied therein, the agony, fear, and horror, under which the habit of steady work, without which no civilization could ever have become possible, were ingrained. But not only was man thus trained

and shaped on the grindstone of terror and toil, but the foundation was also laid of the organization of society, of the whole complex and far-reaching machinery of the future state. To keep the conquered race in subjection and prevent rebellious uprisings, something akin to the later military class had to be created. To make the work of the slaves most effective their labor had to be somewhat specialized; great numbers of overseers, inspectors, and minor officials had to be trained, and thus a hierarchy was gradually developed. The strict military supervision could not be kept up forever; the enforced propinquity, moreover, toned down to some extent the original hatred, and resulted gradually in toleration on both sides; the subject race, after generations of servitude, finally accepts its position as inevitable or even willed by higher powers or deities; an ecclesiastical class, eagerly welcomed and protected by the conquerors, arises to confirm them in this view; the military class, no longer necessary to keep down rebellions to such an extent, but chiefly used to fight outside enemies and conquer new territory, is gradually recruited from the ranks of the subjected, while the conquering race still furnishes the officers; thus distinct classes and ranks are formed; the conquering race constitutes the nobility and all the higher posts of honor and responsibility are given to its representatives. In the struggle for supremacy among themselves members of the ruling class begin to value the support of the subject race and to reward their faithful adherents with positions of trust and honor. The long slavery and enforced labor has gradually accustomed the subject races to work and ingrained in them the habit of continuous labor, they are much less apt to be rebellious, and are in time given much greater freedom. The middle classes, industrial and professional, arise. The strict system of caste which prevailed for a time and still prevails in many countries, kept up by innumerable laws, which gave rise to the whole complicated system of jurisprudence, is gradually mitigated, and the barriers between the classes are more and more removed. Thus a people, a nation, a state is evolved. But the progress of conquest and amalgamation goes on; the once dominant race, made more efficient by its organization and trained militia, spreads its domain farther and farther and grows ever stronger by assimilation. Yet luck is not always with the most progressive. The flush of continuous victory has made them careless and loosened their organization; moreover, the enforced idleness of the leisure classes has made them effeminate; vice and luxury spread; and we have the spectacle of a Roman empire being overthrown by barbarians. However, the organization, the institutions, and laws of the ancient culture are taken over by the conquerors and quickly a new state and nation arises. Thus the process is ever repeated, and civilization rises ever higher. And the nations which today stand at the pinnacle of civilization are those in whom this process has been most frequently repeated, who have gone through the greatest number of amalgamations.

This, in brief, is the history of civilization and evolution of the state through conquest. Must we, then, draw the conclusion, that conflicts, antagonisms, and even bloody wars will always be necessary to insure the further progress of mankind? Gumpłowicz seems almost to hold this view; to his mind history ever repeats itself, because what he calls the "nature-process" remains eternally the same. But in this he is mistaken. Though the nature-process, as Mr. Ward has pointed out,¹ remains the same in form, it does

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1905, p. 547.

not remain the same in its essence. The very fact that it is creative prevents that. If something new is continually formed out of existing material and conditions, then it is impossible ever to go back to exactly the same beginning. Progress or evolution is not only relative, as Mr. Gumpłowicz will have it, but absolute. Even if, as some people pretend to believe, the new is inferior to the old (in which belief I do not coincide), it is certainly never the same and cannot be the same. The process is ever carried to a higher plane. Thus while conflicts may always remain necessary, they need not be destructive. Out of the conflicts occasioned by natural emotions and passions grew intelligence and organization. Mind, thus originated, is a new factor in the problem, which did not exist before, and mind will give a new direction to the process. It will recognize that, though necessary and unavoidable under the conditions of low, egotistic intelligence, destructive wars and conflicts are not necessary under a régime of social consciousness and intelligence; that here as elsewhere the natural process, unaided by intelligent foresight, has been wasteful of much that is precious, has expended energies ruthlessly, that can be turned to better account under more intelligent management. It will see, that, just as slavery and the compulsory training of mankind to work were an improvement over cannibalism, so now, after the habit of continuous work has been ingrained into the very constitution of man, freedom of activity will in most cases be superior to enforced labor, and that gradually attractive measures can be substituted for compulsory measures. The conflicts between peoples and nations will be changed more and more into conflicts of ideas, out of which new and broader views will continually arise, until finally an era may be ushered in, in which we shall have peace of arms but the utmost possible contact of mind with mind, the greatest difference of character, capacity, and work, with the greatest unity of purpose and aim.

K. ASAKAWA, PH.D., YALE UNIVERSITY

The argument of Professor Thomas' paper seems to be that the Orient is able to give the Occident certain stimuli which will enlarge and enrich the latter's consciousness, and thereby aid the "progress of socialization." As a student of history, I do not feel called upon to comment on so broad a hypothesis. I am mainly interested in the specific stimuli that the Occident

might receive from the Orient, upon which alone the soundness of the writer's argument must rest, and confess that I fail to find them clearly stated in the paper. It seems evident, in the first place, that Professor Thomas' "Orient" does not include either India or all the subtle but profound influences which Indian thought and religion have exercised upon the social life of central and eastern Asiatic nations. I am led to suppose that he confines his attention to the two countries with which America is in the most active relation, namely, China and Japan. My endeavor to infer from the writer's occasional remarks on these two countries the stimuli which they might afford has not been very successful.

Taking China first, I infer that little wholesome stimulus may be expected from the form of her government. Reference is also made to the feelings which China must have received from the treatment she has suffered at the hands of occidental powers. Here it is China, not the Occident, which has felt the stimuli, unless, indeed, the Occident's own reflection upon China's distress may be called a stimulus. Although the industrial habit and the cheap labor of the Chinese and Japanese receive attention, it is not clear how important the writer regards the stimulus of this kind. Perhaps the most important reference to China made in the paper is the idea that her social organization is largely tribal, and her social consciousness is comparatively simple and uniform. I have tried in vain, on these important points, to gather what is meant by "tribal," what sort of uniformity there is in Chinese society, and what stimuli these supposed facts may give to the Occident to its benefit.

In regard to Japan, Professor Thomas admits freely that she is different from China in being more open to social changes. He seeks a partial explanation of this difference in the fact that Japan is a colony from Asia, all colonies being, according to him, more ready to change than the mother-country. Nearly all the more civilized nations on earth, including China and India, not being originally native to their present habitats, one is inclined to ask the writer when a nation ceases to be a colony and becomes a mother-country.

Although Professor Thomas thus admits the existence of some difference between Japan and China, they are both different, he seems to think, from the Occident in several important ways. In the first place, their ["Japan's before her awakening" and China's] social organization is defined as "tribal." Does he use the term in a figurative sense, as he seems to do in connection with the present racial feeling of the Occident? Or, in case of Japan, has he perhaps been misled by the extremely objectionable term "clan" used by many writers in describing the territorial feudal division before 1868? Japan's social organization has seldom been tribal, in the sense of being based upon the blood tie of the whole group or of the larger groups of the nation, except before 645 A. D.

Then Professor Thomas asserts that Japan "before her awakening" possessed, like China, a "relatively uniform and simple consciousness." Aside from the question of simplicity, which is a flexible term, I am embarrassed by the statement, for its literal acceptance would result in confusing a short period with the entire historic age of Japan. The period between 1639 and 1853, during which foreign intercourse was vigorously excluded by the feudal authorities, and in which the elements of foreign culture introduced in previous ages were assimilated into national life, was in many respects an abnormal period. Circumstances had forced her to close her doors, against her will and contrary to her historic habit. In all other periods, the elements of "dissent, skepticism, and change" were never "absent," and have at three different times brought about as thorough changes of the entire social organism as are known in human history.

Professor Thomas also declares: "The white nations are also all well advanced toward democratic freedom," a statement which is perplexing, especially when it is taken in the implied contrast with the oriental governments. With such elements of democracy as were common to "all the white nations" at the time of Japan's "awakening" may favorably be compared the democracy of letters that has prevailed in China for centuries, and the democracy of arms in the Japan of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as well as the village self-government in the latter country under the Tokugawa and in China.

Again, we are told that the Occident lacks at present "adequate social ideals." Does or did the Orient possess them? What are they, and how may they stimulate the Occident?

I seriously suspect that, although the writer admits some difference between China and Japan, he has not completely freed himself from the dogma that the Orient is a unit, and from the consequent inclination to conceive the Occident and the Orient always in a broad contrast to each other. I hope my suspicion is unfounded. I suppose he went farther than he would, when he said: "The western nations have the habit of change," and, also: "The oriental world is large enough to overwhelm us and smite us with a sword which we have put into its hands." The large Orient is not united, and could not more readily be united than the western powers. Anyone who claims that the East is one should clearly show wherein its nations, in spite of their enormous differences, are the same.

When Professor Thomas referred to the "scientific observation and experiment" of the Occident, I rejoiced to see him approach one of the great things that differentiate Occidental civilization from any of the Oriental civilizations, and hoped he would enlighten us upon the mysterious origin of this momentous factor. He, however, dismisses this superb subject by lightly saying that the scientific method is "a trick which we caught from the Greeks, who perhaps themselves caught it from Asia, and bettered the instruction."

To sum up: I am sorely disappointed that I have not succeeded in finding many specific contents in this otherwise instructive paper. The writer declines to foretell the *how* of the reaction of the Orient upon the Occident, and he has said little more of the *what*. His paper is another example of the difficulty of making general remarks upon historic nations, when one has not time enough to refer to their historic training. On the other hand, a consideration of the more important features of the social evolution of China, and more particularly of Japan, might have greatly helped us to surmise the probable effects upon the Occident of its active relation with the Oriental nations. I conclude by saying that, although I am unable to judge the value of Professor Thomas' main contention, I do hope that he will make another attempt to substantiate it by a specific discussion. He has a magnificent field before him.

PROFESSOR ALBERT ERNEST JENKS, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

While I have purposely sought to place antithetically certain differences between the man of the Far East and the man of the West as I conceive these differences, and, while of necessity, I take my stand with the man of the West, yet I wish to preface my remarks with a statement of my admiration for the oriental man.

Since it is a law of life that man must earn his bread in the sweat of his brow, I greatly admire a people which has learned to toil almost incessantly, with so little friction and complaint and with so much contentment, as has the Chinese, whether in China or out of it.

When I know the unparalleled ravages of tuberculosis among the American people, I turn with hopefulness to China which has bred a human race practically immune to this terrible disease. The Chinaman has become the most perfect human animal for colonization in the world today. With greater safety than any other people the Chinese may be transplanted to the Arctic snows or the reeking heat of the humid equatorial area.

Again I turn with admiration to the Orient—to Japan. Japan has taught the whole world the practicability of modern scientific knowledge in everyday life—the most important lesson the West can learn from the recent Russo-Japanese war.

When we consider the Asiatic continental man as the oriental, and the American and western European as the occidental, there are, it seems to me, three fundamental cultural traits in which the oriental and the occidental have radically differed, and today do greatly differ, and in which conflict stimuli are active in contacts between the two.

First, the oriental is a peaceful, patient, plodding man, with a meditative, spiritual nature. He has given the world most of its domestic animals and staple food plants. He has given the world all of its great religions. The occidental is a thinking, active, belligerent, materialistic man. He has

given the world its incessant pioneering activity, its modern science, its machinery of modern war, and its heretofore undreamed of machinery for and hoards of material wealth.

We may now enlarge our definition of the oriental so as to embrace the Japanese as well as the continental man of Asia, and say :

Second, the oriental is a communistic man, living, struggling, and dying in herds—in the commune of labor, and the family. The occidental is an individualist. It may almost be said that every American private soldier is potentially a general. Representative government, whether monarchical or republican, points to the individualism of the occidental. One who has seen the average American among the average orientals in the Orient knows that two Americans are worth twenty orientals in an emergency—when practical things must be thought instantly and done quickly.

Third, if one may be pardoned an American bull, he may say the future of the oriental has been, and is largely today, behind him. The oriental looks always backward over his shoulder for the nod or frown of his ancestors. He is tightly tied to the past with the gordian knot of custom and tradition. The occidental's future is before him, and he cares little for the customs and traditions of the past. He builds his reputation and his fortune for his children much more than, as the oriental builds, for the family name established generations ago by his ancestors.

There are three additional conflict stimuli active between the occidental and oriental; and we may now understand the term oriental to be broader than used above, so as to include also the Malayan peoples.

The oriental is naturally a dissembler in word and business transactions. The occidental is a man of truth. The oriental's ways are those of indirection and dissimulation. The occidental man is direct and frank. The oriental will tell you that which he thinks you want to hear, without respect to its truth or falsity. The famed honesty and honor of the Chinaman in business transactions with foreigners of his acquaintance is deserved. It may be based on the superior business acumen of the Chinaman who is a much better judge of the western man than the western man is of the Chinaman. Those who know the Chinese best at home, however, tell me that the greatest weakness of the Chinese today is their mutual distrust of one another; and it is founded upon their inherent untrustworthiness. In spite of the famous Bushido of Japan, all men having transient or prolonged business with individuals in Japan know of the business dishonesty of the Japanese.

The oriental is commonly fanatical and intolerant. The occidental is commonly sane, rational, and a lover of justice; in private life he takes the part of the under dog, and the bully has short life with him.

The oriental is commonly an autocrat and an oppressor, and his hand is heavy on the lower classes and the women. The occidental loves his liberty and his democratic institutions, and his ideal is that the will of the

many shall be the will of all. He has the habit of lifting up the unfortunate, and he honors women.

As Professor Thomas has said, the secrets of the West "are getting out" and all the people of the world are rapidly "becoming of one consciousness." Although the conflict resulting from this contact of the West with the East will undoubtedly give the people of the Orient wonderful cultural advance, as such conflict always does, and will tend to break down some of the differences presented above, yet, because of the long-standing, inherent tendency of the Occident to cultural advance, and because of the long-standing, inherent tendency of the Orient to cultural inertia, and, more than all else, because of the unprecedented racial and cultural conflicts in the occidental world, especially in America, and the apparently relative absence of opportunity for such conflict in the Orient, I believe that the Occident will have far into the future the power of discovering new secrets for cultural advance ahead of the oriental world.

PROFESSOR W. I. THOMAS, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

With reference to Mr. Hearn, I think that while two groups have and continue to have so disparate a consciousness, a member of one group would continually feel the presence of the other; but I imagine also, from my reading of Mr. Hearn, that what he had largely in mind was the insupportable etiquette of the Japanese.

With reference to the question of space and the query as to what we should do if another desert area should emerge, I would suggest that we have the new science of eugenics, and we would see if the two don't synchronize. It may be said in this connection that adaptation to new conditions is the function of reason, and my argument was that while we have reason as a tool, we have not really applied it; and I think when we apply it fully we shall be able to handle the oriental situation. It has been my own observation, in attempting to find what was at the bottom of the universal statement that low races cannot count more than five or ten, that always, when they can't count more than five, they haven't more than five to count; and that any race which gets into commercial relations requiring the counting of five hundred thousand will count five hundred thousand. We may settle upon the principle that the mind will act under stimulation, and the question of desert areas will probably bring forth inventiveness.

With reference to Dr. Tenney's remarks, I feel too much interested in them to wish to say anything. But as to the question of homogeneity: I merely meant by that what I understand he would accept: that the matter of ancestral worship and the principles of Confucianism and the devotion of the Chinese to ethics and their classical literature, give them, although divided linguistically into dialects, a certain background in common.

With reference to Mr. Asakawa's remarks I may say in justice to him

that certain portions of my paper I had not written when he received the outline of it. I don't think it could be inferred that I had confused or merged Japan and China in my remarks. Neither did I in the outline sent to him, but I imagine that he imagined that I designed to do that originally, and made his remarks anyway. Mr. Asakawa misses the point of my statement concerning tribal conditions of consciousness. I did not say that Japan is in a tribal condition, but that tribal society and half-cultural societies like China and Japan, are characterized by a relative homogeneity of consciousness. Some of the comments of Mr. Asakawa evidently arise from a misunderstanding of my meaning. My statement that the Orient is large enough to smite us with the sword which we had put into its hands is perhaps rhetorical, *but it is large enough*. As to his question, when does a country become a colony? It becomes a colony just after it leaves the mother country, and if a part of its inhabitants leave it, they also form a colony. I don't question that the Asiatics came from somewhere; I merely remarked that Japan is not in every sense so old as China.

With reference to Mr. Jenk's remarks, which were not devoted to me, I want to say of oriental dissimulation that I understand it does not appear in Chinese business. That is universally, I believe, understood. Certainly I don't think that the love of justice on the part of the Occident has been exhibited in connection with any race, at any time, or anywhere.

IS CLASS CONFLICT IN AMERICA GROWING AND IS IT INEVITABLE?

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The present-day significance of the term "class conflict" is found in the apparent antagonism of employing and wage-earning classes. There are other interests that might be described as economic classes, but their opposition does not lead to outbreak. Their differences are compromised under forms of constitutional government. But a strike is incipient rebellion. It might go to the limit of a general stoppage of industry, as it has done in Belgium and Australia. Whether limited or general, it is the revolt of a practically unpropertied class against property rights. It is a kind of class conflict not yet obviated by our forms of government, like the contests of other classes or interests.

As nearly as I can make out from the census of the United States, of the 24,000,000 men and boys engaged in industry, 6,000,000 are farmers and tenants, 3,750,000 are farm laborers, 11,000,000 are other laborers, clerks, and servants, 1,500,000 are professional and agent classes, and 2,000,000 are other employers. There is no appreciable class conflict between farmers, tenants, and farm laborers. Over one-half of the laborers are sons of the farmers, destined to pass up into their fathers' position or out into other classes. The tenants are small contractors, interested more in prices and profits than they are in wages. The professional and agent classes are disinterested, or else interested in the classes to whom they cater. The field for a class conflict is the 11,000,000 other laborers and servants and the 2,000,000 employers.

But not all of these are in a position to provoke class feeling. In the thousands of small towns and villages the employer or the merchant and his help do the same kind of work side by side and they have close personal relations, often that of father and son,

like the farmers. The servants are individually attached to individuals of other classes. Many thousands of apparent laborers, like teamsters and peddlers, are also small capitalists. At the outside guess, not more than 6,000,000 wage-earners, and 1,500,000 employers and investors are in the field where classes are forming. Two-thirds of the voting population are spectators. We call them the public. They may be forced to take sides, but they want fair play. The outcome depends on the way they are brought in.

While therefore only one-third are available for class conflict, yet they operate fundamental industries of our civilization, like railways and coal mines, or they command strategic points, like cities, the centers of population. Their importance is greater than their numbers.

Now, it must be noted that within this third of the population enormous industrial changes are going on. These tend to intensify the class conflict, but for the time being conceal it. The principal changes are the growth of corporations on the employers' side and the division of labor on the wage-workers' side. That corporations break down the personal ties that formerly held together the employer and his men has long been recognized, but this incidental effect is insignificant compared with the direct effect of the consolidated corporations and syndicates of the past ten years. By combining several corporations into one, by operating several establishments of the same kind in different parts of the country, by placing them all on a uniform system of accounting which shows at a glance every month the minutest detail of every item of cost, the modern trust is going farther to alienate classes than did the simple corporation when it displaced the individual employer. The primitive competition of employer against employer is a children's game compared with the modern competition of manager against manager checked up every month by the cold statistics of cost. Under this system managers go down like tenpins, or up like Schwab. They "hire and fire" their employees, promote and derate their subordinates, with the precision of rapid-fire guns. Under their exact system of costs they measure a man as they do coal, iron, and kilowatts, and labor

becomes literally, what it has been by analogy, a commodity. If one be a scientist or an engineer one can but admire the marvelous results. The astounding reductions of cost, the unheard of efficiency of labor, the precise methods of scientific experiment and tests, reveal a new field of conquest of the human mind. But if one talks with the workmen at their homes one hears the grumblings of class struggle.

The system is perfected by the division of labor. Formerly a workman's efficiency consisted of two things, skill and speed. Division of labor has split up his skill into its constituent operations, and the progress of cost-keeping is carrying the analysis farther than ever before. Instead of the skill of one man we have the grading of operations among a gang of men. Skill had to be measured by quality, by intelligence, by ingenuity, versatility, and interest in his work. These human qualities are elusive and not yet measured even by modern psychology. But speed can be measured by quantity and a clock. Workmen now can be compared with each other and metered up like dynamos. The rise and fall of their energy each hour or day can be charted and filed away in a card catalogue for reference.

Immediately there follows a new science and art of industrial psychology. The efficiency of a steam engine is kept always at its maximum by feeding the coal with an automatic stoker. So the output of labor is kept at the top by adjusting the pay exactly to the motive and capacity. This is done by premiums and bonuses on output, instead of the cruder and more wasteful methods of paying the same price for every piece, and these premiums are nicely figured to the point where the workman will put out the maximum exertion for the minimum bonus. The psychology of the workman is analyzed and experimented upon as accurately as the chemistry of the different kinds of coal. A time-keeping department is created for this purpose with experts, card records, and a testing laboratory, and a new engineering profession springs up with industrial psychology as its underlying science. Wonderful and interesting are these advances in harnessing the forces of human nature to the production of wealth. The pioneers in this field, calling themselves "production

engineers," may well be compared with the great inventors of the turbine and the dynamo in what they are doing to reduce cost and multiply efficiency.

But in doing so they are doing exactly the thing that forces labor to become *class-conscious*. While a man retains individuality he is more or less proof against class feeling. He is *self-conscious*. His individuality protects him somewhat against the substitution of someone else to do his job. But when his individuality is scientifically measured off in aliquot parts and each part is threatened with substitution by identical parts of other men, then his sense of superiority is gone. He and his fellow-workmen compete with each other, not as whole men, but as units of output. The less-gifted man becomes a menace to the more gifted as much as the one to the other. Both are then ripe to recognize their solidarity, and to agree not to compete. And this is the essential thing in class conflict.

But it is significant to note that in the industries where the conditions described have gone farthest there the class conflict is least apparent. Of the 6,000,000 wage-earners mentioned, possibly 2,000,000 are organized in unions. But the unions have practically disappeared from the trusts, and are disappearing from the large corporation as they grow large enough to specialize minutely their labor. The organized workmen are found in the small establishments like the building trades, or the fringe of independents on the skirts of the trusts; on the railways where skill and responsibility are not yet displaced by division of labor; in the mines where strike-breakers cannot be shipped in; on the docks and other places where they hold a strategic position. While the number of organized workmen shows an increase in these directions it shows a decrease in the others. It is in these organized industries that the class conflict appears, and there the lines are drawing tighter. It is there that employers' associations are forcing employers into line and are struggling to do for the medium employer what the trust does without an association. But most of the unions in question are not unions of a class. They are unions of a trade or a strategic occupation. On the railroads they cater only to a third or a fourth of all railroad

employees. They represent for the most part the first stage in the class struggle—that of the skilled workmen protecting themselves through apprenticeship against the inroads of unskilled. Other unions like the shoe-makers and mine-workers represent the second stage, that of an industrial class including all occupations. The first stage has been driven out of the trust; the second stage has not arrived.

And it does not seem likely, where a corporation has reached the position of a trust, that unionism will get a footing, no matter how class-conscious the workmen have become. The very division of labor, which tends toward class solidarity, offers means to circumvent it. It need not be repeated that a potent reason for the persistent class conflict of the past twenty years is the closing up of the great outlet for agitators, the frontier. But the division of labor offers a substitute outlet in the form of promotion. Promotion, where speed is the standard, has rich possibilities compared with old forms of promotion based on skill. Under the older forms workmen came into the various skilled trades by several side entrances of apprenticeship, and each trade had its narrow limits upward. Under the newer forms the workmen nearly all come in at the bottom, and the occupations are graded by easy steps all the way to the top. The ambitious workman advances rapidly, and with every step his rate of pay increases and his work gets easier. But he remains all the time a part of the gang, and his earnings depend on the exertions of those below him. As he approaches the head of his gang he has the double job of a man who gets wages as a workman and profits on his fellow-workmen. He begins to be paid both for his work and for making others work. Quite generally it will be found that the head men of a gang are paid disproportionately high for the skill they are supposed to have. The difference is a payment, not for mechanical skill, but for loyalty. They keep their fellows up to the highest pitch of exertion and they stand by the company in times of discontent. Their promotion is not a mere outlet for agitation—it is a lid on the agitation of others.

But there is still further room for promotion, when the work-

man becomes a foreman, superintendent, or manager. Here he ceases manual work and keeps others at work. He gets a salary, often a bonus or a share in the profits, depending for its amount upon the work of his former fellows. Thus it is that a wise system of promotions becomes another branch of industrial psychology. If scientifically managed, as is done by the great corporations, it produces a steady evaporation of class feeling. I have often come upon fiery socialists and ardent trade-unionists thus vaporized and transformed by this elevating process.

In some industries, like railroads and others, the straight line of promotion is as yet obstructed by cross trade lines, and it might seem that the situation is different from that herein described. In such cases a skilled trade or two may be found which is organized and recognized by the employer on apparent class lines. But the situation is not essentially different. The true class conflict is really for the time prevented by elevating a strategic fraction of the class instead of promoting individuals. It is this kind of fractional organization, as already mentioned, that has been gradually eliminated from other industries with the growth of corporations and the division of labor.

Another line of promotion quite potent in drawing off leaders is politics. Class conflict in America is less persistent than in England and Europe, because the leaders find an outlet in salaried political jobs when the burden of agitation grows tiresome. If civil-service reform continues to make progress, this outlet, like free land, will gradually close, and the class struggle will become more intense.

While promotion at the top weakens class solidarity, immigration and women's labor at the bottom undermine it. Race divisions and their accompaniment, religious divisions, are injected, and to the inducement offered by way of promotion to exploit their fellows is added race antipathy toward those exploited. The peculiarity of class conflict is its occurrence within the dominant race. The bitterest class struggle now going on in America is that of the Western Federation of Miners, the most purely American of trade-unions. In places where that union has been defeated the employers are bringing in the Italians and the

Slavs, and the struggle is as much a defense against immigrants as an aggression on capital. In other industries like iron and steel, where the non-English foreigner is two-thirds of the force, those English-speaking workmen who have not been driven out have been promoted up to the higher positions, and both their race aversion and their superior jobs hold them aloof. In the iron mines of Minnesota, unlike the gold, silver, and copper mines of the Rockies, the Western Federation meets greater difficulty in organizing the Americans than in organizing the immigrants. In still other industries, like the coal mines, where the immigrants are more Americanized and the Americans have not escaped their competition by promotion, race and religion have been fused and an economic class has emerged. Thus immigration has a three-fold effect. At first it intensifies the conflict of classes in the dominant race. Next it shatters class solidarity. Finally, when the immigrants and their children are Americanized and promoted, they renew the class alignment. While immigration continues in great volume class lines will be forming and reforming, weak and unstable. To prohibit or greatly restrict immigration would bring forth class conflict within a generation.

The foregoing are some of the complex industrial conditions which must be taken into account in estimating the prospects of class conflict in America. There remains to be considered the question of politics. Class conflict inevitably compels the government to take a hand. The executive calls out the police, the militia, and the army. The judiciary enjoins the strikers and orders the arrest and commitment of the leaders. The struggle terminates in favor of the side that controls the policy of these branches of government. Whether we like it or not each side reaches out to get control. The contest is shifted to the field of practical politics. Here the great third party, the two-thirds of the voters, is sooner or later brought in. As long as organized labor can win by strikes or negotiation it rejects the political weapon. When strikes begin to fail and negotiation is fruitless it turns to the elections. But strikes are successful mainly in the early stages when employers have not learned the tactics of organization. After they have perfected their associations, after

these associations have federated, and especially after employers have consolidated in great corporations and trusts, their capacity for united action exceeds that of organized labor. Their tactics are directed, not so much toward winning in strikes as toward preventing strikes and disintegrating unions. By wise promotions, by watchful detectives, by prompt discharge of agitators, by an all-round increase of wages when agitation is active on the outside, by a reduction only when the menace has passed or when work is slack, by shutting down a plant where unionism is taking root and throwing orders to other plants, by establishing the so-called "open shop"—these and other masterful stratagems set up a problem quite different from what unionism has heretofore met. It does not seem possible under such conditions that organization will get a footing in the great consolidated industries. The only possibility appears to be that in the event of some widespread social unrest or depression of trade, the thousands of these employees throughout the country will suddenly quit work, on the impulse and without prior organization or concerted action. Such an unlikely revolution would quickly end in submission.

Neither does it seem possible that these thousands of employees will turn to a socialist party. This is not because they are not ripening for socialism. Nothing is more surprising than the numbers of well-paid men employed by the trusts and great corporations who say in confidence that they are socialists. It is not their wages of which they complain, but the long hours, the intense speed and exertion, the two shifts of 12 hours six or seven days in the week, the Sunday labor sometimes continuing twenty-four hours in succession when the day and night shifts change. Their physical exhaustion and continuous work nullify the enjoyment of their good wages. But the very reasons that keep them from unionizing keep them from voting or discussing. They distrust politics, they think the socialist party has no chance, they are not willing to lose their jobs, they are in the minority, and the great mass of their fellow-workmen have but little time and strength to think and talk of anything except the gossip of their daily work. I do not look for a socialist party to recruit these voters—I look for a demagogue.

If we may judge from what has happened in two other English-speaking nations, Australia and Great Britain, a labor party may be expected. In Australia this party followed upon a series of widespread and disastrous strikes. In Great Britain it followed a supreme court decision that jeopardized the funds of trade-unions. But a party formed on class lines cannot enlist more recruits than there are in the class. In this case, at the outside, it is one-third of the voters. Whether a socialist or labor party shall ever be able to reach even this number depends on the attitude taken by the other two-thirds. If they demand fair play and if they are able to enforce their demand, a class party will not attract even its own class. More inspiring to the ordinary man than the struggle for class advantage is the instinct of justice. But justice is not merely fair play between individuals, as our legal philosophy would have it—it is fair play between social classes. The great constitutional safeguards which we have asserted since the time of Magna Charta have been adopted in order to place a subordinate class on an equilibrium with a dominant class. It is in this way that trial by jury has had to be reasserted whenever a new social class has emerged. And it is partly by restoring trial by jury that the great third class, the public, is now beginning to assert its right to hold the balance between two struggling classes. This beginning may be seen in the new constitution framed by the farmers of Oklahoma.

Class conflict may be growing but it is not inevitable if this third class, which is not a class, is able to determine directly the issues. There are, indeed, serious obstacles in the way. The principal one is political. Between the public and the expression of its will are the political party, the party machine, and a legislature, executive, and judges selected by these intruders. Here is a backstairs for manipulation, corruption, and class legislation. But the public at large is too big and too exposed for the wire-pulling of classes. And it does not consent that one class shall have an advantage over another. It does not favor either radicals or reactionaries. When the public shall have more direct means of expressing its will, through direct nomination, direct election, initiative, or referendum, then we may expect class con-

flict to subside. The class war in Colorado broke out because the legislature refused to carry out the will of the people as expressed in a constitutional amendment. A popular verdict may not always be just, but it insures non-resistance. It is not so much abstract justice that satisfies individuals and classes, as confidence in a full hearing, a fair trial, and honest execution of the verdict. If these are guaranteed, the issue may be brought up again. Class antagonism will not disappear as long as there is wealth to distribute, but it can be transferred to the jury of the people. Then we may expect social classes to state their case in the open and to wait on the gradual process of education rather than plunge into battle.

I do not hold that this third class is disinterested and that its will is always right. Economically it stands apart as a class of consumers. It is interested directly in low prices for the products it purchases. The existing widespread movement for the regulation of corporations is a movement for reducing monopoly prices. If it is carried through, the consumers will be conciliated and satisfied. But they will be satisfied on the basis of existing wages, hours, and conditions of labor. A movement of wage-earners for larger wages and shorter hours will then meet their hostility as well as that of the immediate employers. If the regulation of corporations on behalf of consumers is not accompanied with regulation on behalf of employees, the class conflict may become more intense and difficult. Time is the essence of prevention. It is not merely blind economic evolution that provokes economic classes into existence. It is class legislation in the past. The protective tariff has appealed to wage-earners and the public on behalf of manufacturers, but it has contained no provision, like that in the Australian tariff,¹ by which the profits of the tariff should be shared with wage-earners. It has been left to them to get what they could by trade-unions. With such an example of class legislation before them it is not surprising that, when unions are crushed by the great tariff-protected trusts,

¹ The Australian Excise Tariff Act of 1906 places an internal revenue tax equal to one-half the tariff on home manufactures, the same to be remitted if the manufacturer shows that wages paid are fair and reasonable.

then the wage-earners should think of socialism. But it does not follow that the tariff should be abolished. It follows that when it is revised it should provide means to pass the protection along to the wage-earners as well as conciliate the consumers.

Other lines of legislation might be mentioned, which would tend to place social classes on an equilibrium. Whether they do so or not depends on whether they come before the whole people soon enough, on their merits and without the intermediary of political machinery. If this occurs then no one class or part of a class will be big enough to swing all the voters. Like the waves on the ocean it may move up and down but it comes back to the level of the massive bulk beneath.

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR GRAHAM TAYLOR, CHICAGO, ILL.

However we may differ with some of the conclusions of the paper, I think those of us who are nearest the facts will agree that the analysis of the situation was fundamental, even exhaustive. I have thought that the brief time that was at my command might best be spent in describing to you a concrete experience in a situation which exemplifies and enforces almost all the factors of the problem stated in this paper.

In this population under review there was great complexity. There was racial division, keen and sharp-edged, because upon this particular district of Chicago there breaks, like the surf upon the sand, each new wave of immigration. And the Irishman has not yet become reconciled to the Italian, nor the Norwegian to the Pole, nor all four of them to the Armenian and the Greek, to say nothing of the other nationalities represented. They were still further divided by the four religious classifications, the Greek, Gregorian, Roman, and Protestant. Then there was a still more marked lack of unity in this particular population because some of them were independent merchants and street vendors, but the great bulk of them were day laborers. They were positively disinterested in the discussion of the economic aspects of their own labor conditions. After nearly seven years of a free floor discussion in the midst of that population, some of the most intelligent young Americanized mechanics requested that it might be discontinued, because the class-consciousness of the men who took part in the discussion was too high for their consciousness, and they did not wish to be considered as so entirely apart from current opinion and public policy. There was no common ground among them; they were thrown together by the vicissitudes of immigration.

All at once the great teamsters' strike swept over the city. For a while there was no more interest in it than in any other little labor agitation. But

when the strike-breakers began to be introduced into the city and began to drive the coal carts up that avenue, there was a strange agitation, like the breaking up of the foundations of the great deep. There were little knots of people gathered here and there. As the wagons passed, the tenement house windows began to be lined by the women. Hostile demonstrations began with little citizens scarcely more than knee-high, and as these men drove the coal wagons up and down that avenue, women with babies at their breasts and little boys and girls would double up their fists and shout at the top of their voices, "Down with the scab!"

There was a sudden psychological change. Mr. Commons calls it industrial psychology. I should like to say it was a mass psychology. There was nothing very volitional about it, but it was almost wholly instinctive. There was no deliberative choice about it, but a kind of a reversion to type. It was the cry of the wild and the response thereto. Thus suddenly these people of many names and nationalities and tongues were merged into one solid mass—so much so that those coal wagons had to be protected by long platoons of police and by a patrol wagon heading the procession, every morning as they went up and every noon as they came down the street. And in passing a little playground these terrified teamsters were so fearful that one of them actually jumped off his driver's seat, rushed into the playground—where there was nobody but youngsters—and flourished a revolver to protect his life, so scared was he at this sudden reversion to mass consciousness. This is only an illustration of what the union men mean when, in times of stress, they talk to you about "the movement" instead of about the organization. I have often noticed how they drop that word "union" and "organization" in the time of great crises, and say "the movement is safe."

A man cannot get close to that movement without feeling that it is elemental, primal; it is leaderless—less dependent upon leadership than any other movement in history; more absolutely inevitable than any other organization. It is there, and it is there to stay, it is there to increase; it is there to subside once in a while from sight, but all at once to emerge again, a mighty power like some tidal wave of the sea.

I do not like to call it a class movement. It is rather a movement of the mass. If I were to illustrate the class movement, I should say that I had never seen so much class-consciousness among the working people as I have always detected among the employers. There is no such class-consciousness in the ranks of labor as anyone can detect for himself in the ranks of the employing, merchant, and capitalistic classes.

Now as to whether this movement, whatever it is, is to be inevitable and is to grow: to what proportions it may grow, it seems to me, is a relative question; it depends upon certain contingencies. Up to the point of being assured equality before the law, up to the point of equality of political oppor-

tunity, this movement will grow in turbulence, in menace, and in revolutionary spirit. The last race on the face of the earth to be driven into the ranks of socialism were the old Hollanders, but when the military forces were called in to put down that railroad strike in Holland, the class movement along trade lines suddenly merged with the Belgian Socialists; and I was more amazed than by anything I saw in Europe when a thousand of those phlegmatic day laborers at the Hague took the train to attend a great socialist demonstration in Brussels. If that can be done in Holland, what may not be done if the repression goes so far, politically and legislatively, as to violate the sense of justice and human equality before the law on the part of the great mass of American and Americanized labor?

If only there be political equality, then it seems to me that this movement will follow the course taken in Great Britain and I believe that that course has already begun to be followed. We have had a wonderful demonstration of the political intelligence of the great masses of voters in Chicago, even in the immigrant wards. In a paper which somewhat animadverted against the referendum, at the meeting of the Political Science section, an exception was made of the referendum votes in the city of Chicago. Now, the extraordinary thing about those votes lies in this fact, that, although the popular side of those railway questions was at one time expressed by voting "yes" and the next time expressed by voting "no," the people made that choice intelligently. Moreover, they discriminated between ownership and operation with rare intelligence. But as for the assertion of the public rights as against corporate aggression, in that long ten years' struggle in Chicago for the people's rights to their streets, the great democracy of the second greatest city in the Union gathered strength and volume as it went on. Now that movement is going on. The practical politicians will continue to be strongly against direct primaries and direct legislation. Nevertheless the ills of democracy are to be cured only by having more, not less democracy. The will of the electorate is insistent and will be found to be persistent. The party machinery that now stands in the way of the direct primary and of the direct expression of the will of the people must be taken out of the way. Party obligations, party divisions are perceptibly losing their hold, daily and hourly. Even the immigrants that used to be rounded up by the padrones are asserting their independence. I have seen four hundred of my Italian neighbors march with a transparency bearing this bid for bribery: "This political club open to engagement." Poor souls, they knew not what their leaders meant! But at last the Italian vote divided: that is the beginning of the end.

Now, if there be equality of political opportunity and equality before the law, there will be a peaceful and evolutionary development of this mass instinct, this elemental consciousness that "all of us are worth more than some of us." I do not believe that it will take in the whole socialist pro-

gramme by any means. But I think that the solution is coming in two very diametrically different ways. In the first place, this agitation for industrial education and trade schools which is spreading all over the country is going after a while to throw more and more intelligent and trained men into the ranks of the wage-earning mechanical classes. We will then begin to get the leadership of American labor such as the British trade-unions have had and so amazingly profit by. And as the status becomes more fixed, as it is going to be more and more difficult for men to change their status and work up through the stratification that is likely to become more impervious to this elevating influence which Mr. Commons spoke of, we are going to have abler men and men capable of political leadership. Then something is going to happen, and it is going to happen not so much in the area of national politics as in that area which gives labor the best chance it ever had in the world to gain political supremacy—the state governments. No such opportunity has ever been placed before the toiling electorate as the state governments of the United States. Of course the agricultural states will be the last to be won, and those states in which commercial interests predominate will also lag behind, but in the industrial states the legislatures are to be, and are now, the goal of the political ambition of organized labor. With Mr. Commons we can see that as clearly as the dawn. The longest-headed men in the labor movement are just awaiting their opportunity to do what they have done in England—shift the balance of power, not necessarily by any widespread third-party movement, but by gaining one representative here and another there, and wielding their power like the hammer of Thor. That is what the labor representation movement of England has done. That is what some labor representation movement in American politics will some time do. In the last analysis the direction of this movement is in the hands of organized labor. Nor is it in the hands or within the power of organized capital to suppress it. If anything is absurd it is the positive claims of some men who think, or seem to think, they can sweep the earth clear of organized labor, men who claim the right to appoint their own working terms, men who expect the working-men to deal with them individually. The sense of fair play on the part of that greatest of all parties to every industrial issue, the public, will never stand for that injustice. And as the public becomes educated, as the public sees the issue clearly, there is going to be fair play. There is going to be more and more equality before the law, and there is going to be equality of political opportunity. The opportunist's duty of the present moment, therefore, is the education of the public. The appeal to the sense of equity and fair play is seldom without a quick and decisive response from the American public.

But repression, any attempt to silence, any effort to drive back that which has thus started forward, can result disastrously and only disastrously to all concerned. I do not look for any markedly revolutionary spirit. Once in a

while evolution may hurry up a bit, but it will still maintain its evolutionary character. It seems to me as though when you get close to the peasant simplicity of most of our working people, if you see their love of home, if you realize their profound reverence for government, if you see them depositing their little earnings in the bank that bears the name of "State Bank," and, when the bank fails, stand around in blank amazement that the state is not going to stand by its own name, you will never doubt the essential, fundamental loyalty of the great mass of American immigrants to the institutions of our country.

No, ladies and gentlemen, the class-conscious movement is inevitable, because without it the individual cannot maintain his freedom of contract. Men will continue to divide, so as to unite in still grander and more glorious union. I really believe that those who are most pessimistic are farthest from the field of action, and that those who are in the thick of the struggle are most optimistic in regard to the mass movements of American labor, most optimistic of its peaceful and evolutionary and triumphant struggle for justice and equity.

MISS JANE ADDAMS, CHICAGO, ILL.

My opinion in regard to this question, I am sorry to say, varies from time to time, like that of the woman who was asked whether her husband was a Christian. She said that sometimes when she heard him speak at prayer meetings she thought he was, and sometimes when she heard him speak at home she thought he was not, so that, although she was sorry to seem so stupid, she really could not tell. Sometimes when I hear the talk in labor meetings, especially when the speaker is a good, straight socialist, I am quite sure that we are going through the same economic development in America that other countries have experienced and that we can only reach the inevitable salvation through a class conflict; then there are other periods when I see people of divers economic standing going about their daily work with very similar hopes and ambitions and I conclude that after all there is not much class conflict in America. I should like to take up three points in Mr. Commons' paper, one for and two against the contention that the class-conscious struggle is increasing in America.

The first point in the paper which occurs to me to be open to discussion is the statement that as but one-third of the workers are engaged in industrial processes, they alone are subjected to the acute operations of class-consciousness. To my mind it does not follow that the other two-thirds are not also subjected to the same social results of industry. The "industrial conflict" is very absorbing and has many characteristics of a game. Modern life does not offer many episodes which are as exciting as a strike. The "industrial psychology"—I am very grateful to Mr. Commons for that phrase—divides people into two camps, through their sympathies quite as

definitely as it does through their experiences. In moments of real excitement "the fair-minded public," who ought to be depended upon as a referee, practically disappears. At least that has been our experience in Chicago during the teamsters' strike and other similar moments. This increasing sense of sympathetic participation is therefore, to my mind, a point in favor of the contention that class-consciousness is growing.

The next points which I should like to discuss present arguments against a class-conscious struggle. First, the point which Mr. Commons made in regard to immigration: That the first experiences of the immigrants in America doubtless break into their former European class-consciousness, but that later the immigrants are incorporated into the working-class consciousness which is rapidly being formed in America, and that thus an orderly development goes on. I quite agree with Mr. Commons' description of the immigrants' first experience but not with his second. My observation leads me to conclude that the result upon the immigrants of having had their class-consciousness broken into, and the necessity of making new and unprecedented connections with the community about them, is in itself such an educating process that when they reach the second stage in which class-consciousness begins to form again on other lines, the process itself has been so educating that they can't get back to the original position in order to start afresh; the very basis has evaporated so to speak. If you are an Italian and are forced to make friends through the very exigencies of the situation with a Polish Jew representing another nationality, another religion which cuts into all your most cherished prejudices, it isn't so hard after that to make a larger synthesis and include everybody with whom you come in contact. All succeeding efforts will be less fundamental and easier to make. People are after all more or less alike, and it is much harder to utilize your prejudices after they have once failed you than it was to break into them the first time. It requires less effort to be friends with your employer than it required in the first place to be friends with your alien fellow-employee if one effort follows after the other. Immigration by its very variety is bringing in its own education. An old enemy working by your side has turned into a comrade. It is quite possible that your employer formerly regarded as an enemy, mitigated by feudal survivals, is also not so bad.

Mr. Commons made a most suggestive analysis of the effect of the "trust" upon the situation. The trust is of course the great educator of us all, and I suppose in the end, as a brilliant Englishman has said, "The trust, when it is finished, will bring forth socialism," for its unimpeded growth must at last include all of us. The fact that the trust breaks up temporary trade-unionism brings the workers into a state of mind—may I use the phrase industrial psychology again—which makes it difficult to get back to the class-conscious position. I have heard many discussions in regard to the evils of the speeding-up process which we have just heard described by Mr. Commons,

but the man whom I heard speak most bitterly in regard to it was himself a manager in a huge manufacturing plant. The managers in the various departments of such a plant compete with each other and the one who drives his men the hardest, whose department makes the best showing in the reduction of cost, is the one in line for promotion. The manager feels the wretchedness of such a situation very keenly and the workmen under him know how he feels about it. There grows up a certain common experience between them and the men say, "The manager is in the same box with us." The blame for the actual condition of things is thus transferred from the actual manager of a department to the one next in authority on and on until it reaches the stockholders or that which in the popular mind is a horrible thing, the trust itself. When the blame reaches the trust it must become impersonal, for the stockholders of a given concern change every day with the operations of the stock exchange. When an enemy is impersonal, it is difficult to be bitter, although one may yet be very bellicose and determined. When the trust is the enemy it comes to be a matter for governmental action. I suppose one reason for the popularity of the recent federal attempts to regulate the trusts has been the impression that the President is a general leading the nation against a common enemy; that the cause of economic difficulty has at last been located. But to advance toward a common enemy is to unite all those who march into a sense of comradeship and mutual undertaking which for the moment at least makes class feeling between them extremely difficult. One may almost assert that so long as the nation is in this mood, class-consciousness is not increasing.

From my own experience I should say perhaps that the one symptom among working-men which most definitely indicates a class feeling is a growing distrust of the integrity of the courts, the belief that the present judge has been a corporation attorney, that his sympathies and experience and his whole view of life is on the corporation side. Either this distrust is growing rapidly or the statement of it is being more distinctly made every day. It may be that with the advance in social legislation which has been discerned by the reader of the paper and has been reasserted by Mr. Taylor this distrust will be allayed. Certainly it has been apparent throughout all the discussions today that the scholar and the working-man are uniting in a demand for social legislation, and it may well be possible that the amelioration which we all hope is thus being inaugurated will result in a further lessening of the class conflict. I know of course, that such a statement must sound like "rose water for the plague," but in an effort to give quite honestly and plainly one's own experience, one can only after all reaffirm the careful analysis of the situation as made by Mr. Commons which shows that the conflict is disappearing from the very exigencies of industry: that the newer organization of industry brings the employer himself into a position subordinate to the trust: the trust is composed of the constantly changing stock-

holders; the trust can be controlled only by the government which after all in a democracy is composed of all the citizens, a universal class. In making this rose-colored deduction, I realize that I am speaking vaguely, but I hope not foolishly.

PROFESSOR ALVIN S. JOHNSON, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

It seems to be agreed that we have at least the raw material for class conflict. Now I understand that Professor Commons has in mind not simply a conflict of ideas or a conflict of ideals, but that a class conflict is something more violent—not necessarily a revolution, perhaps, but a period of riot and disorder.

Whether this is inevitable or not depends upon a great many things. In the first place, have we such classes? Are six million working-men now a class? I think not. Will they form a class? One necessary condition is that they shall be provided with leaders. But Professor Commons has shown how working class leaders have been drained away. Well, political experience has shown that leaders multiply according to the food-supply. It is an expensive thing to buy off leaders; in fact, a great many reform movements have been started to get rid of the expense of supporting political leaders, and I think we shall find that before very long the number of industrial leaders who have to be maintained will be so great that a new method will have to be employed: organized resistance on the part of employers. This will result in the creation of a class-consciousness among working-men.

The working class has opposed to it the smaller class of the direct employers of labor—two million, Professor Commons estimates it; and as there are twenty-four million voters in all, something like sixteen million are left to arbitrate between the two million and the six million. It is a question in my mind whether these sixteen million will serve as impartial arbitrators. A large contingent—the agricultural laborers and the small farmers—will naturally sympathize with the laboring classes. Another contingent, embracing, we may say, men of small property and the professional classes, manifest a great deal of sympathy with the laboring classes; they recognize nevertheless the rights of capital. Will they continue to be neutral? We shall have to answer this question by considering what it is that the class of laborers will demand. If their demands are limited to matters of comparatively minor importance, as, for example, restrictions upon the employment of military forces to police a strike, this class will be ready to judge very fairly between the laborer and the employer.

But will the working class in the long run be content with anything of this kind? I think not. The fundamental demand of every man is that he shall have security; a reasonable degree of comfort; that he shall hold his position under reasonable conditions; that he shall receive reasonable pay; that in old age he shall not be a pauper, and that in sickness he shall not be left destitute. These things the laborer will demand. But can they all be

granted? Some of them will mean increased taxation, and that means a burden for the small property owner, and for the professional classes also. Some of these demands create a clear opposition between the rights of labor and the rights of property. In my opinion, a good many of us who are now so solicitous about the rights of the working-man will scurry to cover just as soon as the real demands of the laboring classes appear.

Let me tell you an incident that occurred at San Francisco during the summer. A young man whom I had known for many years to be sympathetic to the working-man came out to study labor conditions in that city. He was riding on a street-car operated by scabs, but he didn't know it. Two stalwart unionists pulled him off the car and threw him into a vat of mortar. He came out of that vat a dyed-in-the-wool conservative.

If ever the working class becomes strongly organized throughout the country, we who are not directly engaged in the class conflict will meet with many unpleasant experiences and we shall find our impartiality somewhat impaired. Those of us who do not attach ourselves to the party of the working-man will unconsciously support the employing class. There will be no impartial jury to whom the questions at issue may be submitted.

PROFESSOR HENRY RAYMOND MUSSEY, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

The thing underlying class conflict is the effort to secure a larger share of the economic surplus. I doubt whether the lines of sharpest conflict at present are those drawn horizontally through industry, separating employer and employee. Are they not rather the lines drawn vertically, separating different industries, or more exactly, separating monopolists from all other members of the community? Though this is not the ordinary notion of class conflict, yet it appears to me unquestionable that the real economic struggle of our day is between monopoly and privilege on the one side, and the consumers of monopoly goods and the unprivileged on the other. More and more, political issues frame themselves along these lines. Consequently I use the term class conflict to include all struggles of classes to increase their share in the economic surplus, whether it be the struggle of employees against employers, or of the unprivileged part of the community against monopoly and privilege.

Existing economic arrangements are rooted in an older state of industry, in which they represented, perhaps, some approximation to fairness. As such, they crystallized into law. The growth of large-scale business and monopoly has made those arrangements work greatly to the advantage of certain favored individuals, as compared with the rest of society. Hence most thinking people have begun to question the fairness of the distribution of income sanctioned by law. This inevitably breeds class conflict; for the beneficiaries of the present system will evidently not yield without a struggle. Such seem to be the underlying facts of the present situation.

As to the issue of the conflict, one thing appears tolerably certain, whatever may be one's judgment as to the abstract justice of the claims advanced. As the mass of the people become more intelligent, and as political arrangements become democratic in fact as well as in name, the great body of citizens, the unprivileged of the present time, are bound more and more to embody their ideas of fairness and justice into law, and make distribution far more nearly equal than it is now. If they are not allowed to do it in accordance with the orderly processes of legislation, then they will do it by violence; for it is inconceivable that existing inequalities can be tolerated indefinitely in a democratic society. Such, to my mind, is the broad meaning of all class struggles at this time.

If this be true, the practical problem becomes, how shall social arrangements be modified so as to compel the privileged class to give ground gradually, without forcing violent class conflict and possible revolution, and how shall the demands of the oncoming democracy be made sane, reasonable, and practicable of attainment? Professor Commons has pointed out the necessity of increasingly efficient forms of political democracy. The most perfect political machinery, however, will be of little avail unless we join with it effective machinery for learning and making public all the essential facts concerning the great strategic industries. It is in transportation, mining, public utilities, steel making, oil producing, sugar refining, and the like industries, that the great privileged interests are most strongly entrenched. Here the surplus piles up, here the attack is sharpest, here the conflict waxes hottest. Here no amount of democracy can save us, unless it is joined with a wide knowledge of the facts of industry. The men in industry, trained in a school of extreme individualism, will never give us the facts till they have to. But our present lack of knowledge breeds suspicion, mutual distrust, inconsiderate radicalism. To withhold the facts is only to dam back the river till it rises and breaks over its banks in a devastating flood. Hence our time has no more important task, if social peace is to be preserved, than to devise such accounting and reporting machinery as will exact from the captains of industry and give to the public definite information as to investment, methods of operation, and standards of service, costs, prices, profits and their distribution, in all the great industries. Only on the basis of such information can we move intelligently toward that increasing equality of distribution which is bound to come whether we will or no; only on this basis can we decide in each case whether we shall content ourselves with mere public control of industry, or shall enter on the more radical policy of public operation. Shall we continue our present system of blundering along in the dark, or shall we get the knowledge that will light our path in the future? If the former, we insure for ourselves increasingly sharp class conflict, possibly ending in violent revolution; if the latter, we set our feet on the path of sane and progressive democracy, we take the first great step in freeing the state from its

present sinister control by men of great wealth, we make it possible to put industry in its proper place as the minister to popular well-being, and not as the master of the state and its citizens.

PROFESSOR ROBERT F. HOXIE, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

In dealing with problems of this kind, there seems always to be danger of diffused and fruitless attention to a multitude of specific facts and remedies, to the relative neglect of fundamental and guiding principles. Without any direct or implied criticism of my colleagues, therefore, I wish for a moment to carry the discussion back to the most fundamental matter with which we have here any concern—namely, the *causes* of class conflict.

It has been generally assumed that class conflict is the outcome solely of differences of interest between the membership of different social groups. Now the point that I wish to make is this: Real difference of interest between those who belong to different social groups is not the only, nor perhaps even the most essential, factor in the development of classes and class conflict. In order that classes and class conflict may develop, it is necessary only that the membership of different groups should believe their essential interests to be diverse, and a sufficient cause for belief in difference of essential interest is to be found in differences of materio-economic group discipline.

I can best show what is meant by the phrase "differences of group discipline," and best prove their outcome to be class conflict, by taking a concrete example based on conditions as we find them in the United States at the present time.

We have in the United States at least two recognized systems of materio-economic environment. I refer of course to what are commonly known as the working class or industrial environment and the capitalist-employing class or pecuniary environment. In essential respects these environments are diverse, and each subjects those who come most fully and exclusively within its control to a fairly definite and characteristic intellectual and moral disciplinary influence.¹

In the extreme case the industrial worker is subjected in connection with his most vital and predominant concern—the process of getting a living—to an environment in which blind physical or mechanical force seems to be dominant. He works on inert material with physical tools, operated by his

¹ It should be noted particularly that what follows does not purport to furnish a complete explanation of the characteristic psychological traits of laborers and employers. It is understood that there are and have been other disciplinary influences besides those furnished by the present typical working environments. The writer merely tries to sketch roughly a working theory of class conflict in the United States, not a complete theory of class formation and development. The distinction is important.

own muscles or by energy imparted to machinery from some visible physical source. He works to bring about some visible physical change in his material or to transform it into physical energy for thus changing other material. He sees that the result is in proportion to the physical force exerted and that identical results always follow from identical physical situations or combinations of forces. He sees in other words that general invariable laws characterize the world of material things which forms so important a part of his environment.

But it is not alone the world of material things which, according to the daily experiences of the industrial worker, is dominated by the invariable laws of physical force. To him, situated as he is, these laws seem to determine the relations also between the man and the material. He finds that the man is but the servant of physical force and law. He it is who must conform in time, in place, in action to the laws governing the character of the material and the character of the available force.

Nor is this all. It is not merely in his view the world of material things and the relations of man to these things that fall under the domination of the laws of physical force. According to his experience also the relations of man to man are thus determined. His action as an individual is controlled by the character of the machinery with which he works; the individual machine stands definitely related by mechanical necessity to the whole machinery of the individual, industrial process; and thus to the machinery of related process, so that the worker finds himself and his fellows definitely related to one another in a huge machine-process by virtue of these same general invariable laws which characterize the world of material things.

These laws, the worker's experience teaches him, are blind, unmoral. If he attempts to violate them, the mechanical results will not wait on his convenience or be guided by his welfare. Suffering, love, mercy, faith, hope, are nothing to this universal dominating and transforming physical force. The explosion is not delayed, the fire burns, the knife cuts, the machine mangles, and the process goes on unmoved by the defiance of the strong or by the prayers and sufferings of the weak or the just.

All this necessarily reacts upon the man psychologically. In proportion as his essential activities and relationships come to be determined by physical force and law he becomes mechanical in his mental processes. He comes to think in terms of blind physical cause and effect. He grows fatalistic, atheistic. Physical causation comes to be for him the dominant and final sanction.

Turning now to the environment of the capitalist employer or pecuniary worker, we find in the extreme case an essentially different discipline and psychological outcome. The world of the pecuniary worker is primarily a world of men. He is dependent on the mechanical forces; but the physical force and blind law which permeate his world operate not directly upon him

in his vital activities but upon his agents. His primary concern is not with physical but with pecuniary results—with the control and acquisition of pecuniary energy. His world is therefore dominated primarily by spiritual force. In place of the invariable laws of the material universe, he has to deal, in connection with his most vital concerns, with variable human will, caprice, and cunning, and their institutional outcome. Personality, individual insight, moral and legal strength or weakness, here dominate situations and determine results. He comes therefore inevitably to think in terms of these and similar spiritual forces. He grows animistic, theistic, legalistic. Acquisition, authority, legality, come for him to be the dominant and final sanctions.

Now these differences in fundamental belief, in terms of thought, and in what are considered as sanctions of action and relation, in proportion as they prevail, make it impossible for the members of the industrial and pecuniary classes to agree in regard to truth, justice, and virtue in many concrete cases. This is especially so in respect to the most vital matters of their mutual concern. The industrial worker, for example, reasoning on the basis of fundamental notions given him by his peculiar environment, tends to look upon production as a process of physical transformation; upon the producer as the one immediately concerned with this physical transformation; and upon ownership as confirmed by physical transformation. Against the right thus established, ownership sanctioned by mere acquisition, possession, or legality, tends to be relatively inconclusive. The pecuniary worker on the other hand sees at most only a step in production in the mere mechanical process, and very little in this process to confer ownership. To him production is a market phenomenon—the producer, and therefore the owner, is the one under whose manipulation of the market value appears.

Under such circumstances, where each group is bound to deny what the other regards as the most fundamental postulates in regard to the most vital rights, conflict, I believe, is bound to exist; bound to exist in spite of all the proof that economists, sociologists, moralists, and religionists can muster to show that the real interests of these groups are fundamentally harmonious; and bound to exist, in a democratic country, in physical or political form, in spite of any authority which can be evoked to prevent it.

Application of the theory of class conflict, thus roughly and partially sketched, to the situation in the United States will I believe lead to conclusions somewhat different from those which have been reached in the leading paper of this series.

It would of course be gross error to say that in the United States all men may be divided into these two classes, the membership of the one falling distinctly and exclusively under the discipline of the industrial and the other under that of the pecuniary environment. Numerous and important exceptions would have to be taken to such a statement. It is not claimed

that the average laborer is molded entirely by contact with physical force and law, nor that the average employer is a creature solely of the market. There is of course a great common social and physical environment which exerts a disciplinary influence on both pecuniary and industrial workers. Moreover, in so far as these pecuniary and industrial disciplines exist, what I have attempted to characterize constitute not the usual but the extreme types, and men who may be classed as belonging to the industrial or the pecuniary group fall under what may be taken as their characteristic group discipline in greatly varying degrees. Finally, the actual discipline of perhaps the majority of men in the United States includes characteristic elements derived from both the typical industrial and pecuniary environments.

But all these admissions do not serve to invalidate the main contention. It remains true that as things actually are in the United States today, there are these two fairly distinct disciplinary environmental systems; that there are two fairly large and mutually exclusive groups of men, the one deriving its predominant formative disciplinary influences from the industrial and the other from the pecuniary environment. Moreover, with few exceptions those of every occupation and station in our society (because of working experience or association, or inherited fundamental notions and tendencies of thought) find themselves more or less closely allied in point of view and supposed interest with the one or the other of the classes which I have endeavored to characterize; so that, as things are, our society tends to differentiate intellectually and emotionally into two groups, between the most radical representatives of which the skirmishing of class conflict perpetually exists and perpetually threatens to involve all in conflict.

As yet of course the membership of these two great social groups is not clearly differentiated in all cases. Many individuals and occupational groups derive their discipline partly from the industrial and partly from the pecuniary environment; they have not become definitely and exclusively associated with one or the other of the fighting classes. But I believe that if time permitted I could show that the disciplinary situation is developing in the United States in such a manner as to insure steady growth toward such a definite classification of men and occupational groups; toward a situation, therefore, in which the outbreak of serious conflict between the industrial and pecuniary workers will find individuals, and occupational groups generally, definitely aligned as partisans respectively of these fighting classes.

Is this conflict then inevitable? Obviously, if our theory is correct, class conflict in the United States is bound to exist, unless something should happen to alter essentially the disciplinary situation—either to obviate entirely or partially the differences in discipline which now exist, or to neutralize their effects.

Can, then, these disciplinary differences be obviated? Evidently not, since they seem to be a necessary aspect of the developing life process in society.

Without these differences no division of labor, no specialization, no development of efficiency and individuality could exist. To obviate them we should have to accept the simplicity, stagnation, and atrophy of the small communistic community.

Unless then someone can point out the forces which may be depended on to lessen these seemingly inherent disciplinary differences or to neutralize their psychological effects we shall have to conclude that class conflict in the United States is inevitable.

Are we offered, in the paper which is supposed to be under discussion, anything that may be taken as capable of mitigating the disciplinary situation or its resultant class conflict? An analysis of this paper seems to show that, according to its author, reliance for the mitigation and perhaps suppression of class conflict is to be placed in the main upon authority. The authority which is invoked is the "public," conceived as a *third* class, numbering two-thirds of the population, occupying the position of a spectator relative to the conflict of the other classes, essentially disinterested, desiring fair play and justice. This superior authority—the public—may prevent class conflict, we are told, by means of fair law and fair administration which, it is assumed, will content the warring classes because "a popular verdict may not always be just, but it insures non-resistance. It is not so much abstract justice that satisfies individuals and classes, as confidence in a full hearing, a fair trial, and an honest execution of the verdict."

Is this position well taken? Not if the theory of class conflict which I have tried to outline is accepted. If this theory holds, there is no such thing possible in the United States as a *disinterested* public because there is no third discipline unrelated to the disciplines of the fighting classes. Though, as we have seen, those who are subjected to the extreme discipline of either the industrial or pecuniary environment are relatively few, still the members of this third class share to some extent and in very varying degrees the discipline of the fighting classes, and there are few or none belonging to this third class whose individual disciplines are not determined in essentials more by the characteristic environment of one of those fighting classes than by that of the other. There are then few or none of the members of the great public who are not bound to one rather than the other of these fighting classes, to some degree, by similarity in point of view and therefore by sympathy and assumed likeness of interest. In short, there can be no large, homogeneous disinterested third class, whose members can agree upon a formula for the settlement of class disputes.

But we are told that there is a public, a great public, whose members are not so immediately concerned with the fight that they do not desire fair play and justice. This I would readily enough grant. But what is fair play, and what is justice? What determines men's notions of these things in the concrete? What seem justice and fair play to you are not justice and fair

play to me if the fundamental postulates and preconceptions with which we approach the concrete proposition differ essentially. And they will so differ if the moral and intellectual disciplines which we have derived from our respective environments essentially differ. The mere desire of the public for fair play will not insure social peace when fair laws and impartial justice must always be myths to one or the other of the parties to the class conflict. Who is to make the laws that will *seem* fair to both, and who is to administer justice that will *appear* impartial to those whose essential notions of justice are altogether irreconcilable—between whom there is nothing to arbitrate because there is no mutually admitted basis of justice or fairness.

But after all it is not abstract justice we are assured but a full hearing, a fair trial and an honest execution of the verdict which men desire. I doubt it. But, grant it. Still, who is to define, to the mutual satisfaction of men unable to agree on any fundamental matter, these fundamental terms "*full hearing*," "*fair trial*" and "*honest execution*"? Who even is to define these phrases to the satisfaction of the supposed authority which is to use them as a basis for adjudication? Our utter and manifest inability to answer these questions shows, I think, that we have here no real remedy for class conflict, and, to that extent, must strengthen our belief in the inevitability of this conflict in the United States.

I am well aware that this partial criticism of the position taken in the paper under discussion does not warrant a positive conclusion on the question at issue. To reach such a conclusion would require exhaustive study of the most vital biological and sociological data. But I believe that the known data in these fields is already sufficient to confirm the theory of conflict which I have sketched, and that as this theory is further applied, evidence showing the inevitability of the class conflict will steadily accumulate.

MRS. C. P. GILMAN, NEW YORK CITY

I would suggest that there is still another class in America to which no reference has been made—one which I consider to outnumber or at least to equal any of these other classes mentioned, that is, the women. It is quite possible that with their growing education, their growing interest in public affairs, their growing recognition of the duty of citizenship, they may be able to contribute something in the way of a public point of view, a general point of view, a point of view that has in mind the interests of the human race and not of any specific class. If women are not a class, why legislate upon them as such? If they are, why not mention them in such a discussion as this?

RESPONSE OF PROFESSOR JOHN R. COMMONS TO DISCUSSIONS

Mr. Hoxie has gone several flights above me on industrial psychology. He has added pecuniary psychology. I think he has made an important con-

tribution to the discussion but has not changed the outcome. You will notice that his psychology is based very definitely upon the industrial facts themselves. It follows accurately, like the reflection in a mirror, the mechanical fact on the one hand which makes one class, and the pecuniary fact that makes the other class. All that I can see that he has added is his method of tracing the operation of class interest from the occupation into the mind of the man. If, therefore, my analysis of the general situation in the country is true, and there are one-third of the population who are mixed mechanical and pecuniary, then you have two-thirds of the population that cannot be lined up on any philosophy based on industrial psychology. I contend that he has not made any change in that particular fact. The farmer is one-third of this population. The farmer works with his hands, but he also sells his crops. He has a mechanical mind and a pecuniary mind, and from our general knowledge of the farmers we know that they are not bound to either interest. I think we can see quite plain evidence that if you get the farming class to bear on this class struggle they are going to decide it, not on the basis of class interest but on the basis of a just award. It is a very significant fact that, in the great trial recently carried on in Idaho, they had a jury of twelve farmers to try the most critical outcome of a class struggle in this country, and that body of farmers, who, I judge from his analysis, would belong to the pecuniary class, had their doubts of the guilt of one class. They considered it was a persecution of one class by the other. I could point out other cases in Ohio and other states where a jury of farmers decided in favor of the employers. The general movement of the farming class in this country seems to be that of a mixed psychology. They decide one way or the other, according to the way in which the case is put to them.

The great two-thirds of the population have not figured it out. On account of the nature of their work, the industries in which they are engaged, their relations one to another, they are not tied up to any one class at any time, or they do not think in any one way along class lines. It seems to me that they are really the great jury which is going to decide the case.

I should certainly agree that if there were but two classes in this country, there would be a class struggle. I do not think it is possible for the employing and employed classes to see alike. Class struggle is inevitable if the socialists can show that there is a division of the country into simply two classes. But it seems to me that the protection against this is the fact that these questions do not have to be settled this year or next year; that when one class is suffering the people will come to its aid; the suffering there will cease. Gradually, back and forth, the different elements of the struggling classes will have their grievances mitigated somewhat, and in the gradual appeal back and forth to this great jury of the people, grievances which cause the class struggle will be gradually eliminated, providing we have the other conditions of direct action of which I have spoken.

The trouble about sociology is that if you get into it you are called upon to prophesy, and it is a difficult thing to prophesy. I am trying to answer the question put to me whether class struggle is inevitable and I have to put so many "if's" around it that even Miss Addams, who agrees with me, has fault to find with some of the things I say.

And as to the women, it is too big a prophecy to take them into account at this stage of the game. The one state in this union where women have longest voted is the one where the most intense class struggle has occurred in the last two or three years. That is Colorado. I do not say that that is because the women vote, nor do I see that it proves that women will solve the class struggle. Women have class interests in much the same way that their husbands and sons and fathers have. They are a part of the great community; a class that, while it is based on the industry that the head of the family follows, has its roots in the welfare and the feelings of the family that he supports, and their interests are tied up together. They feel alike, and in any great strike or class conflict the women are the most strenuous fighters. I cannot see that it would make a great difference if we should include the women, and for immediate practical purposes, to keep as far out of the range of prophecy as possible, I tried to limit my discussion to the voting population.

ARE CONTRADICTIONS OF IDEAS AND BELIEFS LIKELY TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT GROUP- MAKING RÔLE IN THE FUTURE?

PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS
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The question which I am expected to attempt in this paper to answer was suggested to me by the Programme Committee. I have adopted the committee's phrasing of it, and I shall endeavor to keep as closely as possible to what I suppose to have been meant by the term "contradictions of ideas and beliefs," and the term "group-making rôle."

It is assumed, I suppose, that contradictions among ideas and beliefs are of various degrees and of various modes besides that specific one which we call logical incompatibility. A perception, for example, may be pictorially inconsistent or tonically discordant with another perception; a mere faith unsupported by objective evidence may be emotionally antagonistic to another mere faith, as truly as a judgment may be logically irreconcilable with another judgment. And this wide possibility of contradiction is particularly to be recognized when the differing ideas or beliefs have arisen not within the same individual mind, but in different minds, and are therefore colored by personal or partisan interest, and warped by idiosyncrasy of mental constitution. The contradictions of, or rather *among*, ideas and beliefs with which we are now concerned, are more extensive and more varied than mere logical duels; they are also less definite, less precise. In reality they are culture conflicts, in which the opposing forces, so far from being specific ideas only, or pristine beliefs only, are in fact more or less bewildering complexes of ideas, beliefs, prejudices, sympathies, antipathies, and personal interests.

It is assumed also, I suppose, that any idea or group of ideas, any belief or group of beliefs, may happen to be, or may become,

a common interest, shared by a small or a large number of individuals. It may draw and hold them together in bonds of acquaintance, of association, even of co-operation. It thus may play a group-making rôle. Contradictory ideas or beliefs, therefore, may play a group-making rôle in a double sense. Each draws into association the individual minds that entertain it or find it attractive. Each also repels those minds to whom it is repugnant, and drives them toward the group which is being formed about the contradictory idea or belief. Contradictions among ideas and beliefs, then, it may be assumed, tend on the whole to sharpen the lines of demarkation between group and group.

These assumptions are, I suppose, so fully justified by the everyday observation of mankind, and so confirmed by history, that it is unnecessary now to discuss them, or in any way to dwell upon them. The question before us therefore becomes specific: "Are contradictions among ideas and beliefs likely to play an *important* group-making rôle in the future?" I shall interpret the word *important* as connoting quality as well as quantity. I shall, in fact, attempt to answer the question set for me by translating it into this inquiry, namely: What kind or type of groups are the inevitable contradictions among ideas and beliefs most likely to create and to maintain within the progressive populations of the world, from this time forth?

Somewhat more than three hundred years ago, Protestantism and geographical discovery had combined to create conditions extraordinarily favorable to the formation of groups or associations about various conflicting ideas and beliefs functioning as nuclei; and for nearly three hundred years the world has been observing a remarkable multiplication of culture groups of two fundamentally different types. One type is a sect, or denomination, having no restricted local habitation, but winning adherents here and there in various communes, provinces, or nations, and having, therefore, a membership either locally concentrated or more or less widely dispersed; either regularly or most irregularly distributed. The culture group of the other type, or kind, is a self-sufficing community. It may be a village, a colony, a state,

or a nation. Its membership is concentrated, its habitat is defined.

To a very great extent, as everybody knows, American colonization proceeded through the formation of religious communities. Such were the Pilgrim and the Puritan commonwealths. Such were the Quaker groups of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. Such were the localized societies of the Dunkards, the Moravians, and the Mennonites.

As late as the middle of the nineteenth century, the American people witnessed the birth and growth of one of the most remarkable religious communities known in history. The Mormon community of Utah, which, originating in 1830 as a band of relatives and acquaintances, clustered by an idea that quickly became a dogma, had become in fifty years a commonwealth *de facto*, defying the authority *de jure* of the United States.

We are not likely, however, again to witness a phenomenon of this kind in the civilized world. Recently we have seen the rise and the astonishingly rapid spread of another American religion, namely, the Christian Science faith. But it has created no community group. It has created only a dispersed sect. It is obvious to any intelligent observer, however untrained in sociological discrimination he may be, that the forces of Protestantism, still dividing and differentiating as they are, no longer to any great extent create new self-sufficing communities. They create only associations of irregular geographical dispersion, of more or less unstable or shifting membership. In a word, the conflicting-idea forces, which in our colonial days tended to create community groups as well as sects, tend now to create sectarian bodies only—mere denominational or partisan associations.

A similar contrast between an earlier and a later stage of culture group-making may be observed if we go back to centuries long before the Protestant Reformation, there to survey a wider field and a longer series of historical periods.

It is a commonplace of historical knowledge that in all of the earliest civilizations there was an approximate identification of religion with ethnic consciousness and of political consciousness with both religious and race feeling. Each people had its own

tribal or national gods, who were inventoried as national assets, at valuations quite as high as those attached to tribal or national territory.

When, however, Roman imperial rule had been extended over the civilized world, the culture conflicts that then arose expended their group-creating force in simply bringing together like believers in sectarian association. Christianity, appealing to all bloods, in some measure to all economic classes, and spreading into all sections of the eastern Mediterranean region, did not to any great extent create communities. And what was true of Christianity was in like manner true of the Mithras cult, widely diffused in the second Christian century. Even Mohammedanism, a faith seemingly well calculated to create autonomous states, in contact with a world prepared by Roman organization could not completely identify itself with definite political boundaries.

The proximate causes of these contrasts are not obscure. We must suppose that a self-sufficing community might at one time as well as at another be drawn together by formative beliefs. But that it may take root somewhere and, by protecting itself against destructive external influences, succeed for a relatively long time in maintaining its integrity and its solidarity, it must enjoy a relative isolation. In a literal sense it must be beyond easy reach of those antagonistic forces which constitute for it the outer world of unbelief and darkness.

Such isolation is easily and often possible, however, only in the early stages of political integration. It is always difficult and unusual in those advanced stages wherein nations are combined in world-empires. It is becoming well-nigh impossible, now that all the continents have been brought under the sovereignty of the so-called civilized peoples, while these peoples themselves, freely communicating and intermingling, maintain with one another that good understanding which constitutes them, in a certain broad sense of the term, a world-society.

The proximate effects also of the contrast that has been sketched are generally recognized.

So long as blood sympathy, religious faith, and political consciousness are approximately coterminous, the groups that they

form, whether local communities or nations, must necessarily be rather sharply delimited. They must be characterized also by internal solidarity. Their membership is stable, because, to break the bond of blood is not only to make oneself an outcast, but is also to be unfaithful to the ancestral gods; to change one's religion is not only to be impious, but is also to commit treason; to expatriate oneself is not only to commit treason, but is also to blaspheme against high heaven.

But when associations of believers, or of persons holding in common any philosophy or doctrine whatsoever, are no longer self-sufficing communities, and when nations, composite in blood, have become compound in structure, all social groups, clusters, or organizations, not only the cultural ones drawn together by formative ideas, but also the economic and the political ones, become in some degree plastic. Their membership then becomes to some extent shifting and renewable. Under these circumstances any given association of men, let it be a village, a religious group, a trade-union, a corporation, or a political party, not only takes into itself new members from time to time; it also permits old members to depart. Men come and men go, yet the association or the group itself persists. As group, or as organization, it remains unimpaired.

The economic advantage secured by this plasticity and renewableness is beyond calculation enormous. It permits and facilitates the drafting of men at any moment from points where they are least needed, for concentration upon points where they are needed most. The spiritual or idealistic advantage is not less great. The concentration of attention and of enthusiasm upon strategic points gives ever-increasing impetus to progressive movements.

Let us turn now from these merely proximate causes and effects of group formation, to take note of certain developmental processes which lie farther back in the evolutionary sequence, and which also have significance for our inquiry, since, when we understand them, they may aid us in our attempt to answer the question, What kind of group-making is likely to be accomplished by cultural conflicts from this time forth?

The most readily perceived, because the most pictorial, of the conflicts arising between one belief and another are those that are waged between beliefs that have been localized and then, through geographical expansion, have come into competition throughout wide frontier areas. Of all such conflicts, that upon which the world has now fully entered between occidental and oriental ideas is not merely the most extensive; it is also by far the most interesting and picturesque.

Less picturesque, but often more dramatic, are the conflicts that arise within each geographical region, within each nation, between old beliefs and new—the conflicts of sequent, in distinction from coexistent ideas; the conflicts in time, in distinction from the conflicts in space. A new knowledge is attained, which compels us to question old dogmas. A new faith arises, which would displace the ancient traditions. As the new waxes strong in some region favorable to it, it begins there, within local limits, to supersede the old. Only then, when the conflict between the old as old, and the new as new, is practically over, does the triumphant new begin to go forth spatially as a conquering influence from the home of its youth into regions outlying and remote.

Whatever the form, however, that the culture conflict assumes, whether serial and dramatic, or geographical and picturesque, its antecedent psychological conditions are in certain great essentials the same. Men array themselves in hostile camps on questions of theory and belief, not merely because they are variously and conflictingly informed, but far more because they are mentally unlike, their minds having been prepared by structural differentiation to seize upon different views and to cherish opposing convictions. That is to say, some minds have become rational, critical, plastic, open, outlooking, above all, intuitive of objective facts and relations. Others, in their fundamental constitution have remained dogmatic, intuitive only of personal attitudes or of subjective moods, temperamentally conservative and instinctive. Minds of the one kind welcome the new and wider knowledge; they go forth to embrace it. Minds of the other kind resist it.

In the segregation thus arising, there is usually discoverable a certain tendency toward grouping by sex.

Whether the mental and moral traits of women are inherent and therefore permanent, or whether they are but passing effects of circumscribed experience, and therefore possibly destined to be modified, is immaterial for my present purpose. It is not certain that either the biologist or the psychologist is prepared to answer the question. It is certain that the sociologist is not. It is enough for the analysis that I am making now if we can say that, as a merely descriptive fact, women thus far in the history of the race have generally been more instinctive, more intuitive of subjective states, more emotional, more conservative than men; and that men, more generally than women, have been intuitive of objective relations, inclined therefore to break with instinct and to rely on the later-developed reasoning processes of the brain, and willing, consequently, to take chances, to experiment, and to innovate.

If so much be granted, we may perhaps say that it is because of these mental differences that in conflicts between new and old ideas, between new knowledge and old traditions, it usually happens that a large majority of all women are found in the camp of the old, and that the camp of the new is composed mainly of men.

In the camp of the new, however, are always to be found women of alert intelligence, who happen also to be temperamentally radical; women in whom the reasoning habit has asserted sway over instinct, and in whom intuition has become the true scientific power to discern objective relations. And in the camp of the old, together with a majority of all women, are to be found most of the men of conservative instinct, and most of those also whose intuitive and reasoning powers are unequal to the effort of thinking about the world or anything in it in terms of impersonal causation. Associated with all of these elements, both male and female, may usually be discovered, finally, a contingent of priestly personalities; not necessarily religious priests, but men who love to assert spiritual dominion, to wield authority,

to be revered and obeyed, and who naturally look for a following among the non-skeptical and easily impressed.

Such, very broadly and rudely sketched, is the psychological background of culture conflict. It is, however, a background only, a certain persistent grouping of forces and conditions; it is not the cause from which culture conflicts proceed.

Always one and the same throughout the ages, although in the course of human history it has assumed endlessly varied outward shapes, the cause of all conflict, cultural, economic, juristic, political, has slowly fashioned also their psychological factors. From the dawn of life until now the alternative has ever and again confronted living things, to change their habits or die. By far the greater part of them have prematurely died because they could not change. Of the survivors, the greater part have lived on because they have changed unconsciously. To a very few, of the human kind, it has been given to know before the event that change must come. They have perceived in time the shifting of external relations, and this perception has been the fearsome New Idea that has set man at variance against his father and the daughter against her mother, that has brought not peace on earth, but the sword.

And from the beginning it has literally been true that a man's foes have been they of his own household. Sheltered in some degree in the struggle for existence, women have rarely felt, as men have felt, the first staggering shock of new conditions. They have rarely been compelled to change their outlook and their way of life as unexpectedly and decisively as men have had to change. They have been able therefore to cling longer to the established order, and to cherish for it a lingering sentiment, a deep affection even, that vigorous men have not been able fully to share.

From the beginning, therefore, whenever the necessity for a new adjustment of life to its conditions has arisen, a conflict between old and new habits, between old and new convictions, between old and new sentiments, has been precipitated, and it has arrayed the rationalistic or katabolic minds, chiefly men, against the instinctive or anabolic minds, chiefly women.

Yet from the beginning another tendency also has been mani-

fest. The approximate identification of static interest with woman and of innovating interest with man, never absolute, has become more and more imperfect.

In the dim past of the primitive age, when each sex had its own traditions and its own ritual, each was taboo to the other, except as the taboo could be broken by ceremonial magic.

Yet that primitive cult of the feminine, it is necessary to remember, always included men as well as women. Boys who could not endure the formidable initiation ceremonies that would admit them to the cult of the men, were consigned to the camp of the women, perhaps for life; were often compelled to don female costume and to remain with the women while their more stalwart brothers went forth to the chase or to war. As time went on, around this nucleus of women and effeminate men gathered an ever-enlarging accretion of men somewhat less feminine in mental constitution, although, on the whole, timid and conservative, and therefore antagonistic to a broadly masculine view of life. At length men of strong personality, dogmatic and authoritative, including old and clever men no longer fit for war, seeing their opportunity to establish dominion, threw in their fortunes also with the backward-looking multitude. In the camp thus constituted, there developed one general attitude toward life and conduct, one general scheme of piety and morals. In the boldly masculine camp there developed another. There, superlatively virile minds stood ready to dare new risks. Crudely and awkwardly but fearlessly experimenting, they perfected new adjustments and took the first infinitely difficult steps of human progress.

So, while priests and women created backward-looking religion and a punctilious morality of personal behavior, men of the daring mood—prophet and discoverer, warrior and reformer—created a forward-looking faith and fashioned the plastic secular structure of economic, juristic, and political relations.

From the moment that these differentiations are established, one new adjustment of human life to its changing conditions follows swift upon another. Culture succeeds culture. That which in its day and generation is practical and profane is trans-

mutated into the sacred and ceremonial. That which today is faith, front-facing and alive, tomorrow will have become reminiscent religion, the sentimental worship of dead ideas, a thing of gentle memories and regrets.

For long ages, each new faith as it arises, each new economic and juristic order, is locally circumscribed. It cannot pass beyond the bounds of a rigid political organization, and these are identified with the blood of tribe or nation.

But, little by little, political integration is achieved, and as age after age goes by, each new culture finds a wider area open to it for possible extension. At the same time each is more and more restricted as a community-forming activity, because political integration makes isolation difficult. Thenceforward, each culture beats upon every other, each mingles with every other, until at length each blends with all.

The significance of this evolutionary process for our immediate question I conceive to be somewhat as follows:

We are practically at the end of the community-forming stage in culture conflict. Every vigorous group of ideas or beliefs in the world will henceforth have unhindered way to propagate itself geographically, to form vast associations of adherents.

The groups so formed will be somewhat indefinite. In the main they will be plastic. In the main their membership will be mobile and shifting.

That mobility is on all accounts to be desired. But while its gradual increase is on the whole inevitable, it will, nevertheless, in some measure be restricted, and certain tendencies will be manifest toward the formation of relatively definite groups of relatively stable membership. The cause of these tendencies will be the effort which each of these contending forces will make to control and to use the police power of the state.

The police power has always a strictly regional or territorial application. A municipal ordinance is valid for that local area the population of which is incorporated as borough or city. The statute of the commonwealth applies throughout the territory of that state, but not elsewhere. The laws and administrative orders

of a national government have force within its territorial boundaries, but not beyond.

It follows that to the extent to which the use of the police power for the achieving of any particular purpose is effective the population to which it is applied becomes a selected group. Opponents and misdemeanants are eliminated, or forced into conformity. It is therefore theoretically possible for idea-forces, including religious faiths and moral creeds, still to create community, as well as sectarian, groupings. How far it is practically possible is perhaps well enough illustrated by prohibition legislation in its various forms.

If now we wish to judge what use is likely thus to be made of the police power in culture conflict, we must call to mind the character of the chief groups of conflicting ideas at present arrayed against each other, and, so far as can be foreseen, likely to maintain their antagonism into an indefinitely distant future.

The chief culture conflict today is obviously the world-wide struggle between scientific secularism on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the various cults of supernaturalism, obscurantism, and dogmatism. On the side of the cults are the forces of sentiment and inertia. On the side of scientific secularism are arrayed the forces of practical interest. Science makes its way with the multitude, not because the multitude is capable of understanding it, or even of greatly caring about it, but chiefly because the multitude sees that science does things. It safeguards the crops. It prevents or controls epidemics. It cuts down freight rates, and it transmits thought through pathless wastes of firmament and sea.

Now it is a peculiarity of scientific secularism—or profane practicality, if we prefer so to describe it—that, with all its power and prestige, it has not been disposed thus far to employ the police power in furtherance of propagandism or any sort of social group making. It has used it only for general utilitarian ends, as, for example, to enforce sanitation, or to prevent destructive forms of exploitation, like child labor. It has been distinctly opposed to any use of the police power to compel assent to a

belief, to enforce a creed, or to establish any code of purely personal morals.

On the other hand, dogmatic supernaturalism has never cared greatly about utilitarian interests, since these are of the earth, and materialistic. But since the dawn of history dogmatic supernaturalism has unhesitatingly made use of the police power, whenever it has been in a position to do so, to compel assent to articles of faith, to enforce rules of purely personal conduct, and to establish ceremonial forms.

Therefore it is probable that to the extent that scientific secularism commands the situation, cultural association will be free. To the extent that dogmatic supernaturalism, obscurantism, mysticism, are in any region dominant, we may expect them to use the police power to create group solidarity.

Much will depend, accordingly, upon the mental composition of the various regional populations. By this I mean that much will depend upon the predominance, in any given region, of one or another mental type. The inductive, critical, intellectual mind, intuitive of objective relations, turns naturally to scientific secularism. The mystical, emotional, subjectively intuitive, instinctive mind as naturally, indeed inevitably, embraces some highly respectable dogmatism with an impressive pedigree, or rushes upon some new-fangled miracle-ism like Christian Science.

It is to be regretted that we seem to have no quite appropriate descriptive name for these two types of mind. In the writings of European sociologists they are commonly designated as masculine and feminine, and the social dominance of one type or the other is called masculinism or feminism. This usage is sometimes carried to the point of labeling entire nations by sex-connoting terms. Germany, for example, was by Bismarck called a masculine nation, and Russia a feminine nation.

If the analysis of the two mental camps, radical and conservative, which I have presented in the foregoing pages, is substantially accurate, these sex-connecting tags are somewhat inappropriate and misleading. If we adopted them for scientific purposes, we should be compelled to say that the prophet, whether man or woman, is mentally masculine, and that the priest, whether

woman or man, is mentally feminine. This might not mystify because, as a mere satirical conceit, the discrimination has long been familiar. But what would be said if we should apply this nomenclature to the business population of the United States? We should then be compelled to class as maculine the business minds of an engineering type—minds that weigh, measure, calculate, and plan, and to class as feminine all business minds that are incapable of grasping the conception of impersonal causation. This would be to say that American business men in general are woman-like, since they have been unable as yet to find any better explanation of the recent commercial crisis than the truly feminine hypothesis that President Roosevelt did it.

But while we cannot describe intellectualism as masculine, or instinctive dogmatism as merely feminine, we cannot, I think, afford to overlook the influence of the so-called woman's movement, when we try to predict which of the conflicting culture forces will probably be ascendant in civilized life in the near future.

As we see it today, the woman's movement is difficult to analyze. Doubtless we may discover in it an effort by intellectual women to awaken large numbers of their sex to the rational life, to wean them from instinct, and to make their outlook increasingly objective. It is obvious that in certain respects the woman's movement is being so conducted as to defeat this commendable end.

When, for instance, women have made up their minds that they want to see things "from the man's point of view," how shall they go about it?

So far as the somewhat skeptical observer, like myself, can judge, they imagine that they are getting the masculine view when they draw men into the circle of their own projects and enterprises, planned, organized, and conducted by themselves. I may be quite wrong in my interpretation of the facts, and I hold my opinion subject to revision, but at present I am sure that by this process of influencing and converting men women get nothing whatever but an intensification of feminism. They get "the point of view" not of masculine men, but of two somewhat

nondescript varieties, namely, first, those gentlemen who in their schoolboy days preferred daisies and buttercups to snowballs and "double rippers," and second, those authoritative persons who are but too glad to seize upon the opportunity thus afforded them to become the confessors and demigods of a worshipful sex. Such always are the men who lend themselves to those moral crusades which proceed on the assumption that there is only a quantitative difference between virtue of private vintage and the virtue that is squeezed and barreled at the public winepress.

To this particular skeptic now speaking, it appears that the person who at the present moment is commonly styled "the new woman" is of all women in civilized lands the most thoroughly primitive. So far from seeing life from the man's point of view, she has taken herself back to that most ancient camp of her sex from whose sacred ground all strictly non-feminine men were looked upon as scandalous and taboo.

On the other hand, it does not seem to this skeptic that woman necessarily gets the man's point of view by following "the good old way, the simple plan" of giving herself to him in the holy bonds of matrimony and bearing numerous sons to distribute his property.

In reality, her getting the man's point of view, if that is what she wants and is bound to have, depends altogether upon the kind of men, including father and brothers, husbands, sons, and acquaintances that she happens to consort with. If she is thrown with anabolic gentlemen only, she can never arrive at the masculine outlook. If her associations are with masculine men she will enjoy that outlook, if she is capable of seeing it.

Probably nothing can with so much certainty be counted on to bring women into contact with men of essentially masculine type as an intellectual education and the cultivation of intellectual interests in intellectual association and comradeship with men. But this in my judgment is not to be achieved by the ordinary processes of college training only. Intellectual principles must be applied to life, and women must be associated with men in making the application. Of the many spheres of activity in which this may be done, the economic, the scientific, the literary,

and the artistic are not to be despised. Yet, after all, the great realm in which intellectual principles can be and should be applied to life is the realm of politics, and possibly women in general will never really see life from the katabolic bench until, after much pounding at the door, they are admitted to the great masculine Brotherhood of Machiavelli.

If such, however, is the truth, our argument appears to end in dilemma, as indeed, most arguments on practical questions do. For it is not probable that if women generally were at once to participate in political life, the forces of true radicalism, of scientific secularism, could make headway, or even hold their ground. What then would become "of the man's point of view"? The dogmatic programme of using the police power of legislatures and the courts to compel uniformity of moral profession and pretense would in all likelihood be used to the uttermost. We should have retrogression from free and plastic association toward local or community grouping on grounds—not perhaps of belief, as in bygone days, but at least of "good morals."

Happily, no such calamity need be apprehended. Women in general are still too instinctive and too wedded to tradition to avail themselves at once of political opportunities, if these were freely accorded. Those that enter upon political life will in some measure be transformed and broadened by it before the multitude of their sisters follows their example. Therefore, with some confidence we may still hold to the main conclusion that this survey of forces and tendencies of culture conflict has suggested. Political integration will not cease. Scientific secularism, not only through its appeal to the calm intelligence of modern man, but also through its sheer practical utility, will assuredly hold the ground it has taken and make further gains. Whatever its momentary victories, the old, in the long run, cannot overthrow the new, because its own inertia incapacitates it for continuous aggressive action. Therefore we may reasonably expect that the world of social relations will continue from this time on to become less and less a congeries of static, solidaristic groups, more and more a bewildering complex of free associations,

through which the energies of mankind, economized to the uttermost, will freely create the uttermost things of human good.

DISCUSSION

REV. JENKIN LLOYD JONES, CHICAGO, ILL.

Leaving theories, classifications, and scientific terminologies to the experts in this presence, it is manifest to the layman that as a matter of fact a sure and profound coming together is a marked characteristic of our times and the inevitable result of culture. Whether we study the religious, political, racial, or social phases of society, everywhere lines are being obscured, superficial differences are being ignored, as fundamental agreements are being discovered. Some wise man has said that progress in philosophy consists not so much in settling as in giving up questions. Logic and the theologies and philosophies based thereon delight in distinctions, may lead to differentiations, but experience, emotion, and, above all, ethics, delights in synthesis and necessitates harmonies. Hence in proportion as intelligence obtains, the doors of sect and political party, race, creed, and social standing, swing easily both ways. Where there are contradictions in beliefs, or even ideas, there is an agreement of ideals. A common quest swings people of diverse origins and in diverse camps into line. Some kind of a catholicism is coming in religion. The organized world which the statesman sees is based on the fraternal elements that are more and more discoverable among races and creeds.

I will not undertake to follow the essayist in his subtle analysis or to gainsay his logic, but I will venture the opinion that as a matter of fact the exceptions to his generalizations are so numerous that they seem to render the rule of little value. There is so much orientalism creeping into the West and occidentalism is so much in demand in the East that any attempt to found a classification on these terms is dangerous. Still more dangerous is it to build up a system of classification, a psychological scheme on the difference between men and women, for the new man is quite as elusive and difficult to label as the new woman. And that third something, the priestly personality, is less and less in evidence in this western world outside of college circles. The gown is more or less discarded by the so-called clergy, and if it remains at all it will be preserved as reminiscence of the ancient régime on the campus and there it will be manifest only on state occasions.

The essayist's definition of religion as "the sentimental worship of dead ideas, a thing of gentle memories and regrets," set over against this something spoken of as "faith," is, to say the least, startling in its freshness, and a still more characteristic evidence of uniqueness in the fact that I suspect it is a definition that few students of religion, friendly or otherwise, can

accept. I certainly do not like that kind of thing any better than the essayist does. I confess my further inability to discover the pertinency, the practical value, or the philosophical justification of a forced antithesis between what he calls "scientific secularism" or "profane practicality" and the "supernaturalism, obscurantism, dogmatism" and, as if there was a deficiency of bad words, our essayist adds another—"miracle-ism." Surely the ideals, the emotions, the passions, the sense of awe, and the "I ought" as well as the "starry heavens above" are objects of scientific study, and such study does yield satisfying results, while, on the other hand, the terms "secularism," "materialism," and the so-called "practicalities," to say the least, furnish their full quota of dogmas and nourish the dogmatic spirit abundantly in these days.

I do not understand that the utilitarian interests are necessarily of the earth or materialistic.

So call not waste that barren cone
Above the floral zone,
Where forests starve:
It is pure use;—
What sheaves like those which here we glean and bind
Of a celestial Ceres and the Muse?

"Naturalism" and "supernaturalism" are dangerous words to play with, but certainly strong wills and stalwart consciences, brave thinkers and noble helpers, find a faith and a religion that is not antagonistic to science and not chained to matter.

As to the woman question here involved, again let me confess that the reasonings of the essayist may be too deep for me, but I believe that any attempt to establish a practical separation in church, in school, in business, or in society on sex lines is as impossible as it is vicious. The most menacing division of today is that which separates the social and intellectual life of the post-academic age into sex groups. The woman- and man-club habit harks back to outgrown monasticism, to mediaeval inefficiency. The demand of science as well as the trend of culture and the inspiration of ethics is toward a larger union, the ultimate synthesis of men and women in the higher life of the state, the advanced interests of culture, morals, and religion, in which I believe and of which I have great hopes.

PROFESSOR GEORGE A. COE, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

The paper of Professor Giddings has opened a wide and enticing vista. If it were possible for me to follow him down it step by step I should be able and glad to add illustrations and confirmations of many of the points that he has made. It does not seem to me possible, however, in the available time, to traverse so broad a topic. Indeed, if I were to suggest a general difficulty with the paper it would be that within the limit of a half-hour the writer

could hardly cover so much territory and yet adequately define all the terms that he was using. With the last speaker I find myself somewhat at sea because I do not know exactly what Mr. Giddings meant by various expressions that he employed. Yet I suppose that we hardly ought to expect the masculine process of katabolism to be completed upon so important and extensive material within half an hour. I should like to know, nevertheless, what was in his mind with regard to "impersonal causation." I wish I knew what he meant by "scientific secularism." I wish I knew whether the propositions that he made with regard to religious organizations cover all of them and all the dominant tendencies in religious organizations with which he is familiar.

In the time that I have at my disposal it will be impossible for me to touch upon more than one point in any detail, and this, too, is a point at which further definition is needed. I agree with the speaker that we have to do here with extra-logical contradictions of ideas, but what is the nature of these extra-logical conflicts? A full answer to this question would require a psychology of belief which cannot be given here. I can, however, I think, confidently lay down one or two propositions in the form of conclusions on this topic.

An idea always has some reference to active processes in which it arises and to active processes in which it issues. An actual idea must have meaning, and the meaning of any idea has reference to some kind of practical attitude that the thinker has assumed or is likely to assume. We cannot separate living ideas from the vital processes in which we are taking part. A belief, accordingly, in one aspect of it, is the intellectual side of a programme of action. Take a belief apart from some act that it contemplates, and you have no longer a belief.

Functionally considered, then, an idea or a belief is a tendency to action—or let us say a purpose—that has come, or is coming, to conscious formulation. Nothing short of this is an actual or living idea. After a purpose has evaporated the verbal symbol of it may remain, but the symbol of a dead purpose is no longer an idea. There is as great a difference between such a symbol and an idea as there is between a fossil fish and a fish. This distinction is an important one, for living ideas and fossil ideas are mixed together in the whole of society. We find it so in the state; we find it in political parties; we find it in the universities, just as we find it in religion.

The problem of the group-making influence of contradictions of ideas and beliefs depends for its solution upon this question: What social effect tends to follow the process of making our purposes fully conscious to ourselves? In other words, when the instinctive and habitual and imitative modes of activity are transformed into the conscious and intentional forms of activity, when the things which are going on express themselves in intellectual formulation, what is the effect?

I think we can make a very simple answer to this question, and the answer will indicate where I am inclined to vary from some of the conclusions of the speaker. The general proposition is, first, that the initial effect of thinking our purposes is to focalize them and so intensify the social oppositions based upon them. But, second, as we continue to analyze these purposes we broaden our horizon, and thus we develop new sympathies, understand the opposing point of view, find that thinking tends to remove the very antagonisms that it has helped to create. This seems to be parallel with the logical process. We know that any idea tends to subsume itself under a more general idea; just so a purpose when it becomes conscious of itself tends to seek a higher point of view wherein the two opposing purposes can be united. When competition stops to think, it gives rise to combination. When we quiet the war-cries of our political parties, especially when we get beyond our catchwords and ask what is the real principle underlying our political conflicts, we find that political bitterness can no longer exist. When two political parties define their purposes to themselves, each finds the relative validity of the purposes of the other group. This seems to be a general law. Let me state it again: The initial effect of thinking our social purposes is to intensify our social oppositions, but the ultimate effect of the broader and deeper thinking is to remove these very oppositions.

This is true of religious organizations as well as of political and other organizations—and let me say right here that, as far as I can see, the speaker's apparent removal of political organizations from the sphere of idea and belief conflicts is entirely artificial. Just as far as, in forming a state or modifying a constitution, we employ thought processes, we form political creeds. We have our political creeds as well as our religious creeds, and political conflicts are in part conflicts of political creeds. It seems to me that we have the essential problem of oppositions of ideas in all social groups that have begun to analyze their own purposes.

This is the clue to religious conflicts. I shall speak first of the matter that concerns us most, the faith that we are in contact with, the Christian religion. At the outset the Christian idea was practically identical with the Christian purpose, and that purpose was profoundly social. But contact with Greek philosophy and Roman law led to efforts to define the Christian idea abstractly and statically. At best such definitions could express only one side of the Christian idea. For an idea, as we have seen, has two sides, a mental image, or symbol, and a meaning, the latter of which involves an active attitude or purpose. Official Christianity turned its attention to the image-side of Christian ideas. Mental images were collected, systematized, insisted upon, handed down from generation to generation.

These symbols, largely fossil ideas, are the main ground of the mutual oppositions of the Christian sects. It could easily be proved from recent events that what delays the union of the Protestant sects, at least, is not the

present purposes of any of them, but a certain clinging to the symbols of old thought processes. As fast as these sects gain a clear consciousness of their own living ideas, that is, the actual purposes of the life that they are now living, opposition to one another will fade away, and they will find themselves irresistibly drawn together. It is not extravagant to foresee the ultimate union, first, of the Protestant sects, and then—well, I do not believe that it involves any insane delusion to suppose that even the opposition between Protestants and Catholics will some day disappear through the discovery that both purpose the same thing for the world. I can hardly guess how pope or council will state this purpose; I do not even know how the Protestants will state it; but the event seems to me as certain as the development of self-consciousness concerning our real purposes.

Now I want to say a word about radicalism and conservatism as applied to religion. The most radical idea that ever entered the heart of man is the thoroughgoing critique of human purposes that expresses itself in religion. Religion is radical because it preaches most general and profound discontent with things as they are. Pessimism is not as radical as religion; for, though pessimism finds no end of fault, it has not the grit to go to work to reconstruct life. But religion undertakes to transform our life and even our nature itself! There is radicalism for you! It is the greatest radicalism in all history. It is the most enterprising thing in all history. It may be a fatuous enterprise, but it is an enterprise—the enterprise of the explorer, of the pioneer, of the masculine element of society—if that is the enterprising element. Now it is only an incident in the history of Christianity that makes it appear so difficult for religion to employ the scientific method for determining the means of attaining its ends. The essential radicalism of the enterprise will yet demand the rigor of that method, and we shall see religion becoming more and more an application of scientific sociology to the world's deepest needs.

What is "scientific secularism"? Science has only one purpose, and that is to know. I do not see that this is particularly secular. Science does not prescribe to the secularist his secular purposes. He is not a secularist because he is scientific, but because he has espoused some ambition different from the religious ambition. There is nothing in the nature of the case to prevent both the secularist and the religionist from being scientific. Science in its relation to civilization plays the part of an instrument. It does not play the part of master. It does not determine what we shall choose as the good in life, but the real character of religion and of secularism is expressed in what each chooses as its good.

When idea-formation advances far enough to generalize human purposes merely as human, then we behold the full social significance of the whole process. The idea of human purposes as merely, broadly human underlies the movement for world peace. This movement has its greatest strength in

religious faith, and specifically the Christian faith in the possibilities of human nature. I do not believe that we can get world-peace by anything short of this broad way of thinking of ourselves. A stable world-society is not possible through any balancing of national interests that continue to think themselves merely as national. The nations must first think their purposes in a more completely human way. The half-idea makes for division; the whole idea for peace. Who knows, then, but that in the end we shall find that the greatest solvent of social conflicts is religion?

MRS. C. P. GILMAN, NEW YORK CITY

Holding that conflicts of ideas and beliefs are likely to play an important part in the group-making of the future, and accepting Professor Giddings' inclusion of the mental attitude of the holder as an essential factor in the ideas and beliefs, I wish to make a few suggestions as to the classification of mental attitudes on which he lays so much stress.

This conservatism of women, on which he so strenuously insists, is perhaps best shown to us all in their slavish adherence from year to year and from season to season to one unvarying fashion in matters of dress. (*Laughter.*)

It is shown again in their well-known quickness of adaptation—and now I am speaking seriously—to new conditions of life and environment; in their alleged exceeding men in criminality whenever they become criminals; in their pushing forward in rapidly increasing numbers to fill every industrial opportunity as fast as they can win it against the conservatism of men; in the fact that in the early history of industry they invented and developed many arts and crafts while man was still but a hunter and a fighter.

The conservatism of women is in exact proportion to their ignorance and restriction; and singularly enough, the progressiveness of men is in inverse proportion to that state. It may be suggested therefore that the distinction is merely one of status; and that the remarkable permanence, in a progressive age, of the patriarchal restriction of women, is due to a peculiar conservatism in men; further, that most of our hindering conservatism of all sorts springs from the injurious persistence of that primitive androcentric institution, the family with the male head.

As against the alleged conservatism of women, do we not see in the "masculine camp" a most conspicuous instance of immovable tradition in the continued deification of the most primitive masculine traits—those of aggressive and combative activities, still practiced even when universally harmful, and still justified and admired in the face of all the accumulated facts of an industrially productive age?

It may be held from one view-point that the world's best progress has come from the productive industries essentially feminine in origin; and that

this progress has been continually injured and retarded by the persistent survival of the early masculine traditions of aggression and destruction.

It may be further suggested that the really essential ideas and beliefs of woman (or her mental attitude), as distinguished from those of the man, are most vitally important in the group-making of the future, in that, from the mother-instinct, women tend to form beneficent groups for the better rearing of the young. (Consider for instance the bees and the ants.) Such groups are one of our most imperative and instant needs today, and they are retarded not by the conservatism of women, but by the economically mandatory ideas and beliefs of men.

HON. C. P. CARY, WISCONSIN, STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

I don't wish to discuss this question even five minutes, but just one minute. I want to call attention to one point in which it seems to me I could not wholly follow the splendid address by Professor Coe, and that is in his apparently entire reliance upon the reasonableness of men when they come to see that they are after the same thing. These matters are not altogether intellectual. Intellectual agreement among men will not solve the whole problem of class conflict by any means. I think the clashes are not so much intellectual clashes in the world at large; they are mainly clashes of interests of various sorts.

REV. F. A. GILMORE, MADISON, WIS.

The part that the conservative forces have played, especially the religious forces, in early and primitive society, has not been fairly stated by Professor Giddings. It is true that a man may go back to a supposed primitive state of society, and in his utter ignorance of what primitive society actually was, he may picture things, he may group things, as he pleases. I assume that nobody knows nor ever can know all the elements in the primordial social group, any more than the psychologist can know the mental contents of the infant's mind.

Professor Giddings has grouped conveniently the primitive social order into these two classes. I will accept it. But what was the function of the conservative and the religious instincts? Was there any useful purpose played by it? Well, he might turn to his friend, Lester F. Ward, and show that it was the function of religion, of conservatism, to hold the group together, and prevent the so-called masculine, rationalistic minds from disappearing from the group and destroying it. It was religion that preserved society in its inception. And then Professor Ward turns around and, acknowledging that it was religion that preserved early man, preserved the social group until it could become solidified, he says, nevertheless, it was all a huge error. It was a great error. Now, I want to say that that is unscientific, because this idea of causation must embrace all of its effects, and one of

its effects was the preservation of the primitive social group, and the means thereto was religion, and because primitive man believed in gods and in his deified ancestors, I claim it is utterly illogical for a man to argue thus that religion corresponds to no abiding reality.

Let me define religion from the point of view of this philosophic test. It is the conscious and the voluntary commerce of the human spirit with that ideal Source whence it has sprung. The conception of God is the conception of the highest good, of the perfect and complete social order, of the entire cosmic process, as it has been up to now and is going to be; therefore I claim it is the most penetrating idea that has ever dawned upon the human intellect.

Impersonal causation: it is like Schopenhauer's will. He takes the human will and whittles it down to the edge of zero, and plants it out in the cosmos, and says, "This is what has done it." Professor Ward's books appear to be the modern expression of the ancient materialism and determinism, the old struggle between the physical and spiritual order of the world. There is no place in it for God, for spirituality. The ultimate cause of things, he tells us, is collision. Collision is not a cause; it is an effect. And he proposes to show that consciousness, like weight or like color, is a property of matter. Gentlemen, if you propose to lead humanity on and up by a merely mechanical process you are kicking against the pricks. It can't be done.

PROFESSOR LESTER F. WARD, BROWN UNIVERSITY

I shall make no reply to the gentleman's remarks. I am satisfied that half an hour's conversation would show that he and I are in perfect agreement on these matters.

I did say somewhere that we had better get rid of the old dogma that error is necessarily bad. The primitive error of mankind was absolutely necessary. The conditions under which intelligence has always dawned were such as to lead to a vast mass of error which we call magic and superstition. Now that mass of error was in its time highly useful.

The only thing I had thought of saying on the question under discussion this morning was relative to the phrase "group-making rôle," and I think my interpretation of that phrase would be quite different from that of those who framed the title of this paper. That there is an immense group-making value in conflict I have no doubt; but the kind of groups that it makes are not differentiated groups but integrated groups. The point has been touched upon by at least two of the speakers. We must come to recognize that the only constructive force in the world, the one that everything that exists has been the product of, is the interaction, the antithetical antagonism of diverse and, when it comes to the social plane, hostile forces. But it is only in our great social problems that we find it so plainly marked. We have to do with the application of an absolutely cosmical principle, which begins with the formation of worlds, which is seen in the formation of all the

substances of nature, and which we find working in the same manner throughout society. I have called it by various names; in society it may perhaps best be called social integration. But it never occurs until after the long process of division by which differences are produced before the contact or the conflict begins. The effect of these hostile forces, popularly supposed to be destructive, is eminently and universally constructive.

MRS. ANNA GARLIN SPENCER, NEW YORK CITY

I think that one of the implications of Professor Giddings' paper has not been specifically touched upon: the implication that group-making is not only past in our sociological progress in its earlier phases, but that group-making is no longer essential in the development of the individual and of society. If I am not correct in that implication, Professor Giddings will mention it.

I should like to bring the discussion for a moment to a very practical point of our present-day life. I am acquainted with a district in New York City in which there is a school where thirty-five hundred children are educated, of these children 98 per cent. have parents who do not speak the English language, have no traditions that introduce them easily into our American life. And of those children, as reported recently, 95 per cent. were born across the water. They are being introduced into a new condition of life in rapid and violent manner; one in which the attachment of the individual to the state and to general society is at work in a way practically **incomprehensible** to the parents of those children. Now in this process one may see the disintegration of personality, or the failure to integrate personality by reason of removing violently and rapidly all the group-making supports, all the traditional coverings, all the protection by which the undeveloped individual reaches the power to make direct attachment to the state at large. It strikes me that as long as our present way of carrying on the race continues—in this presence we do not prognosticate what may be—but as long as we have children born to be inducted into a complicated social relationship, we shall need some group protection, some covering and surroundings of the little atom of life. We get them through the family, we get them through the school, but more and more the single individual is attached directly to society at large and in a period of youth and incompetency.

If I should take you from this presence into another place where I go, I could show you line upon line of little cots containing foundling children. Each child there has a direct relationship to the state, because the state will not permit that child to be wholly abandoned; it takes it in charge; it gives it at least a number, a bed, and a chance at life. But when we consider that every one of those foundling children represents a violent **detachment** from that which all the experience of the past has found necessary to give the child a little protection from those forces that sweep through our social

life, we see that we are in a difficulty about those children; so philanthropy says the best we can do is to give them a foster home. And that is what we are trying to do for them.

My point is this: there never was a time in the history of civilization when the social organization was so directly concerned with every individual human being, even before he understands at all what is being done to him; and in the little child down on the lower east side of New York who comes into an environment so utterly different from that of which he has had knowledge, that his own parents cannot follow him into that environment, but remain behind, we have there a detached human being without any sort of group protection: and that is why, for the first time in the history of America, we are having a Jewish criminal problem. It is because of the detachment of the undeveloped individual from his natural group protection and guidance.

My further point is this: I cannot see any prospect of our peopling the world with new generations unless we begin with little children. I do not see any time coming when childhood and adolescence, with all their dangers, will not still require these protecting group formations. The group-making instinct therefore, I believe, is a persistent one; only we are now coming to the time when we can choose more than ever before our groups for ourselves.

CONCLUDING REMARKS OF PROFESSOR F. H. GIDDINGS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

If one way to indorse what a speaker has said is to demonstrate point by point that the things that he did not say are not so, I am highly complimented.

To touch, for example, on the last point that was made by Mrs. Spencer: the main thesis of my paper was that the group-making rôle of the conflict of ideas continues, but that it is resulting in enabling us more and more to choose our groups for ourselves. That is really the only thing that I was trying to say in my paper.

On one question I should be more sorry to be misquoted than on any other. The first speaker intimated that I had set religion over against scientific secularism. I beg to dissent. I carefully indicated that I set something which I called "faith" over against "reminiscent" or "backward-looking" religion. I believe that I said nothing whatever in the paper about religion in general. I have no recollection of any such passage. I did talk about "backward-looking religion," or "reminiscent religion," as over against "faith," and faith may be religious or it may be a scientific secularism. I did not enter into the question which it is. Speaking merely for myself, I should take the stand of scientific secularism.

This distinction between two different kinds of "sacred things," one of which we may call "faith" and one of which we may call "religion," I did not invent. I have often wondered how many persons who use the word "religion" are aware of the fact that once upon a time religion was defined,

by persons who were exact in their uses of words, for an exact purpose; namely, for the legal purpose of settling disputes. I believe that the oldest definition of the word "religion" that we have is in the writings of Gaius. Gaius tells us that there are two kinds of "things subject to divine dominion," namely, "sacred things and things religious." "Sacred things are those consecrated to the gods above, religious, those devoted to the gods below." Any man could make a religious thing by simply burying a dead body in the earth, but a thing could be made sacred only by the Roman people and the senate.

The distinction was significant: the people who never could look ahead were the religious people; the people who looked ahead, who were willing to get away from a narrow and backward view of things, the people who had "sacred" things were those that were capable of the conception of a great state. They had gods above; the others had gods below. There is more in this than a matter of definition. It brings us to the contrast that Professor Coe spoke of, and which is the essence of the whole matter. Some ideas are, as he says, the symbols of evaporated purpose—a good phrase—and some ideas are living; they express present purpose. And so there are two kinds of people in the world, those whose ideals are chiefly the symbols of evaporated purpose, and those whose ideals express a living and front-facing purpose.

It makes little difference what set of definitions of terms we use, if we fix our minds upon this important distinction. I have spoken of it as the distinction between instinct and reason, a familiar psychological distinction. I have spoken of it as the difference between the conservative and the radical. That is the popular distinction. Professor Coe states it in yet another way, but it is after all the same distinction. And when he says that what keeps the Protestant sects apart is their habit of clinging to symbols of old purposes, I thoroughly agree with him. When a purpose can be made clear to consciousness, when instead of merely following instinct, or habit or tradition, or dogma, we stop and visualize our purpose and think about it and, above all, connect it with all sorts of things, so that we correlate or organize our whole scheme of thought, we are beginning to do the thing which ultimately will ameliorate conflict, because it will enable people not only to think that they agree, but to know that they agree, which is a different thing. It is only when we have "thought the thing through" in that way, and rationally know that we agree, that we have an enduring basis of peace.

Mr. Coe said that religion might employ science quite as much as secularism may employ it. I see no reason to object. I wish that it would.

There is one thing that I want to say by way of comment upon Mrs. Gilman's remarks, which in the main I agree with. Mrs. Gilman is fond of her illustration of the bees. I wish that she wouldn't use it, because Mrs. Gilman stands for the kind of thing that I was talking about when I said

that there are some women who get the rational view of things and who really know what the amelioration of the intellectual condition of women ought to be. So I am always pained when she uses this illustration of the bees, because a colony of bees is a colony of degenerate creatures in which just one individual is fully developed; the others are what they are, and do the things that they do, because they haven't had enough to eat. We don't want a society of bees. We want a society of fully fed men and women, who will have energy enough to live not only a full physical and a full emotional, but also a full intellectual life.

DISCUSSION OF THE PAPER BY PROFESSOR FREDERICK J. TURNER," "IS SECTIONALISM IN AMERICA DYING AWAY?"

(PRINTED IN THE MARCH ISSUE OF THIS JOURNAL)

PROFESSOR FRANK W. BLACKMAR, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

No criticism could be safely made upon Professor Turner's paper so far as his historical résumé of the shifting of political sectionalism is concerned. Yet he fails from a sociological standpoint to give an adequate solution of the question as a present-day problem. The speaker failed, I think, to give sufficient importance to transportation and commerce, and to unified economic interests as destroyers or preventives of sectionalism. Nor was he careful enough to trace the fierce political sectionalism of the past to final economic causes. That the contests of states for supremacy are dying out is true, but the obliteration of state lines is not an assurance of the growth of sectionalism for the same forces that destroy state lines will eventually destroy sectional lines.

Sectionalism is only an expression of race morality, a question of preserving a group with common interests. As such it is a mode of normal social progress and hence in a way can never die out. It is a method of balancing of social forces in a great nation in an attempt to establish community of justice.

As the people of different sections understand one another through the diffusion of knowledge and as their economic and political interests become more common, sectionalism gradually disappears. In the United States sectionalism born of political prejudice is gradually disappearing as better socialization takes place. As the nation becomes more homogeneous in economic development there is less reason for economic sectionalism as a means of self-defense. As an illustration, prior to 1870 less than 3 per cent. of the cotton manufacture was south of Mason and Dixon's line. Now, over 50 per cent. of the cotton manufacture is in this section. Prior to 1870 the South presented an unbroken front on the protective tariff. Now many sections of the South are more radically in favor of the protective tariff than New England. Likewise the farmers of California are more radically in favor of the tariff since the fruit industry needs it.

That sectionalism is a balancing of forces is observed in the Reclamation Act which provides for the irrigation of arid lands. As this section is being favored by the use of public funds, a measure will be introduced in Congress to favor the Mississippi Valley and the Atlantic coast by redeeming swamp lands. If one section of the nation may be helped in one way

it is assurance that another section may be helped in a similar way or in some other way. Sectionalism of this nature will never die out. It is merely a method of self-preservation, and the promotion of economic and political justice.

But that sectionalism born of prejudice and local pride is dying out is evident from more complete processes of socialization. The extension of railways, the diffusion of knowledge through universal education, the unification of religious thought, the rise of the telephone and the rural mail delivery, and the development of common interests make a more homogeneous nation, and cause mere sectional interests to decline.

The more complex society becomes the more one section is dependent upon the other. What helps one section helps directly or indirectly another. Our commercial life is an illustration of this. As people know and feel this, sectionalism gradually dies out. But in this process there is a continual shifting of scenes as one cause for sectional interest passes away and a new form appears. Thus the appearance of the Japanese on the Pacific coast brings new questions to that particular section and the people of that section will defend their interests, regardless to a certain extent of larger national interests. This in time will be adjusted and become a purely national question as the race problem in the South has become.

PROFESSOR FREDERICK W. MOORE, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

In default of having Professor Turner's paper to read I went to the dictionary to find something on sectionalism, and I speak of it here because I found something which rather surprised me. In the *Century Dictionary* I found the definition of sectionalism as it has been treated here this afternoon, as the sectional prejudice growing out of differences in interests, more especially in political interests. But I also found the initials "U. S." at the end of the definition. It is strictly an American usage, then, the dictionary being our authority. "Particularism" is perhaps a German word, "sectionalism" an American word.

I would devote a few minutes to another point that may be worth considering; and in introducing it I am reminded of a conversation to which I listened recently with interest between some Tennessee and Kentucky friends of mine on the subject of the different brands of whiskey which are produced in their respective states. One spoke with a good deal of positiveness about the constituent elements of whisky, and of the presence in large quantity of one particular element in certain brands. The element which was discussed was fusel oil; and it turned out that the maximum in any brand was 3 per cent. and the minimum perhaps 1 per cent. And yet with all positiveness it was asserted that the amount was tremendously great in some brands as compared with others.

Now I would apply it to our discussion in this way. Our American life is made up of a great many elements. This one we are discussing, sectionalism, is certainly one of them; I think, however, it is one which, compared with the number and value of the others, is of small importance and should not be looked upon as having too large a part in the making of our history. Yet if we will not overvalue it we may certainly neglect for the purposes of the occasion the other things and devote ourselves to a very full and careful study of it, forgetting for a moment that there is anything else which needs discussion.

Turning, therefore, to the intensive study of sectionalism, we may surely agree with the speaker that it is a subject of importance, and one out of the study of which very much may be gained. This is the day of intensive study in our institutions of higher learning, especially in advanced classes. They are looking for topics for research. The general problems have all been canvassed; and we are coming to the smaller ones—and not without profit, I am sure. Sectionalism, as it has been outlined by the speaker, affords, I think, a very fine field for many special studies.

I would venture to suggest one form of sectionalism that has not been mentioned and yet is worth investigating and discussing—perhaps a rather elusive one to study, a psychological influence. I can illustrate it from the history of Tennessee.

Like all Gaul, that state is divided into three parts; and we who live there cannot forget it, cannot become unconscious of it. To say that a meeting was held in Nashville is to suggest *per contra* that it was not held either in Knoxville or in Memphis; and if western Tennessee has an insane asylum provided by the state, middle and eastern Tennessee are bound to have insane asylums too. There are physiographic and other reasons for the divisions of the state, but I venture to say that the physiographic or other historical reasons that may have once caused the division would not have perpetuated it so long were it not for the persistence of this acquired attitude of mind. The Baptists of the state cannot hold a convention in eastern Tennessee without planning that within the next two years western Tennessee and middle Tennessee shall be visited. Thus the effect continues long after the causes that produced it have lost their significance.

There is opportunity for the intensive study of sectionalism surely; yet it might prove too much. You might carry it too far and make too much of antagonisms between sections too small to affect the nation at large. That triple division of the state of Tennessee is an instance in point. Other localities furnish similar instances; and I would raise the question, therefore, whether there would not be danger of going too far in defining the sectional divisions; danger of proving too much and of neutralizing the value of those sectional differences that are really worth considering.

Again, the influence of sectional majorities on the general policy of the

government might be studied. I will illustrate this by conditions in our Tennessee counties, which are governed by county courts with considerable power, particularly in the matter of roads, education, and the like. The membership of the court is made up of justices elected by the districts. Now in many counties the division into districts is not according to population. The result is that the majority of the population does not always elect the majority in the court, particularly where some districts include towns and villages and others are sparsely populated. In such counties it often occurs that the country districts, having a majority of the court, refuse to move in the direction of larger appropriations for improved roads and schools as fast as the more densely populated sections of the county would like to go. Contrariwise, if the majority of the people of that county, composed of those in the more densely populated districts of the county, controls these two civilizing forces, good roads and better educational facilities, are forced upon the whole county, doubtless with good results. There is suggested on the one hand the retarding influence of sectionalism, and in the contrary case the forcing of these agencies of progress more quickly into the backward parts of the county, when those parts which are in favor of them have the advantage.

If therefore on the one hand intensive study of conditions will bring to light many an instance of sectional antagonism, we may on the other note how many influences there are already existing which tend to reduce sectionalism within a rather narrow range—important within its own range, yet by these influences confined to a relatively small area. The progress of the frontier westward, the advance of the settler, the merchant, the manufacturer, the development of transportation facilities, all of these carry with them the diminishing of sectionalism. To these attention has been called. The diminishing in some respects of political antagonism has been referred to. We certainly can get a very interesting basis of comparison in Professor Turner's contrast between the map of Europe and the map of the United States when we consider how Europe has been crystallized into countries so different in stock, in language, and in political and social ways, and then see how the growing-up of such a sectionalism has been prevented here—a certainly remarkable contrast.

I am inclined to think that some of the features of our governmental system, which perhaps are not as much spoken of as they once were, have done a good deal to diminish sectionalism. I refer to the fact that our national government, strongly as it exercises the powers which belong to it, is, however, confined to the exercise of a few functions and that a very large degree of liberty is allowed to the sections within their state boundaries.

In the matter of the negro I can illustrate, I think. If the Fifteenth Amendment were applied as it was evidently intended it should be applied to force the suffrage into the hands of the negro, there certainly would be a

greater degree of antagonism between the section to which the negro population is so largely confined and the other sections of the country; but fortunately it has been recognized that, while the suffrage may not be withheld for the reasons alleged or stated in the Fifteenth Amendment, other reasons may be assigned which are not covered by the constitution; and when these reasons are made the occasion of state laws they are allowed to stand although they limit the suffrage. In the matter of federal elections the same tendency of the government to leave the localities in control is manifest.

I have looked with some anxiety upon various phases that Mongolian immigration has presented in the West. I look with anxiety at the rising of a racial problem there, and yet I have one melancholy satisfaction in connection with it. We are coming to recognize racial, ethnic antagonisms; and for something of that sort to manifest itself in another section of the country than the South where it has so long been manifested, is to take away from the southern problem the intensity of personal feeling that has always gathered about it, and make it less a sectional matter with the people of the South and more a broad matter of sociological import—the competition, the rivalry, the jealousy of races.

In conclusion, may I say just two things: First, we must thank Professor Turner for presenting this subject and calling our attention to this field for intensive study. Yet, secondly, I must declare to you with how much satisfaction I have felt that as a teacher before my classes in history it was entirely possible to draw some lessons from the past antagonism of the sections and to show the passing-away of the occasions for antagonism; to illustrate from our history that a country cannot be strong where the sectional differences are great; and to rejoice that the greatest sectional differences have been passed and are behind us, and that we of this and the coming generations can look forward to the continuing and increasing strength of our national union.

PROFESSOR ISAAC A. LOOS, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

I was interested in noting that Professor Turner seems to have answered the question, "Is Sectionalism Dying Out?" in the negative, and for two reasons: First, on account of the persistence of the old forces; although he has intimated that there are certain forces which were at one time very active that have now become less active, but they have not died out as these maps will show.

And then again, I think that another thought, I surely should not say sentiment, that ran through his paper might be generalized under the proposition that there are certain new forces which we might call new manifestations of the cosmic forces—but we need not stop for any designation of these forces. It needs certainly to be recognized that while some of the older phases of sectionalism are waning or perhaps disappearing, the great forces

are at work, which the historian recognizes because, like the judge, his training is judicial and adjusted to the historical method. He recognizes the factors as he finds them, and as he studies the facts, he finds that there are new forces at work. So as the history of the United States opens up in panoramic view to the historian, there is a suggestion of waning provincialisms of some types while he sees new and rising forms of provincialisms of other types. It seems to me that we could call attention to a very interesting phase of sectionalism by accepting that word "provincialism," as suggested, and then raising the subquestion under our broad topic, "Is sectionalism dying out?" We might ask what "the types of provincialism" are at the present time in process of development and what types of provincialism which have developed long since are continuing through the persistence of forces at work from the beginning of things.

It occurs to me that numerous illustrations might be found, but without taking the time for these I want simply to refer to the considerable number of rather admirable provincial studies which have been made by our writers of fiction. And I want to point to at least one type of provincialism with which I am somewhat familiar—the type of provincialism which formed so long ago—I would call it sectionalism except for the fact that it plays rather a minor rôle, but still is recognized very thoroughly in Professor Turner's paper: the rôle played, for example, by the Pennsylvania Germans in their occupation of a specific portion of the United States and the lines along which they spread in specific occupations. For example, there are not many Germans that become presidents of the Pennsylvania Railway Company. There is a type of stock that furnishes the presidents of the Pennsylvania road. I hardly need refer to them by singling them out. They believe in themselves and their organized clans. There was a time in the history of Pennsylvania when it was necessary to divide those two stocks. There was the colonial act of 1748 in which it was decreed in effect that the Germans and the Scotch must keep apart. Today of course they intermarry. But the two stocks, it could be shown through statistical examination, persist along definite lines in religion, in industry, and in social habits, in the most interesting way, illustrating in a broad way the theme of Professor Turner, confirming his conclusion as he stated it, although he did not put it in any very formal manner. It is only recently that these interesting people have attracted the attention of the novelist, but those who are acquainted with *Tillie and Other Sketches* know that there is an admirable field here and that it has been subjected to cultivation in some measure.

Curiously enough, in Professor Turner's maps, for example, the Germans go with the plains and the Republicans, but I dare say there are many here who know that in the heart of the section we have in mind they still vote for Andrew Jackson.

They do that because, in the first place, they were Tories; and they were

tories because the English king befriended them when they were despoiled Protestants.

I agree so thoroughly with the paper that I am sure I do not need to discuss it further.

PROFESSOR J. ALLEN SMITH, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

It was my misfortune not to be able to hear all of Professor Turner's paper, and for that reason I do not feel competent to discuss it.

I come from the section of the country with reference to which a new form of sectionalism was mentioned, namely the race question brought in by the Japanese. It is my personal opinion (and I have been there for the past ten years), that this is as intensely national in its spirit as any part of the country. I don't think there is any sectionalism whatever out there as it was formerly understood. There is not a person who does not think of the nation first and the state afterward, and it seems to me that these newer states which have just recently been formed have been set up under the influence of the national ideas of government.

But the Japanese question is one I want to say a word or two about. There are a good many who have looked at the matter seriously and think that the West is really menaced by the race question. In fact, I could mention a magazine that is published in English in Seattle by a Japanese, in which he expresses the feeling that the Japanese will ultimately overrun the western states. That is the feeling of many of the Japanese today. If the bars were thrown down and the orientals freely admitted, I have no doubt the West would be confronted by the same problem which is confronting the South today, and that is one reason why we are objecting to the free admission of Japanese, Chinese, or any oriental nationality whatever. I would not say however that the opposition to oriental immigration is wholly due to the fear of a race problem; I think the main reason is what Professor Turner alluded to in his paper, economic interest. I think it is the fear that the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Hindus, if they were freely admitted, would become a potent factor in competition with the white man. It thus comes back to the economic basis referred to.

Another matter which was mentioned, and in regard to which I should like to offer just a word, is the opposition between the state and the country at large. Now I think it is true, as Professor Turner suggests, that there is a certain opposition of interests between different localities and the country as a whole, and it seems that it is inevitable in a country as large as this. But he described very clearly the tendencies which are making toward harmony. The West is developing its manufacturing interests today, becoming a mining country, and of course we have aspirations in the direction of commerce, so that our interests have become very much like those of the East. I think if you would examine our attitude toward national policy you would find that

we are in line with other states similarly situated, so that this development all over the country is doing away with that old narrow localism, and is creating interests that are practically national. There must perhaps be local interests which do not harmonize with the interests of the country at large, and I think we have recognized that principle in our federal form of government. We are conceding more and more to the federal government—for example, the control of railroads, of trusts, and so forth. We admit that the expansion of federal authority has been made necessary by recent industrial development. At the same time considerable freedom must be given to the various states to regulate their own affairs. If this is sectionalism, I suppose that this sort of sectionalism exists in the West and we must have it for a long time to come.

PROFESSOR ULRICH B. PHILLIPS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

I wish to make one slight criticism of the paper; namely, that in speaking of the development of the southern Piedmont, Dr. Turner says slavery was carried into the interior. Nearly all other Americans would make the same statement; yet it is inexact and misleading.

Slavery already existed by law in the uplands before the cotton industry developed, and what was carried thither by the cotton industry was negro labor. Slavery was merely the legal system adjusting the industrial and social classes to one another. It was the carriage of the negro, rather than of slavery, which assimilated the social constitution and the public opinion and policy of the uplands to that already developed on the coast. Similar problems led to similar adjustments and to similar policies and opinions. And the fundamental problem was not that of the law (slavery) but that of racial adjustment (white men and negroes). A great deal of misleading interpretation of the history of the South and of the United States has occurred through the overemphasis of slavery and the underemphasis of the negro and the plantation system. This criticism is of course very slight. With the paper otherwise, I am in hearty accord.

Let me say, further, that I am even more of the opinion than Dr. Turner, and certainly more than the other speakers, that sectionalism is an essentially permanent thing and is likely to be as important in the future as it has been in the past. The function of government, particularly in a republic, is to adjust the people to their environment and the groups of people to one another. The function of politics is to readjust that relation as need arises. Different local groups live under different industrial and social conditions, and need differing governmental activities for the settling of their local or sectional problems. When district interests conflict, contests must ensue for controlling the policy of the common government. Instances of this are constantly recurring; and sectionalism of some sort is a chronic thing. Sectionalism, however, is sometimes petty and sometimes on a grand scale; sometimes

normal and wholesome, and sometimes acute, exaggerated, and dangerous to the nation's welfare. To realize that moderate sectionalism in policy need not be at all unpatriotic, and that its possible menace lies only in its excess, would be to steer clear of some pitfalls which have not been entirely avoided by all of those who have preceded me in discussing the paper of the session.

MISS JULIA A. FLISCH, MADISON, WISCONSIN

I came up here really out of curiosity to see what could be said on a subject that seemed to me a matter of course. The terms used by the various speakers seem somewhat indefinite. Some use the word "nationalism;" others, "sectionalism," between which there are shades of difference. Professor Smith's term solidarity is, I think, a better one.

Is sectionalism dying out? I do not think there is any doubt but that it is; whether it will ever die out entirely is another matter. Professor Turner has developed this subject along the lines of trade, commerce, etc., but there are many other lines. There is a social influence which must be taken into account. I come from a section where I suppose sectional feeling has always been particularly strong. Yet in the college where I taught there are teachers from different parts of the country who meet on terms of equality. Twenty years ago that would not have been possible. In the lines of religion, of society, and of literature, sectionalism is dying out. We are becoming more uniform in dress, in speech, and in social customs. I feel sure we may say sectionalism is dying out. That it will ever die completely I doubt; and for my part I should be sorry if it did. If we are to be uniform in dress, in education, in words, in thoughts, and in ideas, life would become so monotonous that the only interesting thing left for us to do would be to die.

DISCUSSION OF THE PAPER BY ALFRED H. STONE, "IS RACE FRICTION BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES IN THE UNITED STATES GROWING AND INEVITABLE?"

(PRINTED IN THE MARCH ISSUE OF THIS JOURNAL)

W. F. WILLCOX, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

I am ready to accept the definition of race friction with which this discussion has been started and to agree with Mr. Stone that the fundamental cause of race friction lies in the assertion by persons of one race and the denial by persons of another race living in the same area that the two races are or should be socially equal. I admit also that slavery with all its defects minimized race friction and that since emancipation race friction has grown, is still growing, and is inevitable. If we admit all this it might seem that there is nothing left to debate.

But is there not a further problem, implicit if not expressed in the wording of the question, and rather glanced at than grappled with by the opening speaker? Is race friction between whites and blacks in the United States likely to increase indefinitely or is it likely to reach (ultimately and perhaps soon) a maximum after which its growth will slacken or stop? It is to this phase of the question that I shall address myself this morning.

The dislocation of industry, of politics, and of life at the South as a result of the Civil War, emancipation, and reconstruction needs no emphasis before an audience like this. But revolutionary as these changes were for the masters, they were far more so for the slaves. The latter were thrown suddenly into the midst of a complex modern civilization for which they had no education, no preparation, no ingrained aptitude and told to "swim or sink." The most valuable asset which they inherited from slavery, their instinctive personal loyalty to master and mistress, was of little and decreasing help to them. What wonder if in the years and decades following such a change it seemed at times to onlookers from a distance as if the whole civilization of both races might be in danger! What wonder if at times both crime and vengeance ran riot in sickening fashion and seemed to be growing with each passing year!

But it may be that these manifestations of race friction have been largely the result of the radical readjustment of ideas and conditions entailed by emancipation. It may be that the two races at the South and perhaps in the whole country are unconsciously but painfully drifting toward a substitute for the slavery system, which differs from slavery in being less frankly and obviously if not less really at war with modern tendencies and American

ideals, and yet which bids fair to provide a more stable social equilibrium than existed at the South between the Civil War and the close of the nineteenth century. I am disposed to believe that this is the case.

In considering the possible future of relations between whites and blacks in this country and the chance that the undesirable growth of race friction since the Civil War may be checked, some suggestion may be derived from the experience in other parts of the world. Admitting with the speaker that for the purpose in view races may be classified roughly as white, yellow, and dark, let us ask where in the world the white and the dark races have been in close contact not for decades or even centuries but probably for thousands of years. The answer seems to be in two main regions, northern and north-eastern Africa and India. In both of these areas the amount of purely race friction is perhaps less than it is in the United States. Our American conditions seem to resemble those in India more than those in Africa and I have found more information about Indian conditions. The question I would raise is this: Do the relations between the light and the dark races in India contain any suggestion for us regarding the probable or possible future of similar relations in the United States?

In a discussion of "The Economic Future of the Negro" before the American Economic Association two years ago Professor Farnam suggested, although as he said, "with great diffidence," that "we already have in the South a caste system." My own thought has led me independently to a similar idea. In the full and able chapter on "Caste, Tribe and Race" contributed by H. H. Risley then Census Commissioner and Director of Ethnography for India to the *General Report of the Census of India, 1901*, I find the same notion expressed as follows: "In this literal or physiological sense caste is not confined to India. It occurs in a pronounced form in the southern states of the American Commonwealth" (p. 555).

In that chapter I find it laid down that the "essential and most prominent characteristic" of caste is the "absolute prohibition of mixed marriages" (p. 496), and declared to be the essential fact of the caste system of India "that the regulations affecting food and drink are comparatively fluid and transitory, while those relating to marriage are remarkably stable and absolute" (p. 517). There is an obvious agreement between these ideas and those underlying what in this country is usually called "the color line." Still further Mr. Risley says, "The race sentiment . . . supplied the motive principle of caste . . . and . . . has tended to preserve in comparative purity the types which it favors" (p. 489); and elsewhere, "The principle upon which the system [sc. of caste] rests is the sense of distinctions of race indicated by difference of color" (p. 556). It may be noticed that the usual word for caste in India (*varna*) means originally and primarily color.

In a loose sense of the word caste we now have a caste system in the United States. It seems likely that with the passing years the system will

grow more rigid and inflexible. Undoubtedly it contradicts at many essential points the political and moral ideals of the United States. But so long as the caste system does not menace the perpetuity of the country, the contradictions between it and our theories will probably be endured as the contradictions between our ideals and the institution of negro slavery would probably have been endured until now had not the supporters of slavery sought to break the Union asunder.

On the other hand I see little reason to anticipate that the fundamental ideas of the caste system will establish themselves as completely in the law and practice of the northern states as they already have in those of the southern states. To be specific, I do not anticipate that laws against the intermarriage of whites and blacks, now found, I believe, in the statute books of every southern state, will be passed in the northern states. Nor do I expect that the objection to many forms of social intercourse between members of the two races now so emphatic and vociferous in the South will extend to and be shared equally by the North. Still when one considers how rapidly sentiment upon these matters at the North has changed as indicated by the illustration and the argument of Mr. Stone one can hardly feel sanguine on the last point.

The question then arises, What effect will the establishment of such a caste system have upon race friction? And it takes two forms: first, if we assume such a system to be accepted and acquiesced in by both races and in all sections; secondly, if we assume it to be bitterly antagonized both by the race or caste discriminated against and also in certain parts of the country by the favored race or caste. In the first case I believe race friction would no longer increase but would decline. In the second and in my judgment more probable alternative I believe that race friction would vary with the prevalence and intensity of the antagonism to it. If the caste system is becoming more rigid and the opposition to it on the part of both blacks and whites is becoming less vehement and less widespread, as seems to me probable, then we may be approaching an equilibrium after which race friction will cease to increase.

To the argument thus far it will be objected that it is purely speculative and that no evidence has been offered in support of the conclusion. The objection has force. To blunt its edge I might point to the argument of Dr. DuBois at Baltimore two years ago regarding the development of a group economy among large groups of negroes. To this I may add a bit of testimony derived from my own studies.

It seems likely that the crimes committed by certain classes of negroes in this country are largely due to and are a rough index of race friction. Several years ago I took occasion to point out the rapid increase all over the country between 1880 and 1890 in the number and proportion of negroes confined in prison for any offense. Since that time the report for 1904 has

been published and reveals a more satisfactory condition. Between 1880 and 1890 the number of negroes in prison in the United States to each 10,000 negroes increased about one-third; between 1890 and 1904 it increased only about one-twentieth.

If negro crime is one vent hole for the heat developed by race friction, and if, as the figures suggest, negro crime is no longer increasing in this country with great rapidity, we may hope that race friction is approaching a constant amount. Whether a state of equilibrium purchased by universal acquiescence in a caste system would be worth what it would cost is a debatable question but hardly within the scope of our present discussion.

PROFESSOR U. G. WEATHERLY, UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA

While agreeing heartily with Mr. Stone's contention that race friction between whites and blacks was not a necessary offspring of slavery, I think it can be shown that certain elements of the problem are inseparably connected with the later history of slavery. Mr. Stone has done well in emphasizing the fact that slavery established and maintained a harmonious working relation between the races. The negro himself was never an active party in injecting bitterness into the slavery controversy, and only in a minor degree has he been a direct agent in race conflict since emancipation. He has been rather the cause and center of a conflict between two opposing types of sentiment among the whites of the South and the North. Militant abolitionism in the decades preceding the Civil War, by arousing the hot passions of the southern whites, gave to the slavery controversy a bitterness that it would not otherwise have had. The natural and very noticeable decay of slavery in the border states was undoubtedly checked by a reaction against this agitation. Since emancipation, likewise, the northern friends of the negro have probably injured his interests by imprudent agitation in favor of his rights in the southern states. The southerner believes that he understands the negro and that the northerner does not. He therefore resents an interference which he regards as both unintelligent and insulting to himself. If certain naturally conservative southern states have in recent years chosen radical anti-negro leaders, the explanation is probably to be found in resentment at this outside interference rather than in a real change toward radicalism. This resentment, be it noted, is not directed against the negro himself, but rather against that idea of his social rights and privileges which he has acquired from sources outside the South. The disastrous period of reconstruction fell with peculiar force on the negro because, in giving him certain things which then seemed of great value, it deprived him of that which he needed most of all—wise guidance and gradual initiation into his new position. What could have been done for him in 1865 cannot be done for him now, but the recognition on the part of the whole country of the mistakes then made promises to open the way toward a

diminution of animosity over the negro question. It is significant that northern protest against the limitation of the suffrage in certain southern states grows less urgent with every year.

On the side of cultural and institutional development the negro's history was almost a blank until he was brought to America as a slave. Whatever achievement he has since made has been upon models which he has taken from the whites. His future career, therefore, will be very little affected by any outward results acquired in Africa. This fact is bound to be immensely significant for the social development of the race in America. Granting that the negro is acquiring a distinct race consciousness, that consciousness is nevertheless molded and held in check by his political identification with this country and with the white man's institutions. We are not, I believe, to see in America that form of race friction which is found among certain factions of the population of Austria-Hungary, where there exist not only cultural differences between the races but in addition a sense of separate nationality based on divergent past histories.

In attempting an estimate of the character and trend of race friction it will not answer to confine our attention wholly to the southern states. We are beginning to become conscious that there is also a negro problem in the North as well. It is essentially the same problem that confronts the South, but it has points of variation. The southern negro is as yet largely agricultural, or in any case he lives chiefly in communities with which he has long been familiar and which have been familiar with him. In the North he is mainly a recent immigrant, and he lives almost wholly in the cities and towns. In certain of our middle western cities the negro population is becoming a notable element. This population has no vital contact with the soil on which it dwells or with the neighbors among whom it lives. Whatever their sympathy for the negro in the abstract, the people of an average northern community have little practical understanding of his ways, and little capacity for successfully dealing with him. One consequence of this is that, living thus socially detached, the general social value of the negro is at a minimum. Patience and toleration toward him are difficult when the facts that come most to the attention of the average white are those of crime, unthrift, and political corruption.

This migration to northern cities is destined to have two important consequences. It will augment the southern negro's unrest under the social restraints that are now imposed upon him, and will, by opening an easy road of escape, render him less willing to submit to such restraints. It will also, in certain sections of the North where negroes congregate in numbers, lead to a dislike for the race that is likely to result, as it already has resulted in some cases, in outbreaks of positive hostility. For nearly everybody who is familiar with both sections will admit that there is in the North less personal liking for and patience with the negro than in the South. If

this tendency becomes sufficiently widespread it is likely to result in a general recognition in the North of the essential justice of the South's attitude on the negro problem, and this of itself will go far toward lessening the friction between the races. For, as already indicated, I believe that at bottom most of the real animosity connected with the contact of whites and blacks in this country has been due to the philanthropic but unintelligent interference on behalf of the negro by his friends in the northern states. When the whites of both sections definitely agree on a policy with reference to the negro, that policy is likely to prevail and to be accepted by the negro.

PROFESSOR JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, SMITH COLLEGE

It is not to be denied that southern race antipathy rests to a certain extent upon natural race differences; but to a larger extent it depends upon the progress of a series of social relations, many of which were in their inception unnecessary and for that reason artificial. Seventy-five years of intense strife have brought the South to a position which did not occur to the men of 1800. I desire to state briefly the attitude of those men, to indicate the processes of change, and to discuss the possibility of restoring the situation to a more natural basis.

Before 1830 the South considered the negro an inferior who might possibly achieve civilization. It willingly saw him make the attempt and gave sympathetic attention to evidences of his success. It did not think that this involved the mingling of a lower with a higher civilization. Its attitude was but an outcome of a feeling of sincere esteem for unfortunate people who struggled against great obstacles.

Evidences of this feeling are numerous. In 1791 Jefferson appointed to office a negro of promising mathematical ability on the avowed ground that he wanted to encourage the negro's efforts.¹ In 1829, at the public reception in the White House on the day of Jackson's inauguration, negroes were present, and the only southern protest I have found was in a letter from James Hamilton, Jr., the nullifier, who wrote:

After the ceremony [of inauguration] the old chief retired to the Palace where we had a regular Saturnalia. The mob broke in, in thousands—spirits black, yellow, and grey, poured in in one uninterrupted stream of mud and filth; among the throng many subjects for the penitentiary and not the fewest among them were Mr. Mercer's tyros for Liberia. It would have done Mr. Wilberforce's heart good to have seen a stout black wench eating in this free country a jelly with a gold spoon at the President's House.²

¹ *Writings* (Ford ed.), Vol. V, p. 379. Jefferson says of this man, "He is a very worthy and respectable member of society."

² Hamilton to M. Van Buren, March 5, 1829, *Van Buren MSS*, Library of Congress.

North Carolina affords some good illustrations of the same kind. About 1820 John Chavis, a full-blooded negro, taught a preparatory school in that state and had for his pupils the sons of leading families. He prepared for the university Willie P. Mangum, and his brother Priestly, and the two sons of Chief Justice Henderson. The grandfather of a brilliant living Episcopal bishop not only went to school to this negro teacher but boarded in his family. John Chavis was also a preacher. He served by invitation the churches of the whites, was entertained in their homes while on ministerial journeys, and sat at table with them.³ Ralph Lane, a Baptist, and Henry Evans, a Methodist, both negro preachers, had at the same period practically similar experiences in the same state.⁴

This older southern attitude toward the negro is essentially Anglo-Saxon. It recognized his present inferiority, but welcomed his elevation; and that is the English attitude today. Tommy Atkins, it is true, resents equality with the mass of Hindoos, but he does not mutiny when his white officers dine with a cultivated Indian gentleman. In Jamaica a negro policeman causes no excitement and society is not scandalized because negro officials attend the governor's reception.

How far does the present southern feeling differ from that of 1800? One may see by considering what would happen if the present Chief Justice of North Carolina, following the example of his predecessor, should send his sons to a school taught by a negro. The difference between the two positions is that which exists between judgment mingled with benignity and popular hysteria mingled with political design. It was about 1830 when passion began to triumph over judgment. At that time the leaders of 1800 were disappearing: young men were taking their places. The Democratic party in the South under the guidance of the disappointed Calhoun was beginning to assume its sensitively pro-southern character. The fiery young leaders, like the men who have led the South since 1890, found that it was easy to fire the southern heart, and they made it glow. The Whigs, naturally more conservative, did not dare to dispute the popular appeals: they merely sought to temper them. In 1860 far the majority of the voters did not remember the old days of judgment and benignity. To the passions of agitation succeeded those of war and reconstruction. The negro received the suffrage which he knew not how to use wisely, although only time will enable us to pass definitely on the wisdom of the givers. In forcing negro suffrage on the South and on the nation the radicals of the North so distorted the formerly accepted views and interpretation of the Constitution that the southern people felt they would be justified in overthrowing it by any means possible. Reconstruction was, in a sense, a continuation of the war,

³ Bassett, *Slavery in the State of North Carolina* ("Johns Hopkins University Studies," 1899), 73-76.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 57-59, 64.

a period of political contention in which the North seemed for a time to win by its superior number of ballots supported by bayonets; but in which the South by skilfully utilizing the weakness of the negro and the peculiar position of the state in the American Union was able to outmanoeuvre its antagonist and for a time to make reconstruction inoperative.

To secure this result it was necessary to convince the southern whites that negro suffrage was a serious evil. The arguments employed were not calm or intellectual; and they fell on black as well as on white, ears. They have left the whites more suspicious than ever of the negro's exercise of equal privileges and the negroes more than ever conscious of their denial. The gradual elevation of the negro makes his pretensions to an equal social status—which does not mean social intermingling—more evident to the whites and more necessary to himself. It seems to be a growing source of irritation.

The southern politicians are not worse than others, but they are as bad. They will fight their battles by the usual methods of the lines of least resistance. Although many of them do not approve of making the negro question a chief political issue, there will probably always be ambitious men who by championing it make themselves influential. They well know that it is sure to draw votes if once it can be got before the people. When the railroad rates shall have been reduced to the point of diminishing returns, when the trusts shall have been "busted" till the people are satisfied with the operation, and when prohibition shall have accomplished its utmost, there will still remain in the South the possibility that politicians will again stir the fires of race antipathy. If the conservative elements of society will attack and break down this popular hysteria the activity of the politician will be checked. If the reiterated efforts of the politicians run ahead of the conservative forces the conflict will continue and deepen. And always there is before us the question: What will happen when the disfranchised negroes, having become rich and intelligent, shall try to reconcile the state suffrage restrictions with the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

Probably the most promising conservative force in the South is religion. Before the war the influential church was the Episcopal, which in the South has rarely been a reforming church. Today it has yielded its place to the Methodist and Baptist churches, which have ever had plenty of reforming impulse, but from being in their evangelizing stages of development they have stressed personal experience more than social good. Today they control most of the wealth of the South, they are passing out of the evangelizing stage, they have begun to feel confidence in their social power, and it will be strange if they do not come to feel social responsibility as well. Indeed, in the present prohibition movement, of which they are the chief support, they are conducting their first contest for a definite policy of social betterment. If these two churches, supported as they would be by others of

smaller size, should ever co-operate to suppress the political agitation of the negro question, race antipathy would be greatly lessened, and there is much hope that it would be restored to the Anglo-Saxon basis of 1800.

In that case we should have two great groups living side by side, distinct in all the ordinary affairs of life yet each enjoying the common privileges of the community, each tolerant of the other, each producing and trusting its own leaders, and each willing to treat individual wrongs as crimes and not as "race outrages" to be wiped out by "race outrages" from the other party to the general struggle.

PROFESSOR J. W. GARNER, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

I thoroughly agree with Mr. Stone that the relations between the white and black races of the South are not as harmonious now as they have been formerly. I agree with him also, that friction and at times open conflict are inevitable. I take it that no one who is familiar with the fundamental differences, physical, mental, and social, between the white and black races will for a moment dispute this proposition. It is too obvious to require argument for its support.

Mr. Stone has well described the natural antipathy which is inherent in the relations between superior and inferior races, especially when one is Teuton and the other is African. I think, however, that he has overemphasized the simple element of race prejudice and neglected other causes both natural and artificial which are contributing materially to the perpetuation and accentuation of race antagonism and which have little or no relation to race prejudice. The old-time natural incompatibility which has existed between the races ever since they came in contact and which will always exist does not explain the recent recrudescence of the race question in several states of the South, and the present irritation, which, it seems to me, has reached a degree of acuteness unprecedented since the close of reconstruction.

Those causes, in my opinion, are partly economic and partly political and not altogether social as Mr. Stone's discussion seems to imply. In the first place, changed economic conditions in the South have tended to impair good relations between the races and to accentuate race antagonism: (1) through increasing competition between whites and blacks in economic matters, and (2) through the movement of the negroes to the towns and their subjection to an environment which is making them less docile and tractable and more vicious and criminal. According to the last census (*Bulletin 8*, p. 81) the number of negro land-owners in the United States increased during the decade from 1890-1900 over 57 per cent., so that in the latter year nearly one-fourth of all the farms in the United States operated by negroes were owned by them and at present there can be no doubt that the proportion is much larger. It is a matter of common knowledge that the negro is showing less and less disposition to cultivate the lands of the South as a wage hand or

even as a tenant. He insists on being an owner, and that he is making rapid strides in this direction the census returns leave no doubt. The white men of substance, the well-to-do upper classes in the South, are not only glad to see the negro become a land-owner, but they encourage him in every way to adopt habits of thrift and economy and become a more efficient factor in the economy of the South. But this is not the attitude of the poorer whites, particularly the tenant class, who find themselves placed in a position of economic competition with the negro. In many communities in the South, the poorer whites have organized to prevent the sale or lease of lands to negroes, and failing in this, they have in some cases systematically boycotted the merchant of whom the lands were obtained, or burned the houses occupied by the negro purchaser or renter. In some communities of the South, this organized and systematic opposition to the sale or lease of lands to the negroes has created a really serious situation and threatened to subvert the peace and good order of society. This is comparatively a new element in the problem of race relations and is a result, as I have said, of the changed economic conditions in the South rather than of inherent race antipathy or the outgrowth of any demand for social equality. The poor whites of the South will always be opposed to the negro for the same reason that the same class of whites on the Pacific coast is opposed to the Chinese coolie or the Hindu laborer; and as the economic rivalry between them grows more fierce, the whole problem of race relations will become more acute and serious.

Furthermore, the rise of manufacturing industries in the South and the resulting opportunities which are being held out to negro artisans is rapidly drawing the non-land-owning class of negroes away from the farms to the towns and cities—a circumstance which has, as I have indicated, substantially altered the character of the negro and added to the difficulty of maintaining harmonious relations between the races.

The twelfth census shows that during the decade from 1890 to 1900, the number of negro engineers and firemen (not locomotive) increased 61.6 per cent.; iron and steel workers, 87.4 per cent.; masons, 47 per cent.; porters and helpers in stores, 147.8 per cent.; saw and planing mill employees, 92.6 per cent.; janitors and sextons, 94 per cent.; while the number of farm laborers for wages increased only 21.5 per cent. (*Census Bulletin No. 12*, p. 58). In the year 1900, more than one-fifth of all the negroes in the country were then living in cities of over 8,000 population and in seventy-two cities they constituted at least one-half of the population (*ibid.*, p. 26). If we include the smaller towns and cities we are probably justified in concluding that one-third or one-half of the negro population is now living under urban conditions. Segregated in particular quarters and subject to an environment which breeds and increases criminality, it is not surprising that the offenses of drunkenness, vagrancy, petty gambling, sexual immorality, larceny, carrying of concealed weapons, riots, and brawls have become well-

nigh universal among the negroes of the South and have created a situation with which the police machinery of few southern communities is adequate to cope.

Another circumstance which is doing much to foster and accentuate the spirit of race conflict is to be found in the recent rise of a new school of politicians in the South who have discovered in the agitation of the negro question an open door to political success and whose chief stock in trade is the race issue. During the past year, we have seen elections in several southern commonwealths fought out on some phase of the race question which was especially devised and injected into the campaign for political capital, while real issues of living importance were pushed into the background or ignored altogether. A notable example was the recent contest for the United States senatorship in Mississippi, a contest in which the principal issue was the repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment, made so not by the natural course of political conditions in the state, but through the action of one of the candidates who saw an opportunity to make political capital out of it. This candidate declared that "all other questions paled into insignificance as compared with it, so far as the South was concerned," yet he admitted that the amendment was a dead letter in Mississippi and had been for a number of years. He traveled up and down the state declaring that repeal was "absolutely necessary for the peace and prosperity of the South, for the harmony of the two races, and for the fulfilment of the commercial and industrial possibilities of the South," and an earnest effort was made to convince his hearers that every vote against him was a vote for negro equality, and that his defeat would create a demand among the negroes for social equality which would plunge the state into bloodshed. The incapacity of the negro for mental improvement, the necessity for keeping him in ignorance, his native brutality, his lack of any political or social rights which the white man was bound to respect were all dwelt upon, and, of course, exaggerated. Everywhere he preached the gospel of hate, animosity, and despair, instead of good-will, forbearance, and mutual helpfulness.

During the past year, we have been treated to the spectacle of a United States senator, a man of influence and distinction in his part of the country, traveling about the North in the pay of a lecture bureau, indulging in violent and coarse abuse of the negro race as a whole, boasting of his own part in the fraudulent methods through which the negroes were driven from political power in his state, and openly advocating lynch law for negro criminals. I submit that ill-timed and intemperate agitation of the race question by political demagogues, whether of the South or of the North, together with the growing practice of a certain class of small politicians, of exploiting the race question for political purposes when in reality it is not an issue constitutes one of the most serious obstacles in the way of maintaining harmonious relations between the races. Indiscriminate abuse of the negro

race in general without distinction between the worthy and unworthy individuals of the race, violent appeals to the passions of the lower classes of whites, constant dwelling upon the savagery and brutality of the negro, by men to whom the masses look for advice and guidance, the conjuring up for political purposes of impossible visions of negro domination can have no other effect than to irritate and inflame the public mind, arouse the passions of the worst members of both races, and array each against the other, excite and perpetuate race animosity, create misunderstanding, destroy confidence, keep desirable immigration and capital out of the southern states, and by solidifying the South politically, prevent independent and wholesome consideration of real issues of living importance to the South and to the country at large. It is difficult indeed to see how the repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment, particularly in those parts of the country where it is inoperative in practice, can improve or alter in any essential manner existing relations between the white and black races; so why agitate it and make it a political issue in local elections when, in fact, it is not? It is difficult also to understand how violent and indiscriminate denunciation of the negro race for its shortcomings will diminish criminality or encourage habits of thrift and industry among the race. I agree with much of what Governor Vardaman says in regard to the appalling increase of crime among the negroes; indeed I doubt if he has overstated the real condition in this respect; but the negro cannot be made a law-abiding citizen by the repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment nor by withholding from him the advantages of elementary education nor by denying him the meager political rights to which he is entitled under the state constitutions. The way to check the increasing criminality of the negro, it seems to me, is not by a denial of these few rights, but by subjecting him to a rigid enforcement of the criminal law. Above all, the statutes against carrying concealed weapons, against gambling, and against vagrancy should, if necessary, be increased in severity and enforced with a vigilance and swiftness which will root out gambling, force the idle negro to work, and send the pistol-carrier to prison. No considerations of mere sentimentalism nor of abstract justice should be allowed to stand in the way of such legislation and its rigid enforcement, for the situation in many southern communities calls for heroic treatment. The abolition of the saloon, the "blind tiger," and the cocaine dive would go far toward removing the most potent causes of negro criminality. Everywhere in the South there is need for more adequate local police, particularly in the towns and cities where the negroes are congregating in such large numbers. Finally, it is worth considering whether something might not be done to check the movement of the negroes to the cities and keep them subject to rural environment where, as Booker Washington has observed, their ideal conditions are best attained.

PROFESSOR EDWIN S. TODD, MIAMI UNIVERSITY

A great deal has been said today concerning the race problem in the South. I have been much interested since I live in that part of the Miami Valley which has been conspicuously before the country during the past few years on account of its race riots. In making a study of race conditions in the Miami Valley, I find an interesting problem which I should like to present to the sociologists here. It is this: Is it possible that, if there should be no immigration from the southern into the northern states, the race problem in the north would soon settle itself through the influence of the forces of natural selection? The records for births and deaths in the Miami, although they contain errors, furnish a rough index of the growth of population. These records show that during the past fifteen or twenty years the birth rate for the negroes has been very little greater than the death rate, if it has been as great. For this reason I infer that the race, in the Miami Valley at least, grows by immigration and not by natural increase. In the time allotted me, I can state only a few of the interesting facts that have presented themselves to my attention. One is that there seems to be a growing cleavage among the negroes themselves. In such cities as Dayton and Springfield, for instance, there is a distinct cleavage between the negroes of middle age and the new comers from the South. The new comers are looked upon as interlopers of a distinctly lower class. It is true also that the older negroes have the respect of the white citizens to a greater degree than the later immigrants.

Undoubtedly race prejudice is growing. We of the North are too fond of thinking that race prejudice exists only in the South; yet is it not true that the North professes to be interested in the negro as a race but does not want to have anything to do with him as an individual, while the South does not like the negro as a race but does like him as an individual? In comparing the aftermath of the riots in Springfield and Atlanta, it is undoubtedly true that more was done by southern men for the safety of individual negroes than was done by any white man in Springfield for any individual negro.

In portions of the Miami Valley the situation is becoming very acute. This race antipathy has appeared in politics. Undoubtedly a great mistake was made in giving the ballot to the negro at the time it was given. In Ohio, for twenty years, the politicians have coddled the negro, until he has developed a political consciousness. He now wants office, and while he may be nominated for office, he never gets an important one. This coddling, I maintain, has brought about one of the phases of the race problem today.

This growing race prejudice may be noticed particularly in the industrial world. It is especially strong in the larger cities of the valley.

PROFESSOR JOHN J. HALSEY, LAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY

As a southern man born into the days of slavery, yet for many years resident in the North, I have the advantage of some of the others who have spoken this morning. I have been impressed with what Professor Weatherly said, and with the fact that we have at last "arrived." This problem is now being discussed scientifically and dispassionately, and it is extremely gratifying to note this.

The gentleman who has just spoken spoke as the representative of a region that touches both North and South. Now I live on the "North shore" along Lake Michigan, in one of a dozen suburbs which are supposed to be "pure white;" and yet the negro problem has come to us with a negro invasion within the past few years, and I discover that we also have a negro problem. Within the last few weeks there has been continued statement in the public press that the people of a gilt-edged town west of Chicago are trying to drive out the negroes because they are seeking to become attached to the soil as permanent renters and even as owners. I speak of this because it is one of the features of the negro invasion of the North. He is pouring into the northern states, and where there is an appreciable negro infusion, we have a negro problem just as truly in the North as in the South. I am glad to find the thought accentuated that it is not merely a southern problem. One of our graduates, who is now editor of the principal Republican paper in Arkansas, said to me: "I see the problem from more points of view now than when I was in the North and theorized about it." And this is one of the things that northern men must realize—the difficulty of seeing all sides of the problem.

PROFESSOR EDWIN L. EARP, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

I was born and brought up in Maryland, one of the border states, and I have given some attention to two phases of the question which have been brought out in part here this morning. One is negro crime with reference to the classes represented by the criminals—the question whether criminality did not grow up during the period when there was little opportunity for the negro to work because of the industrial depression in the South following the war, and because of the meager educational opportunities that were offered. As a matter of fact, the statistics indicate that few of the criminals have been educated negroes.

The second point is with regard to race consciousness, and the problem whether race respect is not developing among the blacks. When I was a boy living where there was a large percentage of negroes it was pretty generally admitted by the negroes that they would have made any sacrifice and paid anything to become white if some means could be discovered to accomplish this. That is not true now, however, of the negroes living today in the same locality. Many of them have developed a race consciousness and a respect for themselves as negroes as the result of their better education.

PROFESSOR W. E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, ATLANTA UNIVERSITY, ATLANTA, GA.

[Dr. DuBois was unable to attend the meeting and sent the following paper; but it did not reach Madison in time to be read at the meeting devoted to the discussion of Mr. Stone's paper. It is, however, with the consent of Mr. Stone, and because Dr. DuBois presents the views of a distinguished Negro educator, inserted at this place.]

I think we may all of us agree in the main with Mr. Stone's very careful presentation of the real significance of racial distinctions today, and also his explanation of the differing attitude of white men toward Negroes North and South and the rôle of slavery in making race contact practicable. There remain, then, three pressing questions: First, Is the old status of acknowledged superiority and inferiority between the white and black races in America longer possible? Secondly, Are the race differences in this case irreconcilable? And thirdly, Is racial separation practicable?

Taking up the first question as to the possibility of a continuance of the old status of acknowledged superiority and inferiority between white and black races, it is certain that physical slavery was a failure, not because it mistook altogether the relative endowment of most of the men who were enslavers and most of those who were the enslaved, but because it denied growth or exception on the part of the enslaved and kept up that denial by physical force.

Emancipation was simply the abolition of the grosser forms of that physical force. The Negro freedman, just as the freedman of Rome or Germany, stepped out of a world of physical restraint into a spiritual world. In this thought-world there is still slavery of ideas and customs; and given men as they are, this is probably fortunate. Yet we all hope for gradual emancipation in thought and custom, and it is peculiarly dangerous for a people of today, who expect to keep up with modern civilization, to base their hope of peace and prosperity on the ignorance of their fellows or the lack of aspiration among working-men—on the survival of such virtues for instance as we expect and cultivate in dogs but not in men. Moreover, even if a people like those in the South do hope that the Negro is not going to aspire and not going to demand equal rights and fair treatment, then they are bound to disappointment. There is today in the South growing protest from the mass of negroes, protest to which whites are yielding today and must yield. These matters are not yet, to be sure, the greater matters of voting and freedom of travel, but they are the more pressing matters of wages and personal treatment, of housing and property-holding. Protest is not confined to a few leaders, it is not confined to the North; it is not confined to mulattoes. Daily and yearly it is growing. And it is that growing which makes the Negro problem today; without it there would be no race problem.

Mr. Stone refers to the meetings in Boston, the Nell meeting and the last Protest, and notes their similarity. He might, however, have noted very

distinct differences. The Nell meeting represented four million people, over nine-tenths of whom were physically owned by the whites, and the rest of whom were largely ignorant and without property; while the meeting this year represented ten millions of people whose property runs into the hundreds of millions, most of whom can read and write and some of whom are well educated (indeed, the leader in the last meeting was a *magna cum laude* bachelor of Harvard, and member of the Phi Beta Kappa). In the Nell meeting the leading moving force was after all the white friends of the Negro; in this meeting the Negro was leading himself and the whites assisted. The attitude of men toward Nell was that of tolerant contempt or amusement or irritation; the attitude toward his descendants is that of consternation and perplexity and more or less veiled dislike. Such a change in fifty years is not only significant. It is tremendous, and only those unacquainted with the deeds of time can discount it.

Have we then today the old case of the irresistible force and the immovable body? If we assume the white South as planted immovably on the proposition that most human beings are to be kept in absolute and unchangeable serfdom and inferiority to the Teutonic world; and if we assume that not only the Negroes of America but those of Africa and the West Indies—not only Negroes, but Indians, Malays, Chinese, and Japanese, not to mention the Mediterranean lands—are determined to contest this absurd stand to the death, then the world has got some brisk days ahead, and race friction will inevitably grow not only in the United States but the world over. But if, as seems more reasonable, we have in the South the beginning of a set of honest reasonable people, beset with hard social questions, but determined to think them through with reason and not with rope, and if we have a set of aspiring and rising serfs determined to be free, but willing to be patient, then race friction need not grow and meantime the nation can calmly scrutinize and answer the second of our queries:

How great is this incompatibility and repugnancy of qualities between white and black Americans? And here we find ourselves facing a field of science rather than opinion. As I have often said before, it is a matter of serious disgrace to American science that with the tremendous opportunity that it has had before it for the study of race differences and race development, race intermingling and contact among the most diverse of human kinds right here at its doors, almost nothing has been done.

When we at Atlanta University say that we are the only institution in the United States that is making any serious study of the race problems in the United States, we make no great boast because it is not that we are doing so much, but rather that the rest of the nation is doing nothing, and that we can get from the rest of the nation very little encouragement, co-operation, or help in this work. It has been my dream for many years that we could in the United States begin at a small Negro college a movement for the

scientific study of race differences and likenesses which should in time revolutionize the knowledge of the world. If for instance the dictum of Professor Boaz of Columbia University be true, namely, "that an unbiased estimate of the anthropological evidence so far brought forward does not permit us to countenance the belief in a racial inferiority, which would unfit an individual of the Negro race to take his part in modern civilization. We do not know of any demand made on the human body or mind in modern life that anatomical or ethnological evidence would prove to be beyond the powers of the Negro"—if this dictum be true (and there is certainly strong scientific backing for it), then how different an aspect this would put upon race differences in the United States than would be the case if it were proven that really black men and white men were of such differing powers and possibilities that they could not be treated as belonging to the same great branch of humanity. As I have said, this is primarily a scientific question, a matter of scientific measurement and observation; and yet the data upon which the mass of men, and even intelligent men, are basing their conclusions today, the basis which they are putting back of their treatment of the Negro, is a most ludicrous and harmful conglomeration of myth, falsehood, and desire. It would certainly be a most commendable thing if this and other learned societies would put themselves on record as favoring a most thorough and unbiased scientific study of the race problem in America. Meantime, in the absence of such scientific basis for our conclusions, there are certain antecedent probabilities in the case which we have a right to take into account: we remember for instance that not many generations ago the very same arguments that are brought to prove the impossibility of white men and Negroes living together, except as inferior and superior, were also brought to prove that white men of differing rank and birth could not possibly exist in the same physical environment without similar subordination. And in still nearer time it was proved to the absolute satisfaction of certain economic philosophers, that the conflict between capitalists and laborers was an inevitable conflict which must lead to poverty and social murder of the masses.

Today what seems to many of us an exactly similar fight is being made on the subject of race. Not only is it assumed without proof that here, as in the matter of birth and work, substantial equality of treatment is impossible, but it is also assumed that the physical conditions of life and social contact are today practically what they were in former ages. But this is not so today; a physical living together of differing groups and kinds of individuals is possible today to a degree which was unthinkable one, two, and three centuries ago. Indeed when the bars between aristocrat and peasant were broken down, it did not mean that the aristocrats disappeared or that the peasants all became dukes; it simply meant that men lived and mingled together and rose and fell freely according to their individual desert, without

artificial prop or bars. A spiritual world took the place of the strait walls and ghettos of their former physical environment. So in the race problem in America, we may ask with regard to this question of incompatibility of whites and blacks: Just what degree of social compatibility is absolutely essential to group contact today? And in answering this question we must realize that not only does the modern world spell increased and increasing contact of groups and nations and races, but that indeed race or group segregation is impossible.

This brings us to our third question, Is race separation practicable? People say very often with regard to the Negro that the Pilgrims of England found a place for liberty when they could not get it at home; why then does not the Negro do the same of his own motion and will? And then they explain it by a shrug and a reminder that one set of people were English and the others are Negroes. Flattering as this is to the sayers, yet this does not explain all. Today we have in the world growing race contact. The world is shrinking together; it is finding itself neighbor to itself in strange, almost magic degree. No one has done more for increasing this contact of the nations than we here in America. We not only brought Negroes here in defiance of law, right, and religion, but we have pounded masterfully, almost impudently, at the gates of China and Japan. Europe has insisted upon the opening of Africa. Now when the world suddenly appears open, with chance of access for all to all parts, we find ourselves standing amazed before a curious exemplification of the old adage, "What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander"! If the world can enter Asia, why cannot Asiatics enter the world? We could of course in case of a helpless nation like China chivalrously refuse to answer the question and bar out Chinese. But when it comes to a question of Japan and Japanese guns, the dilemma before the modern world is somewhat startling. Just so with the Philippines. Here is a group of colored folks half a world away, yet the United States is not content until it goes, annexes them, and rules them according to its own ideas. Now if these things are so, what chance is there for a new nation to establish itself, especially if it be a colored nation, on any spot in the world worth having? And is it going to be possible in the future for races to remain segregated or to escape contact or domination simply by retiring to themselves? Certainly it is not. Race segregation in the future is going to be impossible primarily because these races are needed more and more in the world's economy. Mr. Stone has often expressed the cheerful hope that the Negro would be supplanted by the white man as worker in the South. But the thing does not happen. On the contrary there are today more Negroes working steadily and efficiently than ever before in the world's history. The world is beginning to work for the world. This work is necessary. A new standard of national efficiency is coming. And that efficiency is marked by the way in which a great modern

advanced nation can be neighborly to the rest of the world. It is the counterpart to the sort of rivalry for the world-empire that went on when France and England made a hundred years' struggle for empire in America and India. And while we in America may sneer at neighbors, who are neither as rich or impudent or lucky as we, we can also, if we will, remark that the English again are learning certain things in advance of the rest of the world. They are learning how to get on in peace and amity with colored races; how to treat them as men and gain their friendship and gain the results of their work and skill and brain. And if the United States expects to take her place among the new nations beside England and France, the nations which first are going to solve this problem of race contact, then certainly she has got right here in her own land to find out how to live in peace and prosperity with her own black citizens. If she does that, she will gain an advantage over the rest of the world in the development of the earth which will be simply inestimable in the new commerce and in the new humanity. If she does not, she will always have in her contact with the rest of the world not only the absolute dislike and distrust of the darker two thirds, but a tremendous moral handicap such as she met when she asked Russia to stop her atrocities and it was answered with perfect truth that they did not compare with the barbarities committed right here in the land of the free. We may therefore justly conclude, first, that the Negro is not going to submit any longer than he must to the present serfdom and the disgraceful and humiliating discrimination; secondly, that while we do not know as much of race differences as we may know if we study this problem as we ought, we certainly do know that the chances are that most men in this world can be civilized, and that the world of races just as the world of individuals does not consist of a few aristocrats and chosen people and a mass of dark serfs and slaves. And that thirdly, any dream of separating the races in America or of separating the races of the world is at present not only impracticable but is against the whole trend of the age, and that what we ought to do in America is to seek to bind the races together rather than to accentuate differences. No part of the world could play a greater rôle in the future moral development of the world than the South, if it would. And while today there are few signs that the South realizes this, yet may we not hope that this will be the case before another generation passes? Finally, rhetoric like that quoted by Mr. Stone is not in itself of particular importance, except when it encourages those Philistines who really believe that Anglo-Saxons owe their pre-eminence in some lines to lynching, lying, and slavery, and the studied insult of their helpless neighbors.

God save us from such social philosophy!

RESPONSE BY MR. ALFRED H. STONE

I had not expected to say anything in conclusion, until the reading of Professor Bassett's paper. All the other papers agree substantially with my

fundamental propositions. Only Professor Bassett takes issue with me as to the normal Anglo-Saxon attitude toward the negro. He cites certain North Carolina instances to sustain his contention. Here he falls into a very common error. The relations of which he speaks are characteristic of many communities in which the number of negroes is small as compared with the white population, combined with a certain primitive social state. To the student of race relations there is nothing novel in these North Carolina cases. I could duplicate them in Louisville, Richmond, New Orleans—in fact, in almost any southern community in early days. As contrasted with later and present conditions, they simply represent the difference between a simple and a complex state.

With the increase of population, black and white, and the increased points of contact, there came increased possibilities for friction. Under the constitution of 1790, the state of Pennsylvania did not discriminate against negroes in regard to the suffrage. With the increase of the negro population of the state there developed open manifestations of an antipathy which had hitherto been latent, and then followed discrimination and opposition. By 1829 or 1830 the sentiment against negro suffrage was such that the privilege of voting was specifically restricted to white men in the new constitution adopted about that time. The history of negro suffrage in North Carolina runs parallel to that in Pennsylvania. The same may be said of New York, Connecticut, and other states, and likewise of Cape Colony in South Africa. They all illustrate the force and effect of numbers. And this matter of numerical differences, plus the other reasons which I mention as fundamental, tells the story of differences of racial attitude between different sections of the country, as well as between conditions in the same state or section at different periods. We have but to look at Kansas and see how the increase of negro population, with the normal increase of friction, has compelled the adoption of separate schools for the races in Kansas City, and led to their recommendation for other places in the state.

The suggestion that the Englishman in colonies which contain a large negro population has not the same general attitude toward certain social relations would be news to the white inhabitants of British South Africa. They raised almost as big a row when Khama was entertained by the Duke of Westminster in London as their southern cousins did when Booker T. Washington was entertained by Mr. Roosevelt in Washington. The occasional official social functions in Jamaica stand on a wholly different footing. They also raise another question—one which we have not time to discuss here—that of the recognition in Jamaica of the mulatto as a distinct element in the population, on a different basis, in many respects, from the negro.

But I have no quarrel with those who differ from my views. I usually avoid discussing the future. My life work is trying to learn something

about the past and the present—and endeavoring correctly to interpret what I learn. As I look at the history of race relations the world over, it seems to me almost utopian for us to flatter ourselves that we can escape continued race friction in the United States. That is, of course, if we are measuring the future by historical rather than geological periods.

Something has been suggested as to the rights and wrongs involved in the situation, and about what might be if only men would be just and honest, and so forth. My only reply is that I did not come here to discuss ethical questions. I am just now concerned only with the hard, stern, inexorable facts in the case.

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE

IX

MUNICIPAL PENSION SYSTEMS AND PENSIONS FOR TEACHERS

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON

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It is in the field of social care for firemen, policemen, and teachers of public schools that Americans are preparing their own minds most directly for industrial insurance, and it is there they are working out methods and constructing administrative machinery which will be models for the system of compulsory insurance of workingmen which seems almost at the door. The firemen and policemen are exposed to perils which make their appeal to the popular imagination, although loss of limb and life may be actually no greater than in several important industries. The servants of the public are constantly before the eyes of citizens, their exploits are heralded by the newspapers, and their deaths are made known to the world. Something of the glory of soldiers surrounds their activities in defense of property and life. Formerly the injured firemen and policemen, or the families of those killed in the course of duty, were aided chiefly by charity balls for which tickets were peddled by policemen from door to door, and this up to very recent times. This method was annoying to the public and humiliating to municipal employees, and it seriously interfered at times with their regular duties.

Then came the voluntary associations of firemen and of policemen, with their monthly dues and benefits at death. But this method was also inadequate, uncertain, and unreliable. Within recent years a regular system of municipal insurance has been legally established in several cities of the United States, and methods are gradually improved and developed. We find record of a law of New York enacted in 1871 providing for pensions

of firemen, and in 1878 the policemen were similarly protected. The systems of various cities are by no means equally complete. In some places only retired and disabled officers are pensioned, while elsewhere widows, orphans, and dependent parents are aided.

The motives which have been effective in establishing these systems are worthy of note, for their significance extends far beyond their present sphere of action. First of all it is felt to be shameful to permit the family of a man who died in the effort to protect life and goods to live in want and misery; the feeling which established veterans' pension funds is alive in these organizations. Furthermore, the failure of the unaided efforts of the officers in their mutual benefit associations showed the necessity for a larger measure of municipal direction and public assistance. Then it became clear that the pension funds enable faithful men to give their undivided attention to the service of the public without distraction of schemes to make money for old-age support in addition to the work of each day. Pensions for disability and old age tend to make the officer more faithful, careful, sober, steady, and to retain him in the service of the city. The hope of a pension at the end of a long period prevents frequent changes in the force, since men are not apt to desert an employment after a time and thereby lose their claim on support in the time of old age.

A somewhat detailed description of the Chicago system may serve to illustrate the tendency in our cities, and to afford a more definite and adequate conception of other kindred schemes.

The police fund is controlled according to a state law (Hurd, *Illinois Statutes*, 1903, pp. 364-68). The law of April 29, 1887, is the basis. There are several sources of income mentioned in the law: (1) three-fourths of all moneys received for taxes or for licenses on dogs; (2) three per cent. of licenses of saloons and wholesale liquor dealers; (3) moneys paid for special services of policemen; (4) one per cent. of the monthly pension of each pensioned policeman; (5) fines imposed on policemen as a disciplinary measure; (6) the proceeds of sale of lost or stolen property unclaimed; (7) one-quarter of the money for licenses

from pawnbrokers, second-hand dealers, and junk stores; (8) fees and fines for carrying concealed weapons; (9) one-half of costs collected for violating city ordinances; (10) rewards given to policemen, unless exception is made by chief of police; (11) one per cent. of monthly salary deducted from payroll; (12) three per cent. of all licenses not already mentioned up to \$25,000 per annum (law amended, 1903).

After the fiftieth year of age and the twentieth year of service the policeman is entitled to a pension of 50 per cent. of his former annual salary, but not more than \$900 nor less than \$600. In case of his death the widow receives the pension until her remarriage and the children until they are 16 years old. If the policeman is disabled in service he receives a pension. The figures for 1906 show the following results: Officers who have retired after a service of 20 years, 136; widows of officers who had served 20 years, 44; beneficiaries on account of disablement in service, 26; widows of officers who died in the service, 86; widows of officers who died after service of 10 years, 157; guardians of minor children, 14; total number of beneficiaries, 463. The monthly payroll of the fund calls for \$22,000. The monthly income is \$23,000. This apparently indicates an accumulation in the general fund; but in fact the number of pensioners increases faster than the income. It was the intention of the founders of the fund to set aside out of the surplus a fund for investment of \$300,000, but the revenues have not made it possible to realize this hope. In order to spur the members of the corps to faithful activity in defense of the public a notice was issued to the officers which called their attention to the fact that according to the law their pension fund would be augmented by fees and fines collected by them. The tendency of course is to keep the policemen alert and active in discovering and arresting violators of city ordinances and state laws. No record enables us to say how much this salutary influence is weakened by direct bribes paid into the hands of officers to induce them to relax their vigilance. The administration of the fund rests with a board composed of 5 persons; of whom 3 are chosen by the mayor and 2 are elected by the officers themselves.

The firemen's fund of Chicago is based on the same principles as those of the policemen's fund. The law of Illinois in accordance with which the fund is governed (Hurd, Illinois Statutes, 1903, p. 368) provides that the fund shall be fed from various specified sources: One per cent. of license fees; not to exceed 1 per cent. of the salary of members, to be deducted monthly from payroll; all rewards, fees, gifts, and emoluments paid for extraordinary services, unless specially granted to the member by the board; fines and penalties imposed on members of the department; gifts and legacies, if any; interest on invested funds up to \$200,000; up to 2 per cent. of gross receipts of foreign fire-insurance companies, that is, companies not chartered in Illinois. The board of trustees of the Firemen's Pension Fund is composed of the treasurer, clerk, attorney, marshal, or chief officer of the fire department, and the comptroller of the city. This board has power to administer the fund and to decide all questions as to applications for benefits without appeal. The board reports to the municipal council. During the year 1905-6 the total number of pensioners was 449; the monthly income of the fund, \$9,500; monthly pensions paid, \$11,000; amount accumulated toward permanent fund, \$151,000. All claims are paid in full. The income did not meet all needs and the permanent fund has been drawn upon to prevent deficits. But plans have been made for doubling the fees taken from foreign insurance companies. The fund is not large enough to retire some of the older men who ought to be retired. The rates of benefits at retirement are: for disability, monthly one-half of the former salary; the widow of a member who dies in the service receives, so long as she remains unmarried, \$30 monthly; the guardian of minor offspring, \$6 for each child up to 16 years of age; in all not exceeding one-half the monthly salary. After 22 years of service a member who is 50 years of age may be retired with a pension of one-half his monthly salary; light duties may be assigned to those who are able to work, if emergencies exist; after decease his widow until her marriage and his young children have the pension. By an ordinance of the City of Chicago a member of the fire department who is disabled may receive his

full salary for 12 months. This is true also of policemen, but the pension is not paid during this period.

The fund of the fire-insurance patrolmen, employees of the board of underwriters, is interesting. It is administered by a board of trustees. The income is derived from an assessment of 1 per cent. of the salary deducted monthly from payroll; up to 2 per cent. of funds devoted to support of fire-insurance patrol by the insurance companies; all rewards, fees, gifts on account of extraordinary services (unless specially granted by board); and interest on any fund accumulated. The benefits assured are: disability, retirement pension of one-half the salary; in case of death, the widow of a member receives, until she is remarried, \$30 a month, the children receiving \$6 each up to the sixteenth year of age; in all not more than one-half the salary. If the expenditures outrun the income the benefits are proportionately scaled down. In case of retirement after the fiftieth year of age and the twenty-second year of service the pension is one-half the salary. These pensions cannot be attached for debts. At the time of the report (1905-6) the number of fire-insurance patrol companies in Chicago was 8; the pensioners, 9 (one widow, one disabled man, and 6 children); monthly payments, \$139.16. The cost of operating the department is \$130,000 per year, of which 2 per cent. goes to the fund. The permanent fund is \$100,000.

Here we have a private corporation which has been granted by state law the right to assess the salaries of its employees 1 per cent. and to create a fund to which the fire-insurance companies contribute about 1 per cent. of premiums collected. This is apparently compulsory insurance and covers accident, sickness, invalidism, old age, and pensions to widows and orphans. This fund raises very interesting questions about the constitutionality of such a law, the right of injured employees to sue under the employers' liability law, and the cost of premiums of such insurance.¹

¹ The legislature of Illinois (Acts of 1905, pp. 96, 100) modified and extended the provisions of former laws in an act to provide pension funds for municipal employees and an amendment to the firemen's pension fund.

PENSIONS FOR PUBLIC-SCHOOL TEACHERS

It seems desirable to treat this subject briefly in connection with industrial insurance because it is a system in which the principle of public care of low-paid employees is involved; because the teachers of American cities are in close contact with the population of wage-earners; and because the methods worked out promise to help develop similar provisions for workingmen.² The need of provision by pensions for invalidism and old age has long been keenly felt among those who desire to make teaching a life-profession. The salaries are painfully inadequate to cover the cost of such provision. Numerous and pathetic attempts have been made by teachers themselves to organize insurance, and the entire subject has been carefully investigated by a committee of the National Education Association.

In the year 1900 there were in the United States 446,133 teachers (118,519 male, 327,614 female). In each state and territory the ratio of teachers to the total population of persons between 5 and 24 years of age has increased. In continental United States 26.6 per cent. of the teachers are males and 73.4 per cent. are females. The percentage of male teachers is decreasing and that of female teachers is increasing. In the cities with over 25,000 inhabitants of every main division of the Union about 80 per cent. are women; in the country the percentage of women teachers varies from 59.5 in the south central division to 77.2 in the North Atlantic division. The median age of teachers has increased (*Bulletin 23, Census Statistics of Teachers*, by W. F. Willcox).

The exhibit of salary schedules will show the need of pensions. The ordinary teacher belongs economically to the so-called "proletarians," and the recent organizations of trade unions of teachers in affiliation with the American Federation of Labor are indications that many of the urban teachers share thoroughly the "class consciousness" of the wage-earner. The

² *Report of Committee on Salaries, Tenure, and Pensions*, of National Educational Association, 1905; W. F. Willcox, *Bulletin 23, Census Statistics of Teachers*, Bureau of the Census, 1905; *Report of Commissioner of Education*, 1902, p. 712; 1903, p. 2449.

report of the National Education Association on salaries and tenure says:

On the basis of fifty weeks of work during the year the earnings of the laborers would in nearly every city exceed those of the lowest paid elementary teachers. The wages of laborers here given represent, it should be remembered, the earnings of the commonest untrained labor, while in scarcely any city of importance can a man or women secure a position as teacher without some previous experience or special preparation (Report, pp. 146, 147).

The minimum yearly salaries of teachers in elementary schools ranged from \$216 (Burlington, Vt.) to \$552 (Boston) and \$600 in San Francisco, where cost of living is high. As illustrations of annual salaries in typical ungraded rural schools we may cite: in Minnesota the range is from \$320 to \$450 for men and \$200 to \$450 for women; in Iowa \$180 to \$300 for men and \$143 to \$360 for women.

Naturally the tendency under these conditions is to keep men out of the teaching profession and give over the schools to young and relatively inexperienced girls. There is no outlook for old age in the work of public-school teachers. In cities of 8,000 or over in 1904, 50 per cent. of all the male teachers had been engaged in teaching less than 13 years, while of the female teachers 53 per cent. are found to have been in the profession less than 10 years; for all the teachers in these 333 cities considered together 51.7 per cent. had taught less than 10 years; 10 per cent. of the men and 4.5 per cent. of women had taught 30 years or over.

The report of the National Education Association on salaries makes a distinction between a pension system in the proper sense and various schemes of mutual aid, including retirement funds and old-age stipends, maintained primarily by teachers themselves and at their own expense. The public authorities have hardly made a beginning in the recognition of a state duty to care for outworn teachers, and the service suffers in many ways from this neglect. Here and there we mark the beginnings of better things. In the year 1905 Mr. Andrew Carnegie showed his appreciation of the situation by establishing his great fund

of \$10,000,000 for pensioning college professors. Recently this fund has been vastly increased and its benefits extended to professors in state universities. Already the beneficial influence of this great gift is felt in higher education. It marks the way for future development in elementary and secondary education. The need for accident insurance is not much felt among teachers; the chief need is provision for illness, invalidism, and old age. Sickness insurance may easily be provided through mutual benefit associations, but old-age pensions require more solid foundations and larger funds carefully guarded.

The most direct and primitive method of providing benefits is through a voluntary association of the teachers themselves, without invoking authority or subsidy from the public. Thus we find mutual benefit associations, for temporary aid only, in Baltimore, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Buffalo, San Francisco, and St. Paul. These call for \$1 to \$2 initiation fee and \$1 to \$5 annual dues. Special assessments are sometimes made. Benefits in sickness range from 50 cents a day to \$10 a week; at death funeral expenses only are paid in some instances, and in others a sum equal to \$1 from each member of the association.

Associations for annuity, or retirement fund only, are found in New York, Boston, and Baltimore, and there is an annuity guild in Massachusetts. The initiation fees are \$3 and \$5. The annual dues are 1 to 1½ per cent. of the salary up to \$18 or \$20. The annuity is from 60 per cent. of salary to \$600 a year. The period of service required before pension is enjoyed ranges from 2 to 5 years with disability, or 35 to 40 years without disability.

Associations for both temporary aid and annuity exist in Hamilton County, Ohio (Cincinnati), Philadelphia, Brooklyn, and the District of Columbia. The initiation fees are from \$1 to \$10; annual dues from \$5 to \$40. The annuities vary from \$5 a week to \$600 a year, and \$100 for funeral expenses are paid. The temporary aid during illness varies from \$5 to \$6 per week. The time of service required before enjoyment of annuity is 2 to 5 years with disability, or 35 to 40 without dis-

ability. In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the teachers maintain a voluntary pension or annuity fund, but receive no assistance from the board. A somewhat similar arrangement is reported from Norwich, Connecticut. Philadelphia has a charity fund, known as the Elkins fund, of \$1,000,000 which provides for superannuated and indigent teachers. The report of the National Education Association marks a natural tendency to abandon or merge the voluntary schemes where the stronger and more reliable legal measures gain a footing.

The necessity for having a legal basis for pension funds found expression in plans for requiring teachers to permit the deduction of a part of their salary for the maintenance of the fund. Such a law was passed in Ohio, but it was resisted by teachers of Toledo and failed in a test case before the supreme court of the state. The supreme court of Minnesota annulled a similar law which was made for the city of Minneapolis. Perhaps these schemes ought to be defeated since they do not rest on any well-defined public policy of care for teachers at public expense, but merely impose the burden on the teachers themselves who need all their salaries for immediate use, and whose brief tenure does not warrant sacrifices for those who continue in the services.

The teachers who were anxious to establish pension funds have sought to avoid the constitutional objections which annulled the Ohio and Minnesota laws by creating a fund out of voluntary contributions supplemented by fines, donations, and other uncertain and irregular sources of income. Laws authorizing such a plan for all cities and counties of the state now exist in New Jersey, Ohio, and California; and applying to cities of 100,000 inhabitants or more, in Illinois. The Illinois law has recently been improved for it has long been regarded as very unsatisfactory. There is a law in Massachusetts which applies to Boston, in Rhode Island applying to Providence; and in New York and Michigan limited in action to certain cities.

Another stage of development is marked by state laws which provide state funds to be administered by local or state organs. The Maryland law of 1902 is a type of advanced action by a commonwealth:

Whenever any person in this state has taught in any of the public or normal schools thereof twenty-five years, and has reached the age of sixty years, and his or her record as such teacher has been without reproach, and by reason of physical or mental disability or infirmity is unable to teach longer, the said teacher may lay his or her case before the State Board of Education, and the said board shall proceed to consider the same, and if the facts are found as above stated, the said teacher shall be placed upon a list, a record of which shall be kept by said board, to be known as the "teachers' retired list," and the names upon said "teachers' retired list" shall be regularly certified by said board to the comptroller of the treasury of this state, and every person so placed upon the said retired list shall be entitled to receive a pension from this state of \$200 per annum, to be paid quarterly by the treasurer of this state upon the warrant of the comptroller.

It is interesting to notice that in this first distinct pension system for teachers a state board acquires an administrative function and power; and that the state acts independently of local bodies, such as cities and towns. This method alone gives promise that all will be treated impartially and that local indifference and incompetence will not defeat the righteous purpose of the law. We find here a valuable suggestion for the way in which the state must go about establishing an effective plan of industrial insurance.

We may here examine the systems of three cities which seem to have developed most thoroughly a system of pensions, New York, Detroit, and San Francisco. The systems of Chicago, Boston, Charleston, and Jersey City are supported merely by deductions from salaries, with supplementary gifts from unreliable sources. The Poughkeepsie plan provides that 2 per cent. of the salaries shall be turned into the pension fund, while sums deducted for absence from duty, donations, and legacies are auxiliary sources. The law for this scheme was passed in 1902. In the city of Greater New York the retirement fund is fed from money forfeited or withheld for absence from duty, money received from gifts and bequests, 5 per cent. of all excise money or fees from licenses granted to sell strong liquors. The annuity is one-half the salary at the date of retirement, provided it does not exceed \$1,000 in the case of a teacher or \$1,500 in the case

of a principal or superintendent; nor shall any pension fall below \$600.

In the city of Detroit the fund is supported from gifts and legacies; from money appropriated by the board of education or raised by act of the common council and board of estimates; tuition fees of non-resident pupils; interest on daily balances of moneys appropriated for teachers' salaries; moneys which the trustees of the retirement fund may transfer from the general fund. The general fund consists of deductions from salaries of teachers, not less than 1 per cent. nor more than 3 per cent.; no deduction is made on a basis of more than \$1,000; income from interest of general fund; all moneys deducted from teachers' salaries for absence or for any cause; all moneys intended for the retirement fund and not left specifically to the permanent fund. The board of trustees consists of the president of the board of education, the president pro tempore of the board of education, the chairman of the committee on teachers and schools of the board of education; the superintendent of city schools, and three teachers in the city schools elected from contributors to the retirement fund by ballot, as the board of trustees shall prescribe, for a term of three years, one teacher being elected each year. The rate of deduction from salaries is determined by the board of education on advice of the trustees of the fund. When the permanent fund has reached \$100,000 no additions shall be made to it from salaries, except by a two-thirds vote of the board of education. The term of service required before a pension can be drawn is 30 years, of which 20 years must be in Detroit, or 25 years in the schools of Detroit. Teachers incapacitated for duty, having taught 20 years, of which 10 have been passed in Detroit, may be retired by a two-thirds vote of the board of trustees. Teachers who resign or are removed for cause, may apply after three months for such portion of money contributed by them as the trustees shall direct, not to exceed one-half of their contributions. Annuities are not to exceed \$250. Current expenses of the board of trustees are paid from a maintenance fund of the board of education.

The sources of the fund in San Francisco are: assessments

of \$12 per year deducted from the salaries of day teachers and \$6 per year from the salaries of evening-school teachers receiving less than \$50 per month; gifts and legacies, and not less than one-half the sums forfeited by absence from duty. The permanent fund is composed of 25 per cent. of all moneys from these sources to the amount of \$50,000 and of all gifts specifically bequeathed. The fund is administered by a commission consisting of the mayor, the superintendent of schools, and the county treasurer who reports biennially to the supervisors. The retirement committee consists of five teachers, one at least from primary, and one from grammar schools, elected for 3 years. The term of service is 30 years, with 30 years' assessments. The annuity is \$50 per month. A proportionate annuity is paid to incapacitated teachers who have been contributors for at least five years. The annuity is suspended on return to public-school teaching, or when incapacity ceases, and if the person pensioned has received a sum which has reimbursed for former contributions. There is a provision for paying pro rata. Necessary expenses are paid from the funds.³

The law of Massachusetts applying to Boston was passed in 1900 and is compulsory for all teachers who enter service after the enactment of the law or who voluntarily come under its provisions. The fund is maintained from gifts and legacies and from sums set apart by the trustees for the permanent fund; there is also the general fund made up of gifts and legacies not specifically assigned to the permanent fund, amounts retained from salaries, and the interest on the permanent fund. The city treasurer pays annuities on order of the board of trustees in monthly payments. Ordinarily the annuitant must have taught 30 years of which 10 years must be in Boston. The board may allow aid to a disabled teacher who has served 2 years in Boston. A teacher who retires from the service may receive one-half of total previous payments to the fund.

The Ohio law, passed in May, 1902, extends the benefits of a permissive system to all school districts of the state; the authorities of each school district are granted the right to create a fund

³ *Report on Salaries, etc.*, p. 183.

and retire teachers, but the act does not make it mandatory. The income is derived from payments by teachers of \$2 per month, or \$20 a year, deducted from the salaries of those teachers who have declared a desire to become contributors and subsequently beneficiaries of the fund. The school authorities may retire a teacher from service on account of mental or physical disability and apply the pension provisions after 20 years of service, provided that three-fifths of that time have been spent in the service of the district or county and two-fifths in other parts of the state or elsewhere. The term teacher includes principals and supervisory officers. The right to retire voluntarily and draw pensions is accorded to men and women alike after they have taught 30 years. The amount paid is \$10 a year for every year served, but is in no case over \$500 a year. Both interest and principal may be drawn upon to pay pensions. Certificates are given teachers each month showing what amount has been withheld from their salaries. In case a teacher resigns and retires from the profession she may claim one-half of the sum she has paid into the fund during her service in the school. The new school code of Ohio, passed April 25, 1904, contains the following clause:

Any board which has created, or shall hereafter create, a teachers' pension fund, shall pay into such fund all deductions, fines, penalties, and assessments made against teachers and other employees of the board. Such board may also pay to such pension fund, out of the contingent fund, not to exceed 2 per cent. of the amount raised by the board from taxation.

The next logical step will be to make the law mandatory, applicable to all teachers in all districts, make the system a state system rather than local, and contribute a more liberal sum from general taxation. But this will take time.

The state of New Jersey, in Article 27 of its school law, provides for the retirement of teachers. A board of trustees administers the fund and pays annuities according to the terms of the law. Any teacher may be retired on pension after 20 years of service, in case of disability, receiving one-half the average salary for the five years before retirement. The minimum annuity is \$250 and the maximum \$600. No teacher can be retired under these legal provisions unless he or she shall have first paid into

the fund such sum as shall make his or her total payments into said fund equal to at least 20 per cent. of his or her average annual salary for the five years immediately preceding the time of retirement. The fund is maintained by deductions from salaries, 1 per cent. of annuities, gifts, and legacies, interest on investments of the funds.

In 1895 a law was enacted in California (amended in 1897 and in 1901) to create a public-school teachers' annuity and retirement fund in the cities and counties of the state. Teachers become contributors and beneficiaries by signing a contract and paying dues. The benefits accrue to members who have served 30 years in the schools of the state. The tendency of a system of pensions and sickness insurance is to lengthen the period of service, and thus to increase the number of teachers who have a strong professional spirit and who have time to give the community the advantage of long experience. At the same time it is easier to remove from the service without inhumanity those who are too old and feeble to be efficient. But such pensions ought not to be paid out of the meager salaries even now too low; they should be supported from taxation, only those receiving over \$1,000 being required to contribute and having higher rates of pensions on this account.⁴

⁴ Tables with notes will be published in the next number of this *Journal*.—ED.

REVIEWS

The Negro Races: A Sociological Study. By JEROME DOWD.
Vol. I. New York: Macmillan, 1907. Pp. xxiii+493.
\$2.50.

This is a work to be commended. First, it emphasizes that the study of the Negro problem should begin in Africa, where the forces of the natural environment which have made the Negro what he is are to be seen clearly in operation. Secondly, the work, of which this is but the first volume, intends when completed to present a survey of the social life of the different races of mankind, and of the sociological forces which have shaped their domestic, economic, political, religious, and cultural evolution. No other work of similar scope and purpose is known to the writer of this review except possibly Featherman's *Social History of the Races of Mankind*, which is now out of print, and is a work of many deficiencies. Every sociologist will wish Professor Dowd success in his ambitious project, however zealous he may be in offering suggestions to the author for its improvement in certain details.

The present volume deals with (1) the African Negritos, including in that term the Bushmen and Hottentots as well as the Pygmies; (2) the Nigritions, or peoples of the West, Central, and East Sudan, and (3) the Fellatatis, a people of mixed Berber and Negro stock found scattered over the Sudan. Another volume will deal with the Gallas of East Africa and the Bantus of Equatorial and South Africa. Still other volumes will deal with the American Indians, the Mongolians, and various Caucasian peoples.

Practically all of the present volume except the first sixty pages is occupied with the consideration of the Nigritions, or Negro peoples of the Sudan. As it was from these Sudanese, especially the West Sudanese, that the bulk of our slaves came, the volume is of especial interest to those studying the Negro problem in America. In effect, it carries back the study of the American Negro to his home-land in Africa. The author, who is a southern man, shows that the culture of the West Sudanese is by no means so low as many have represented it. Even the Negroes of the

Banana Zone (Gold Coast and Slave Coast) are not savages, but apparently long before the European came had reached the stage of barbarism with a knowledge of agriculture, weaving, and metal-working. Cannibalism was relatively rare, except in certain tribes, while slavery, polygyny, and despotic government were highly developed. As the author says, quoting Ratzel, "the remarkable thing about the Negro is his high economic status and low moral status." The West African seems to have progressed up to a certain stage, and then to have been incapable of further progress, either because of inherent racial peculiarities or because of an unfavorable environment (the author seems undecided which).

The author divides the Sudan region into four zones, the Banana Zone, the Millet Zone, the Cattle Zone, and the Camel Zone. He treats successively the economic life of the several zones, then the family life, then the political life, then the religious life, and so on. This method of treatment has obvious advantages in that it enables the author to bring together the facts concerning a single phase of the social life, say the family life, from the different zones for comparison; but it has also disadvantages in that it leaves no clear idea in the mind of the reader of the total social life of different peoples, and disregards all boundaries of culture except those which economic and climatic conditions impose.

Indeed, the chief criticism against the book from a sociological standpoint is that it makes the total social life depend too exclusively on economic conditions. The methods of production, especially the methods of obtaining a food-supply, the author seems to argue, determine the social life generally. No economic determinist could wish for better illustration of his theory than that which Professor Dowd furnishes when he argues that the changes in the type of family life, government, and religion, as one advances from the equator toward the Sahara, are due chiefly, if not wholly, to the changes in the economic and climatic conditions. Yet the author specifically rejects economic determinism (p. 417) as a theory.

Put more positively, the criticism amounts to this, that Professor Dowd neglects unduly racial and other factors not reducible to economic and climatic conditions. The reviewer's brief study of the social life of the Sudan Negroes has led him to two conclusions among others: first, that civilization is higher among the Negroes of mixed blood, other things being equal; second, that

Mohammedanism since the tenth century has been everywhere in the Sudan the greatest civilizing influence. The second of these factors the author almost entirely ignores, while the first he takes issue with. He says (p. 417):

The author inclines to the opinion that too much stress generally is laid upon race mixture, and believes that modifications of races and peoples which are often attributed to intermixture are amply accounted for by the peculiarities of environment.

Nevertheless, a few pages farther on (p. 420) he attributes the superiority of certain individual Negroes to race intermixture. If this argument holds for individuals, why will it not hold for peoples also? Moreover, he ignores or overlooks facts which are opposed to his theory of the all-powerful influence of the economic environment. The Felups, for example, a relatively pure-blood Negro people living in the Millet Zone, have quite as low a culture as any of the Negroes of the Banana Zone. Again, the Mangbuttus and Zandehs, peoples of mixed blood living in the Banana Zone, have a relatively high culture. Facts like the above might be multiplied. I am not denying the powerful influence of the economic environment; but it seems to me that Professor Dowd has stressed that influence too much, and minimized altogether too greatly the influence of inherent racial traits and spiritual factors like religion.

Other minor criticisms of the work are that Professor Dowd in explaining racial traits too often attributes them to the direct influence of the environment rather than to the indirect influence of selection. Natural selection is, indeed, made very little use of throughout the book in explaining psychical traits or social institutions. Often the author comes dangerously near to indorsing the exploded use-theory of racial development, as, for example, when he quotes, without disapproval, the idea that the flat-footedness of the Negro is due to carrying heavy loads on his head (p. 85). Sometimes personal bias is shown in the opinions expressed, as, for example, when the author says, "Even if the white race should never be able to populate this zone [the banana region], the blacks will gradually die out"—a speculation for which facts as yet offer no support. Finally, though the work shows evidence of the widest reading and the list of sources given is a long one, one misses certain familiar authorities. Of Letourneau's numerous works, for example, only one is cited, the English translation of

his *Sociology*, though Letourneau covers in one way or another all the problems with which Professor Dowd deals.

On the whole, however, the work is deserving of high praise. The criticisms just made are not sufficient to detract from the real value of the work. If Professor Dowd succeeds in keeping the other volumes up to the high standard of the first, the complete work will be one of great value to every serious student of sociology.

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Social Aspects of Religious Institutions. By EDWIN L. EARP,
Professor of Sociology, Syracuse University. New York:
Eaton and Main, 1908.

This little volume was prepared as a syllabus for the studies of theological students in a department of thought not familiar in divinity schools. It was natural that a wide territory should be covered, as religion touches all forms of life. From the technical standpoint no one subject could be exhaustively treated in such a plan, but the young minister is brought into sight of numerous problems and stimulated to follow them under the guidance of specialists.

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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

A Challenge to Socialism. II. On Social Justice and Evolution.—The socialists have committed a fundamental error in supposing that the evolution of human society and civilization embracing the most diverse factors can be narrowed down to a purely economic and industrial evolution, and this only as pertaining to the great mass of manual laborers and artisans. Man is a being with an *ideal* and he adapts himself to this in conformity with the pressure of his various environment. Socialism ignores the gradualness of this evolution. Social justice must grow out of the entire complex of the relations in which men stand to each other and to the functions they perform; it cannot be stamped upon from the outside. Its elements are *power, authority, custom, and prestige*, and the *ideal of right*. We must get away from the Rousseauan dictum that all men are equal.

Besides, as a mere strategic move, the socialists have, as object in narrowing human evolution down to the merely industrial, the insistence that, since the workers produced all surplus values, they should also be the rulers and displace the statesmen, inventors, scientists, captains of industry, etc. But as a matter of fact, even admitting this narrow interpretation of human evolution, the great social and economic advances from serfdom were mainly accomplished by men outside the ranks for the ranks in pursuit of an *ideal*. The socialists attack the family because it lies in the way of abolishing the gradualness of human evolution. One plan is to do away with individual families and to make the race over into a series of generations or great families whose members shall bear the artificial stamp of political and industrial equality, other interests being ignored. The church tried this assumption of equality and found it failed, because conflict is necessary to life and to the formation of an ideal. Justice has meaning only in connection with inequality. Another scheme of theirs is an attempt at a strictly scientific economic doctrine based on equal reward for "average labor time." The result of this, if carried out, would be to put a premium upon doing things in the longest time and slowest way, rather than to invent improved methods for doing things better and more rapidly. It leaves out of consideration exceptional ability and knowledge, to which it offers no incentive.

Socialist agitation has reached the present high stage because of conditions of unemployment. This, however, is not due to capitalism but to the Rousseauan and Smithian doctrines of *laissez faire*.—J. B. Crozier, *Fortnightly Review*, April, 1908. L. L. B.

Social Justice and Evolution.—[Reply to Dr. Crozier's article.] Dr. Crozier unfortunately confines himself to a consideration of pioneer socialism which was often hasty and immature. Present-day socialism is not perfected but represents an efficient progression. Dr. Crozier is utterly wrong in claiming that socialists urge the industrial question as the one problem of human evolution. They merely say it is the fundamental factor. Further, his own theory of human evolution—modification under pressure from a changing environment—is identically that of socialism. This modification demands industrial and social reorganization and this reorganization must be socialism. The industrial revolution added a third class, the capitalist, to the lauded and laudless classes. Despite the individualistic theories of the economics of the time, the workers immediately began a successful and many-sided agitation for suffrage rights, with a view to getting a more equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity, and a larger measure of social justice.

The general tendency of ameliorative legislation and government during the present economic era has been toward socialism; the chief work of law and

government during the last half-century has been to adjust the relations between classes, and in the interests and welfare of the general mass. The private ownership of the means of production, including land, is not in harmony with the co-operative working of the instruments of production, and it is to this fact socialists attribute the injustice and evils of our social order. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century all have sought, through legislation and administration, for social justice by restricting individual freedom to own and use private property. The righteous revolt of the oppressed against the social justice of the time has in all ages been the most potent factor in human evolution. With the coming of the workingmen into politics, the same thing is happening—a demand for the removal of the social injustice which oppresses them, and when the political enfranchisement of the people is complete, the political democracy will establish an equal standard of social justice throughout socialism. The contention that most of the economic and social advantages of the “herd” have been conferred from above is not supported by history. Nor does modern socialism wish to dispense with statesmen, scientists, and inventors; but it does maintain there is no distinction in original ability between the classes. Social advantages are the result of economic advantages. Socialism, therefore, aims at the establishment of equality of opportunity (not equality of individuals) which must be founded upon economic justice. Economic justice results in social justice. Under this order the winners will not be those who have trampled others in the race, but those who have scattered most of the seeds of helplessness as they passed along.—Philip Snowden, *Fortnightly Review*, April, 1908.

L. L. B.

The Psychology of the Yellow Journal.—The yellow journal appeals to the fundamental impulses little amenable to intellectual oversight. Man is a social animal only from necessity; his primitive interests are selfish. The family relationships with children and comradeship among men with common interests have socialized man, the latter coming to have increasingly a broader basis. This primitive or hunting pattern of interest is never eradicated, but appears anew in children of each generation. The yellow journal owes its existence to this hereditary perpetuation of insidious attitudes in its readers. Men injured by the press are not rehabilitated by it; it is not interesting or profitable to confess mistakes. The yellow journal deals in pleasurable shocks, based primarily upon satisfaction in the misfortune of others. It reproduces for the delectation of its readers those immoralities which it condemns. It has its hold on the masses because the popular mind is essentially childish. Also the material comes cheap, owing to the support of advertising. The yellow journal is immoral because it is unfavorable to the control or adjustment of society, giving, instead, abnormal suggestions under cover of reliable information. This is made more readily possible because of the traditional respect in which printed things are held. Consequently the daily press has become an almost negligible factor from the scientific standpoint, because of its untruthfulness. It conspires by its exaggeration and misrepresentation to render knowledge esoteric and sterile. It is, through its constant bringing of the abnormal into the attention, the agent of vice and crime. Progress in civilization works slowly because we generalize new situations slowly. One of the new commandments in the revised list will be, “Thou shalt not have the perversion of truth for a gainful occupation.” The yellow journal, however, is no worse than its readers want it to be.—W. I. Thomas, *American Magazine*, March, 1908.

L. L. B.

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